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1. Aims of Reflective Review 
What follows are the defined aims of the reflective review 
process involved in the PhD by public output as set out in the 
University's academic regulations. 1 
(a) The work submitted should demonstrate that the candidate 
has carried out a programme of study and research at least 
comparable with that required to prepare a PhD thesis in 
the field concerned 
(b) The candidate should demonstrate the evolution of 
substantive theoretical approaches, systematic study and 
research skills in the body of research that has been 
undertaken 
(c) The candidate should demonstrate originality by exercise of 
independent critical powers and have made a distinct 
contribution to knowledge. 
It is my contention that all three aims of the PhD by public output 
have been fulfilled in the process of my research into harassment 
and discrimination and this will be illustrated in the following review 
of my public output in these areas. 
' This is a summarised version of the aims outlined in Paragraph 20.12 also see 
section 16 of this application dealing with the Conclusions 
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undoubtedly influential as the first expert on the law of harassment 
in the United Kingdom and David Pannick was an early source of 
inspiration as the first person in the United Kingdom to write a 
definitive text on discrimination law. 
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example motivated me to undertake research and Professor Richard 
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Mays who convinced me of my potential to write first class 
published work. 
3. Reflective Overview 
In the course of my relatively short research career I have been 
extremely productive and published widely on employment law, 
especially in the area of discrimination law and the civil law of 
harassment. I have also researched and been published on aspects 
of the criminal law. In particular articles involving analysis of the 
criminal liability of perpetrators of harassment and stalking and the 
legal protection of their victims. 
It is contended that the combination of the published output 
involved in these areas of research has produced a body of work 
which has led to this author being recognised as an authority in the 
field, been instrumental in ensuring these issues are placed at the 
forefront of legal debate and reform and led to legal rights being 
made available to victims of discrimination and harassment 
Before considering these achievements in more detail it is 
necessary, in order to place my work in context, to provide a 
background to the research and a literature review of the published 
output of writers in these fields. 
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4. Background to Research and Literature Review 
Background 
I have worked in education for around twenty years although I only 
commenced academic research in 1986 with part-time study for my 
M. Phil. at the University of Edinburgh. The title of my thesis was 
'An Inclusive Analysis of Sexual Harassment at Work'. 
My research career in terms of published work began in 1993 
however it only commenced fully in 1996. The reasons for my late 
start in publishing work are numerous however the most significant 
of these deserves mention. 
The work involved in undertaking the M. PhiI at the University of 
Edinburgh was considerable and took up all my spare time after 
undertaking a heavy teaching load (around twenty-one hours of 
teaching on nine separate courses at Napier) and fulfilling 
substantial administrative tasks (for a number of years at RGU I 
was course leader for the BA (Honours) Law and Management, 
timetabler, and unofficially head of the law section). 
So the process of getting a significant amount of my work published 
started in 1996 and coincided with a gradual reduction in the 
administrative tasks I was required to do and an increased 
confidence in my own research abilities. 
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During the eight year period of my employment since 1996 at the 
Robert Gordon University I have achieved a considerable research 
output and with it recognition of my expertise in the areas of 
harassment and discrimination. Specifically I have written and 
published around 24 refereed articles, one book chapter and one 
book, 15 professional articles and presented 12 conference papers 
(the bulk of which are published). 
I have organised and chaired three successful conferences and was 
instrumental in preparing a winning bid for funded research for the 
Scottish Executive. Although not all of these research outputs will 
be considered in this application fortunately the majority of them 
will as they fall within the broad themes of discrimination and 
harassment (see the bibliography of authors relevant publications) 
Literature Review 
The broad areas of sex and race discrimination have been widely 
covered in articles and books for some considerable time. Some of 
the most important will be mentioned below. 
The earliest publications were in the United States where the law 
(particularly statute law) developed much earlier in these areas 
than in Europe. 
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The first definitive text on sex discrimination in the UK was 
published in 1985.4 It was written by a barrister specialising in 
employment law. As well as dealing with legal rules on sex 
discrimination it also touched on areas which were at an early stage 
of development at the time and would in the future feature. in my 
research (sex orientation, sexual harassment, dress codes etc. ). 
It is interesting to note that after almost twenty years since 
publication of this book some of the areas of discrimination touched 
upon remain largely unprotected while others have only recently 
been covered by legislative rules. Camilla Palmer and Kate Poulton 
wrote a book with the title Sex and Race Discrimination in 
Employment shortly after Pannick's book. 5 While this book lacked 
the depth of coverage of the earlier text it benefited from being 
concise and accessible. 
Another influential book is Discrimination Law: Concepts, 
Limitations and Justifications edited by Janet Dine and Bob Watt. 6 
This is an edited collection of chapters contributed by various 
academics that deal in depth with specific aspects of discrimination 
law. 
A text that has supported and underpinned my research and 
teaching by highlighting the leading articles, cases, statutory 
provisions etc. on sex and race discrimination is Discrimination Law: 
° Pannick, D Sex Discrimination Law (1985) Clarendon Press Oxford 
5 (1987) Legal Action Group 
6 (1996) Longman 
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Text Cases & Materials. The first edition was written by an academic 
Richard Townshend-Smith. 
Another important book that included detailed analysis of UK 
employment law derived from membership of the European 
Community (including equality law) is EC Employment Law by 
Catherine Barnard. 8 
Although my own contribution to texts on discrimination law is 
limited I have recently written a lengthy chapter for an edited 
collection on Discrimination Law contributed by academics and 
edited by a leading commentator on employment law Malcolm 
Sargeant. 9 My contribution covered the law on sex and race 
discrimination and was a key chapter of the book. It is worthy of 
noting that I was the only contributor from Scotland. 
It is my intention to write a book on discrimination law in the not 
too distant future when I find a suitable publisher. 
The articles written by commentators on discrimination law 
generally are too numerous to mention although it seems 
appropriate to highlight some of the published articles that I have 
written on this topic. 
The first of these was in 1997 when along with a colleague Richard 
Mays I wrote an article on the impact of a new definition of 
vicarious liability in discrimination cases that was introduced 
(1998) Cavendish Publishing, 2"d edition published in 2003 and written by 
Michael Connolly 
$ 2nd ed. (2000) Oxford University Press 
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through a landmark judgement. 10 This was followed up in 1998 by 
a single authored case and commentary outlining how the legal 
judgement considered in the previous article had been applied in 
subsequent cases. " 
In 1999 1 wrote a case note for a refereed journal which was a 
critical analysis of a judgement that decided that discrimination on 
the ground of sexual orientation was not included in discrimination 
law in the UK and in the European Community. 12 
In the same year I wrote an analysis of a case which highlighted the 
difficulties faced by persons pursuing a case under the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 finding suitable comparators. 
The significance of this case was that the requirement to find 
comparators, utilised under the Act to underpin a discrimination 
claim, and had been largely dispensed with by the courts in favour 
of disabled employees. 13 
In the year 2000 1 undertook analysis of a case which attempted to 
delineate the circumstances when an employee or a third party can 
Discrimination Law (2004) Pearson Longman 
10 The Common Law and Statutory Concepts of Vicarious Liability, The Parting of 
the Ways? Scots Law Times, March 28, pp 95-97 
11 Tower Boot Revisited: The Impact Continues, Scottish Law Gazette, December 
1998, Vol. 66, No 4p 180-181 
12 Smith v Gardner Merchant (1998) IRLR 510, Juridical Review, Vol. 17, 
March 1999 pp 134-137 
13 Comparators in Disability Discrimination Cases, Scottish Law & Practice 
Quarterly, April 1999, Vol. 4, No 2, pp 151-153 
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be liable for discrimination along with an employer under the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 14 
In the same year I wrote a lengthy article for a refereed 
international journal arguing for changes in the law dealing with 
discrimination to ensure that applicants in discrimination cases can 
easily find comparators with whom they can compare their situation 
and thereby support their discrimination claim 15 
In 2001 along with a colleague Nicole Busby I wrote a highly critical 
article on the failure of the legal systems in the UK and European 
Community to protect the employment rights of employees that are 
homosexuals or lesbians. This was published in a renowned refereed 
journal with an international readership. 16 
This was followed up by a further case note in a refereed journal 
which offered a critical analysis of a case in which the judiciary 
confirmed that the Human Rights Act 1998 is incapable of 
extending rights under UK employment law to protect against 
discrimination in employment for homosexuals and lesbians 17 (see 
section 5(b) below) 
14 Aiding a Discriminatory Act of the Employer, (AM v WC and SPF (1999) IRLR 
410) Scots Law Times, Issue 1,7 January 2000 pp 1- 4 
is "Shall I Compare Thee"? The Legal Dilemma, Choice of Comparators in 
Discrimination Cases, International Journal of Discrimination and Law, Vol. 4 
September, 2000 pp 293-317 
'6 The Equality Deficit, Legal Protection for Homosexuals and Lesbians in 
Employment? Gender Work and Organisation, Vol. 8 No 4 October 2001 pp 
387-410 
17 Back to Square One, The Secretary of State for Defence v McDonald (2001) 
IRLR 431 and the legal protection against discrimination in employment 
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More recently my articles on discrimination law have dealt with 
aspects of discrimination that remain unprotected after recent 
legislation was introduced to provide the right to claim unlawful 
discrimination and harassment on various grounds (including sexual 
orientation, religion and belief etc. ). The legislation referred to 
implemented legislative measures emanating from the European 
Union on discrimination law. i$ 
The areas unprotected after the legislative changes are 
discrimination on ground of physical appearance, discriminatory 
appearance codes, bullying and sexual favouritism. 
I wrote an article along with a colleague Olga Hay, on the legal 
protection for employees against discriminatory dress or 
appearance codes utilised by employers. It was argued that where 
dress codes have a discriminatory effect they should represent the 
basis for a claim of sex, race or religious discrimination in the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 
This article has been published in an international refereed journal 11 
and represents the first article to involve detailed comparative 
analysis of this area of law. 
based on sexual orientation Scottish Law Practice Quarterly October 2001 
is Framework for Equal Treatment Directive 2000/78/EC, Council Directive 
19 
on Equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin 2000/43 EC 
Fashion Victims, Dress to Conform to the Norm, or Else? Comparative 
Analysis of Legal Protection against Employers Appearance Codes in 
the United Kingdom and the United States, International Journal 
of Discrimination and Law, 2003 Vol 6, pp 69-102 
13 
In the same vein I have written an article and conference paper on 
the legal aspects of discrimination on the ground of physical 
appearance. This article like the earlier one provides a comparative 
analysis of the legal status and impact of dress or appearance codes 
in the UK and the US but also includes a comparative analysis of 
legal treatment of discrimination based on physical looks (which 
includes weightism, heightism etc. ) in these jurisdictions. 20 
The evidence produced in this article shows that this is an important 
issue for staff of both sexes. This is the first article/conference 
paper to deal with both aspects of lookism and to attempt to 
provide a solution to this problem in the workplace. 
I recently completed an article in which I critically examined the 
legal treatment of victims of sexual favouritism in the United 
Kingdom and compared how victims of this type of discrimination 
are dealt with under the United States legal system. 
This article represents the first attempt by an academic in the UK to 
give this issue detailed consideration. 21 Discrimination arises here 
through of a series of events whereby an employee has sexual 
20 Beauty's Only Skin Deep? Legal Liability of Employers for Discrimination on 
the Ground of Physical Appearance? A Comparative Analysis, sent to 
the International Journal of Discrimination and Law November 2004, 
21 An article with the title Anglo-American Comparison of Legal Liability of 
Employers for Sexual Favouritism was sent for consideration to the 
Industrial Law Journal in September 2004. This is the top employment 
law journal in the UK published by the Oxford University Press and 
has an international reputation. 
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relations with her/his boss and as a consequence gets a tangible 
benefit (e. g. promotion) which is not available to other employees. 
This is because the employees (the victims) suffer a detriment 
because they are unable or unwilling to follow the same path. 
Sexual and Racial Harassment 
Areas of law that feature strongly in my research are sexual and 
racial harassment. When I started research on sexual harassment 
for my M. Phil in 1986 there were only a handful of published books 
or articles dealing with the legal aspects of this problem. 
In the United States the definitive text was Sexual Harassment of 
Working Women by Catherine McKinnon. 22 A further text that was 
published shortly after that was Lynn Farley' Sexual Shakedown 23 
Although these books covered all aspects of the issue, including the 
sociological and psychological aspects of the behaviour they 
highlighted the case for reform of the law in the United States to 
protect victims. More importantly from a historical perspective they 
coined for the first time the term sexual harassment. Up until then 
the behaviour went largely unnoticed because there was no term to 
cover it. 
Developments in the form of recognition of the problem and 
pressure for legal intervention in the United Kingdom were led by 
22 (1979) Yale University Press 
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Michael Rubinstein. He was undoubtedly the only recognised expert 
in the field on the law on sexual and racial harassment in the 
nineteen eighties. 24 Other writers that are worthy of a mention for 
dealing with sexual harassment were Camilla Palmer & Kate Poulton 
11 Christopher McCrudden 26 and Alice Leonard. 27 While all of these 
writers were in their own way influential in the development of the 
law their interest was short-lived. I would argue that my influence is 
greater because in my published work (as discussed below in 
Section 8) 1 have over a long period of time made a continuous 
study of the topic and attempted to identify all the possible legal 
remedies for victims of harassment throughout the UK (in England 
and Wales and in Scotland). 
I recently wrote an Article which defined the law of harassment 
subsequent to significant changes in the law and also surnmarised 
the legal protection available for victims of bullying at work. 
23 (1980) Melbourne House 
24 Rubinstein M When the office romeo violates the law, Personnel 
Management, March 1979 pp 48-51 
The Dignity of Women at Work -a report on the problem of sexual 
harassment in the workplace in member states of the European 
Communities by Michael Rubinstein (1989) was instrumental in 
inspiring European Community initiatives. 
25 Chapter 11, Harassment in Sex & Race Discrimination in Employment 
(1987) Legal Action Group 
26 Chapter 9 Conclusions and Issues for the Future 
Ed. McCrudden Women Equality and European Community Law 
(1987) Eclipse Publications 
27 Remedies for Sexual Harassment New Law Journal Nov 8 1991 pp 1514 - 
1516 
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This article has the title The Right to Dignity at Work? Protection 
from Harassment and Bullying under Employment Law in the United 
Kingdom and was sent to the Legal Studies Journal in October 2004 
Stalking 
The other area of law included in my application is the law of 
stalking. It is worth pointing out that while stalking is an important 
topic in its own right it is a form of behaviour that falls under the 
heading of harassment. Accordingly publications in this area 
contribute to my reputation as an advocate for victims of 
harassment and can be included in the application. 
The difference between other areas of harassment such as sexual 
and racial harassment and stalking is that complaints about the 
former behaviour tend to dealt with under the civil law whereas the 
seriousness of the nature and consequences of the latter behaviour 
means that complaints tend to be dealt with under the criminal law. 
Where complaints are upheld they tend to be treated as a common 
law crime in Scotland or a statutory offence in England and Wales. 
At the time of writing our first published article on stalking in 1997 
28 there were very few published works dealing with this topic from 
28 With Mays, R. Watson, 3. Every Breath You Take, Every Move You Make... 
Scots Law, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Problem of 
Stalking in Scotland, Juridical Review, Part 6,1997 pp 331-354. 
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a legal perspective, particularly in Scotland. There were a number of 
articles dealing with legal protection against stalking in the United 
States where the law was more developed. In that jurisdiction 
Federal Law and in some instances State Law (e. g. California) would 
provide help to victims of stalking. 29 
In Scotland in 1997 it was the legal establishment's opinion that the 
common law (particularly the crime of breach of the peace) was 
sufficiently flexible to protect victims of stalking and harassment. " 
At this time the Scottish Parliament were not convinced of this and 
considered that there was some merit in the argument for 
legislative intervention. Following the results of research 
commissioned by them 31 and certain legislative changes in 
Scotland which impacted on victims of stalking they have reached a 
similar view. Protection in the form of statutory offences was 
introduced south of the border 32 but not in Scotland and we argued 
in our article that this was a serious omission. 33 
29 Lingg, Stopping Stalkers: a Critical Examination of Anti-Stalking Statutes, 
St John's Law Review, (1993), 67 p 351 
30 Bonnington, A Stalking and the Scottish courts, New Law Journal, 27 
September 1996 at p 1394 
31 Morris S et a[ Research Finding RF 67, Scottish Executive 
available at www. scotland. gov. uk 
32 Wells, C. Stalking: The Criminal Law's Response, 1997, Criminal Law 
Review 463 
33 Supra 28 
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This failure in the law became only too apparent in a case where a 
stalker that had been dealt with under the criminal law of Scotland 
went on to murder his victim. 34 
There have been developments in the law dealing with stalking in 
both jurisdictions which have been well documented. 11 However no 
commentator has as yet provided detailed coverage of the legal 
rules dealing with stalking and harassment that apply in both 
jurisdictions. This is what I will have achieved when my book on 
stalking and harassment is finished. 
While the book was initially written from a Scottish perspective I 
was unable to find a publisher in Scotland willing to publish it due to 
the restricted market for a book of this kind. I have decided I will 
re-write it from a United Kingdom perspective which will involve 
considerable re-working. 
The expansion of., the subject-matter namely the Law of Stalking 
and Harassment (including the civil law) and widening of the 
jurisdiction covered (the United Kingdom) should ensure that the 
prospect of finding a suitable publisher is much improved. 
34 Protection against Harassment: The Harsh Reality in Scotland, 
Green's Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 36, December 1998 p 4-5. Reviewed in 
an article on the front page of the Scotsman Newspaper, 29th December 
1998 
35 Finch, E Stalking the Perfect Stalking Law: 
An evaluation of the Efficacy of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, 
The Criminal Law Review, September 2002 pp 703 - 718, 
Middlemiss, S Substantive Relief for Victims of Abuse? The Protection from 
Abuse (Scotland) Act 2001, Scots Law Times, 7.12.01, Issue 10, pp 324 - 
327 
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S. Research Output on the Themes of Discrimination 
and Harassment 
The theme that I have rigorously pursued and developed during my 
research career is expansion of legal protection for victims of 
harassment and discrimination. The terms harassment and 
discrimination are used here in their broadest sense and encompass 
various kinds of undesirable behaviour (usually on the part of an 
employer). 
The victims of these types of behaviour have traditionally been 
disadvantaged because their legal rights have been disregarded and 
consequently they have been given little or no legal protection (e. g. 
victims of sexual harassment, bullying or stalking). They are often 
the weaker party in a relationship (employee, trainee) or someone 
who is not afforded due care or consideration by another party 
whose actions adversely affect them (e. g. liability of employers for 
work induced stress related illness of employees). 
The victims of harassment or discrimination will often as a 
consequence of the behaviour suffer economic loss and/or physical 
or mental harm to their person. The legal process they must follow 
to secure redress is often weighted against them in respect of being 
beset with evidential difficulties (e. g. finding a comparator or 
proving an employer's vicarious liability in discrimination cases). 
Other obstacles to their legal redress are that the judicial procedure 
they must follow is inaccessible or there are inherent inequalities in 
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their treatment within the legal system as compared with other 
social groups (e. g. women, homosexuals and lesbians, victims of 
lookism) 
The research is intended to highlight the difficulties faced by these 
disadvantaged groups and identify possible legal solutions. 
This might involve recommendation of a course of action that can 
be pursued on their behalf by legal practitioners (e. g. applying 
existing laws that are untried in a particular legal context). 
Alternatively the courts' handling of a case may be the subject of 
constructive criticism " with a view to highlighting mistakes in a 
decision and recommending that it is reconsidered and overturned 
by a higher court or appeal tribunal. 
In the context of an article dealing with analysis of legal protection 
for victims of discrimination and harassment this writer will often 
encourage the Government to introduce legislation, often for the 
first time, to provide protection for disadvantaged groups (e. g. 
protection against stalking, discrimination on the ground of physical 
appearance, legal rights for atypical workers, protection of the 
employment rights of homosexuals and lesbians). 37 Alternatively it 
might be recommended that the Government change their social 
policy to take account of the legal rights of disadvantaged groups 
(e. g. atypical workers). 
36 Supra 17 
37 With Busby, N Supra 16 
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Parliament will also be encouraged to amend legislation where this 
is necessary to provide better protection to victims of harassment 
and discrimination. Also to ensure the compliance of UK legislation 
with European legal standards (law on sexual harassment, disability 
discrimination). The research has identified several areas for social 
change and it has undoubtedly influenced actual or proposed 
changes in the law. 
The published research output has also facilitated improvements in 
the quality of the protection for legal claimants. This primarily 
occurs where legal practitioners in the field of harassment and 
discrimination as a consequence of reading my articles are 
persuaded to change their approach to an issue (e. g. by bringing an 
action under an area of law untried in that context). 
Improvements in legal protection can also occur where academics 
and/or practitioners attend conferences or training sessions where I 
am presenting a paper and are convinced by my legal arguments to 
change their approach to the law. 
The objective of the research will often be to advise legal 
representatives of the full scope of legal redress available to their 
clients. 
Another feature of my research is consideration of the 
appropriateness of legal tests or principles to decide a particular 
issue (e. g. comparators in discrimination cases) . 311 A substantial part 
38 Supra 15 
22 
of the research is concerned with discrimination and the need for 
equality of treatment within society. More specifically it is concerned 
with protecting individuals at work against behaviour which 
represents an affront to their person e. g. harassment, stalking or 
bullying. 
The judiciary is sometimes respectfully requested to reconsider their 
approach to a legal issue to ensure such victims are given legal 
protection. 19 
As can be seen the research often outlines the evidential difficulties 
facing victims of discrimination or harassment in obtaining legal 
protection or highlights gaps in their legal protection. 
This application invites consideration of a collection of research 
outputs, which underpin the area of research highlighted namely 
legal protection for victims of harassment and discrimination (see 
Volume 2 for outputs included). 
5.1 Sexual Harassment 
I have over a number of years developed expertise in the United 
Kingdom and beyond in the legal aspects of sexual harassment. 
This process started when I undertook, by part-time study, an 
M. Phil degree by research at Edinburgh University (Graduated 
39 Supra 12 & 17 
23 
1993). At the time of writing the thesis there was little written on 
sexual harassment from a legal perspective and no broad scale 
research had been undertaken on this issue which complicated the 
process of offering a comprehensive analysis of the legal position. 
To achieve the depth of analysis required I was obliged to make 
reference to primary research and the legal treatment of this issue 
in other jurisdictions. 
I have written various articles on sexual harassment which were 
derived directly from, or inspired by research undertaken on, the 
thesis. These were published in various refereed and professional 
journals 11 some of which are cited below. 
Although this type of discrimination was not included in any statute 
in the UK through statutory interpretation the judiciary provided a 
remedy for victims of this behaviour under the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975. 
As well as tracing and reporting on the development of this 
statutory tort through conference papers and articles and identifying 
obstacles to legal redress 41 1 also undertook to explore the full 
range of remedies available for victims of this type of behaviour. 
Toward this end I considered the availability of other statutory 
remedies for sexual harassment e. g. Protection from Harassment 
40 Most notably in 1993 1997,1998,1999 and 2002 
41 Gender Neutral Conduct is Sex Discrimination, 
Green's Employment Law Bulletin, December 1996. 
24 
Act 1997.42 1 also analysed the appropriate common law remedies 
which could apply in Scotland under the law of delict 11 and 
contract 44 
As well as writing articles I have also presented various conference 
papers on this topiC. 45 
The most notable development to date was that as a consequence 
of my reputation in Scotland as an expert in the law of sexual 
harassment I was invited to present a paper on ""Sexual Harassment 
Law since Porcelli" at a joint conference of the Industrial Law Group 
of the Law Society of Scotland and the Equal Opportunities 
Commission in 1997. This conference was held in Dundee and 
commemorated the 20th anniversary of the Equal Opportunities 
Commission in Scotland. 
I continue to write books and articles on sexual and racial 
harassment in the United Kingd OM 46 and in other jurisdictions, 
most notably the United States. 
47 
42 Statutory Control of Harassment, The Implications for Employment, 
Green's Employment Law Bulletin, Vol. 19, June 1997 
43 Civil Remedies for Victims of Sexual Harassment: 
Delictual Actions, Juridical Review, Part 4, July 1997 pp 241-249. 
44 The Legal Protection for Victims of Sexual Harassment: 
The Contractual Dimension, Scots Law Times, February 7,1997,37-40. 
45 In 1992 (Napier University) 1994 (The Robert Gordon University) 1996 
(University of Central Lancashire) 1997 (Dundee). 
46 Ed. Sargeant M Discrimination Law (2004) Chapter 4, Sex and Race 
Discrimination (including sexual and racial harassment, Pearson Longman, 
pp 73-107 
47 Duffy, A, Middlemiss, S Comparative Analysis of Vicarious Liability of 
Employers in Harassment Cases in the United Kingdom and the United 
25 
The law in this area has dramatically changed over the period of my 
research and sexual and racial harassment will shortly be 
recognised for the first time in statutes as a specific stand - alone 
tort. This is gratifying because this is a legal outcome that I have 
advocated for in my writing since 1986 when I first undertook 
research in this area. Despite this development there will continue 
to be issues arising under the heading of sexual harassment that 
are worthy of consideration as a topic for research e. g. sexual 
favouritism, harassment based on physical looks. 
5.2 Equality Law 
Other areas of equality law where I have published work is disability 
discrimination, "I racial harassment, 49 discrimination on the ground 
of sexual orientation (see section (a) below, 10 employers vicarious 
liability for employees discriminatory acts 51 analysis of the use of 
52 
comparators in discrimination cases. use of dress and grooming 
States, Common Law World Review Vol. 31 Number 3 2002 pp 254 - 285 
48 Supra 13 
49 Supra 11 
11 Supra 16 With Busby, N& Supra 17 
51 With Mays, R Supra 10 
S2 Supra 13 & 15 
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codes in employment, 53 discrimination on the grounds of personal 
appearance (lookism) and sexual favouritism. 54 A brief description 
of this research has already been provided under section 4 
(background to research and literature review). 
All of these articles involve an element of critical or constructive 
analysis of the current law in dealing with discrimination issues and 
recommendations for improving a particular aspect of discrimination 
law to enhance the legal protection for victims. 
I have recently completed an article on the legal rights of atypical 
workers which considers the legal status and employment rights of 
various types of workers (e. g. part-timers, casual and temporary 
workers) and argues the law relating to them needs reformed. 11 
Hopefully it will be instructive to pick two of these areas as 
illustrations of my approach to research into equality law. 
53 Supra 19 
54 Articles on one of these topics is currently with Modern Law Review for 
consideration Supra 20 and the other Supra 21 is with the industrial Law 
Journal 
55 This article was sent to the Journal of Obligations and Remedies for 
consideration a short time ago. On a similar theme see The Legal Liability 
of Employers for Trainees, Journal of Education and Law, Vol. 15, No 2/3 
2003, pp 115-133 
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(a) Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
My research in this area commenced in 1999 when I reviewed a 
case where the European Court of Justice decided that homosexual 
and lesbian employees were not entitled to protection against 
discrimination under the equality laws of the European Union 
because this behaviour was not covered by EU law. 56 
The courts in the United Kingdom had already adopted a similar 
approach in respect of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, arguing 
that sexual orientation was not sex for the purposes of determining 
the form of discrimination covered by the legislation. Around two 
years later I wrote a lengthy article along with a colleague which 
involved analysis of all the legal rights available (or more 
significantly) unavailable to these categories of employee. 
It was argued that legislation should be introduced to address 
inadequacies in the law and protect their rights. 57 
In the same year I reviewed a legal decision where the Scottish 
courts stated that on proper interpretation of domestic legislation 
interpreted in light of the Human Rights Act 1998 homosexuals and 
lesbians have the right to protection against discrimination under 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. Controversially this decision was 
overturned on appeal leaving employees in this position without any 
legal redress for discriminatory behaviour (such as dismissing 
56 Supra 12 
57 With Busby, N Supra 16 
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someone in the armed forces when it became known they were a 
homosexual). 11 This decision was critically reviewed in the article 
and the need for specific legislation to protect victims of sexual 
orientation discrimination was highlighted. Since then, largely as a 
result of EU intervention, legislation has been introduced to protect 
these categories of employee. 19 in a book chapter on sex and race 
discrimination law I recently contributed to an edited collection this 
area of law was given detailed consideration and the legislation 
recently introduced to protect these employees was reviewed. 60 
It is gratifying that the action I have called for in these articles, 
namely the introduction of legislation to protect against 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, has been taken. 
Given the volatile nature of this topic I am convinced that there will 
continue to be aspects of the law in this area that merit further 
research. 
58 Supra 17 
59 Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations S1 2003/1661 
60 Ed. Sargeant M Discrimination Law (2004) Pearson Longman 
Chapter 4, Sex and Race Discrimination, pp 73-107 
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(b) Legal Rights of Atypical Workers 
This thread of my research involves four publications written over a 
number of years which contribute to an understanding of the 
current legal position of atypical workers and the impetus for reform 
of employment law to enhance their rights. 
It can be argued that because of their particularly limited legal 
status they are discriminated against in the broadest sense by being 
denied the same rights as employees. 
The first of these publications was an article published in 1998 
which involved analysis of the legal liability of employers for non- 
employees (including self-employed contractors and visitors) under 
health and safety law (covering statute and common law). It was 
included in a refereed practitioners' journal published by the 
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. 61 
This was followed up by a small article which considered whether 
mutuality of obligation and personal service were essential elements 
of a contract of employment and if so what impact this would have 
on the rights of atypical workers who are often involved in working 
arrangements with employers that don't have these essential 
characteristics. 
62 
61 Employer's Liability for Non-Employees Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health Journal, June 1998 Vol. 2, Issue 1 pp 15-27. 
62 Mutuality of Obligation, The Contractual Imperative in Employment 
Law? Scottish Law Gazette, June 2000, Vol. 68, No 3. pp 79-83 
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This article was also critical of the courts approach to determining 
the status of workers in this context. 
The third article involved a detailed analysis of the legal status and 
rights of trainees in employment. In many instances trainees will 
carry out the same tasks as employees but are not granted the 
same contractual or statutory rights. They are deemed to work 
under a contract of training and are not eligible for the standard 
type of legal rights in employment. The position of relevant trainees 
(e. g. those working under a government sponsored scheme) has 
improved recently because they have been treated as workers 
under specific statutes and provided with rights arising under these 
statutes (restrictions on working time, entitlement to minimum 
working wage). Other trainees will not get these rights and will be 
denied any form of legal protection (except under health and safety 
legislation). 
It is my argument that the distinction should be between those 
persons working on behalf of an employer under a training 
arrangement (including on-the-job training) and those only being 
provided with training. In the former case they should have the 
same rights as employees and in the latter case they should be 
extended the status of workers or the status quo should apply. "I 
A topic which I recently taught on an undergraduate employment 
law module and thought was a suitable topic for an article is an 
63 Supra 55 The Legal Liability of Employers for Trainees 
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analysis of the legal rights of atypical workers. This combines 
together elements of the three articles mentioned above and 
includes new material (including in particular new legislation derived 
from EU law). It is argued that although certain types of atypical 
workers have had their employment rights extended as a result of 
EU law (part-time and fixed-term workers) and others will have 
additional rights shortly (agency workers) their position under the 
law is still uncertain. It is further argued that other forms of atypical 
workers (casual workers, trainees and temporary workers) are 
denied any substantial legal rights or protection. 
While reviewing current developments in the law the article also 
makes recommendations for reforming the law to ensure that all 
these atypical workers are extended legal rights under statute and 
consequently lead to the extinction of a two-tier workforce. 64 
It is interesting that the Government have recently considered 
broadening the concept of worker to cover almost all kinds of 
atypical workers for the purpose of ensuring their entitlement to 
statutory employment rights. 
65 
64 Article on Legal Rights of Atypical Workers sent to Journal of Obligations and 
Remedies, August 2004 
61 Issued a consultation paper on this in 2002, Discussion Document on 
Employment Status in Relation to Statutory Employment Rights, DTI 
URN 02/1058 
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5.3 Law of Harassment 
There are various aspects of my published research into the law of 
harassment which does not fall within the conventional areas of my 
research, namely sexual and racial harassment in employment law. 
These are liability of employers for work induced stress related 
illness of employees, criminal aspects of stalking and harassment, 
harassment at work on grounds other than sex or race (sexual 
orientation see section 5.2 (a)) and bullying. Given that I have 
dedicated a considerable amount of attention to certain of these 
themes during my research career it is appropriate to explain how 
they have developed as research interests. 
Since publication of my first article on stalking I have continued to 
write articles on this issue and I am in the process of writing a book 
on stalking and harassment. Unfortunately this book is unlikely to 
be published before submission of my application for a PhD. 
I was instrumental in obtaining funding for the School of Public 
Administration and Law (00,000 in total) from the Scottish 
Executive for research into stalking and harassment. My research 
on stalking including my progress on the book is given detailed 
consideration under section 4, above. 
I have always had an interest in bullying particularly in the contexts 
of employment and education. I presented a paper at a conference 
in 1999 on the ""Legal Aspects of Bullying in Education" which was 
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based on research undertaken by a Masters student 66 into bullying 
in higher education. He was happy for me to use his findings in my 
paper but unfortunately had no desire to publish them in an article. 
67 
Along with a colleague I have written a lengthy article with the title 
Bullying in the Workplace, The Case for Legal Redress? which was 
published in three parts by the Irish Law Times. 68 This article set 
out to highlight the inadequacies in the legal protection for victims 
of bullying in the workplace, identify all the possible legal remedies 
available to them and emphasise the need for legal intervention in 
the form of statutory protection. I have recently written a further 
article dealing with bullying in the context of legal protection for 
dignity at work. 
69 
Another area of law that falls under the heading of harassment is 
behaviour on the part of employers that causes stress in employees 
and lead to them suffering physical or mental illness. It may be 
harassment or bullying is the cause of stress or having to work to 
unrealistic deadlines or overlong hours. There are a number of 
66 LLM in Employment Law and Practice 
67 Association of Law Teacher's Conference , Oxford (1999) 68 With Hay 0 Irish Law Times Issues October (Vol. 21 No 17), November (Vol. 
21 No 18) and December (Vol. 21 No. 19) 2003 
69 This article has the title The Right to Dignity at Work? Protection from 
Harassment and Bullying under Employment Law in the United Kingdom 
and was sent to the Legal Studies Journal in October 2004 
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stressors that can apply here. The first research output on stress 
was a paper co-presented with a colleague on Stress and the Law. 70 
This covered all aspects of the legal treatment of work-induced 
stress-related illness in the United Kingdom. It represented a critical 
analysis of the case law and provided a strong case for reform of 
the law. 
A further paper covering a similar but somewhat narrower ground 
was presented at the Society of Legal Scholars Conference at De 
Montfort University, Leicester in 2002.71 
This paper was published in the same year with the title Liability of 
Employers for Work-Induced Stress-Related Illness, The Judicial 
DichotoMy? 72 
70 Psychology and Law Conference, Trinity College, Dublin (1999) 
71 Employer's Legal Liability for Employees' Stress Induced Illness Society 
of Legal Scholars Conference, De Montfort University, Leicester (2002) 
72 Institute of Occupational Safety and Health Journal, Vol 6, Issue 1 
June 2002 pp 57 - 71 
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6. Research Methodology 
It is traditional in law research that books, articles and conference 
papers are produced after analysis of secondary sources such as 
relevant case law, articles, books, electronic sources and legislation. 
These research outputs will often include a summary of existing 
legal opinion in an area being researched and analysis of arguments 
for reform of the law or evaluation of the impact of legal changes in 
the pipeline (e. g. as a result of legal developments in Human Rights 
or EU law). Much of the information included in research outputs 
has been derived from visiting relevant free sites on the internet 
(www. dti. gov. uk, http: //www. echr. coe. int), subscription services 
(e. g. Westlaw) and reviewing CD ROM materials held by the library. 
The novelty in the research is evident where the existing law is 
broadly reviewed to ensure that its widest coverage is considered to 
assist victims of harassment and discrimination. Alternatively the 
law could be analysed in the light of new developments (e. g. an 
important case or a new statute). Often ideas for articles will come 
from reading other articles or books, from research undertaken into 
new areas of teaching, ideas put forward by teaching colleagues or 
students or from discussions with colleagues from other institutions 
Also attending sessions at which contemporaries give papers at 
conferences can be fruitful. 
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I obtain feedback about many of my ideas from delivering papers at 
conferences when contemporaries will ask questions and provide 
positive and negative reactions to the work. 
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7. Research Assistance 
It is difficult to separate this section on research assistance from 
the one above on research methodology as the two are closely 
interrelated. 
As referred to earlier I have been regarded as research active for a 
number of years now and part of the entitlement attached to this is 
research assistance. This was provided under the active researcher 
scheme in the former School of Public Administration and Law and 
is still provide under a current scheme in the department of law. 
I have been provided with invaluable research support from various 
research workers over the last six years. Prior to this research for 
any articles I was writing was undertaken by myself. 
This research consisted of reviewing articles in the library, reading 
relevant reference works and textbooks, reviewing cases, analysing 
statutes and to a lesser extent carrying out searches of databases 
on CD-Rom and the internet. 
The precise form that the research support I have been given has 
taken is the dedicated services of a research worker for half a day 
or a full day in the week to assist me in my research. 
The research worker will normally undertake an initial trawl of 
sources of research material to determine the information that is 
available on a given topic and to ensure the topic has not been the 
subject of writing (or more significantly substantial writing) 
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elsewhere. After considering the initial results of the search I will 
often instruct the research worker to continue but concentrate their 
research activities in a particular area. Once this process is 
complete I am then in a position to review the materials found, 
decide on a structure for the article, book or conference paper and 
then set about writing it. During the writing up stage I may call on 
the research worker to research minor points or I will do the work 
myself. On completion they may be asked to present the article in 
the format or house style required by a particular journal. 
The assistance provided by research workers has allowed me the 
opportunity to develop areas of research that fall within the 
research theme of harassment and discrimination. I have also been 
able to write on topics that represent a departure from this theme 
(see section 8). It is likely that without this help my research output 
would have been considerably less, however because at certain 
times research support is not available I am still required to 
undertake research myself and accordingly utilise my research 
skills. 
I have encouraged research workers to be fully involved in the 
research I am undertaking and this is evidenced by the fact that I 
have recently co-written four articles with my most recent research 
worker Olga Hay. She was an excellent researcher who assisted me 
for over a year but who has now unfortunately left the university. 
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The ex-Dean of Faculty and the two previous Heads of School have 
also provided their general support over the last few years in the 
form of a reduction of administrative responsibilities for three 
months, financial support for attendance at conferences over a 
number of years and a sabbatical (funded by RDI funding) 
consisting of one semester away from the university in the first 
semester of academic session 2003/2004. 
The current Dean and Head of Schoo 1 73 continue to ensure that I 
have research assistance, funding to attend conferences, financial 
and administrative support for my PhD application and most 
importantly sufficient time away from my considerable teaching and 
administrative roles to undertake research. 
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Research Outputs Not Included 
Although employment law is my primary teaching and research 
interest I have not restricted my research to this topic. 
I will often undertake research in areas of law that are topical or of 
interest to myself at a particular juncture in my research career. 
Accordingly I have written and published articles on education law 
and the law dealing with medical and socio-legal issueS 74 that are 
not part of this submission. 
Areas of employment law falling outside the research themes 
mentioned and accordingly not included in this application are 
worthy of a brief mention. 
The earliest of these consisted of a short article that set out the 
legal position of employers and others called upon to give 
references to third parties. Through analysis of the relevant cases I 
highlighted the type of actions of a reference provider which could 
give rise to liability for them and/or their employer. It was stressed 
that their duty of care would extend to both the subject of the 
reference and the recipient. 7 -5 This was followed up four years later 
by a commentary piece that updated the legal position of persons 
giving references including aspects such as liability for sex or race 
73 Assistant Head of School 
74 See note 81 
75 New Developments in Liability of Employers for Employee References, 
Green's Employment Law Bulletin, June 2000 
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discrimination and human rights. 76 This was published in the top 
employment law journal in the United Kingdom which is also a 
journal of high international standing (see section 14). 
In 1999, along with a colleague, I wrote an article critically 
examining the appropriateness of arbitration as an alternative 
method for adjudicating on unfair dismissal disputes. 
This was prompted by the fact that up until 1998 Employment 
Tribunals had been the only forum for dealing with these cases. 
When new legislation was introduced which extended the 
jurisdiction of arbitrators appointed by ACAS to hear these claims it 
was important to consider the impact of this change. "I 
I had a vested interest in the subject-matter of this research as I 
was appointed as an Arbitrator a year after our article was 
published in a prestigious refereed law journal 
I recently wrote an article on the Demise of the Common law in UK 
Employment Law? This is contentious because it argues that the 
common law, which has traditionally been the cornerstone of the 
employment contract and the employment relationship has declined 
in importance to such an extent that it is almost extinct. This article 
was published in two parts by the Irish Law Times. 78 
76 The Truth and Nothing but the Truth? Legal Liability of Employers for 
Employee References Industrial Law Journal, Oxford University Press, 
March 2004 Vol. 33 pp 59 - 67 
77 With Busby, N Arbitration; A Suitable Mechanism for Unfair Dismissal 
78 
Disputes? Civil Justice Quarterly, Vol. 18, April 1999 pp 149-161 
The Demise of the Common Law in UK Employment Law? Part 2 Irish Law 
Times Part 14 Vol 22 pp 214-219 The Demise of the 
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9. Research Collaboration 
It will be apparent from the publications I have cited that I have 
written several joint articles with law graduates and other members 
of staff that involved pursuance of a common research interest with 
a view to publication. My earliest experience of co-writing an article 
with a colleague was in 1993 when we wrote an article on sexual 
harassment in education, which was a comparative analysis of the 
legal treatment of this behaviour in the UK and the U. S. and was 
published in a refereed journal. 19 Since then I have co-written 
various published works in refereed and professional journals with 
staff on aspects of the law dealing with discrimination and 
harassment. 
Published work includes a critical analysis of law in Scotland dealing 
with stalking (1998) and comparison of the law of harassment in 
the UK and the US (2002). Since publication of the article on the 
former topic I have continued to undertake research on this issue in 
the form of three further articles and a book (this strand of my 
research is given detailed consideration under the section on 
harassment). 
Common Law in UK Employment Law? Part 1 Irish Law Times Number 
(9) Volume 22 2004 pp 138-143 
79 With Stewart, R. 'Sexual Harassment in Education' 
Journal of Education and Law, Volume 5, No. 4,1993 pp 187-197 
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The first article written with a stud ent/g rad uate of the Law and 
Management degree involved a critical analysis of law in Scotland 
dealing with stalking. 110 The second article written with a graduate 
of the same degree (now a lecturer at RGU) involved an analysis of 
law as it relates to CID in Scotland 11 (not included). 
The third article written with a graduate involved a comparative 
analysis of the law of harassment in the UK and US (see note 12). 
The fourth and final article co-written with a graduate was a 
comparative analysis of legal protection against employers dress or 
appearance codes in the United Kingdom and the United States (see 
note 18). 1 am proud of the fact that along with a colleague or 
singularly I have taken an undergraduate dissertation and 
considerably re-written it to become of publishable standard. 
All of these articles have been published in highly reputable 
refereed journals and two of them in journals of international 
standing. 
I have written several articles with a previous colleague Nicole 
Busby two of which have been published (see note 12) and I also 
co-presented a conference paper with her. 
80 With Mays, R, Watson, I Every Breath You Take, Every Move You 
Make... Scots Law, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Problem 
of Stalking in Scotland, Juridical Review, Part 6,1997 pp 331-354 
81 With Crichton, D Mays, R Liability for CJD Deaths, Juridical Review, Part 2, 
1998 pp 89 - 103 
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I have also co-written several articles with a former colleague 
Richard Mays (formerly Depute Dean of the Aberdeen Business 
School) two of which are included in this submission (see notes 16 
& 19). 
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10. Conference Papers 
These research outputs are sometimes mentioned earlier in the 
context of research themes that I have pursued although I think it 
is useful to provide an overview of this aspect of my research. 
I have included conference papers as part of the application 
because they are a measure of academic standing that will often 
lead to published outputs and will enhance the reputation of an 
academic within the legal community. Attendance at conferences 
also offers the opportunity for networking and knowledge update. 
I can confirm that in the majority of cases I have obtained a 
published article from my conference papers. 
I have organised three successful conferences during my time at 
the Robert Gordon University (1994,2000, and 2002). 
Areas of research covered in conference papers include comparative 
analysis of legal treatment of workplace pornography (1994) 
arbitration as a means of resolving sexual harassment complaints 
(1996), and a historical perspective of sexual harassment law 
(1997). 1 presented findings of a collaborative nature based on 
primary research undertaken with a graduate from the LLM in 
Employment Law and Practice course into bullying in education 
(1999). 
Along with a colleague I co-presented a paper on stress and the 
law, primarily concerned with the employers' liability for stress- 
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related illness in employment, at the Psychology and Law 
conference in Dublin (1999). 
paper on a narrower aspect of employers liability for stress 
induced illness of employees at work was presented at the Society 
of Legal Scholars conference at De Montfort University Leicester in 
September (2002) and a paper on the legal aspects of dignity at 
work at the Institute for Employment Law conference in Aberdeen, 
September (2002). 82 
All of these conference papers fall with the headings of harassment 
and/or discrimination and all have been subjected to an element of 
consideration by referees before acceptance. Because of the high 
standard of work involved the papers will often end up as published 
outputs. 
82 This topic was covered in a training session for Sussex Police (see section 
11) 
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11. Training/Consultancy 
I have not included this in the main submission as I think it is a 
separate aspect of my research however it is an indicator of my 
academic standing and for this reason it deserves a mention. I will 
restrict my attention to recent examples of training or consultancy. 
My first experience of training in Aberdeen was when I first arrived 
and was called upon to design and present in-house training 
programmes for managers of oil companies (Mobil, Chevron, and 
ELF) in the areas of employment law, trade union law and the 
health and safety law. This training was undertaken on behalf of the 
University but carried out at the client's workplace and outside my 
timetabled hours 
have developed and presented various training events including 
continuing professional development (CPD) courses for solicitors 
etc. (e. g. legal aspects of stress in the workplace, January 2000) 
and organised for various academics and practitioners to provide 
training for solicitors and human resource specialists over the years. 
I have designed and presented an employment law module over a 
period of twelve years on the post-graduate Diploma/LLM in 
Employment Law and Practice (over 13 weeks and now 6 weeks). 
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I have as a consequence, of teaching this module provided 
consultancy level employment law training to solicitors and human 
resource managers. I have also taught on various other modules on 
this programme including labour law and health and safety law. 
The Legal Services Agency Ltd, a firm specialising in providing legal 
CPD updates, asked me to provide a half-day course for 
practitioners on the Protection from Abuse Act 2001 following an 
article I had written on this topic in the Scots Law Times. 
I provided this training in Glasgow on the 10th of July 2002 
At around the same time I was contacted by a consultant who 
asked me to provide a half day course on "Dignity at work the legal 
aspects' 83 to his clients, who were trainers working for the Surrey 
Police. 
I delivered the course at Police Headquarters, in Guilford, Surrey on 
the 8 th of July 2002. It was made clear to me that I was chosen 
because of my recognised expertise in the area. 
83 Including racial and sexual harassment, bullying and other forms of 
harassment 
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12. Relevant external roles 
While these roles are not strictly speaking part of my public outputs 
some of them have a bearing on my research experience and 
professional standing and deserve mention. 
I have been a Member of the Research Committee of the Department of 
Law since September 2001. Its role is to engender a research culture, 
ensure sufficient research support is provided for colleagues, to monitor 
progress of colleagues towards research objectives and encourage junior 
colleagues to publish their ideas 
I was a director of the Scottish universities law institute, which is the 
publisher of the most authoritative legal texts for law practitioners in 
Scotland from 1994 - 2000 
As the university representative for the Society of Legal Scholars 
(SLS) I am the point of contact between the Society and other 
members of the Society at RGU and I am required to write regular 
updates on what the Department is doing for publication in their 
members update. I have been a representative and a Member of 
the Society from May 2001 to the present. 
I have also been a Member of the Committee for Heads of 
University Law Schools (CHULS) since September 2001. 
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This consists of representatives from law schools throughout the UK 
who tend to meet at the SLS Conference each year and discuss 
issues of relevance to them (research, professional standards). 
I was appointed as an Arbitrator by the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS) in February 2000. My role is to arbitrate 
in unfair dismissal disputes at arbitration hearings held usually 
where the workplace is. In this capacity I have been extended the 
power to award the same legal remedies as Employment Tribunals. 
This is an open-ended appointment at the present time. 
I was Head of the Institute for Employment Law (April 2000 - July 
2003). Its aim was to encourage and facilitate research, 
consultancy etc. and create a focus for employment law. A two-day 
conference was held in Aberdeen in July 2000 with internationally 
renowned speakers in attendance. 
A one day conference on the theme of recent changes in 
employment law was held at the University in September 2002 
All of these roles have a bearing on my academic standing and 
sometimes feed into my research and teaching. It is for this reason 
that I have included them. 
51 
13. Quality of Research Outputs 
The articles published in refereed and non-refereed journals and the 
conference papers selected for this application and cited all fall 
within the broad theme of the research submission. 
The professional journal articles cited are mainly Scottish and 
accordingly more limited in their geographical coverage however the 
readership of these journals can be substantial, often consisting of 
all the legal practitioners in Scotland. 
These publications in professional journals are important because 
they ensure I maintain a reputation for high quality writing at a 
national level. Writing for these journals also allows me the 
opportunity to analyse issues that have a particularly Scottish 
dimension. 
The refereed journals included are published for a Scottish, UK or 
International readership. 
The academic standing of the journals in which I have published has 
improved over time and while my early work tended to be published 
in professional journals, Scottish journals or journals with a 
specialised readership most of my recent publications have had at 
least a general UK wide readership. This is part of my strategy to 
increase the impact of my written work. I am pleased to say this 
has paid off and my most recent work has an international 
readership. 
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As a case in point I am extremely pleased that an article was 
accepted and published by the top employment journal in Europe, 
(the Industrial Law Journal) and it is anticipated that further articles 
will be submitted to and hopefully published by them. 81 
This reflects a deliberate effort to have my work recognised as of 
international standing in the next RAE exercise in line with the 
research strategy of the Business School and the University. 
14. Impact of Research 
Before considering the broad impact of my research it is worth 
pointing out it has influenced specific aspects of my career such as 
providing the opportunity to carry out consultancy (see section 11) 
and my appointment to certain external roles (12). 
The research has had a broad impact through identifying areas for 
change in statute law or common law rules. This has undoubtedly 
indirectly influenced actual or proposed changes in the law (e. g. E. U 
amendment to Equal Treatment Directive implementing law 
covering sexual harassment, protection for stalkers under the 
criminal law of Scotland (e. g. Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Act 
2001) review of rules relating to compensation for psychiatric injury 
by the Scottish Law Commission. I have identified other examples 
84 They have been considering one of my articles for publication for several 
months now. 
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earlier where my research has proved influential on the judiciary 
and legislators. 
It is difficult to quantify the direct impact that research has on 
individuals and society although it seems an unlikely coincidence 
that many of the objectives that I strived to fulfil through my 
research in the areas of harassment and discrimination have now 
been fulfilled through changes in the law. 
15. Work In Progress 
am currently writing a book on the law of stalking and 
harassment, which can be firmly placed within the broad theme of 
harassment. The University allocated me a sabbatical during the 
first semester of 2002/2003 to allow me time to write the book. It is 
hoped that the final draft will be submitted for publication in June 
2005 (subject to finding a suitable publisher) so the book should be 
completed (although it may not be published) during the period of 
application. As already stated the book is concerned with identifying 
the current protection to victims of stalking and harassment under 
the civil and criminal law in England and Wales and Scotland and 
considering where improvements might be made. 
Other projects which I intend to undertake over the next few years 
are a book on Discrimination Law, an article on international 
employment law, an article dealing with a ten-year anniversary 
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review of the operation of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, 
further articles on stress and vicarious liability and an article on the 
new age discrimination legislation. 
16. Conclusion 
The aims of the reflective review were set out at the outset and I 
have attempted to illustrate how my combined research outputs in 
the fields of discrimination and harassment law have fulfilled these 
aims. The study and research involved in producing these outputs 
does, in my opinion, compare favourably and probably exceeds the 
study and research necessary for a standard PhD. Although for 
reasons of brevity it has not been possible to provide a full account 
of the research process underpinning the work I hope I have 
illustrated in the brief outline provided the evolution of 'substantive 
theoretical approaches and systematic study'. This can be judged 
most effectively by looking at the research outputs themselves 
which can be found in Volume 2 of the thesis. 
I have gone to considerable lengths in the written report to 
demonstrate that my work is original and that I have exercised 
critical powers. I would argue that all the outputs included contain 
an element of originality. Given that one of my personal aims in 
research is to highlight inequalities of treatment and inadequacies in 
the law I am often breaking new ground and offering original 
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explanations and solutions. Sometimes my work is unique because 
it is covering areas that not been written about by any academics or 
practitioners. This is particularly a characteristic of my recent work. 
Admittedly there are areas of law I have considered in my research 
where there is a proliferation of writers covering similar ground 
(e. g. employers liability for work-induced illness caused by stress) 
although even in these circumstances I strive to make the work 
original (e. g. by carrying out a comparative analysis). 
The evidence of me exercising independent critical powers is 
evident in the choice of research topics, the research strategy 
adopted (section 5) and the methodology (section 6& 7) that 
underpins the published output. There is undoubtedly a common 
theme which is to break down barriers to protecting victims of 
discrimination and harassment through legal argument. This 
inevitably involves (in the majority of cases) criticism of some 
aspect of the present legal system and constructive 
recommendations for improving it. It will also often involve 
comparison with legal systems in other countries (jurisdictions). The 
chosen comparator in my research tends to be the United States 
which up until recently had the most fully developed harassment 
and equality laws in the Western world. 
The final aim is to demonstrate that I have made a distinct 
contribution to knowledge. I feel I have illustrated this through the 
foregoing consideration of my published work, my conference 
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papers, the consultancy activities I have carried out and the 
external roles I have undertaken. This is the aim that is most 
difficult to quantify but most important to establish. One way of 
ascertaining whether this aim has been fulfilled is to consider the 
state of knowledge without my contribution. 
The legal protection that now exists against sexual and racial 
harassment and other forms of harassment might not exist in its 
present form. The law covering stalking and harassment in Scotland 
might not be as protective to victims of this behaviour as it is 
without the call made by myself and a few others to improve their 
position. 
The areas highlighted in the application where I am most widely 
published and therefore have exerted most influence is the law on 
sex discrimination (Section 5.1), sexual orientation (Section 5(2) 
(a) and atypical workers (see section 5(2) (b) and the discussion 
below). 
With respect to sex discrimination most of the criticisms of the legal 
process for obtaining redress have been resolved through decisions 
in legal cases and changes in statute law. 
With respect to homosexual or lesbian employees their rights have 
recently improved dramatically as a result of the EU Framework 
Directive however the legislation introduced in the UK to implement 
the Directive appears to have taken account of criticisms raised by 
commentators which hopefully include my own. 
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I would like to believe that legislators and judges have altered their 
views and consequently changed their approach to the law as a 
result of critical views expressed in my published work. 
There are some areas of the law where little has changed despite 
my efforts. 
Workplace bullying is largely unprotected except where it can be 
established that it is based on a discriminatory ground or it 
represents a clear breach of duty by the employer under the law of 
85 delict in Scotland. 
Where neither of these situations applies there is very little in the 
way of legal protection available for them. This could easily be 
remedied by statutory invention. 
The position of women having to work alongside pornographic 
images in the workplace is still uncertain as the leading case states 
that the effect of this type of working environment is gender neutral 
(offending men and women equally). 
While the legal position of relevant trainees has improved in relation 
to their entitlement to statutory rights since writing my article (see 
note 61) their entitlement to certain other statutory rights and their 
contractual status is still uncertain. Other types of trainee (e. g. 
students on placement) are still provided with very few rights of any 
kind. 
85 The three articles (note 63) an unpublished article (note 69) and the 
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While the article I have written on atypical workers highlights 
similar issues of lack of entitlement to employment rights and 
uncertain contractual status for other types of workers it is as yet 
unpublished. It is hope that the articles cited earlier on trainees and 
atypical workers will help convince the Government that inequalities 
in treatment for certain kind of workers should discontinue (see 
note 63) and a minimum standard of rights should apply to all 
workers. 116 
Other areas where changes should be made to the law to protect 
employees against discriminatory dress or appearance codes, 
discrimination on the ground of physical appearance and sexual 
favouritism. While an article concerning discriminatory appearance 
and grooming code is already in the public domain articles on the 
other areas of discrimination are as yet unpublished. These are both 
contentious areas because they are difficult to define and more 
importantly it is uncertain,, if legislation was in place to protect them 
how it would be framed and who if anyone would be willing to 
pursue their legal rights in these areas. In both instances it requires 
them to admit their unattractiveness (and make a claim on the 
basis of it) and establish that it has led to them suffering a 
disadvantage. 
Such difficulties can be overcome and they should not mean that 
nothing is done to help employees in this position. 
conference paper on bullying in the workplace is cited above. 
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As outlined in broad terms in section 15 my plans for future 
research are completion of any unfinished projects and primarily a 
continuance of my current research objective, which is hopefully 
apparent from my application, namely producing high quality 
published outputs in the areas of discrimination and harassment. 
86 Possibly only excepting the genuinely self-employed. 
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Public Output Included in the Application 
Books 
Ed. Sargeant, M Discrimination Law (2004) Chapter 4, Sex and Race 
Discrimination (including sexual and racial harassment, Pearson Longman, 
pp 73-107 
The Law of Stalking and Harassment in the United Kingdom first draft 
written but requiring considerable re-writing before publication. 
Refereed Articles 
With Hay 0 Bullying in the Workplace: The Case for Legal Redress? 
Published in three volumes of the Irish Law Times Issues October (Vol. 21 
No 17), November (Vol. 21 No 18) and December (Vol. 21 No. 19) 2003 
Fashion Victims, Dress to Conform to the Norm, or Else? Comparative 
Analysis of Legal Protection against Employers Appearance Codes in 
the United Kingdom and the United States, International Journal 
of Discrimination and Law, 2003 Vol 6, pp 69-102 
The Legal Liability of Employers for Trainees, Journal of Education and 
Law, Vol. 15, No 2/3 2003, pp 115-133 
Duffy, A, Middlemiss, S Comparative Analysis of Vicarious Liability of 
Employers in Harassment Cases in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, Common Law World Review Vol. 31 Number 3 2002 pp 254 - 
285 
With Busby N The Equality Deficit, Legal Protection for Homosexuals and 
Lesbians in Employment? Gender Work and Organisation, Vol. 8 No 4 
October 2001 pp 387- 410 
Back to Square One, The Secretary of State for Defence v McDonald 
(2001) IRLR 431 and the legal protection against discrimination in 
employment based on sexual orientation Scottish Law Practice Quarterly 
October 2001 
"Shall I Compare Thee"? The Legal Dilemma, Choice of Comparators irl 
Discrimination Cases, International Journal of Discrimination and Law, 
Vol. 4 September, 2000 pp 293-317 
Comparators in Disability Discrimination Cases, Scottish Law & Practice 
Quarterly, April 1999, Vol. 4, No 2, pp 151-153 
Employer's Liability for Non-Employees, Institute of Occupational Safety 
and Health Journal, June 1998 Vol. 2, Issue 1 pp 15-27 
Casenote: Smith v Gardner Merchant (1998) IRLR 510, 
Juridical Review, Vol. 17, March 1999 pp 134-137 
With Mays, R. Watson, J. Every Breath You Take, Every Move You Make 
Scots Law, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Problem of 
Stalking in Scotland, Juridical Review, Part 6,1997 pp 331-354 
Civil Remedies for Victims of Sexual Harassment: 
Delictual Actions, Juridical Review, Part 4, July 1997 pp 241-249. 
Professional Journal Articles 
Substantive Relief for Victims of Abuse? The Protection from Abuse 
(Scotland) Act 2001, Scots Law Times, 7.12.01, Issue 10, pp 324 - 327 
Mutuality of Obligation, The Contractual Imperative in Employment 
Law? Scottish Law Gazette, June 2000, Vol. 68, No 3. pp 79-83 
Aiding a Discriminatory Act of the Employer, (AM v WC and SPF (1999) 
IRLR 410) Scots Law Times, Issue 1,7 January 2000 pp 1- 4 
Protection against Harassment: The Harsh Reality in Scotland, 
Green's Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 36, December 1998 p 4-5. Reviewed in 
an article on the front page of the Scotsman Newspaper, 29th December 
1998 
Tower Boot Revisited: The Impact Continues, Scottish Law Gazette, 
December 1998, Vol. 66, No 4p 180-181 
Statutory Control of Harassment, The Implications for Employment, 
Green's Employment Law Bulletin, Vol. 19, June 1997 
With Mays, R The Common Law and Statutory Concepts of Vicarious 
Liability, The Parting of the Ways? Scots Law Times, March 28,1997 pp 
95-97 
The Legal Protection for Victims of Sexual Harassment: 
The Contractual Dimension, Scots Law Times, February 7,1997,37-40. 
Gender Neutral Conduct is Sex Discrimination, 
Green's Employment Law Bulletin, December 1996. 
Articles Being Considered for Publication 
Beauty's Only Skin Deep? Legal Liability of Employers for Discrimination 
on the Ground of Physical Appearance? A Comparative Analysis, sent to 
the Internation Journal of Discrimination and Law in November 2004 
An article with the title Anglo-American Comparison of Legal Liability of 
Employers for Sexual Favouritism currently being re-written 
Article on Legal Rights of Atypical Workers sent to Irish Law Times 
January 2005-01-11 
The Right to Dignity at Work? Protection from Harassment and Bullying 
under Employment Law in the United Kingdom sent to the Industrial Law 
Journal January 2005 
Articles Mentioned in the Submission but Not Included 
The Demise of the Common Law in UK Employment Law? Part 2 Irish Law 
Times to be published in Part 14 Vol 22 very shortly 
The Demise of the Common Law in UK Employment Law? Part 1 Irish Law 
Times Number (9) Volume 22 2004 pp 138-143 
The Truth and Nothing but the Truth? Legal Liability of Employers for 
Employee References Industrial Law Journal, Oxford University Press, 
March 2004 Vol. 33 pp 59 - 67 
New Developments in Liability of Employers for Employee References, 
Green's Employment Law Bulletin, June 2000 
With Busby, N Arbitration; A Suitable Mechanism for Unfair Dismissal 
Disputes? Civil Justice Quarterly, Vol. 18, April 1999 pp 149-161 
With Stewart, R. 'Sexual Harassment in Education' Journal of Education 
and Law, Volume 5, No. 4,1993 pp 187-197 
Relevant Conference Papers 
A paper (in an amended form) also called Beauty's Only Skin Deep? 
Legal Liability of Employers for Discrimination on the Ground of 
Physical Appearance? A Comparative Analysis is to be presented at 
the Society of Legal Scholars Conference, Sheffield, September 2004 
A paper with the title Beauty's Only Skin Deep? Legal Liability of 
Employers for Discrimination on the Ground of Physical 
Appearance? A Comparative Analysis presented at the Socio-Legal 
Studies Association Conference, Glasgow University, April 2004 
Organised and chaired one day employment law conference in Aberdeen, 
September 2002 under the auspices of the Institute for Employment Law, 
presented a paper on dignity at work and the law 
Paper presented on Employer's Legal Liability for Employees' Stress 
Induced Illness Society of Legal Scholars Conference, De Montfort 
University, Leicester (2002) now published 
Organised and chaired a conference on employment law held under the 
auspices of the Institute for Employment Law (2000) Hilton Treetops 
Hotel, Aberdeen 
Co-presented a paper with Busby N on Stress and the Law, Psychology 
and Law Conference, Trinity College, Dublin (1999) 
Presented a paper on Legal Aspects of Bullying in Education 
Association of Law Teacher's Conference , Oxford (1999) 
Presented a paper on Sexual Harassment Law Since Porcelli joint 
conference of the Industrial Law Group of the Law Society of Scotland and 
the Equal Opportunities Commission. in Dundee (1997). Commemorating 
20th anniversary of the Equal Opportunities Commission. 
University of Central Lancashire, National Campaign against Harassment, 
(1996), Arbitration: A Suitable Forum for Sexual Harassment 
Complaints? (published in written summary of proceedings) 
Joint organiser of the Scottish Law Teacher's Conference held at the 
Robert Gordon University (1994). 
Robert Gordon University, Scottish Law Teacher's Conference (1994) 
Pornography in the Workplace, A Comparative Legal Approach. 
Napier University, Scottish Law Teacher's Conference (1992) 
Law and Sexual Harassment. 
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Chapter 4 
Sex and race discrimination 
Sam Middlemiss 
Introduction 
This chapter will involve detailed consideration of the legal protection 
available to victims of sex and race discrimination. These are the areas 
of discrimination law that are by far the longest standing in the United 
Kingdom and a working knowledge of these areas is instrumental to an ýn Z7) 
understanding of discrimination law. 
'A"hat follows is a description of the current law in these areas, including 
the legal rules covering discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, 
gender reassignment and racial and sexual harassment (aspects relating 
to the European Union are considered in Chapter 2). 
Sex discrimination 
Historical background 
The sexual division of labour was predetermined by the di-vision of 
labour that had existed in the family when the household was the unit 
of production. The epoch of modern industry far from challenging this 
division further demarcated it. ' 
The starting point for sex discrimination within employment in the 
United Kingdom is commonly identified as the Industrial Revolution, 
when for the first time the home was separated from the place of 
S Alexander jj! omen's Work in 19th Centuiy London. A Study of Yea7S 1820-1850 (journey- 
man Press, 1983), p 5. 
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work' and women were expected to stay at home and out of the 
workplace. ' 
The productive role which women had played as part of the economic unit 
of a family was largely forgotten in the economic and social changes brought 
about by the Industrial Revolution. ' 
When economic necessity forced women to enter employment they were 
faced with a wide variety of discriminatory behaviour. ' 
Gendered patterns of occupational segregation can be explained by the 
pervasive domestic or patriarchal ideology prescribing certain work roles as 
appropriate for women and others not: an ideology shared by employers, 
male workers and even many women themselves. ' 
The fact is that, where women were brave enough to enter employment 
in the face of a general opposition, they were regarded by paternalistic 
employers as second class workers. They were consequently restricted 7 
to low-paid and unskilled occupations, required to work for long hours 
in bad working conditions and often subjected to sexual harassment. 
Employers would be unlikely to promote women for a number of reasons. 
Women often worked part-time and promoted posts would often only be 
available to full-time workers. 'In general working-class women did not 
regard full-time work as something they would undertake for the whole 
of their adult lives, while married women continued to firmly believe that 
their primary commitment was to home and family. ' Where promotion 
was available only to persons with a considerable length of service, women 
would find it difficult to qualify where they had taken breaks in employ- 
ment to fulfil their parental role. ' 
The trade unions were the only force capable of gaining improvements 
in women's rights from employers but they were traditionally driven by 
male interests. They failed to encourage women to join the union and 
did not consider women's issues: this was because unions were restricted 
to craft or skilled workers for most of the nineteenth century, which 
excluded almost all female workers. ' 
I In the agrarian society prior to the Industrial Revolution men and women worked along- 
side each other on an equal basis and the place of work, the farm, was also the home. 
The process of alienation of work from home brought about by changing work patterns 
caused by the process of industrialisation has become known amongst sociologists as the 
'social division of labour'. 
3E Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (The Free Press, 1997). 
4S Boston Women Workers and the Trade Unions (Lawrence and Wishart, 1997), pp 13-14. 
For the equivalent position in the United States, see J Matthaei An Economic History of 
Women in America: Women's Work, the Sexual Division of Labour and the DeveloPment of C*tal- 
ism (Schocken Books, 1988). 
J Zeitlin 'The sexual division in the Chartist family' (1989) 54 British Society of Social Labour 
Histoiy journal 6. 
7 Sexual division of labour and job segregation. 
'I Pinchbeck Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution (Frank Cass & Co Ltd, 1969). 
9 Note 4 above, pp 15-28. .1 
Sex and race discrimination 75 
Although in more recent times things have improved for women in 
terms of representation by trade unions, " it is only relatively recently that 
mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that women receive equal- 
ity of treatment with men in employment. The position of women began 
to change in the 1970s, with the passing of the Equal Pay Act 1970 (EPA 
1970) and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA 1975) (equal pay issues 
are dealt with in Chapter 5). 
The main legislative provisions dealing with sex discrimination in the 
United Kingdom are as follows (see Chapter 2 for EU aspects): 
" SDA 1975 
" SDA 1986 
" Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay (Remedies) Regulations (SI 1993/ 
2798) 
" Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/ 
1002 
" Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden of Proof) 
Regulations 2001, SI 2001/2660 
" Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/ 
1657. 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
Despite the fact that the United Kingdom had already joined the Euro- 
pean Community (EC) when this legislation was introduced, little or no 
account was taken of the EC equality agenda at the time. 'It is doubtful 
too, whether the EEG Directive had much influence upon the structure 
of the U. K. Act. "' The Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 clearly came 
into being after the SDA 1975 was enacted, although details of its con- 
tent were available to the legislators and they could easily have included 
its main provisions. The major influence on the legislation came from 
further afield than Europe: 'The main foreign influence on the UK 
Legislation was clearly from the United States. 112 Concepts borrowed 
from the US legal system included the concept of indirect discrimina- 
tion's and the role of the Equal Opportunities Commission. 14 Reference 
to American discrimination cases has been deemed relevant by courts in 
the United Kingdom and the European Court of justice (ECJ). 15 
The threshold requirement in the SDA 1975 and the Race Rela- 
tions Act 1976 (RRA 1976) is that an applicant in a case of sex or race 
'o General and Municipal Workers Union, USDAW, NALGO, NUPE and the AUEW. 
1, C McCrudden (ed) Women, Equality and European Equality Law (Eclipse Publications, 1987), 
p 36. 
12 lbid p 37. 
13 As defined by the United States Supreme Court in Grigp v Duke Power Company 401 US 
424 [19711. 
14 Based on the role of the Employment Equal Opportunities Commission (EEOC) in the 
United States. 
15 jenkins v Kingsgate [1981] IRLR 228, ECJ. 
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discrimination must show that his or her employer is vicariously liable 
for the actings of the perpetrator of the discriminatory act. " So, if, for 
example, a female employee is harassed in the workplace by a male col- 
league, is the employer then vicariously liable under the SDA 1975? On 
the basis of case law dealing with sexual harassment (considered below), 
it seems likely. 
The employee could, in these circumstances, also sue the perpetrator 
of the discriminatory act or persons that assist him. Under s 42 of the 
SDA 1975 and s 33 of the RRA 1976, a person who knowingly aids 
another person to commit an act which is unlawful under the Act shall 
be treated as himself doing an unlawful act of the like description. In 
Hallam v Aveyy and Lamber4 17 the Court of Appeal held that it is not enough 
th , at the person assisted with a complete act of 
discrimination. Iý must be 
established that the person knew that the perpetrator was treating or was 
about to treat someone less favourably on racial grounds and proceeded 
to provide them with aid. " In Anyanwu and another v South Bank Student 
Union and another, " the House of Lords held that a person aids another 
to *do an unlawful act under the RRA 1976 if he or she helps or assists 
that other, whether or not that help is substantial and productive, pro- 
vided it is not negligible. 
One of the main aims of the SDA 1975 is to combat stereotypical 
assumptions about women and to make unlawful any behaviour by an 
employer that is based upon such assumptions. In Skyrail Oceanic v 
Coleman, 20 an assumption that a man was the 'breadwinner' in a marriage, 
resulting in the dismissal of a female employee, was held by the Court of 
Appeal to be discriminatory. In Hurley v Mustoe, 21 the employer's general 
assumption that employees with young children are unreliable A-as held 
to be directly discriminatory against women and also indirectly discrim- 
inatory on the grounds of marital statUS. 22 
Which types of workers are protected? 
The SDA 1975 offers protection against discrimination to both men and 
women, although the legislators rightly anticipated that women would 
need more protection. The protection offered by the discrimination laws 
is not restricted to employees and applies to a much wider constituency. 
The SDA 1975 and the RRA 1976 offer protection tojob applicants against 
" SDA 1975, s 41; RRA 1976, s 32. 
17 [20011 ICR 408. 
'8 For some background to this provision, see S Middlemiss 'Aiding a Discriminatory Act of 
the Employer (AM v WC and SPF (1999] IRLR 410)' Scots Law Times, Issue 1.7january 
2000, pp 1-4. 
[20011 IRLR 305. 
20 [19811 ICR 864. 
21 [ 1981 ] IRLR 208. 
22 See also Horsey v D)fed County Council (19821 IRLR 395. 
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discriminatory recruitment and selection practices (under section 6 and 
section 4 respectively). 
Employment for the purposes of the SDA 1975 is defined widely by 
section 82(l) to include women working under a contract of service or 
of apprenticeship or a contract personally to execute any work or labour. 
This last category of person includes the self-employed, independent 
contr-actors, certain agency workers and trainees working under a train- 
ing contract with the employer. 23 
Direct discrimination 
Direct discrimination is a relatively straightforward concept whereby an 
employer directly and usually blatantly discriminates against persons of 
one sex in terms of his process of recruitment and selection or in his 
employment policies. Section 1 (1) states: 
A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for 
the purposes of any provision of this Act if - 
(a) on the grounds of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or 
would treat a man --- 
In respect of direct discrimination as defined above, the motive or inten- 
tion of the discriminator is irrelevant, as determined by the House of 
Lords in James v Eastleigh Borough CounciL` Mr and Mrs James, both aged 
61, went for a swim in Eastleigh Borough Councils baths. Mrs James was 
allowed in free because she had reached the 'pensionable age' of 60, 
while MrJames had to pay 60p. MrJames, with the support of the Equal 
Opportunities Commission, brought a claim of direct sex discrimination 
as per s1 (1) (a) of the SDA 1975. Lord Bridge said 'pensionable age' is a 
convenient shorthand expression that refers to 60 for women and 65 for 
men. Thus, this was a case of direct discrimination - which is in breach 
of s1 (1) (a) of the SDA 1975 - and but for the fact that Mr James was a 
man he could swim free of charge in Eastleigh Borough Council's baths. 
James v Eastleigh Borough Council establishes the 'but for' test and also 
confirms that laudable motives are of no significance in determining if 
the employer is guilty of direct discrimination. In order to find direct 
discrimination under section 1 (1) (a), the complainant must show that 
he has been treated less favourably by the discriminator than the discrim- 
inator treats or would treat other persons in the same circumstances. 
However, in certain cases the comparison need not be demonstrated by 
evidence as to how a comparator was or would be treated, because the 
very action complained of is in itself less favour-able treatment on sexual 
or racial grounds. -5 
23 Dalty v Allied suppliers Ltd [1983] IRLR 14, EAT. 
24 (199o] IRLR 288, HI- 
25 Sidhu v Aerospace amposile Technology Ltd [20001 IRLR 602, CA. 
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Indirect discrimination 
Indirect discrimination is defined in section 1 (1): 
A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for 
the purposes of any provision of this Act if - 
(b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or would 
apply equally to a man but - 
(i) which is such that the proportion of women who can comply with 
it is considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can 
comply with it, and 
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the sex of the 
person to whom it is applied, and 
(iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with it. 
A different definition of indirect discrimination is provided by section 
1(2), which applies to certain aspects of the SDA 1975, including those 
relating to employment. 26 Under section 1 (2) (b) a person discriminates 
against a woman if he applies to her a provision, criterion or practice 
which he applies or would apply equally to a man but: 
(i) which is such that it would be to the detriment of a considerably larger 
proportion of women than of men, and 
(ii) which he cannot show to bejustifiable irrespective of the sex of the 
person to whom it is applied, and 
(iii) which is to her detriment. 
In P7ice v Civil Se7vice Commission, 27 Mrs Price applied for a job as an 
executive officer in the Civil Service but she was told that she was too old 
at 32 as the age requirement for candidates was between 17 and 28. She 
claimed that this requirement represented indirect discrimination as less 
qualified women in the job market would be able to comply with it than 
men (as many women were absent from the sphere of work during this 
time, bringing up their families). It was held on appeal that it was a case 
of indirect discrimination that was not justifiable and the Civil Service 
were liable for damages. The Civil Service altered their age requirements 
for executive officer posts following this decision. 
In Home Office v Holmes '28 Mrs Holmes had worked full-time for the 
Civil 
Service but after maternity leave she found this difficult and asked her 
employer for part-time work. Her employer refused to employ her part- 
time on the basis that all their posts were full-time. She claimed indirect 
discrimination on the basis that it was more difficult for women to com- 
ply with the full-time requirement than men, given that women are more 
likely to have primary parental responsibility. It was held that in this case 
26 Any provision of Part 2, ss 35A and 35B, any provision of Part 3 so far as it relates to 
vocational training. 
27 [ 19781 ICR 27. 
21 [19841 IRLR 299, EAT. 
Sex and race discrimination 79 
there was indirect discrimination. The tribunal at the initial stage of the 
legal process summarised the position as follows: 'it is still a fact that the 
raising of children tends to place a greater burden on women than it 
does on men'. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), however, took 
the view that this ruling was not to be treated as a precedent that women 
are entitled to work part-time in all such circumstances. Whether or not 
a woman would be entitled to be offered part-time employment would 
depend on the circumstances in the case. 
Issues in indirect discrimination cases 
(1) The meaning of the terms 'requirement or condition' is clarified in 
FaLkirk Council v Whyte, ' where these terms were broadly interpreted by 
the EAT. In this case three women brought a claim of indirect discrim- 
ination when they were refused employment in a managerial post at 
Cortonvale Prison. The job specification stated that management train- 
ing and supervisory experience were desirable qualities. It was clear that 
possession of these qualities was a decisive factor in being selected for 
the job. It was more difficult for women than men to comply with as all 
women were employed at basic grades. " It was held that a desirable qual- 
ity could be a requirement or condition in this case. 
A very different conclusion was reached in a race discrimination case, 
Perera v Civil Service Commission (No 2); ` where it was stated that for a 
requirement or condition to be treated as discriminatory it must be an 
absolute bar to the employee gaining equal rights with their comparator. 
There have been recent changes to the definition of indirect discrimina- 
tion under the Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden 
of Proof) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/2660 (considered below). Under 
the Regulations, the terms 'requirement or condition' were replaced with 
the much broader terms of 'provision, criterion or practice' for certain 
important sections of the SDA 1975. This will make it easier for appli- 
cants and employees in indirect discrimination cases to establish they have 
been subject to inequality in their treatment by their employer. 
(2) It is important that, in deciding the relevant 'pool' for comparison 
for the purposes of an application, one tries to second-guess the pool 
that the employment tribunal will choose. In Jones v University of Manches- 
ter, 32 the applicant was excluded from employment as a careers adviser as 
the University (wanting someone close to the age of the students) had 
restricted eligibility for this post to graduates aged 27-35. She was 46 years 
of age and the basis of her claim was that the requirement was indirectly 
" (19971 IRLR 560. 
30 See also Meer v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [ 1988 ] IRLR 399. 
" [19831 IRLR 166. 
32 [19931 IRLR 218. 
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discriminatory as female mature students tended to be older than male 
mature students and, by definition, fewer women could comply with the 
age requirement than men. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, 
claiming that the appropriate comparators were all persons meeting the 
relevant criteria: 'It is, in effect, the total number of all those persons, 
men and women, who answer the description contained in the advertise- 
ment, apart from the age requirement. Here, that means all graduates 
with the relevant experience. "' In the event that an applicant chooses a 
pool for comparison which is incorrect, he or she will lose the case. 31 The 
relevant pool is a matter of fact for the employment tribunal to deter- 
mine 3' but, as illustrated in the Jones case, it does often prefer to choose 
" broad pool (e. g. all women in the United Kingdom eligible to apply for 
" job). The tribunal will expect statistical evidence to be produced and 
led to support assertions of indirect discrimination. One solution is to 
provide statistical evidence for a number of different pools and, instead 
of the employment tribunal turning down the case, if deemed appropri- 
ate, it can decide which statistical evidence is most apt and accept that as 
evidence of discrimination. 
(3) It is a defence to a claim for indirect discrimination to show that the 
types of discriminatory activity were 'objectivelyjustifiable' by an employer 
on a ground other than sex. The question is, can the provision, criterion 
or practice be shown to be justifiable? 
In Clarke v Ell (1AH) Kynoch Ltd" it was notjustifiable under a redund- 
ancy procedure to choose part-timers for dismissal before full-time staff. 
10 tikU V MSC37 n ju the Court of Appeal said that the standard for proving 
ajustifiable reason other than sex should be 'what was acceptable to right 
thinking people as sound and tolerable reasons for adopting the practice 
in question' . 
3' This was not a very helpful definition for employment tri- 
bunals and the ECJ in Bilka-Kaujhaus 39 provided clarification of the stand- 
ard of proof required. The employer must demonstnate objectivelyjustified 
factors which are unrelated to discrimination based on sex. The employer 
must show that there is a real business need for the discriminatory out- 
come and that the means chosen to achieve the outcome are suitable 
and necessary. 40 
31 Ibid, per Evans LJ at 228-291. 
' Pearce v City of Bradford Metropolitan Council (19881 IR1R 378, EAT. 
15 Kidd v DRG (UK) Ltd [1985) IRLR 190, EAT. 
" [19821 IRLR 482, EAT. 
37 [19821 IRLR 418, CA. 
Ibid at p 422. In Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board (1987] IRLR 26, the House of 
Lords held that the concepts of justification in indirect discrimination and equal pay 
cases should be interpreted in the same way. 
Bilka-Kau/haus GmbH v Weber Von Hartz [ 1986] ECR 1607. 
S Anderman Labour Law - Management Decisions and Workers'Rights (Butterworths, 2000), 
ch 8. J Dine and B Watt (eds) Disc7imination Law. Concepts, Limitations and Justificatiow 
(Longman, 1996), pp 103-109. 
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(4) The applicant must show that their inability to meet or comply with 
the provision, criterion or practice caused them to suffer a detriment. 
The degree of detriment needed to substantiate a discrimination claim 
for the purposes of this Act and other equality legislation was until 
recently unsettled. 41 In Minisby of Defence v jeremiae' it was defined as 
merely 'putting under a disadvantagc'. In other cases, however, some- 
thing more had been looked for. In Schmidt v Austicks Bookshops Ltd'-' it 
was not sufficient detriment for a woman to be required to wear a dress 
under the company rules. 44 
To establish a detriment it is not necessary to establish a breach of 
contract but it is necessary to show that the applicant had been disadvant- 
45 
aged in the circumstances in which he or she had to work. In Insitu 
Cleaning Co Ltd v HeaV6a single sexist comment made to a female man- 
ager in a meeting was sufficient to constitute a detriment. In Shamoon v 
Chief Constable of the Pwyal Uster Constabula? )ý7 the House of Lords heard 
an appeal from a decision of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal that 
a female chief inspector whose power to undertake staff appraisals had 
been withdrawn by her employer had not suffered sufficient detriment 
for the purposes of the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 
1976. The Court of Appeal's finding, that for a detriment to be estab- 
lished there must be some physical or economic consequence as a result 
of the discrimination, which is material and substantial, was overturned. 
The House of Lords emphasised that the word detriment should be given 
its broad ordinary meaning and there was no requirement to show that 
the employee suffered some economic or physical consequence. " 
Victimisation 
Under s4 of the SDA 1975 it is unlawful to discriminate against persons 
by way of victimisation when they try to assert a right under the SDA 
1975 or take part in proceedings to assert such a right for someone else 
or themselves. To establish victimisation the applicant must show that 
the following three elements are present: 
(1) The victim must have brought an action for sex discrimination to an 
employment tribunal, given evidence in a sex discrimination case or 
alleged that sex discrimination has taken place. 
"' Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Rayal Ulster Gonstabula7y [20031 IRLR 285, HL. 
42 [19791 IRLR 436, CA. 
43 [ 19771 IRLR 360, EAT. 
In De Souza v Automobile Association [ 19861 IRLR 103, CA, a racial insult made in a conver- 
sation overheard by a typist was insufficient detriment. 
Sexual harassment will represent a suitable detriment in most cases. 
[1995] IPJLR 4, EAT. 
47 (20031 IRLR 285. 
48 Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan [2001] IRLR 830. 
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(2) It must be shown that the applicant experienced less favourable 
treatment compared to a person not involved in sex discrimination 
proceedings. 49 
(3) It must also be established that the less favourable treatment is a direct 
result of the involvement in sex discrimination proceedings. 
In Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd (No 2), " a woman who had left her 
employment claimed she had been subjected to victimisation by her 
employer because it refused to provide her with a reference. This matter 
was referred to the ECJ by the EAT to determine if she had a right of 
action under European Law. The ECJ ruled that Article 6 of the Equal 
Treatment Directive did provide a right to bring an action for discrim- 
ination after the contract had come to an end. The EAT decided it could 
give effect to the ECJ judgment without distorting the language of the 
SDA 1975 and it was possible to construe the Act in a way that is in con- 
formity with the Directive. " 
The application of the SDA 1975 to relationships which have come to 
an end is dealt with by reg 3 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Amend- 
ment) Regulations 2003, and similar provisions are made under the 
Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 (reg 21 )12 
and the Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 (insert- 
ing s 27A into the RRA 1976, which includes only grounds of race, ethnic 
or national origin). " Where a 'relevant relationship' has come to an end 
it, %ill be unlawful for the 'relevant party' to discriminate so as to subject 
another party to a detriment or to harass such a party 'where the dis- 
crimination or harassment arises out of and is closely connected to that 
relationship'. 
Unlauful activities 
The Act specifies what type of discriminatory activities should be treated 
as unlawful. These cover discriminatory practices in recruitment and 
selection, within employment and dismissal on the ground of sex. Under 
s6 of the SDA 1975 it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against 
a woman: 
in the a7rangements made for the purpose of determining who shall be offered 
employment (s 6(1) (a)). In Brennan v Dewhurst5' the EAT held that it 
, Ibid. 
50 C-185/97; (19981 ECR 1-5199, ECJ. 
-11 The legislation introduced to implement the Race Discrimination Directive and the Frame- 
work Directive makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a former em- 
ployee where the discrimination is closely connected to the employment relationship. 
52 Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1661. 
53 SI 2003/1626. 
54 [19831 IRLR 357, EAT. 
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was irrelevant that the employer did not intend to discriminate and 
clarified that 'in all stages in applying for and obtaining employment a 
woman should be on an equal footing with a man'. 
or in the terms in which employment is offered (s 6(l) (b)). Although inequ- 
ality in pay and other terms and conditions between men and women 
in employment is covered by the EPA 1970, where the inequality 
applies to terms and conditions offered at the selection stage of 
employment the SDA 1975 will apply. It will also apply where there is 
no opportunity to bring a case under the EPA 1970 (e. g. where there 
is no suitable male comparator in the same employment). 'Under the 
EPA 1970 a female applicant must normally point to a male compar- 
ator with whom to compare her terms and conditions of employment, 
whereas in an equivalent claim under the RRA 1976 the applicant need 
only point to a hypothetical comparator of a different racial group. "' 
In Macarthys Ltd V SMithý6 it was decided by the ECJ that a woman was 
entitled to receive the same terms and conditions as her male pre- 
decessor under Article 119 (now Article 141). 
by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her employment (s 6(1) (c)). This 
will be difficult to prove because the information needed to make a 
comparison is in the hands of the employer and the applicant needs to 
show that they are the best candidate and were refused employment 
on the basis of their sex. 5' The employer has a managerial prerogative 
to decide who is chosen for employment and, unless there is clear evid- 
ence of discrimination, the employment tribunal may be reluctant to 
intervene. 
in the way in which she is afforded access to promotion, transfer or training or 
to any other benefits, facilities or services or by refusing or deliberately omitting 
to afford access to them (s 6 (2) (a)). This is a wide-ranging measure cap- 
able of covering most kinds of discrimination arising within the employý- 
ment relationship. 
by dismissing her or subjecting her to any other detriment (s 6 (2) ). The term 
detriment has been interpreted by the courts as including sexual har- 
assment (discussed below). Where a woman is dismissed on the ground 
of her sex then she may have a choice of bringing a claim under this 
part of the Act or for unfair dismissal. " The benefit for her pursuing 
the former option rather than the latter is that she will not need to 
establish that she has continuous service of one year with the employer 
and the damages that she can be awarded are unlimited. The term 
'5 R Townshend-Smith Disc7imination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Cavendish, 1998), 
p 331. 
56 [1980] IRLR 210, ECJ. 
57 An order for the discovery of documents (see Nasse V Science Research Counci4- Vyas v Leyland 
Cars (19791 IRLR 465, HL) and a questionnaire procedure under s 74 of the SDA 1975 
and s 65 of the RRA 1976 will assist the applicant in proving his or her case. 
ýý8 Under s 95 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. 
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'dismissal' here and under s 4(2) (c) of the RRA 1976 has been ex- 
tended to cover constructive dismissal. " 
Genuine occupational qualifications 
There are certain situations prescribed by s7 of the SDA 1975 where it is 
permissible to discriminate in terms of recruitment and selection and 
these are known as genuine occupational qualifications (GOQs). The onus 
is on the employer to show that this defence applies and he need only 
show that part of the job is covered by a GOQ. 
Discrimination in recruitment and selection may be permissible where: 
it is for physiological reasons (other than physical strength or stamina). 
This would allow someone of a particular sex to be chosen for a job 
where the physical characteristics of a person of that sex are needed 
for reasons of authenticity (e. g. acting, modelling). ' 
the job needs to be held by a man or a woman to preserve decency or 
privacy as it is likely to involve physical contact with a man and it is 
reasonable for them to object. In Wylie v Dee & Co (Menswear) Ltd61 a 
woman applied for a job as a sales assistant in a men's tailors. She was 
refused employment on the basis that part of the job involved taking 
the inside leg measurements of male clients and they would object if 
a woman did this (GOQ). It was held that the refusal to employ her 
was sex discrimination and the GOQ did not apply because this was a 
small part of the job that could be undertaken by one of the six male 
assistants. 
" men or women will be in a state of undress. 62 
" there is single-sex accommodation - it is impractical for thejob-holder 
to live anywhere other than in the employer's premises and the only 
such premises available are for one sex and these are not equipped 
with separate sleeping accommodation or sanitary facilities and it is 
not reasonable for an employer either to equip those premises with 
such accommodation and facilities or to provide other premises (e. g. 
manned lighthouses). 
" the job is in a single-sex establishment which is a prison, hospital or 
other establishment for persons requiring special care, supervision and 
attention and it is reasonable having regard to the essential character 
of the establishment or that part of the job should be held by a person 
of a specified sex. 
11 SDA 1975 (as amended), s 82(lA) and Derby Specialist Fahrication Ltd v Burton [2001] 
IRLR 69, EAT. 
IG Pitt 'Madam Butterfly and Miss Saigon: Reflection on Genuine Occupational Quali- 
fications' in j Dine and B Watt (eds) Discrimination Law. Concepts, Limitations andjustifica- 
tions (Longman, 1996), pp 198-206. 
61 [19781 IRLR 103. 
62 Etam ple v Rowan [ 1989] IRLR 150. 
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the holder of the job provides individuals with personal services pro- 
moting their welfare or education or similar personal services and those 
services can most effectively be provided by a person of a specified sex. 
the job is one of two held by a married couple. 
thejob involves working outside the United Kingdom in a country whose 
law and customs are such that the duties could not or could not effect- 
ively be carried out by a person of a specified sex. 
Remedies 
A complaint of sex discrimination must be brought to an employment 
tribunal within three months of the discriminatory act. Where a com- 
plaint is made out of time the tribunal can consider it when it is just and 
equitable to allow the case to proceed to a hearing. 
Where a claim for sex discrimination is successfully brought against 
the employer there are three possible remedies that an employment tri- 
bunal can award to the applicant: 
(1) A declaratory order from the employment tribunal, setting out the 
rights and obligations of the parties in relation to the act to which 
the complaint relates (SDA 1975, s 65 (1) (a)). " 
(2) Recommendations can be made by a tribunal, recommending that 
an employer take action to remove the discriminatory effect of its 
behaviour on the complainant. This might consist of transferring a 
harasser away from his victim, introducing training for managers on 
equal opportunities policies and procedures, changing procedures 
for recruitment and selection to ensure equality of treatment, and 
providing a fair and accurate reference to someone that is dismissed 
because of his or her sex. When an employer fails to comply with the 
recommendation without reasonable justification, then the amount 
of compensation it has been required to pay to the complainant can 
be increased; or, where no provision for compensation has been 
made, an order for compensation can be issued against the employer. 
(3) Compensation is the most common remedy sought by and awarded 
to complainants. The compensation is unlimited as a consequence 
of the ruling of the ECJ in Marshall v Southampton and South West 
Hampshire Health Authori ty (No 2)6' and the Sex Discrimination and 
Equal Pay (Remedies) Regulations 1993. In some instances, the 
amount of damages awarded have been considerable. 5 The head- 
ings of financial loss which the complainant can be compensated for 
For a critique of the remedies, see L Lustgarten 'Racial inequality and the limits of the 
law' (1986) 49 Modern Law Review 68. 
[1993] IRLR 445. 
M Nichols 'Analyst wins over Ilm for sex discrimination' The Scotsman, Friday 31 January 
2002, p 5. 
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by way of restitution include injury to feelings, loss of earnings 
(including future earnings), loss of pension rights, interest due on 
the award, and expenses associated with the legal claim. 
Positive or affirmative action" 
The SDA 1975 and the RRA 1976 both make provision for positive action 
for sexual or racial groups who are under-represented in terms of employ- 
ment, training or promotion. Most commentators agree that the provisions 
in both Acts are inadequate as a positive force for combating inequality. 67 
The provisions in equality law encourage two types of positive discrimina- 
tion: the first is to encourage more persons in a disadvantaged group to 
apply for jobs and to provide such groups with the opportunity to gain 
such skills and experience to allow them to compete for these jobs. ' 
The second type, which is the right to positively discriminate in favour 
of one sex or a racial group, will not apply unless it can be shown that 
the group it is sought to discriminate in favour of is under-represented as 
per s 47(l) of the SDA 1975 - in other words, within that group, no one 
has been employed in that particularjob during the last 12 months or 
the number of persons doing that work is comparatively small. " Under 
sex discrimination law, in determining whether the number of employees 
in a particularjob is comparatively small, the comparator will be all women 
in a population. The issues related to this are highlighted in the following 
quote: 
One of the difficulties with legal intervention, perhaps inevitably, is that 
there is no sliding scale of what is permissible... In policy terms, the 
greater the degree of under-representation, the greater and more varied 
the steps an employer should be encouraged and permitted to take. 70 
In race discrimination cases the comparator in determining under- 
representation is much narrower, being the numbers employed by a 
particular employer, and this presents less difficulty for employers from 
an evidential point of vieW. 71 
Sex Discilmination Act 1975 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 
This very short piece of legislation deals with two main issues, one of 
which has been dealt with elsewhere. Sections I and 2 clarify that a 
66 These terms can be used interchangeably. 
Rj Townshend-Smith Disc7imination Law. Text, Cases and Materials (Cavendish, 1998), 
p 539. For the contrary view, see B Parekh 'A case for positive discrimination' in B Hepple 
68 
and E Szyszcak (eds) Disc7imination: Limits of the Law (Mansell, 1993), pp 261-280. 
69 
V Sacks 'Tackling Discrimination Positively in Britain' in ibid, pp 357-383. 
RRA 1976, s 37(l). 
70 Hughes v London Borough of Hackney, below. 
71 Hughes v London Borough of Hackney [19861 unreported, London Central Industrial 
Tribunal; see 7 Equal Opportunities Review 27. 
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police constable (despite being an office holder) should be treated as an 
employee for the purposes of the SDA 1975 and deemed to be working 
for the chief officer of police. 72 Further, anything done by a person hold- 
ing such an office shall be treated as done in the course of employment. 
Given that the police are increasingly respondents in discrimination cases, 
it is not surprising that the liability of both parties arising under the SDA 
1975 should be clarified. 
Under sections 3 and 4 the rules are set out dealing with discrimina- 
tion after an employment relationship has come to an end (see the Coote73 
case). Where there is a relevant relationship and the discriminatory act 
that arises after the employment has ceased is closely connected with that 
relationship, then protection is provided (ss 20A and 35C are inserted 
into the SDA 1975). 
Sexual harassment 
Article 2(2) of the Equal Treatment Amendment Directive provides that 
harassment is unwanted conduct related to the sex of a person that 
occurs with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of that person. 
Harassment is defined as occurring where, on grounds of sex, A engages 
in unwanted conduct which has the purpose or effect of (a) violating B's 
dignity or (b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating 
or offensive environment for B. The conduct is deemed to have the re- 
quired effect if, having regard to all the circumstances, including in par- 
ticular the perception of B, it should reasonably be considered as having 
that effect. Under the new legislative rules implementing the amendments, 
harassment will no longer be a type of discrimination but a distinct type 
of unlawful conduct. 
Sexual harassment has been described as: 
Conduct of a sexual nature, or other conduct based on sex affecting the 
dignity of women. It is unacceptable, if it is unwanted, unreasonable and 
offensive to the recipient and such conduct creates an intimidating, hostile 
or humiliating working environment for the recipient. 74 
In Porcelli v Strathclyde Regional CounCi175 Mrs Porcelli was subjected to a 
campaign of harassment by two male colleagues to get her to leave her 
job, including sexual comments and sexual innuendoes, threatening ges- 
tures, etc. She applied for and was given a transfer and claimed that the 
behaviour constituted sex discrimination under SDA 1975. It was held 
for the first time that sexual harassment was sex discrimination under 
72 Similar measures were brought in for race discrimination cases under the Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2000. 
73 Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd (NO 2) [1998] ECR 1-5199. 
74 Council of Ministers of EU, Code of Practice, definition of sexual harassment. 
75 (19861 IRLR 134, Ct Sess. 
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s6 (2) (b) of the Act and fell under the term 'any other detriment'. The 
behaviour was discriminatory as a man similarly placed who was equally 
disliked would not have suffered the same fate. Treatment is on grounds 
of the woman's sex as per s1 (1) (a). Sexual harassment by itself without 
any accompanying threat to terms and conditions of employment is 
sufficiently detrimental to be treated as sex discrimination (working 
environment). 
While it was originally believed that harassment must involve a con- 
tinuous mode of conduct, this was refuted by two cases: Bracebridge Engin- 
eering Ltd v Darly, 76where a single incident of harassment was capable 
of constituting sufficient detriment (a serious assault by her supervisor 
and another); and Insitu Cleaning Co Ltd v Heads, " where a single verbal 
comment of a sexist nature made by a fellow manager at a meeting was 
sufficient detriment. 
In the following two cases sufficient detriment was not established. In 
British Telecommunications v William? an inter-view by a male manager of 
a female applicant for ajob in a very confined space was not treated as 
sex discrimination; and in Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd79 
pornographic images displayed in the workplace were not deemed to 
be discriminatory against women as working in an environment tainted 
by pornography was gender neutral (a man would have been equally 
offended). 
In Waters v Commissioner for Police of the MetropoliS80 a female police 
officer was sexually assaulted by a colleague outside working hours in her 
home. She reported the incident to her employer but after an enquiry 
no action was taken against the harasser. She then experienced victimisa- 
tion by her employer and made a claim under s4 of the SDA 1975. It was 
held that no legal action could be taken against the employer under the 
Act for the assault (not vicariously liable as per section 41 because the 
harasser was acting outside the scope of his employment); correspond- 
ingly, there was no right to bring a claim for victimisation, which is 
dependent on the action complained of following a complaint under s 41 
of the SDA 1975. The case was eventually taken to the House of Lords 
and they upheld Ms Waters' claim that the employer's failure to offer 
her support and to prevent harassment and victimisation of her amounted 
to breach of its duty of care under the law of contract and tort: 81 
If an employer knows that acts being done by employees during their 
employment may cause physical or mental harm to a particular fellow 
employee and he does nothing to supervise or prevent such acts, where it is 
76 (19901 IRLR 3, EAT. 
77 (19951 IRLR 4, EAT. 
711 (19971 IRLR 668, EAT. 
79 (19941 IRLR 440, EAT. 
"0 [19951 IRLR 531. 
81 Waters v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2000] IRLR 720. 
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in his power to do so, it is clearly arguable that he may be in breach of his 
duty to that employee. It seems to me that he may also be in breach of that 
duty if he can foresee such acts may happen, and if they do, that physical or 
mental harm may be caused. " 
The employer should have anticipated that Ms Waters' persistent com- 
plaint about the assault by a fellow officer would lead to retaliatory 
action. 
I consider the person employed under an ordinary contract of employment 
can have a valid cause of action in negligence against her employer if the 
employer fails to protect her against victimisation and harassment which 
cause physical or mental injury. This duty arises both under the contract 
of employment and under the common law principles of negligence. " 
In the course of employment 
Anything done by a person in the course of their employment shall be treated 
for the purposes of the SDA 1975 as having been done by the employer 
as well as him, whether or not it is done with the employer's knowledge 
or approval. The term 'in the course of their employment' must be given 
its everyday meaning. 84 
It is a defence for an employer to show he has done all that was 
reasonably practicable to prevent an employee's discriminatory act. In 
Chief Constable of the Lincolnshire Police v Stubbs" the employer was held 
liable under s 41 of the SDA 1975, for a discriminatory act perpetrated 
outside the workplace. On two occasions outside work, a female police 
officer socialising with her colleagues was sexually harassed physically and 
verbally by a fellow officer. A question arose concerning the liability of 
the employer for these acts. It was held by the EAT that the employer was 
liable: 
these incidents are connected to work and the workplace. They would not 
have happened but for the applicant's work. Work-related functions are an 
extension of employment and we can see no reason to restrict the course of 
employment to purely what goes on in the workplace. 
The courts adopted a similar approach to determining whether the 
vicarious liability of an employer applied under the law of tort. In Lister 
v Hesley Hall Ltd 86 a warden at a school for children with emotional or 
behavioural difficulties was sexually abusing his charges. The House of 
Lords held that the employer was vicariously liable for the acts of its 
employee because the well-being of the children in its care was part of 
81 Ibid, per Lord Slynn at 721. 
83 Ibid, per Lord Hutton at 724. 
"' See race discrimination cases redefining rules concerning vicarious liability, below. 
[1999] IRLR 81. 
[20011 IRLR 472. 
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the school's responsibility that it delegated to its employee. The torts were 
connected to the perfor7nance of the employee's duties under his contract. 
Sexual orientation and gender reassigiunent 
Until recently, victims of discrimination based on sexual orientation were 
denied any protection under discrimination law. There were no rights 
available to homosexual or lesbian employees facing discrimination 
under the equality laws of the United Kingdom or the European Union. 
They were denied protection because sexual orientation was not included 
within the ambit of section I of the SDA 1975, Article 141 of the EC 
Treaty or Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 EEC. The 
position in the United Kingdom was summarised by the Court of Appeal 
in the case of Smith v Gardner Merchant 87 in the following umy- 
... discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is not discrimination on 
the ground of sex within the meaning of the SDA 1975. A person's sexual 
orientation is not an aspect of his or her sex. 
It was the view of the judiciary that homosexuality derived from some- 
one's sexual proclivity rather than their gender and only gender-based 
discrimination v%ras acceptable for comparison in sex discrimination cases. 
A similar interpretation of Community law was provided by the ECJ in 
Grant v South-West TrainsN although they were apologetic for reaching 
such a conclusion: 'While the European Parliament ... has indeed 
deplored all forms of discrimination based on a person's sexual orienta- 
tion, it is nevertheless the case that the Community has not yet adopted 
rules providing for such equivalence. '" 
Even if homosexuals and lesbians could overcome this jurisdictional 
hurdle they would still be faced with the related problem of finding an 
appropriate comparator that meets the evidential requirement of the 
judiciary in these cases. The courts had ruled that the correct approach 
in determining if inequality of treatment applied was to compare a 
homosexual's treatment against a hypothetical comparator, namely a 
lesbian in the same situation. In the case of lesbians pursuing their rights, 
a homosexual would be the comparator. Only if they could satisfy the 
court that their gay comparator would be subjected to discrimination in 
the same circumstances would an action lie. ' This intractable view of the 
judiciary on this issue has recently been given the added support of the 
Scottish Court of Session in the case of Secreta7y of State for Defence v 
[19981 IRLR 510. 
( 199811 RLR 206. 
Ibid at p 218; this reasoning was followed in Rv Seadary of Stalefor Defence, exparUP6*ins 
(No 2) 119981 IRLR 508. 
90 Referred to as the 'equality of misery, in sexual discrimination, this can now apply 
to gays: Employment Law News from Tolley, 23 October 2000, available on 
www. personneltoday. net/pt-legal/legal-features. 
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AfarDonal&` It removed any hope in the short term for lesbians and gay 
men obtaining equal rights with heterosexual employees under UK em. 
ployment law. 
They overturned an ambitious but ill-considered judgmen t of the EAT 
(discussed below) which resulted in short-lived protection being provided 
for employees suffering discrimination on the basis of their sexual ori- 
entation. " It is important to remember that, despite this setback for 
these employees, legal developments in the law of the European Union 
in the form of a Directive providing protection against discrimination on 
the ground of sexual orientation, and consequent implementation in the 
United Kingdom through the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003, will bring about a change in their legal position. " 
European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights became part of the law 
of the United Kingdom Nvith the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA 1998). 9' The HRA 1998 came fully into force in most of the United 
Kingdom on 2 October 2000.95 The precise impact of the legislation is 
still uncertain; however, it does offer the prospect of legal rights being 
provided for various categories of victims of discrimination not catered 
for by UK employment law (Article 8- homosexuals and lesbians; 
Article 9- covering religious discrimination; and Article 14 -a more 
general discrimination provision). 
it was successfully argued before the Scottish EAT in MacDonald vMin- 
istry of Defence" that, as the European Convention had directly impacted 
on interpretation of domestic legislation, domestic equality legislation (the 
SDA 1975) should therefore be deemed to include sexual orientation 
urithin the term 'sex' as the basis for a claim under the Act in %iew of 
relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The 
justification for this conclusion came from the decision of the ECHR in 
Saiguiero da Silva Mouta V portugaL97 Article 14 vms interpreted (the right 
not to be discriminated against) as extending a direct right of action 
for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In light of this 
[20011 IRLR 431. 
The Court of Appeal's decision %ras recently upheld by the House of Lords. 
In the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, Sl 2003/1661 it is 
left suitably vague concerning the appropriate comparator in direct and Indirect dh, 
crimination cases; and under reg 3 they are referred to as 'other persons', leaving the 
employment tribunal with a wide choice of comparator. 
K Ewing 'The Human Rights Act and Labour Law' (1998) 27(4) Industrial Lawjournal 
276. 
In s 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998, the Scottish Parliament was called on to recognise 
the impact of the Convention and the Human Rights Act 1998 in fulfilling its legislative 
function. 
[20001 IRLR 749. 
Case 33290/96 [20011 Fam LR 2, ECHR. 
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judgment, the EAT interpreted UK domestic legislation as incorporating 
this right. The Court of Session, on appeal, regarded this reasoning as 
flawed and rejected this hypothesis in favour of the reasoning adopted in 
earlier cases such as Smith and Grant: 
On the whole matter I am satisfied that this statute and in particular this 
provision is concerned with gender and not sexual orientation. Section 3(1) 
of the 1998 Act does not in my opinion enable or oblige us to adopt any 
other reading. 98 
This judgment must be considered in the light of developments in the 
European Union: the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC has been imple- 
mented in the UK Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regula- 
tions 2003 and this has had a direct impact on the rights of victims of 
sexual orientation discrimination. The Regulations will make it unlawful 
to discriminate on various grounds not directly covered by existing legis- 
lation, including sexual orientation. 
HRA 1998 and Secretary of State for Defence v MacDonald 
The case against the Ministry of Defence was as follows: Mr MacDonald 
was initially commissioned into the Territorial Army Intelligence Corps 
and then employed by the Royal Air Force. He applied for a transfer to 
the Scottish Air Traffic Control centre at Prestwick on compassionate 
grounds. Mr McDonald was subjected to a rigorous vetting procedure for 
the job, under which he was asked if he was a homosexual. After heavy 
questioning about his sexuality, he confirmed that he was a homosexual 
and notified his commanding officer of this fact. His declarations led to 
his compulsory resignation under Queen's Regulations 2905. He claimed 
that he was sexually harassed and unlawfully dismissed on the ground of 
his sex. 
Although the legislative rules in the United Kingdom and the European 
Union offered him no chance of success, as his employer was the Ministry 
of Defence (a public body), he was entitled to seek appropriate protection 
under the HRA 1998. The argument that the effect of the HRA 1998 was 
expansion of the scope of existing domestic legislation to cover discrim- 
ination on these grounds was rejected by the Court of Appeal. 
In Smith and Grady v United Kingdonr the ECHR was satisfied that the 
introduction and application of the Ministry of Defence's policy to 
discharge homosexuals from the services when their sexual orientation 
became known to them (e. g. following an investigation into the personal 
affairs of the accused) was contrary to Article 8 (right to respect for pri- 
vate life) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy before a national 
98 Secretary of StateforDefmce v MacDonald [2001) IRLR 431, per Lord Prosser at p 436. 
"[ 19991 IRLR 735. 
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authority). The issue of the applicability of Article 14 to discriminatory 
acts based on someone's sexual orientation was raised but was consid- 
ered inadmissible. 
The EAT in MacDonald considered the following question: who should 
be the appropriate compar-ator in these cases? It was decided that it should 
either be a heterosexual man where a lesbian is bringing a claim or a 
heterosexual woman where the applicant is a homosexual man. 
If comparators are relevant, the issue is not as between male and female 
simpliciter but between a male or female homosexual and a male or female 
heterosexual in order to determine not whether one homosexual is being 
treated less favourably than another but whether homosexuals of either 
gender in this context are being treated less favourably than heterosexuals 
of the opposite gender which is the true comparator in the context of 
sexual orientation. 100 
The use of inter-sex comparison as the basis of a discrimination claim is 
already undertaken in the enforcement of rights under the SDA 1975, 
whereby heterosexual comparisons are carried out between the sexes. 
It is questionable whether an inter-sex or intr-a-sex comparator (e. g. 
comparing a lesbian with a heterosexual female) is likely to be the best 
option. In PvS and Cornwall County Cound4lo' however, the ECJ ruled 
that transsexuals should be compared with persons of the same sex not 
considering or undergoing gender reassignment. The EAT in the 
MacDonald case suggested that in serious cases of discrimination based 
on sexual orientation (such as those involving physical harassment or bullyý- 
ing) no comparator should be required: 'In circumstances where the 
behaviour complained of is both "blatantly unacceptable" and "sexually 
related" then there is no need for a comparator. ' A similar approach 
was taken by the Court of Appeal in Clark v Novacold Ltd, "' where it was 
decided, in respect of disability discrimination, that the 'sick person' 
comparison was invalid and no comparator was required to establish 
discrimination against a disabled employee on the ground of his or her 
disability. '03 In the Court of Appeal, the majority reverted to the original 
basis for comparison in these cases -a homosexual man or lesbian. 
However, Lord Prosser (in his dissenting judgment) said that the appro- 
priate comparator was a person of the opposite sex, regardless of any 
question of sexual orientation. 
"' M Rubenstein (2000) 29 U 1) Indust7ial Relations Law RePo7ts 745. 
10, [1996] IRLR 347. 
102 [19991 IRLR 318, CA. 
For an interesting discussion on the appropriate comparators in gender reassignment 
cases, see R Winternute 'Recognising new kinds of direct sex discrimination, trans- 
sexualism, sexual orientation and dress codes' (1997) 60 Modem Law Review 334 at 
pp 340-341. The intra-sex comparison is now part of the Sex Discrimination (Gender 
Reassignment) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/1002. 
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Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003'04 
Sexual orientation is widely defined under regulation 2 to mean 
orientation towards persons of the same sex (homosexuals), persons of 
the opposite sex (heterosexuals), and persons of the same sex and the 
opposite sex (bisexuals). This means that homosexuals, heterosexuals and 
bisexuals are protected under the legislation. 
They cover discrimination on grounds of perceived as well as actual 
sexual orientation (i. e. assuming - correctly or incorrectly - that someone 
is lesbian, gay, heterosexual or bisexual). The Regulations also cover 
association, i. e. being discriminated against on grounds of the sexual 
orientation of those with whom you associate (for example, friends 
and/or family). 10' 
The Regulations provide protection against direct and indirect discrimina- 
tion and victimisation. Regulation 3 states: 
(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person ('A') discriminates 
against another person ('B') if - 
(a) on grounds of sexual orientation, A treats B less favourably than he 
treats or would treat other persons; or 
(b) A applies to Ba provision, criterion or practice which he applies or 
would apply equally to persons not of the same sexual orientation 
as B, but - 
(i) which puts or would put persons of the same sexual 
orientation as B at a particular disadvantage when compared 
with other persons, 
(ii) which puts B at that disadvantage, and 
(iii) which A cannot show to be a proportionate means of achieving 
a legitimate aim. 
(2) A comparison of B's case with that of another person under paragr-aph 
(1) must be such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the 
same, or not materially different, in the other. 
The key provisions of this legislation are the same as or similar to exist- 
ing equality legislation. Regulation 4 deals with victimisation and provides 
protection against such behaviour where it occurs for the reason that a 
person has brought an action against another or proceedings against, or 
given evidence or information in connection with proceedings against 
another, etc. 
The definition of harassment in regulation 5 is similar to that found 
in other legislation, making it unlawful for A to engage in unwanted 
conduct on the ground of sexual orientation, which has the purpose or 
effect of violating B's dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrad- 
ing, humiliating or offensive environment for B. Under regulation 6(3) 
" SI 2003/1661. 
105 DTI website, www. dti. gov. uk/er/equality/eeregs-a. html. 
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'it is unlawful for an employer... to subject to harassment a person whom 
he employs or who has applied to him for employment. ' Regulation 6 
sets out the types of activities that will be treated as unlawful under the 
Regulations, which are largely identical to those under s4 of the RRA 
1976 and s6 of the SDA 1975. Dismissal of a person includes expiry of a 
fixed-tenn contract or constructive dismissal. 
Regulation 7(2) sets out a general occupational requirement in favour 
of employees of a particular sexual orientation that can exempt an other- 
wise discriminatory act, including unlawful dismissal of someone not of 
that sexual orientation. Under regulation 7(3), where employment is for 
the purpose of organised religion the employer can impose a require- 
ment that it is difficult for a person (because of their sexual orientation) 
to meet and consequently can discriminate against them (including 
undertaking dismissal). This can apply where such a requirement is 
necessary to comply with the doctrine of a religion, or where, because of 
the nature of the employment (or the context in which it is carried out), 
the requirement is necessary to avoid conflicting with the strongly held 
convictions of a significant number of the religion's followers. 
There has been little research into the extent of this type of discrimina- 
tion within employment in the United Kingdom. However, where research 
has been undertaken the results show that discriminatory practices in 
employment against this type of employee are commonplace. 106 
While at the present time it is impossible for victims of discrimina- 
tion based on sexual orientation to bring a successful claim for dis- 
crimination, there may be other statutory claims (working time, wages, 
breach of contract, harassment) and common law actions (e. g. actions 
in tort) they could pursue. 107 Where they are dismissed because of their 
sexual orientation, this action could be deemed to be reasonable by an 
108 employment tribunal. There is clearly a deficiency in equality legisla- 
tion, which will hopefully be addressed by the Employment Equality 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003. It will be interesting to see how 
successfully the new regulations fulfil this role. Employees may be reluct- 
ant to pursue claims against their employers for fear of stigmatisation, 
victimisation (regulation 4) or harassment (regulation 5), despite legal 
protection being provided against these activities; and the issue of choos- 
ing the appropriate comparator may still cause problems for employment 
tribunals. 
Stonewall, a national lobbying organisation on behalf of lesbians, bisexuals and gay men, 
undertook a survey of 2,000 employees in 1993. They found that 16% of respondents 
had experienced discrimination, 48% had been harassed because of their sexual ori- 
entation and 68% felt the need to conceal their sexual orientation from co-workers. 
In an independent survey carried out by the Social and Community Planning Group in 
1995, similar results were obtained. 
107 S Middlemiss and N Busby 'The equality deficit, legal protection for homosexuals and 
lesbians in employmen0' (2001) 8(4) Gender Work and Organisation 387. 
108 Saunders v Scottish National Gamps Association Ltd [1980) IRLR 14. 
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Transsexuals 
Legal protection against discrimination has been provided for transsexuals 
at work. Transsexuals are persons convinced that their physical anatomy 
is different from their true gender. 109 They will often undertake opera- 
tions to redress this perceived imbalance (by changing their sex) and will 
dress in the clothes of someone of the opposite sex and want to use 
facilities provided for the opposite sex. This will often cause practical 
problems for employers"' and possibly persons working alongside an em- 
ployee who is a transsexual. "' Transsexuals themselves may often experi- 
ence various kinds of discrimination at work at the hands of their employer 
or co-workers, including harassment, social and professional isolation, 
dismissal and ostracism. 
judicial recognition of the right of transsexuals not to be discrimin- 
ated against was first achieved in the ECJ's decision in PvS and Cornwall 
County Council. "' When the applicant was initially employed as a general 
manager he was male but after about a year he announced that he was 
intending to undergo an operation for gender reassignment. He was 
dismissed. The tribunal felt that this case fell outside the scope of the 
SDA 1975 but referred the case to the ECJ to determine if the Equal 
Treatment Directive offered protection. The ECJ found that: 
such discrimination is based, essentially, if not exclusively, on the sex of the 
person concerned. Where a person is dismissed on the ground that he or 
she intends to undergo, or has undergone, gender reassignment, he or she 
is treated less favourably by comparison with persons of the sex to which he 
or she was deemed to belong to before undergoing gender reassignment. '" 
The treatment of the employee in this case was deemed to be contrary to 
Article 5(l) of the Equal Treatment Directive. 
Following this case, the EAT ruled in Chessington World of Adventures v 
Reed"' that the definition of sex discrimination in the SDA 1975 could be 
interpreted (in light of the judgment in Pv S) as including gender re- 
assignment. The response of the Government was to introduce legislation 
in the form of the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regula- 
tions 1999.11' These Regulations expressly prohibit discrimination on the 
grounds of gender reassignment in the fields of employment and voca- 
tional training. Where a person receives less favourable treatment than 
another person on the ground that the individual intends to undergo, is 
undergoing or has undergone gender reassignment, then a case will be 
109 Referred to as gender dysphoria or gender identity disorder. 
"0 Av Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police (20031 IRLR 32. 
... In Croft v Consignia p& (20021 IRLR 851 a refusal to allow a pre-operative male to female 
transsexual to use a ladies' toilet was not contrary to the SDA 1975. 
[19961 IRLR 347. 
Ibid at p 354. 
114 [19971 IRLR 556. 
115 SI 1999/1002. 
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established, unless a GOQ applies. 116As a result of the permanent GOQs, 
it will now be permissible to discriminate against an individual who 
intends to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone gender reassign- 
ment and the job involves the holder of the job being liable to be called 
upon to undertake physical searches'17 or work or live in a private home 
and objection might reasonably be taken to allowing that person a degree 
of physical or social contact with a person living in the home (or know- 
ledge of their intimate details). 
The impact of these Regulations can be seen in Goodwin v United King6 
dom, "' where the ECHR held that the United Kingdom was in breach of 
Article 8 of the Convention (dealing with the right to family life, etc. ) 
because, as part of certain procedures set up to implement legal rules in 
the United Kingdom (e. g. dealing with national insurance, employment 
and social security), someone's sex was recorded as that of their birth, 
thereby discriminating against transsexuals. 
In Av Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police"' the complainant was a 
male to female transsexual who applied to become a police constable. 
She was refused employment on the basis that legislation affected the 
carrying out of searches by transsexuals and, accordingly, the complain- 
ant would not be able to carry out the full duties of a police constable. 
The Chief Constable argued that 'she was legally male and conformity 
of legal and apparent gender was a genuine occupational qualification 
within the meaning of section 7 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975'. The 
employment tribunal found in favour of the complainant; however, the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal. The case went on 
appeal to the Court of Appeal, where it was held that a post-operative male 
to female transsexual was to be regarded as female, except where there 
were significant factors of public interest to weigh against the interests of 
the individual applicant in obtaining legal recognition of her gender 
reassignment. This might include the situation where a transsexual wanted 
her transsexualism to remain undisclosed, although that was not the 
position in this case. 
Race discrimination 
Background to the legislation 
The large-scale influx of racial and ethnic minorities into the United 
]Kingdom in recent times started with recruitment of cheap migrant 
116 For details of supplementary temporary and permanent GOO-s in the legislation and 
relevant case law, see (2002) 104 Equal OPPomnities Review 17. 117 es See Av Chief Constable Of IV' I Yorkshire Police [2003] IRLR 32, where this right was qualified. 
[20021 IRLR 664. 
[20031 ICR 161. 
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labour from the New Commonwealth territories such as the West Indies 
and India and other countries in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. These 
immigrants were used to fill the labour shortages caused by post-war 
industrial expansion in the United Kingdom. 
Following this period there was an economic recession which led to 
a substantial decrease in primary immigration, although the process of 
secondary immigration (whereby the families of existing migrants were 
allowed into the country to join their relatives) continued throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s. Substantial numbers of refugees from Eastern 
Europe and Africa sought asylum from the 1980s onwards and this phe- 
nomenon continues today. "o Overall, the introduction of people with 
different backgrounds, cultures and physical characteristics often led to 
racism within British society and particularly in the workplace. 121 
In societies such as Britain racism is produced and reproduced through 
political discourse, the media, the educational system and other institutions. 
Within this wider social context racism becomes an integral element of 
diverse social issues such as law and order, crime, the inner cities and urban 
unrest. ' 22 
The following quote summarised the traditional view of most employ- 
ers in respect of employment of persons from racial minorities: 
Despite the need for their labour, their presence aroused widespread 
hostility at all levels ... Employers only reluctantly recruited immigrants 
where there were no white workers to fill the jobs ... At this time the 
preference for white workers was seen as quite natural and legitimate - 
immigrants were seen as an inferior but necessary labour SUpply. 123 
It was necessary to combat racism 124 through application of the law and 
the first attempt to do this in an employment context was the RRA 1968. 
There were inherent defects in this Act, however, which meant that it 
was ineffective in its attempt to combat racism within employment (e. g. 
there was no scope for direct complaint about employers by victims of 
discrimination and there was no facility to bring a case for indirect dis- 
crimination). These deficiencies became apparent and pressure was put 
on the government by various bodies to bring in new legislation in the 
form of the RRA 1976. 
It is interesting to note that race discrimination in employment was 
not part of the agenda of the European Union until very recently. In the 
past, however, where changes in the legislation dealing with sex dis- 
crimination came about through EU legislation or case law, governments 
"' M MacEwen Tackling racism in Europe. an examination of anti-discrimination law in practice 
12 
(Berg Publishing, 1995), pp 3-6,155-159. 
'B Wiley Employment Law in Context (2nd edn, Prentice Hall, 2003), pp 194-199. 
'22 j Solomos Race and Racism in Britain (2nd edn, Macmillan, 1993), pp 183-185. 
11 j Solomos and L Back Racism and Society (Macmillan, 1996), pp 67-69. 
124 Ibid, pp 194-198 for useful definitions of race, ethnicity, colour and racism. 
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tended to introduce equivalent changes to legislation dealing with race 
discrimination shortly after (e. g. Race Relations (Remedies) Act 1994). 
The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the power to adopt a Directive to 
implement the principle of equal treatment on grounds of race or 
religion. "' The power to adopt measures to deal with discrimination is 
now contained within Article 13 of the EC Treaty (see Chapter 2). 126 
Race Relations Act 1976 
There are strong similarities between the legislation dealing with race 
and sex discrimination in most areas. As a result, there is no need to give 
detailed consideration to sections of the RRA 1976 where this applies 
because reference can be made to the relevant provision in the SDA 1975. 
The RRA takes its form from the SDA; the two are substantially equivalent, 
except that in one case discrimination on grounds of gender is being dealt 
with, whereas in the other it is discrimination on racial grounds which are 
proscribed. 127 
The case law arising under sex discrimination law can not only alter 
interpretation of that law but also the equivalent legal rules dealing with 
race discrimination, and vice versa. 
Under s 3(1) of the RRA 1976 racial grounds are defined as meaning 
128 4colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins'. 
There is no explicit protection against religious discrimination, although 
certain religions have protection under the Act (e. g. Sikhs andjews) and 
all religions are covered by the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003'29which came into effect in December 2003. 
The term 'nationality' refers to race and citizenship. Thus it is unlaw- 
ful to discriminate against nationals of countries in the European Union. 
It is now clear that the Scots and the English can be regarded as a separ- 
ate national grouping for the purposes of the RRA 1976. 
Direct discrimination and the RRA 1976 
Section 1 (1) (a) of the RRA 1976 provides: 'A person discriminates against 
another in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision 
in this Act if... on racial grounds he treats that other less favourably 
125 Council Directive 2000/43/EC. 
126 E Guild 'The EC Directive on Race Discrimination: surprises, possibilities and limita- 
tions' (2000) 29 Industrial Lawjournal 416. 
127 C Bourn and j Whitmore Anti-Disaimination Law in Hritain (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1996), pII- 
121 The new regulations implementing the EU Race Discrimination Directive - the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 - insert a new section 1A in the 
RRA 1976 that covers only discrimination based on race or ethnic or national origin, 
not on colour or nationality. 
121 Sl 2003/1660. 
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than he treats or would treat other persons. ' As in sex discrimination 
cases, the motive of the employer is irrelevant. It is enough to show that 
the employee suffered less favourable treatment. The assumption is that 
the applicant will cite a comparator of a different racial group in a sim- 
ilar position to him or her who has been given (or would have been given) 
preferential treatment by the employer. In the event that a comparator 
in the workplace cannot be found, reference may be made to a hypo- 
thetical comparator. 130 
The less favourable treatment may be on the ground of the race of a 
third party. In Zarzynska v Levy, 13' a female barperson was dismissed when 
she refused to follow an order not to serve drinks to persons of a particu- 
lar racial group. It was held that this represented direct discrimination as 
per s1 (1) (a) of the RRA 1976.132 
Indirect discrimination 
Section 1 (1) (b) of the RRA 1976 provides: 
A person discriminates against another in any circumstances relevant for 
the purposes of any provision of this Act if... he applies a requirement or 
condition"' which he applies or would apply equally to persons not of the 
same racial group as that other but - 
(i) which is such that the proportion of persons of a racial group that can 
comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons 
not of that racial group who can comply with it; and 
(ii) which he cannot show to bejustifiable irrespective of the colour, race, 
nationality or ethnic or national origins of the person to whom it is 
applied; and 
(iii) which is to the detriment of that other because he cannot comply with it- 
Under section 1Aý34a person also discriminates against another if, in any 
circumstances relevant for the provision referred to in section 1B 135 (which 
includes discrimination in the employment field): 
he applies to that other a provision, criterion or practice which he applies or 
would apply to persons not of the same race or ethnic or national origins as 
that other but - 
(a) which puts or would put persons of the same race or ethnic or national 
origins as that other at particular disadvantage when compared with 
other persons, 
Balamoody v United Kingdom Central CouncilJor Nursing, Midwifoy and Health Vtsiting[20021 
IRLR 288. 
[19781 IRLR 7, EAT. 
112 See also Weathalfield v Sargent (1998] IRLR 14, EAT. 
It used to be necessary to show that a discriminatory condition or requirement applied 
and this represented a high standard of proof for the applicant in these cases. 
134Added by the Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, * SI 2003/1626. 
135 Part 11, ss 17-18D; s 19B so far as it relates to social security, health care, any form of 
social protection or social disadvantage which does not fall within s 20; ss 20-24, ss 26A and 
26B; ss 76 and 76ZA; and Part IV in its application to the provisions referred to above. 
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(b) which puts that other at that disadvantage, and 
(c) which he cannot show to be a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim. " 
There are therefore two different definitions of indirect discrimina- 
tion which apply under the RRA 1976 (the second definition having 
narrower grounds but a less stringent evidential requirement) and deter- 
mining which one of these definitions is appropriate is dependent on 
which section of the Act applies. The evidential aspect of these definitions 
is best illustrated by consideration of indirect discrimination cases. 
In Perera v Civil Service Commission (No 2) 137 the complainant was a Sri 
Lankan by birth. He had a legal qualification and had practised at the 
bar in his own country, and for several years in the United Kingdom he 
had practised at the bar and obtained ICMA qualifications. Despite this, 
he had failed after numerous attempts to be transferred into the legal 
service or accountancy section, or to obtain a promotion in his post as 
executive officer. He brought a case against his employer, the Civil Ser- 
vice, alleging discrimination over the rejection of his application for the 
post of legal assistant. The selection board took into account four fac- 
tors in determining suitability for selection: experience in the United 
Kingdom; command of English; whether the candidate had or had not 
applied for British nationality; and age. He claimed these requirements 
were indirectly discriminatory against people from his racial group. The 
Court of Appeal held: that the applicant had failed to establish that these 
were the requirements or conditions (must be absolute bar); and that the 
candidate's personal qualities were the significant factor in determining 
selection of staff. 
The whole of the evidence indicates that a brilliant man whose personal 
qualities made him suitable as a legal assistant might well have been sent 
forward on a short list by the interview board in spite of being, perhaps, 
below standard on his knowledge of English and his ability to communicate 
in that language-138 
It is doubtful that the Court would reach the same conclusion now, given 
that the definition of indirect discrimination has been amended. 139 
In Hussein v Saints Gomplete House FurnisherPO an employer made it part 
of the specification for ajob that applicants could not be residents in the 
city centre of Liverpool. Evidence was led which showed that 50% of the 
population of the city centre were black, whereas only 12% of the resid- 
ents in the acceptable area were black. There was nojustification for this 
"I RRA 1976, s IA. 
137 [ 19831 ICR 428, CA. 
Ibid, per Stephenson Lj at p 147. 
See Raval v Department of Health and Social Security and Civil Service Commission (19851 
IRLR 370, where various questions were set for tribunals to help them analyse claims of 
indirect discrimination. 
(1979] IRLR 337. 
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discriminatory requirement. It was held that this was indirect discrimina- 
tion as per s1 (1) (b) of the RRA 1976. 
Victimisation 
Under s2 of the RRA 1976 anyone involved in enforcing the Act by bring- 
ing proceedings, making allegations or giving information is protected 
against victimisation by his employer or its employees. 141 It is now pos- 
sible, as a result of the Coote 112 decision, to claim victimisation where an 
employer takes retaliatory action against an ex-employee (e. g. refusing to 
give a reference) because he or she brought a claim against the employer 
under the RRA 1976. Section 27A of the Act is concerned with 'relation- 
ships that have come to an end'. 14 -' This section provides that an act of 
discrimination or harassment is unlawful even after the relationship has 
come to an end, provided that the discrimination or harassment arises 
out of, or is closely connected to, the relationship. 
Genuine occupational qualifications 
Under s5 of the RRA 1976 it is permissible to discriminate in recruit- 
ment and selection where: 
the job involves participation in a dramatic performance or other 
entertainment in a capacity for which a person of that racial group is 
required for reasons of authenticity 
" the job involves participation as an artist's or photographic model in 
the production of a work of art or visual image for which a person of 
that racial group is required for authenticity 
" the job involves working in a place where food or drink is provided or 
served to and consumed by members of the public in a particular set- 
ting for which, in thatjob, a person of that particular racial group is 
required for reasons of authenticity (e. g. Chinese restaurant) 
" the holder of the job provides persons of that racial group with per- 
sonal services promoting their welfare and those services can be most 
effectively provided by persons of that racial group. 
Enforcement of the Race Relations Act 1976 
An employee or an employer or the tribunal itself can request a discov- 
ery of documents by an employment tribunal, whereby a party is ordered 
to produce documentation where such information is necessary for 
dealing with the complaint. In West Midlands Passenger Transpart Executive 
I'll Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan [2001] IRLR 830, HL. 
112 C-185/97 Coote v Granada Hospitality Lid (No 2) [19981 ECR 1-5199, Eq. 
"I Inserted by the Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1626. 
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v Singh"' the applicant needed statistical data from his employer to sub- 
stantiate his claim for indirect discrimination. The applicant was denied 
promotion as a senior inspector and claimed racial discrimination and 
asked for a discovery of documents of statistics relating to the ethnic ori- 
gins, qualifications and experience of all applicants applying for senior 
inspector posts over a two-year period. 
The suitability of candidates can rarely be measured objectively; often 
subjective judgements will be made. If there is evidence of a high percentage 
rate of failure to achieve promotion at particular levels by members of a 
particular racial group, this may indicate that the real reason for the refusal 
is a conscious or unconscious racial attitude which involves stereotyped 
assumptions about members of the group. 
We are satisfied that the statistical material ordered is relevant to the issues 
in this case, in that (1) it may assist the applicant in establishing a positive 
case that the treatment of coloured employees was on racial grounds, which 
was an effective cause of their, and his, failure to obtain promotion; (2) it may 
assist the applicant to rebut the employer's contention that they operated in 
practice an equal opportunities policy which was applied in his case. "' 
Under the Race Relations (Questions and Replies) Order 1977111 the 
questions to put to an employer in the form of a questionnaire are set 
OUt. 147 A completed questionnaire can be used as evidence in the pro- 
ceedings and where the employer fails to respond to the questionnaire 
or his answers reveal a discriminatory attitude on his part then the tri- 
bunal will draw appropriate inferences at the hearing of the case. 
Remedies 
The following remedies are available under the Race Relations Act 1976: 
Compensation: the headings of compensation can include lost earn- 
ings, loss of future earnings, injury to feelings, loss of other employ- 
ment rights (including pensions) and aggravated damages (in 
England and Wales). 
The Race Relations (Remedies) Act 1994 came into force in July 
1994 and repealed the upper limit for compensation (set out in 
s 56(2) of the RRA 1976). It also gave the Secretary of State the 
power to make regulations providing for interest to be included 
in any compensation award made under the RRA 1976. 
(2) Recommendations can be made whereby an employer will be given 
a specified time to take action to remove or lessen the harmful effect 
144 (19881 ICR 614, CA. 
"5 Ibid at 620. 
146 SI 1977/842. 
147 Under RRA 1976, s 65 and SDA 1975, s 74 the Secretary of State is given the power to 
prescribe a questionnaire which an aggrieved Party can send to an employer, seeking 
further information about the reasons for its decisions and actions. 
104 Discrimination law 
of the discrimination on the complainant (RRA 1976, s 56 (1) (c)). 
If an employer fails without reasonable justification to comply, then 
the employment tribunal (if it thinks it is just and equitable to do 
so) can award additional compensation. 
(3) A declaratory order states the rights of the parties in relation to the 
allegation of discrimination. 
(4) In the course of a formal investigation the Commission for Racial 
Equality can, where satisfied that an unlawful act or practice has 
taken place, issue a non-discrimination notice in respect of the per- 
son concerned. " The CRE also has the power to bring proceed- 
ings against an employer where the employer has issued instructions 
to or put pressure on an employee to discriminate. Under s 290) 
of the RRA 1976 it is unlawful to publish discriminatory adverts and 
the right to take action is placed in the hands of the CRE. 
Burden of proof - vicarious liability 
Under s 32 of the RRA 1976 and s 41 of the SDA 1975 (discussed above) 
an employer can be vicariously liable for the actions of an employee 
undertaking a discriminatory act. 'Anything done by a person in the course 
of his employment shall be treated ... as done by his employer as well as by him, whether or not it was done with the employer's knowledge or 
approval. ' In deciding if the employee was acting in the course of his 
employment for the purposes of the definition, the tribunals and courts 
referred to the interpretation of this phrase by the judiciary in tort cases 
under the common law. 
In Irving v Post Office, "9 the Post Office was not liable for racially 
abusive words written on an envelope destined to be delivered by a 
postman, to his neighbour, since the postman was not acting in the course 
of employment. His employment provided the opportunity for his 
misconduct, but the misconduct formed no part of the performance of 
his duties, was in no way directed towards the performance of his duties 
and was not done for the benefit of his employer. 
In Tower Boot Co vjonesl" an employee was racially harassed at work, 
suffering severe physical and verbal abuse from his colleagues. The 
employer argued that the acts were not committed in the course of the 
harassers' employment and that there was therefore no liability. The EAT 
held: 
The nub of the test of whether an act is done in the course of employment 
is whether the unauthorised wrongful act of the employee is so connected 
with that which he was employed to do as to be a mode of doing it. 
148 SDA 1975, s 67; RRA 1976, s 58. 
119 [19871 IRLR 289, CA. 
'5' [19951 IRLR 529, EAT. 
1; ) 
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The racial harassment did not represent a mode of carrying out their 
employment. The case of Lister v HesIty Hall Ltd"' (discussed above) broad- 
ened consider-ably the scope for the employer to be vicariously liable under 
the common law for the actions of its employees. 
The approach for determining the vicarious liability of an employer 
under both statutes was set out by the Court of Appeal in Jones v Tower 
Boot Co Ltd. 152 The Court rejected the EAT's approach of resorting to 
common law rules and said that the words 'in the course of employment' 
as set out in s 41 of the SDA 1975 should be given a purposive construc- 
tion and interpretation should be on the basis of everyday speech. The 
employer was held liable for the actions of its employees. Where attempt- 
ing to avoid vicarious liability, an employer's primary defence in race and 
sex discrimination cases is provided under s 41(3) of the SDA 1975 and 
s 32(3) of the RRA 1976: 
In proceedings brought under this Act against any person in respect 
of an act alleged to have been done by an employee of his it shall be 
a defence for that person to prove that he took such steps as were 
reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from doing that act, or 
from doing in the course of his employment acts of that description. 
What shall be reasonably practical steps will depend on the circumstances. 
However, the following types of behaviour might in part or in full repres- 
ent such steps: the employer undertaking training on equal opportunit- 
ies for supervisory employees; having an equal opportunities policy (or 
more specific policies dealing with different kinds of discrimination, e. g. 
sexual harassment), the content of which is notified to all staff, providing 
adequate supervision to control discriminatory acts; and introducing dis- 
ciplinary measures for dealing with perpetrators of sex or race discrimina- 
tion under the employer's disciplinary procedure. 
Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 
This substitutes a new section 71 to the RRA 1976 and imposes a statut- 
ory duty on public authorities to have due regard, when performing their 
functions, to the need to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and to 
promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of 
different racial groups. It therefore outlaws for the first time direct and 
indirect discrimination in the carrying out of public authority functions 
and places duties on public bodies to promote r-acial equality. 153 The CRE 
has new enforcement powers in the form of compliance notices, which 
"' [20011 IRLR 472. 
152 [19971 ICR 254, CA. 
The CRE has issued a code of practice for assisting public authorities in taking appro- 
priate action to comply with the Act. 
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can be issued to public authorities failing to comply with any of their 
specific duties under the 
ACt. 154 
Justiflcation defence 
The employer has a defence that the discrimination is justifiable on 
grounds other than race, nationality, ethnic origins, etc. It must show 
that there is a real need which can be objectively justified for the prac- 
tice, criterion or condition. In Singh v Rowntree Macintosh Ltd" a 'no beard' 
rule was found to represent indirect discrimination against Sikhs; how- 
ever, it was justified on the ground of health and safety. "' 
Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 
The EU Race Discrimination Directive (2000/43/EC) is the first Direct- 
ive to provide rights to employees in Member States. In the United King- 
dom, this was transposed by the Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) 
Regulations 2003, "' which include a statutory definition of racial harass- 
ment, introduce changes to the burden of proof and provide a new defini- 
tion of indirect discrimination. 
Definitions of direct and indirect discrimination were amended to com- 
ply more closely with the Burden of Proof Directive. With respect to indir- 
ect discrimination, the wording used in defining indirect discrimination 
as it applies to certain sections in the RRA 1976 changed to 'provision, 
criterion or practice' instead of 'requirement or condition' (discussed 
earlier). Also, for the first time racial harassment was defined under stat- 
ute and treated as directly unlawful. 
As in the case of sexual harassment, the legal protection against racial 
harassment has derived from creative interpretation of the RRA 1976 by 
the judiciary: it was decided that harassment was a detriment for the 
purposes of s 4(2) (c) of the Act. 
In De Souza v Automobik Association"' a black female employee over- 
heard a racist comment about her in a conversation between two man- 
agers. This was not deemed to be sufficient detriment'" by the Court of 
Appeal for the purposes of the RRA 1976. The Court of Appeal did take 
the opportunity to clarify that liability can arise in cases of sexual or 
racial harassment where the only detriment suffered by the employee is 
114 For detailed cover-age of the Act's main provisions, see Industrial Relations Law Bulletin 
(March 2002) pp 2-8. 
[19791 IRLR 199, EAT. 
In Panesar v Nestlee Co [19801 ICR 144, CA, a rule forbidding the wearing of beards in a 
chocolate factory, although discriminatory against Sikhs, was justifiable on hygiene 
grounds. 
157 Sl 2003/1626. 
[19861 IRLR 103, CA; see also Thomas and another v Robinson [20031 IRLR 7. 
Defined as 'putting under a disadvantage' in Ministry of Defence vjeremiah [19791 IRLR 
436, CA. 
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having to work in a hostile or unwelcome working environment caused 
by the harassment. 160 The legal rules developed in sexual harassment cases 
such as Strathclyde Regional Council v Porcellil6l and Insitu Cleaning Co Ltd v 
Heads 161 (covered earlier) also apply to racial harassment cases. 
The leading case ofjones v Tower Boot C6161 illustrates an extreme form 
of racial harassment involving physical assault and verbal abuse of a 
16-year-old boy by a group of colleagues. The legal significance of this 
case was that employers could potentially be held vicariously liable for 
the actions of all their employees in cases of racial or sexual harassment 
or in other discrimination cases. 
As a result of EU intervention, for the first time racial harassment is 
now defined and directly treated as unlawful under statute. "' The Race 
Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 insert a new sec- 
tion 3A into the RRA 1976: 
A person subjects another to harassment ... where, on grounds of race or 
ethnic or national origins, he engages in unwanted conduct which has the 
purpose or effect of - 
(a) violating that other person's dignity; or 
(b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment for him. 
This effect is said to have occurred 'if and only if, having regard to all the 
circumstances, including in particular, the perception of that other, it 
should reasonably be considered as having that effect'. "' This takes into 
consideration the impact of the behaviour on a particular victim, which 
caters for differences in the reaction of victims to racial harassment. There 
is no longer any requirement for a comparator in harassment cases. 
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162 [1995] IRLR 4, EAT. 
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The Truth and Nothing but the Truth? The Legal Liability of 
Employers for Employee References 
1. INTRODUCTION 
... It is a reality of contemporary employment that the use of the reference in the workplace 
is so common that most employees take it for granted they will be granted one on request 
and even more significantly prospective employers expect that as a matter of course the 
employee would provide a reference or give his or her consent to one being obtained from 
the employer! 
It is now widely recognised notwithstanding this 'contemporary reality', that where the 
employer giving the reference fails to provide a fair or accurate reference, through 
malice, negligence or carelessness, he may face a legal action. This article will deal with 
all the legal aspects of the provision or non-provision of references for employees or 
ex-empIoyees by employers. This is an area of concern for both employers (sender and 
recipient) and employees. The employer giving the reference wants to know the scope of 
their liability (which can include the issue of disclosure of a reference to employees). The 
recipient employer needs to know if they have the right to recompense for economic loss 
arising from reliance on the reference. The subject of the reference needs to know their 
legal rights in respect of unjust or unfair references and accessing the content of written 
references. This is undoubtedly an important issue for all the parties that merits detailed 
consideration. The present note will outline the relevant principles of law in the context of 
recent case law on the subject. 
Until judicial recognition in Spring v Guardian Assurance p1c and otherS2 of the appro- 
priateness of pursuing a negligence action in these circumstances, the only option for an 
employee subject to a unjustly poor reference was to pursue an action in tort for defama- 
tion against their employer. Ibis option was unpopular because of the evidential obstacles 
facing the plaintiff in the case. 
The House of Lords in Spring v Guardian Assurance p1c and others' held that where an 
employer makes the decision to provide a current or former employee with a reference 
they are under a duty to that person to take reasonable care in compiling or giving the 
reference and in verifying the information on which it is based. They also held that where 
an employer provides a reference to a prospective or future employer he owes a duty of 
care to that employer is respect of the preparation of that reference. Where a breach of 
these duties occurs by reason of a negligently prepared reference the reference provider 
can be liable in damages to that employee or that prospective or future employer for any 
economic loss they suffer. 
I N. L Wallace-Bruce, 'Employers Beware! The Perils of Providing an Employment Reference', 
Journal of Business Law (September 1997) 456-64 at 462. 
2 [1994] IRLR 460. HL 
3 [19941 IRLR 460, H see Lord wooirs judgment, pp 476-81. 
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2. REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE A REFERENCE? 
It is unclear whether in all instances there is a legal obligation to provide a reference. 
Although many employers provide a reference as a matter of course and may regard 
themselves as under a moral obligation to do so, it seems that some large employers do 
not normally provide references. " 
Where the employer is under a specific legal duty or an implied duty (eg where it is 
customary practice within an industry or profession) to provide a reference they must do 
so or face an action brought by their employee for breach of contract. In Spring Lord 
Slynn and Lord Woolf were both of the opinion that it could be appropriate in some cases 
to imply a term into a contact of employment that the employer will provide the employee 
with a reference at the request of a prospective employer. This might arise where there is 
custom within the workplace that references are given and failure to provide one will 
jeopardise the employee's future employment. 
In Spring there was a duty on the employer to provide a reference under the LAUTRO 
rules which governed employment practice within the life insurance industry. Under the 
scheme of self-regulation administered by LAUTRO-1 which was highlighted in Spring 
and subsequent cases 6 it is required that an employer covered by the LAUTRO rules must 
provide a written reference about employees to other employers covered by the scheme. 7 
Similarly under paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Financial Services Agency guidelines, former 
employers are required to give references about employees intending to perform a 
customer function for a new employer where both the former and new employer are FSA 
regulated. Under these rules while the former employer must respond to a new 
employer's request there is no obligation on that new employer to make such a request 
although it could be seen as part of his duty to exercise due diligence. 
The right of refusal to provide a reference was qualified in the case of Coole v Granada 
Hospitality. 8 Here an employer that refused to provide a reference to his employee was 
found to be acting unlawfully. This non-cooperation was deemed to be victimisation against 
the employee under section 4(l) of the SDA 1975 because she had during her employ- 
ment pursued an action against her employer for sex discrimination. What was significant 
here was that other employees that had asked their employer for references were not 
treated the same. Despite the fact that discrimination rights were not available after the 
end of the employment relationship the European Court of Justice ruled that the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 could provide protective rights after employment had ceased 
in this type of case. The application of the SDA to relationships which have come to an 
end is clarified by regulation 3 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Amendment) 
' Consignia, one the UK's largest employers, does not give job references although it does provide 
a record of employment which confirms a person has worked for them for a certain period of time: 
see 'Jobs and Money', Guardian (11.5.02) 22. 
5 Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation; its functions are now performed by the 
Financial Services Authority. 
6 Singh v Royal Life Insurance Ltd, Queen's Bench Division (6.11.00). 
Now called the Personal Investment Authority (PIA) Rules. 
[1999] IRLR 452. 
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Regulations 2003.9 Where a 'relevant relationship' has come to an end it will be unlawful 
for the 'relevant party' to discriminate so as to subject another party to a detriment or to 
harass such a party 'where the discrimination or harassment arises out of and is closely 
connected to that relationship. ' 
3. NEGUGENCE ACTIONS 
In these actions it is necessary for the claimant to establish a duty of care exists between 
the parties through proximity of relationship. 
A. Duty of Care Owed to Subject 
This will be easily satisfied in the case of an employee or ex-employee suing on the basis 
that the reference was negligently given by his employer under a contract of employment 
with the result that they suffered a loss arising out of their existing or former contractual 
tie. In Kidd v Axa Equity and Law Life Assurance Society'O the High Court attempted to 
summarise the legal rules that apply in this area: 
The duty owed by the giver of a reference to the subject of that reference, whether arising in 
tort or from contract, is a duty to take reasonable care not to give misleading information 
about him, whether as a result of the unfairly selective provision of information, or by the 
inclusion of facts and opinions in such a manner as to give rise to a false or mistaken infer- 
ence in the mind of the reasonable recipient. The giver of the reference owes no additional 
duty to the subject to take reasonable care to give a full and comprehensive reference, or to 
include in a reference all material facts. 
B. Duty of Care Owed to ReCipient Employer 
The duty of care owed by the employer providing the reference to the employer relying 
on it and consequently employing the subject of the reference (recipient employer clearly 
does not arise under a contractual arrangement between the two employers). It will only 
be established where, it is foreseeable that the recipient of the reference would rely on the 
information supplied, their decision to employ someone is materially influenced by the 
content of the reference and as a result of employing them they suffer an economic loss. 
Liability could arise where, in an effort to get rid of a troublesome employee, they 
provide a reference about him that is misleadingly favourable. " In Spring, Lord Goff of 
Chievely was doubtful whether an action would lie against the reference provider by the 
9 Similar provisions are made under the Sexual Orientation Regulations (reg 29) and Race Regula- 
tions (inserting section 27A into the Race Relations Act 1976). 
10 (2000] IRLR 301. 
11 Supra n1 at 459-ft it is called an overblown reference see Castledine v Rothwell Engineering 
Ltd (1973] IRLR 99. 
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recipient unless causation could be shown between the provision of the reference and the 
decision to employ. It will be up to the reference provider to establish that factors other 
than the reference were relied upon in the recipient employer's decision to engage the 
services of the subject of the reference. He will find it difficult to maintain that the refer- 
ence is unimportant where, as is often the case, completion of the selection process cannot 
be achieved until a satisfactory reference is received by the employer. Where it is an oral 
rather than a written reference that is given, the recipient employer will face evidential 
difficulties proving what was said to him about the employee and the recipient employer's 
success will depend on his ability to convince the court that untrue or misleading state- 
ments were made. 
Where none of the exceptions identified above apply an employer may still feel morally 
obliged to provide a reference. Failing this he is in a position to refuse a reference, and 
may, in the light of recent judgements be inclined to do so. 
4. RECENT DECISIONS 
In Legal Assurance Lid v Kirk" it was decided that if an employer makes an informal 
statement about an employee that is not relied on by a third party. no liability for negli- 
gent misstatement will arise. In this case the employee tried to argue that his employer 
was liable for negligent misstatement (for asserting that he was indebted to his former 
employer) even where no reference had been given. This claim was rightly rejected by the 
Court of Appeal as it was based on conjecture about what the employer might say when 
asked for a reference. 
In Bartholomew v London Borough of Hackney 13 an employer, in providing a refer- 
ence for a former employee, had informed the Richmond-upon-Thames Social Services 
Department that at the time of leaving he 'was suspended from work due to a charge of 
gross misconduct and disciplinary action had commenced'. 14 Mr Bartholomew brought a 
claim for breach of duty of care on the basis that although the reference was factually cor. 
rect it was unfair. His appeal against this decision was unsuccessful; however, the Court of 
Appeal took the opportunity to clarify the law in this area. Essentially employers must 
not only take care in preparing any statements about their employee in the reference; they 
must also take care that the holistic impression of the employee from scrutiny of the refer- 
ence is not unfair or misleading. Also it is acceptable in preparing a reference to eff on the 
side of brevity: 
An employer is under a duty of care to provide a reference which is in substance true, accurate 
and fair. The reference must not give an inaccurate or misleading impression overall, even if 
the discrete components are factually correct. However the duty of care ... 
does not mean 
that a reference must in every case be full and cornprehensive. 's 
12 [20021 IRLR 124 CA. 
13 [19991 IRLR 246. 
14 At 246. 
Is At 246. 
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In Cox v Sun Alliance Life Ltd 16 Mr Cox was promoted by his employer to the position of 
manager of an office in Leeds which covered the whole of Yorkshire. Within six months of 
his appointment it became apparent that he had had a serious rift with his staff and he was 
suspended. After this it was reported to his employer by a tied agent that he had received 
improper payments. This allegation was not properly investigated or fully brought to the 
attention of Mr Cox. An audit investigation of his business dealings revealed no impropriety 
on his part. He agreed to resign subject to being given a reference mutually drafted in 
bland terms and which made no mention of the allegations against him. Mr Cox was then 
dismissed from two jobs he had obtained because his ex-employer had given each of his 
new employers a reference which stated that he had been suspended pending the outcome 
of investigations into allegations of dishonesty and that he would have been dismissed had 
he not chosen to resign. The Court of Appeal held that the employer was in breach of his 
duty of care and that this was an agreed settlement of termination rather than a dismissal 
by the employer- 
Discharge of the duty to provide an accurate and fair reference will usually involve making 
reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of the statements in the reference ... In order to 
take reasonable care to give a fair and accurate reference an employer should confine 
unfavourable statement about the employee to those matters into which they have made 
reasonable investigation and had reasonable grounds for believing to be true. 
In Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan 17 a police offer who had taken a case 
against his employer for racial discrimination because he had been refused promotion was 
successful in a claim for victimisation where his employer refused to provide him with a 
reference. He had treated him less favourably than other employees who normally 
received a reference on request. " 
In TSB Bank p1c v Harris9 an employee, after discovering that the contents of a refer- 
ence about him was misleading and unfair, claimed constructive dismissal on the basis of 
breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. The EAT found that the bank were in 
breach of the implied term because they failed to discuss the complaints included in the 
reference with Harris prior to their inclusion and they had presented a misleading picture 
of him which they should have anticipated would have a detrimental impact on his career 
prospects: 
Using the implied term of trust and confidence the EAT approves in this case that employers 
should provide a fair and reasonable reference, a duty which goes beyond the obligation to 
take reasonable care to avoid inaccurate statements of fact. 20 
While none of these decisions have had the impact of Spring on this area of law they 
collectively provide further refinement of the expectations of an employer in preparing 
"' [2001] IRLR 448. 
17 [2001] ICR 1065. 
11 He was awarded 11,500 as compensation for injury to feelings see R. Clement, 'The Art of 
Comparison', New Law Journal (25.1.02). 
19 [2000] IRLR 157. In this case the EAT held that an accurate and truthful reference may not be a 
reasonable and fair reference. 
2* H. Collins, K. D. Ewing and 1. McColgan, Labour Law Text and Materials (Hart, 2001) 126. 
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a reference (to provide a reference which is in substance true, accurate and fair), the legal 
standards (reasonable investigation required before inclusion of facts) that an employee 
can expect to operate in his or her favour, and the remedies which will be available to 
them. 
5. ACCESSING THE CONTENTS OF A REFERENCE 
There are practical difficulties for employees and ex-employees in accessing the contents 
of a reference where the reference giver refuses to divulge this information. Where an 
employee is given a testimonial at the point of his leaving his job he will normally be privy 
to its contents. With regard to the content of references however, employers are under no 
obligation to provide the information to the subject of the reference. Under schedule 7 
of the Data Protection Act 1998 it is stated that employees are not entitled to access any 
reference given in confidence by the data controller for the purposes of education, train- 
ing and employment. The employee can ask the new employer to give him a copy of the 
reference provided to him although he can refuse in a case where showing the reference 
given by a third party (eg the former employer) would identify that third party. It can be 
disclosed to the employee, however if the former employer consents or if it is reasonable 
to disclose without consent. 
6. CODE OF PRACTICE COVERING RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION 
The Information Commissioner recently issued a code of practice which set out behaviour 
in respect of recruitment and selection (including giving references) which would be com- 
pliant with the Data Protection Act 1998. These recommended courses of action, which 
were largely drawn from relevant case law, are that employers should ensure that every 
reference is true, accurate and fair and not misleading. Moreover, they need not be com- 
prehensive. It is also recommended that in order to limit their vicarious liability for man- 
agers giving personal references, employers should have clear policies on references, 
including specifying who is authorised to give references and who has access to thern. 21 
7. HUMAN RIGHTS 
The issue of human rights has been invoked in complaints involving employee references 
arguing a breach of convention rights, but so far without success. It seems that there is, 
firstly, little prospect of a successful challenge under the human rights legislation being 
brought by the subject of a reference against public authority employers that provide an 
unfair or inaccurate reference. In Griffiths v Newport County Borough Counci122 the 
21 www. dataprotection. gov. uk. 
2' [2001] EWCA Civ 1860. 
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applicant argued that by being the subject of a negligently provided reference by his 
employer which was inaccurate, misleading and unfair, his security of work and pros- 
pects of employment had been removed and that there had therefore been a breach of 
Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). This lays out the 
right to liberty and security of the person. The Court of Appeal was unconvinced that 
the applicant's argument was a correct application of Article 5, and went on to state 
that a breach of the Article could only be established where negligence was proven on 
the part of employer. The applicant was unsuccessful because the negligence of his 
employer could not be established. This case therefore does not rule out the pos- 
sibility that an action brought under Article 5 could be successful if the facts were 
different. 
In Legal and General Assurance Ltd v Kirk' the appellant claimed unsuccessfully 
that Article 1 of the Protocol I to the ECHR (which entitles every person to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions) had been breached by his employer. His 
argument was that his employer had through provision of a negligently prepared 
reference about him deprived him of a right to trade as a company or appointed 
representative. 
There are three Articles of the Convention that are untested in this context but in the 
view of this writer clearly have a bearing on this area of law: Article 6, Article 8 and 
Article 10. It is questionable whether an employer breaches Article 6 by making 
unfounded or unsubstantiated accusations against an employee or referring to proceed- 
ings of an internal dispute procedures that are incomplete in a reference. The question of 
whether this article covers an internal disputes procedure arose in Darnell v UK24 and the 
Court stated that it must involve a claim or dispute that is genuine, of a serious nature, 
and includes the determination of civil rights and obligations. The provision of a reference 
to another that treats an employee in a prejudicial manner is unlikely without more to be 
contrary to Article 6, unless it arises in the context of disciplinary proceedings, the out- 
come of which can affect the employee's right to continue in a profession, continued 
livelihood or ability to trade. 25 
Under Article 8 every person has the right to the protection of their private and family 
life, home and correspondence. ' This right might apply where the employer, in giving a 
reference, provides personal details of his employee (the subject) to a person who was not 
an agreed recipient. Although in most instances the employee will give his permission for 
the use of a reference, it is not inconceivable that a reference could be provided without it, 
in particular where the giving of a reference is an established custom or a part of a self 
regulatory code operating between employers. The issue of privacy arises here and the 
23 (2002] IRLR 124 CA. 
24 Application No 15058/89. 
25 Tehran! Y UK Councilfor Nursing Midwifery and Health Visiting [2001) IRLR 208. 
11 Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings: furthermore, there is no reason of principle to justify excluding 
activities of a professional or business nature from the notion of 'private life' (see Nientietz v Gennany 
judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A, 251-13, pp 33-4, §29, and the Halford v United Kingd,, 
judgment of 25 June 1997, Reports 1997-111, pp 1015-16, §§42-6). 
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following passage summarises the impact of Article 8 on domestic measures in the United 
Kingdom providing privacy rights for employees (including the subject of a reference): 
Article 8 may inform common law duties such as breach of confidence and the implied term 
of trust and confidence. In the context of unfair dismissal a tribunal should no doubt 
approach the test of reasonableness in section 98 of the ERA 1996 in the light of Article 8. 
Most important of all the wide scope of the Data Protection Act 1998 and in particular the 
requirement ... that personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully provides a means by 
which domestic law can give effect to a right of privacy for workers. r 
The grounds on which interference with this right can be justified under Article 8(2) are 
unlikely to protect employers who issue unfair references. 
Under Article 10 there is a right to freedom of expression which might appear to offer 
employers some protection. This freedom consists of a right to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas. These rights are subject to qualification and 
certain of these qualifications apply to freedom of expression in connection with provid- 
ing references. Article 10(2) states that: 
the exercise of these freedoms ... may be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society --- for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
disclosed in confidence ... 28 
The following restriction on the freedom of expression could refer to the type of views 
often expressed by an employer about an employee in a written reference: 
Where a person makes a factual assertion which is demonstrably false and damages someone 
it is reasonably easy to justify imposing a penalty or a duty to compensate the victim and 
refrain from repeating the falsehood, particularly if the speaker failed to take reasonable 
care to check his or her information. 29 
8. USE OF EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION CLAUSES 
Where an employer decides to give a reference, he/his may try to limit he/his liability by use 
of disclaimers or exclusion clauses in the contract of employment or in the reference itselL' 
These will only be upheld where they are deemed by the courts to comply with the standard of 
'reasonableness' as defined in sections I and 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.3' 
Under section 1(1)(b) of the Act negligence is defined as breach of any common law 
duty to take reasonable care and exercise reasonable skill and under section 2(2) it states 
27 M. Ford, 'Two Conceptions of Worker Privacy', (2002) 31 ILJ 135-55. 
The domestic laws to protect privacy mentioned above under Article 8 would apply here. 
D. Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales. 2nd edn (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 757-8. 
-' Possible wording could be'This reference is given in good faith but without any legal liability C)n 
the part of the company or the author of this reference. It is written and accepted on this basis'. 
31 Sections 16,21 and Schedule 2 in Scotland. 
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that in the case of loss or damage a person cannot exclude or restrict his liability for negli- 
gence except in so far as the term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. 
Exclusion clauses included in the written document that incorporates the reference passing 
between the sender and the recipient employers would be covered by the Act. The subject 
of the reference, as well as being protected from attempts by his employer to unreasonably 
exclude liability under the law of tort, will also be protected from such action under the terms 
of the contract of employment. 32 
Both the English and Scottish Law Commissions aim to replace two overlapping pieces 
of legislation, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations SI 1999/2083, with a single Act written in a much more accessible 
way and potentially wider in its application. The Commissions aim for a Bill to be put 
before Parliament in 2004. 
9. CONCLUSION 
It is becoming increasingly difficult for employers to refuse to provide references to their 
former employees. It is important that the information provided is clearly given in con- 
fidence for reasons of privacy but also because it is a requirement in the Data Protection 
Act 1998 that before access to the reference for employees is restricted it must represent a 
communication between the employers given in confidence. 
Employers may limit their liability through attaching qualifying statements to the descrip- 
tion of their former employee's character and abilities and where these caveats are widely 
utilised within the reference it could lead to it becoming meaningless, since 'those giving such 
references can make it clear what are the parameters within which the reference is given, 
such as stating their limited acquaintance with the individual as to time or as to situation'. 33 
Employment law is therefore increasingly encroaching on the format of the reference to 
ensure that it does not create a false or misleading impression. This does not mean that 
employers cannot provide unfavourable references where it is reasonable and justifiable to 
do so. On the other hand they must not provide references which are excessively favourable. 
Employers are likely to continue to provide references as a consequence of moral pres- 
sures, practice and expectations within particular workplaces (eg financial services) or 
professions-34 The law looks set to continue to extend the protection of the law to current 
or former employees. 11is could arise as a result of developments in the common law 
(particularly contract and tort) and through enforcement of human rights. 
SAM MIDDLEMISS 
Senior Lecturer in Law, The Robert Gordon University 
-'2 In Julian Bridgen v American Erpress Bank Lid (14.10.99 QBD) the question of whether an 
employee was covered by the Act was considered and decided in the affirmative. 
33 Lord Slynn of Hadley in Spring, see R. W. Painter and A. Holmes, Cases and Materials on 
Employment Law, 4th edn (Oxford University Press, 2002) 162. 
34 The Law Society of England leaves it up to its members to decided whether or not to provide 
references. 
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FASHION VICTIMS, DRESS TO CONFORM TO THE 
NORM, OR ELSE? COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST EMPLOYERS' 
APPEARANCE CODES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
OLGA HAY* AND SAM NUDDLENUSSW 
ABSTRACT 
An organisation will impose appearance codes on their employees that are designed 
to ensure that they conform to the prevailing organisational culture and present the 
correct image of the company to external agents. These codes can adversely affect 
members of a particular sex, sexual orientation or ethnic group, but often there is 
no legal remedy for them. This article will involve a critical analyse of the extent 
of the legal protection available for employees that are adversely affected by 
employers' appearance standards in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
INTRODUCTION 
'The semiotics of clothing are of course wide-rancring and go beyond 
performances of gender and sexuality to include negotiations of class, 
attitude and aspirations which are played out in the workplace. " As 
this quote suggests the issue of controlling employees' standards of 
dress and grooming at work is a multi-faceted one including import- 
ant considerations for the organisation and the individual employee. 
Employees will often sublimate their normal mode of dress to 
comply with organisational norms or requirements. While this uneven 
arrangement will not have far-reaching consequences for most 
employees, some will find it compromises their sexual identity, reli- 
gious beliefs or sexual orientation. A managerial prerogative that is Zý Z; I 4-: P 
generally accepted as being extended to employers under a contract 
of employment, is the right to lay down rules imposing appearance zn C) 
standards for their employees that control the way their employees 
are dressed (e. g. clothing) or groomed (hair, C, ZP 4_ý jewellery etc. ) Whether 
or not such codes are capable of being included within a contract of 
employment is often a moot point because judges accept that a legral 
right exists for employers to introduce and enforce such codes irres- 
pective of their contractual status. 
Strictly speaking they are in most situations probably regarded 
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as the employer's unilateral company rules unless they have been 
mutually agreed with trade unions or employees prior to their intro- 
duction. 
Normally unilateral rules of the employer are not contractual and 
therefore not binding on either party. ' However as the courts in the 
United Kinadorn have generally accepted that employers have the 
right to enforce appearance standards it will be a brave employee that 
acts in contravention of them. 
Where there is inequality of treatment under appearance codes 
between different classes of employee, then the dissatisfaction of the 
recipients of such discriminatory requirements will be substantial and 
may lead to them pursuing legal action. 
'Such rules often impose different requirements on men and 
women, reflecting current perceptions of conventional appearance . '4 Overcoming traditional attitudes as to what is acceptable for each 
gender in terms of their appearance represents a hurdle that must be ;1 
overcome before equality of treatment of the sexes will be achieved. 
Reasons given by an employer for imposition of dress or groom- 
ing codes are that the application of such rules are necessary for 
operational reasons or they allow the employer to promote a distinct 
corporate image. Unfortunately their effect is often to impose sub- 
stantially different burdens on men and woman thus representing a 
discriminatory requirement. 
In this article we will undertake a critical analysis of the legal 
rules in the United Kingdom and the United States that control 
employers' imposing restrictive or discriminatory appearance stand- 
ards on their employees. This will include consideration of the 
impact of the power relationship involved, the difficulties raised by 
the relevant case law and the defences available to employers in both 
jurisdictions e. g. business necessity. 
Grooming codes tend to reinforce sexual stereotypes and they 
make it very difficult for employment decisions to be made without 
reference to the sex of a person. A stereotype is defined as a: 'widely 
held but fixed and oversimplified image or idea of a particular type Z_; ý 
of person or thing'5 
An example of gender stereotyping would be where an employer 
does not allow men to wear jewellery because it does not present a 
masculine image to their customers. Stereotyping is inconsistent with 
the aim of the equality legislation in both jurisdictions. Some 4_ý 
examples of the restrictions imposed on women by employers in fur- 
therance of dress/grooming codes are given below 
'Wear skirts of a certain length, or high heeled shoes, to conform to It: - 4D different weight criteria than men, or to wear make-up ... to have 
sexually alluring figures or to wear sexually provocative clothing, or 
they may be made to downplay their sexuality'6 
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The right of the employer to set policies concerning dress 
should not be uncritically accepted by courts and tribunals, since part 
of the role of the law is to protect the weaker party in an employ- 
ment relationship where an abuse of power is likely. The reality is 
that the source of this power and its legal status has never been 
properly challenged in legal cases. 
'There is no doubt that the power to control appearance is 
widely, though subtly, used in the workplace ... from refusing to Z_D 
employ people whose facial features depart very substantially from 
the accepted norm of good looks, 
7 
through to the informal request to 
wear a shirt instead of a T-shirt' 
Strict adherence to standards of smart dress may also adversely 
impact on employees' productivity and job satisfaction. ' 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF APPEARANCE CODES IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
The leading case dealing with dress codes is Schmidt v Austicks 
Bookshops Ltd. ' where female employees who came into contact with 
the public were not allowed to wear trousers. Instead they were 
obliged to wear skirts and overalls. Schmidt was dismissed because 
she refused to wear a skirt. She claimed this represented direct dis- 
crimination on the ground of her sex but was unsuccessful. 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that there was no 
inequality of treatment as required by s. 1 (1)(a) of the Sex Discrim- 
ination Act 1975, because there was no comparable restriction that 
could be applied to men equivalent to a ban on wearing trousers. 
Moreover, men were not allowed to wear t-shirts and on the evidence 
it appeared that men would not have been allowed to wear any 
unconventional clothing. It was felt that there was insufficient evi- 
dence to show that choice of clothing at work was not restricted for 4D 
both sexes. Schmidt appears to endorse a 'swings and roundabouts' 
approach' to assessing whether appearance rules are acceptable, typi- 
t' 
fied by the following quote. 
'There were in force rules restricting wearing apparel and governing Cý 4! ) C> 
appearance which applied to men and also applied to women although 
obviously, women and men being different, Z: O the rules in the two cases 
are not the same"' 
it is argued in some quarters that where women are forbidden to 
wear trousers as in Schmidt they should have a valid discrimination 
claim because such a requirement means the treatment of women and 
men is unequal on two counts. 12 Firstly they are subjected to differ- 
ent requirements, which result in women suffering a detriment, and 
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secondly only women are denied the opportunity to wear something 
that is socially acceptable. If the dress code restricted men fron, 
wearing skirts, the effect would be far less burdensome because it is 
unlikely that many men would want to wear them. The restrictive 
interpretation of the equality aspect of dress codes in Schmidt has 
been followed by Employment Tribunals and Courts in the United 
Kingdom (cases considered below). However this narrow approach 
has not been confined to clothing requirements, but extended to cover 
hair length, jewellery, body piercing, facial hair etc. " 
In Schmidt it is stated that: 'an employer is entitled to a large 
measure of discretion in controlling the image of his establishment ZP V including the appearance of staff ... 
"' 
Adherence to the idea of managerial prerocrative in this respect ZD C) 
was upheld in Boychuk v H. J. Symons Holdings Ltd` where the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal agreed with the decision of the 
Employment Tribunal that it was not unfair to dismiss a worker who 
refused to remove a badge on her jacket statinar 'lesbians ignite'. ZP IM) 
In Burrett v West Birmingham Health Authority" female nurses 
were required to wear a cap as part of their uniform but male nurses 
weren't. Ms Burrett claimed that this was a discriminatory require- 
ment and brought a claim for sex discrimination. The Employment 
Appeal Tribunal followed the reasoning in Schmidt and decided that, 
as the requirement to wear a uniform applied to both male and 
female nurses, the fact that the uniforms differed and the applicant 
objected to one part of the uniform, did not amount to less favour- 
able treatment under s. 1 (1)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
The Court of Appeal in Smith v Safeway p1c" enthusiastically 
endorsed the Schmidt approach. In a case involving a grooming code. 
Smith, a male delicatessen assistant, was dismissed when his ponytail 
grew too long to be hidden under his hat. It contravened the rule for 
males in his position which specified 'tidy hair not below shirt collar 
length. No unconventional hairstyles or colouring. ' Safeway required 
all food handlers to wear hats and both sexes were prohibited frorn 
having unconventional hairstyles or colour. However women were 
allowed to clip back shoulder-lengrth hair. He brought a complaint of 4_ýP 
sex discrimination on the basis that a female employee would not 
have been dismissed for having long hair. The Court of Appeal held 
that Smith had not been discriminated against. Lord Justice Gibson IMP stated that an employer would not be acting unlawfully by adopting 
a code that applies conventional standards to both sexes. " Moreover, 
it was felt that it could not be accepted that changes in society 
rendered the above reasoning unsound in law. 
The reasoning adopted by the Employment Appeal Tribunal at 
an earlier stage of the case was more sensible. They decided that the 
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imposition of two different conditions for hair-length. for men and 
women was unnecessary. 
'The need to present a conventional appearance at work is 
already met by the standards laid down as to hairstyle which, in the 
case of a pony-tail is specifically capable of being treated the same 
way for both men and women' 19 
The issue of hair length and an insistence that an employee cut 
his hair will not only impact on him at work but also in his private 
life. The Court of Appeal overturned the EAT decision in favour of 
the more conventional interpretation of Schmidt. " However, the 
Smith decision does not amount to a rule of law that restrictions on 
hair length for male employees. are never discriminatory. " Cý 
The grooming policy affected Smith's life inside and outside of 
work and it seemed unlikely that in a le al regime governed by 9 tý 
human rights that such a requirement would 'withstand scrutiny' as 
being necessary in a democratic society. " However in a recent case 
with similar facts to Smith the issue of whether dress codes could 
represent a breach of human rights under the European Convention 
of Human Rights was considered and discounted. In Fuller v Mas- 
tercare Service and Distribution EAT10707100, the employer had dif- 
ferent rules concerning hair length for men and women. Mr F grew 
his hair in contravention of a requirement for male employees that 
his hair should be 'cut conservatively'. He was eventually dismissed 
when he refused to have it cut. The Employment Tribunal held that 
neither the imposition of a dress code or his dismissal was discrim- 
ination on ground of his seX. 23 They were also of the opinion that 
even if the European Human Rights Convention had been incorpor- 4n 
ated into UK law at the time of the hearing there would not have 
been a breach by the employer of Article 8 of the Convention, the 
right to respect for private and family life, the home and correspond- 
ence, and the right to freedom of expression under Article 10. 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the tribunal's decision, 
but chose not to address the human rights issue. We shall return to 
the Human Rights aspect and this case later in the article although it Cý 24 
seems safe to conclude at this stage that it was wrongly decided. 4-P 
The more recent case of Cootes v John Lewis plC 25 illustrates 
that the Schmidt approach is still being followed. The EAT upheld 
the Employment Tribunal's finding, that it was not unlawful sex dis- 
crimination to require a female selling partner to wear a uniform. MS 
Cootes was gaven notice that in accordance with dress regulations 
incorporated into her contract of employment she was obliged to 
wear the standard business dress for a female selling partner, which 
was a blue suit and a green blouse. She claimed that male selling 
partners were only required to wear a dark business suit, shirt and tie 
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which gave them a more senior appearance and that the uniform 
requirement placed on her amounted to sex discrimination. Her clairri 
failed and the Employment Appeal Tribunal stated that 'different 
treatment is not necessarily less favourable treatment'. 
The above are examples of cases where tribunals have. decided 
that rules goveming the appearance of employees are not discrimina- tý 
tory on grounds of sex, however in the interest of balance it is neces- 
sary to mention the few cases where actions for discrimination have 
been successful. 
SUCCESSFUL SEX DISCRIMINATION/DRESS CODE CASES 
In McConomy v Croft Inns Ltd" it was unlawful discrimination for 
a public house to refuse to serve a man wearing earrings, where there Zo 
was no such objection to serving women wearing earrings. Although 
not an employment law case, it was accepted that there should be 
equality of treatment between men and women in respect of groorn- 4: P ing codes in today's' society. 
'In today's conditions it is not possible to say that the circum- 
stances are different as between men and women as regards the wearing 
of personal jewellery or other items of personal adornment'. 27 
In Hutcheson v Graham & Morton Ltd" a senior female 
employee was required to wear a nylon overall whilst men wore 
lounge suits. She successfully argued that being forced to wear a uni- 
form subjected her to a detriment under the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975. The tribunal held that the detriment was that the uniform was 
uncomfortable and indicated a lower status than a male employee. 29 
The approach in Schmidt was not followed in Rewcastle v Safe- 
way p1c. 10 where female employees were rýquired to tie back shoulder- 
lencyth hair whilst men were required to keep their hair short and well 
groomed. Rewcastle refused to cut his hair and was dismissed. 
The tribunal acknowledged the right of employers to set stand- 
ards of dress and appearance, however, they questioned whether a 
policy which mirrors conventional differences between the sexes 
could be in harmony with the underlying logic of the Sex Discrim- 
ination Act 1975. " 
More recently, in Owen v The Professional Goýf Association" it 
was held that dress codes forbidding women to wear trousers to work 
was discriminatory. The tribunal distinguished this case from 
Schmidt, because the latter involved clear dress codes whereas Owen 
had resigned after being ordered home to change from a trouser suit 
into a skirt. The tribunal felt that if Owen's manager, Mr Paton, had 
taken the opportunity to consider Owen's trouser suit, he would have 
accepted that it complied with the PGA policy which said clothes 
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should be 'on the conservative side of conventional business dress'. 
The instruction of the supervisor telling her to go home became a tý 
special and arbitrary ruling which only restricted females. In the eyes 
of the Employment Tribunal it was impossible to say that Owen had 
not been disadvantaged by the lack of choice. The manager's instruc- 
tion amounted to less favourable treatment on the ground of sex. 
Unfortunately while these cases are interesting departures from 
the principles in Schmidt and Smith, they are not binding on tribunals 
and the EAT and while they illustrate a more enlightened approach 
to this issue they are unlikely to be followed in future cases. 
SEXUALLY PROVOCATIVE CLOTHING 
In the United States in EEOC v Sage Realty Corp. " the courts held 
that where an employer applies a sexually provocative dress require- 
ment (e. g. it is made a condition of employment that a woman wears 
a revealing uniform or costume) that he knows, or reasonably 
expects, will lead to sexual harassment of those female employees 
then this amounts to sex -discrimination. In this case a lobby attend- 
ant was required to wear a sexually provocative uniform and was 
consequently sexually harassed by customers of her employer. She 
brought a successful claim for sex discrimination. 
There have been no comparable cases reported in the UK 
although this type of behaviour would undoubtedly be treated as a 
detriment to women and contrary to section 6(2)(c) of Sex Discrim- 
ination Act and fall within the definition of sexual harassment in the 
'European Commission Recommendation No. 92/131/EEC on the Pro- 
tection of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work', " since this 
definition is broad enough to cover sexually provocative dress codes. 
Although there does not appear to be a UK equivalent of Sage 
Realty where a dress code led to sexual harassment, it is worth men- 
tioning the case of Driskel v Peninsula Business Services Ltd & 
OR. 35 Ms Driskel was told by her head of department that. she better 
attend her promotion interview in a short skirt and see-through 
blouse, showing plenty of cleavage in order to persuade him to pro- 
mote her. She was successful in her sex discrimination case against 
her employer on appeal. It was held that she had been unlawfully 
discriminated on grounds of her sex. The EAT decided it was irrele- 
vant that his remark was 'flippant' and that he never expected her to 
do those things. What was relevant was that his remarks had under- 
mined her. 
It is likely that the UK courts would probably follow the 
approach of the EAT in Driskel, where a woman was subjected to 
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sexual harassment because she was required to wear sexually provoc- 
ative clothing at work 
TRANSSEXUALS AND TRANSVESTITES 
Transsexualism is concerned with sexual identity. A transsexual is 
anatomically of one sex but believes they belong to the other SeX3'a 
and thus tends to dress up as the opposite sex. This can generate a 
'panicked defence' from management resulting in harsh decisions 31 being made against the employee. Transsexuals are now protected 
against the discriminatory acts of the employer by section 2A of the 4-> 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975. " 
A transvestite on the other hand is a person who obtains gratifica- 
tion from wearing the clothes of the opposite sex. Grooming codes are 
important here since a transvestite may wish to wear clothes to work 
that are deemed inappropriate by society. The Court of Appeal's 
decision in Smith was followed in Kara v London Borough of 
Hackney. " The EAT held that Kara, a male transvestite, was not dis- 
criminated against when his employers banned him from wearing 
women's clothes at work. It was concluded that the employers were 
lawful in requiring Kara to dress as a man whilst at work. The clairn 
was dismissed on the grounds that the council reasonably and genuinely 
believed Kara's clothes were in breach of their clothing policy. 
Kara went on to complain to the European Commission that his 
rights under Article 8(l) and 10(l) of the European Convention had 
been violated. The outcome of this appeal will be discussed in detail 
below. 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND DRESS CODES 
Dress codes could run contrary to religious beliefs of various racial 
groups or cultural norms of ethnic groups. In Mandla and Anor v Lee 4-: ) 
and Park Grove School' the meaning of racial grounds (as defined It: p &) 
by s. 3 of the Race Relations Act 1976) was. considered and it was 
held that Sikhs were a racial group by reference to their ethnic ori- 
gins. In this case the applicant, a schoolboy, was compelled to wear 
a turban because by his religion, but he was denied this right by his 
school and the House of Lords ruled that forbidding the wearing of 
gainst Sikhs turbans could amount to indirect sex discrimination ag, 
under s. 1 (1)(b). They held that if 'can comply' is literally construed, 
then anybody could refrain from wearing a turban. However, in the 
context of s. 1 (1)(b)(i) the phrase has a broader meaning and does 
not simply mean they can 'physically' comply but that they 'can con- 
sistently with the customs and cultural conditions of the racial group, ZP 
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comply with a requirement or condition. Although Mandla is not an 
employment law case it does have some application to employment 
law. The House of Lords held that a rule forbidding the wearing of 
turbans could amount to indirect sex discrimination against Sikhs 
under s. l(l)(b) and this could extend to employers forbidding the 
wearing of turbans in the workplace. Most problems arise for appli- 
cants in race discrimination cases where the employer argues that the 
condition imposed was justifiable. In Malik v British Home Stores" 
shop assistants were required to wear a uniform consisting of a skirt 
and overall. Malik, a Muslim woman, was tumed down for a job 
because British Home Stores would not consent to her request to 
wear trousers and she successfully claimed indirect discrimination. 
The tribunal rejected the employer's claim that the requirement was 
justified on the grounds that sales staff must wear a neat and tidy 
uniform in order to present a good image to customers. It was felt 
that the detriment to Muslims far outweighed this commercial neces- 
Sity. 42 
Sikhs wearing turbans are excused from any legal requirement to 
wear safety helmets on a construction site under the Employment Act 
1989.4' As part of their religion Sikhs are often required to have a 
beard. In Panesar v Nestle Co Ltd" an orthodox Sikh applied for a 
job as a machine fitter. The employer had a long-standing rule that 
no beards were allowed in the chocolate-making section. Mr Panesar 
refused to shave and was subsequently refused a job interview. 
Having heard expert evidence on the possible health hazards of 
beards, it was held that the rule had only been introduced in the 
interests of hygiene . 4' Although indirectly discriminatory against 
Sikhs the requirement was justifiable on the grounds of hygiene and 
his appeal was unsuccessful. " 
In Kingston and Richmond Health Authority v Kau? " it was dis- 
puted whether a policy forbidding nurses to wear trousers as part of 
their uniform was justifiable. A Sikh woman was unable to comply 
with the policy and was refused a place on nurses' training course. 
It was held that although the Health Authority's requirement was 
reasonably necessary, they could easily have accommodated Ms 
Kaur's need to wear trousers and the policy could not be justified. 
The Area Health Authority successfully appealed. The EAT held that 
the refusal of the employer to allow Ms Kaur to wear trousers was 
justifiable because it complied with a prohibition by the General 
Nursing Council. 48 
SUMMARY OF THE UK POSITION 
Until recently employers have had nothing to fear from applying 
appearance standards to their employees even when the rules were 
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different for employees of each sex or impacted more seriously or, 
one group of workers than another. The areas where some restriction 
is placed on employers is where codes interfere with religious beliefs 
or cultural norms, dress requirements that represent or are likely to 
lead to sexual harassment, or codes that restrict the rights of trans- 
sexuals. In these situations dress or grooming codes could be deemed 
contrary to the provisions in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 or the 
Race Relations Act 1976. 
There is a judicial view that the restrictive application of equal- 
ity law to dress codes is wrong (best seen in some sex discrimination 
cases) and that in an era of full equality and human rights, differenti- 
ation between sexes, racial groups etc in this respect is inappropriate 
and unfair. 
Although the impact of human rights legislation and European 
Community law in this area has been touched on it will be more 
fully considered below. Before this it is important to analyse the 
extent of legal protection for victims of dress/grooming codes in the 
United States. 
A recent case involving a dress code that required men but not 
women to wear collar and tie is noteworthy. It is the first case in the 
United Kingdom, where an employment tribunal accepted that dress 
codes requiring different treatment in employment are discriminatory. 
Matthew Thompson, a clerical worker from Stockport won -his sex 
discrimination case against a rule requiring him to wear a collar and ZP 
tie. " He complained that the Jobcentre required men to dress fornri- 
ally even if they did not come into contact with the public, whereas 
this requirement did not apply to women, who were free to wear 
t-shirts. However, this decision has now gone on appeal to ttie 
Employment Appeal Tribunal and there is a possibility that it could 
be overtumed. 'o 
LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST EMPLOYER'S DRESS CODES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
While no explicit reference is made to workplace grooming policie. S 
in US equality laws, they are often deemed to be included in the 
terms and conditions of employment and thus can fall within the 
types of discrimination prohibited by Title VII 42 as amended by 
USCA Section 20OOe-2(a). " The only exception to the above would 
be where race, colour, religion, sex or national origin and associated 
appearance standards are a bona fide occupational qualification-52 
which is necessary for the operation of the employer's business. 53 
The courts in the United States take a similar view to their UK 
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counterparts in that both treat dress or grooming codes as a manager- 
ial prerogative that they are reluctant to interfere with. 
In Fagan v National Cash Register Company" it was noted by 
the Federal Court of Appeals that: 'Perhaps no facet of business life 
is more important than a company's place in the public estimation. 
That the image created by its employees dealing with the public 
when on company assignment affects its relations is so well known 
that we take judicial notice of an employer's proper desire to achieve 
favourable acceptance' 
In Fagan the judges were categorical that the employer's public 
image was paramount and any measures taken to maintain that image 
such as dress codes would be justifiable. 
SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Ultimately workplace appearance standards will only amount to 
unlawful discrimination if one sex is less favourably treated than 
another because of their sex. 
In the early 1970s the US District Courts were more supportive 
than they are today of male employees subjected to different hair 
length requirements from female employees. " 
In Donoghue v Shoe Corporation of America Inc. " a require- 
ment that males have short hair was prima facie a violation of Sec- 
tion 703. Similarly in Laffey v Northwest Airlines InC. 17 impositions 
of different grooming -standards for women amounted to sex discrim- 
ination, since female cabin attendants (unlike male attendants) were 
not allowed to wear spectacles and were subjected to a maximum 
weight requirement. 
In Carroll v Talman Federal Savings and Loan Association of 
Chicago" the Federal Court of Appeals held that Title VII had been 
breached: " ... Disparate treatment 
is demeaning to women. While 
there is nothing offensive about uniforms per se, when some 
employees are uniformed and others not there is a natural tendency 
to assume that the uniformed women have a lesser professional status 
than their male colleagues attired in normal business clothes"' How- 
ever, Judge Pell complained that the decision meant that: 'Big 4D 
Brother or perhaps in this case, Big Sister has encroached ... farther 
than the Congress intended or authorised into the domain of private 
enterpnses ... simply to respond to the emotional complaint of one 
disgruntled employee'. ' In Michigan Department of Civil Rig , hts ex 
rel. Cornell v Edward A. Sparrow Hospital Association" it was held 
that an employer's dress code was based on sexual stereotyping and 
amounted to sex discrimination. 
Despite the decisions outlined above, most challenges to groom- C) ZP 
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ing policies have been unsuccessful. Willingham v Macon Telegraph 0 Publishing Company' appears to be the US equivalent of the 
Schmidt case. In this case Willingham filed a complaint asserting sex C: 1 discrimination by Macon in its hiring policy. He was refused employ- 
ment because they disliked the length of his hair. " Their grooming Z_: ý 
policy required all employees who were in contact with the public w 
be neatly dressed and groomed in accordance with community stand- 
ards. Willingham claimed that if he were a female with identical hair 
length and similar qualifications he would have been hired. It was 
held that the employer's grooming policy constituted discrimination tý 
on grounds of grooming standards and not on the grounds of sex, 
which meant his claim was outwith the scope of the 1964 Act. 64 
Moreover, if an employee objects to the grooming code they have 
the right to reject it by looking elsewhere for work or alternatively 
they could compromise their preference by accepting the code that 
comes with the job. " The court's decision in this case while in line 
with previous authority' was not without its critics. 
The four dissenting judges in Willingham" disagreed with the 
majority decision of the Court of Appeals that the 1964 Act does not 
apply to grooming codes. They argued that anti-discrimination law: 
"extends to all differences in the treatment of men and women 
resulting from sex stereotypes. .. (the law) does not permit one 
standard for men and another for women, where both are similarly 
situated'. " 
In Dodge v Giant Food Inc. " it was decided that hair policies: 
fare classifications by sex ... which do not represent any attempt by 
the employer to prevent the employment of a particular sex, and 
which do not pose distinct employment disadvantages for one sex. 
Neither sex is elevated by these regulations to an appreciably 
higher occupational level than the other '070 It cannot be denied that 
the number of men who have lost such claims in the United States 
is high. In Page Airways of Albany, Inc. v New York State Division 
of Human Rights 71 it was held that hair regulations which required 
men to cut their hair, did not discriminate or classify within the 
meaning of Human Rights Law. In Knott v Missouri Pacific Railroad 
Compan) ý72 the Court of Appeal decided that a grooming policy 
requiring men to have short hair did not violate Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act because it was never intended that this legislation would Cý 
interfere with the 'promulgation' or 'enforcement' of personal 
appearance regulations by private employers. 73 
The justifications put forward by the judiciary in these early 
cases for excluding grooming codes from coverage of the Civil rý 
Rights Act 1964 were interesting because of their diversity but other- 
wise fairly tenuous. 
Aside from hair length, the biological differences inherent in 4_ý 
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males and females can cause additional problems. Most cases show 
that courts in the United States believe that 'no-beard' policies do not 
amount to sex discrimination. ' In Rafford v Randle Eastern Ambu- 
lance Service" the principal reason for termination of the plaintiff's 
employment was his beard and moustache and not the length of his 
hair. It was decided that this behaviour did not violate the 1964 
Act. " They had not been discriminated against because of their sex 
but because only men could be discharged because of an unwanted 
beard. 77 There is more chance of a claim being successful where 
wearing a beard is required as part of the employee's religious Z_ý 
beliefs (considered below). Federal Express have, following legal 4_ý 
actions against them by certain of their Rastafarian and Muslim Zý 
employees, agreed to amend their personal appearance policy to 
allow employees with sincerely held religious beliefs to wear a beard. ZIP 
SEXUALLY PROVOCATIVE DRESS REQUIREMENT 
Deakin & MorriS78 state that the reciprocal duty of co-operation 
means that an employer will violate Title VII by implementing a 
policy that clearly oppresses an individual's dignity. 
In Marentette v Michigan Host InC. 79 the court recognised that 
requiring an employee to wear sexually provocative clothing which 
leads to them experiencing sexual harassment could violate the spirit 
of Title V111. It is useful to remind oneself of what constitutes sexual 
harassment in the US: "O unwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors other verballphysical conduct of a sexual nature in 
three situations" The nature of the job in question will play a part 
in determining whether sexual harassment is unlawful. " 
Thus a topless dancer may be expected to tolerate more sexual 
advances and unwanted verbal comments from customers than a 
woman who is a receptionist, without considering herself discrimin- 
ated against. Perhaps the most cited case in this area is EEOC v Sage 
Realty Corporation" where a female lobby attendant was sexually 
harassed as a result of customer reaction to her uniform. The US 
District Court found there had been sex discrimination because it was 
unreasonable for her to tolerate such treatment and the employer's 
knew the 'Bicentennial Uniform' would expose her to sexual harass- 
ment due to its revealing nature. Moreover, the employee raised two 
important issues. The first was that the uniform was entirely inappro- 
priate and incompatible with the nature of her job. She was to be 
responsible for security, safety, maintenance and infon-nation func- 
tions of the office building. Secondly, she said the uniform misrep- 
resented her duties by making her look like a sex object. Sprogis v 
United Air Lines" was referred to; where it was stated that many 
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years ago an employer could conduct himself in such a way that 
women were treated as sex objects, however, those days are long 
gone. In Sage it was decided that Title VII was: 'intended to strike 
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women 
resulting fi-om sex stereotyping'. " Male employees would not have 
been required to wear such a uniform thus there was no question that 
Hassleman was only required to wear the uniform because of her 
sex. The uniform was made a term and condition of employment and 
by firing her for refusing to wear the outfit, her employers violated 
Section 703(a) of the 1964 ACt16. 
TRANSSEXUALS AND TRANSVESTITES 
The relevant caselaw indicates that transsexuals in the US, unlike 
their UK counterparts, have little protection from discrimination 
under Title VII and are likely to be unsuccessful in such claims. In 
Grossman v Bernards Township Board of Education"' the US Diýtrict 
Court categorically conformed this and stated it: 'has no desire, to 
encyacre in the resolution of a dispute as to the plaintiff's present sex. ZD Z; ) Rather we assume ... the plaintiff is a member of the female 
gender.. . she was discharged by the defendant school board not because of her status as a female, but rather because of her chancre 41D 
Ie9.88 
The employee had no claim under Title VII since the court felt 
that there was no evidence of any cong gressional intent to include transsexuals within the ambit of equality legislation. 
Three US Court of Appeal decisions are often cited in this area 
and they follow the reasoning in Grossman. " In Holloway v Arthur 
Anderson & Company" there was no unlawful discrimination when 
an employee was dismissed for commencing sex-change treatment ZD 
because Congress only had the 'traditional notions of sex' in mind 
when enacting Title VIL Despite their restrictive interpretation of 
Title VII in respect of transsexuals the US Court of Appeal in 
Holloway did concede the lecrislation could offer limited protection: Cý 
'consistent with the determination of this court, transsexuals claiming 
discrimination because of their sex, would clearly state a cause of 
action under Title VIF" 
They accepted that transsexuals could have a valid claim of sex 
discrimination where they can prove they have been less favourably 
treated as a result of their sex and not their transsexualism. In such 
a case they will be afforded the same protection under equality law 
as any other person of the same sex that is a victim of discriminatory 
treatment (see Enriquez case below). 
83 
The position of persons who are dismissed for displaying char- 
acteristics that are associated with the opposite sex must now be 
assessed. A man could argue that if he belonged to the opposite sex 4-P he would not have been dismissed since it would have been socially 
acceptable to adopt the social role he is being penalised for adopting. 
It is unlikely that an employer would be able to establish that dress- 
ing like a woman or having feminine tendencies affect's a male 
employee's ability to perform his contractual duties. " Despite this, in 
the case of Smith v Liberty Mutual Assurance Company"' the Court 
of Appeals held that Title VH had not been violated when a homo- 
sexual employee was dismissed for being 'effeminate'. It was stated 
that the 1964 Act does not forbid discrimination based on sexual 
preference. Moreover, it was averred that Smith was not discrimin- 
ated against because he was male but because his characteristics were 
associated with females. Thus owing to his display of 'sexual aberra- 
tion' he was justly refused employment. ' 
In Gay Law Students Association v Pacific Telephone & Tele- 
phone Company" it was held that a public utility's management 
could not automatically exclude homosexuals from consideration for 
employment, however, they were'not denied the authority to exercise 
legitimate discretion in such decisions. 
All of these early decisions were flawed in their reasoning. It 
could be convincingly argued that just because discrimination in 
dress or grooming codes is not mentioned in the legislation it does 
not mean that they should not be brought within its ambit. 16 The 
legislators would have specifically included this behaviour within the t: ý 
ambit of equality legislation had they thought of it and it should be 
interpreted as if they had included it. Legal protection against sexual Cý 
harassment has been provided by the US courts on the same basis. 
In Price Waterhouse v HopkinS97 the plaintiff was denied 
appointment as a partner because her manner, speech, dress and 
physical appearance etc. were not feminine enough. 
The Supreme Court ruled that Title V11 protects employees 
against discrimination for failing to comply with gender role expecta- 
tions. It could be argued that a reasonable extrapolation of this 
decision is that employers cannot discriminate against employees that 
maintain an outward appearance that Js inconsistent with their ana- 
tomical sex. Unfortunately the courts have not chosen to utilise the 
decision in Price Waterhouse as the basis for affording protection to 
transsexuals. 
State Governments are generally more generous in affording t_ý 
protection to employees than Federal Authorities. Some State laws 
extend similar protection against classic forms of discrimination to 
that provided by Federal Acts to employees while other statutes pro- 
vide protection to groups not covered by the Federal Acts e. g. Cali- 
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fornian statute to prevent, discrimination based on sexual orientation', 
Californian labour code 1102.1. 
Many States now provide protection against discrimination 
because of an employee's sexual orientation (California, New Jersey, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Wisconsin, New 
York and the District of Columbia) and individual States provide 
protection against discrimination on the ground of being a transsexual 
or cross-dressing (Rhode Island, Connecticut, Minnesota and in Cali- 
fornia shortly) personal appearance (District of Columbia) and height 4_=ý 
and weight (Michigan). 
In the case of Enriquez v West Jersey Health Systems" a doctor 
was dismissed when he underwent treatment for gender reassignment 
and his appearance gradually changed to that of a woman. When he 
refused a request by the West Jersey Health Systems to change his 
appearance back he was dismissed. A New Jersey Court accepted his 
argument that forcing men to act like men and women to act like 
women constituted cender discrimination. They also held that dis- 
crimination against transsexuals could constitute illegal disability dis- tý 
crimination under New Jersey law. ". 
In the absence of Federal laws protecting against discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation and transsexual behaviour it will be 
left to the courts to broadly interpret relevant State legislation (where 
it exists) to ensure employment rights are available to those category 
of employees. 
Obviously as long as dress or grooming codes are being upheld 
by the courts as non-discriminatory on the basis -that they are gender 
neutral or required in the interests of business necessity, it will be 
difficult for transvestites and transsexuals to obtain any protection 
against discrimination because they tend to wear clothes etc. that pre- 4: ) 
sent an outward appearance that is inconsistent with their anatomical 
sex and are contrary to organisational norms. 
RACE, RELIGION AND GROOMING CODES 
Grooming codes can have a discriminatory impact on individuals that 
have specific appearance requirements as a consequence of their race 
or religion. An employee suffering a detriment because they are 
obliged to flout their racial or religious rules could bring a case 
against their employer under Title VII and claim their rights have Z) Cý 
been breached under the Federal Constitution. " 
With respect to hair requirements in grooming codes these can- 
have a discriminatory effect on the ground of race and be contrary 
to Title VIL In EEOC Decisions No. 71-1985 the EEOC found reason- 
able cause to believe that an employer's hair policy violated Title 42 
U. S. C. A. Section 20OOe-2(a), since it banned hair that was 'cut 
85 
bushy' and the court felt African-Americans were being measured 
against a grooming standard that assumed Caucasian hair character- 
istics. Furthermore, it was found that the employer was not applying 
his policy uniformly. 
In EEOC Decisions No. 72-0979"' the EEOC held that prohibit- 
ing bushy hair styles (Afros) discriminated against African-Americans 
of both sexes. The grooming policy also banned various moustaches, 
which were common amongst Black males and were thought to be an Im 4D 
expression of their heritage and culture. However, in Rogers v Amer- 
ican Airlines, Inc. "' a Black employee failed to prove that a 'corn- 
row' hairstyle was exclusive to black people. 
In relation to facial hair, the majority of cases are decided in 
favour of the employers, especially if their business requires a high 
standard of hygiene and safety. 
Policies prohibiting beards for safety reasons do not usually 
violate Title VII as long as they are not used as an excuse to reject 
Black applicants. "' There are cases where Black employees have 
won their case, like in Johnson v Memphis Police Department" 
where a grooming policy requiring all officers to be clean-shaven 1P 
violated Title VII because employers made no effort to accommodate 
a black officer who suffered from folliculitis which prevented him 
from shaving. '05 
In EEOC v Sambo's of Georgia, Inc. " a grooming policy 
banned restaurant managers and personnel from having facial hair. 
Employers however, are not free from all liability when setting 
grooming policies. A Jewish employee won his case when it was 
held that the employer failed to show neutral or valid reasons (health 
or safety) for the 'no-beard' policy other than the excuse that it was 
'tradition'. " 
The US District Court in Atlanta recently ruled that a no-beard 
rule for employees in contact with customers violated an employee's 
religious beliefs. Khaleed Abdul Azeez had asked for an exemption 
from the rule because of his Islamic beliefs. Federal Express Corp 
was found to have violated Title V 11. "' A rule set down by the mil- 
itary that originally required (and later strongly recommended) female 
personnel serving in Saudi Arabia when off duty to wear local dress 
in the form of a 'abaya' was prohibited by the US Lec,,, islature. This 
move followed a lawsuit by America's highest-ranking female pilot 
Colonel Martha McSally claiming the requirement violated her Chris- 
tian sensitivities and her constitutional rights as a woman. " 
SUMMARY OF THE US POSITION 
In the United States the courts have supported the legitimacy of 
employer's codes regulating the appearance of employee 
Is in all but 
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the most extreme cases. With respect to arguments of inequality on 
grounds of sex, race etc. it will only be treated as discrimination 
where the restrictions are unjustified and there are no similar restric- 
tions on the chosen comparator. Where there are restrictions that 
apply to both sexes, races etc then no matter how different the dress 
codes are this will be treated as a gender neutral requirement and zn 
therefore not contrary to Title V11. The employer can often easily 
establish that the code is necessary to maintain the image of the busi- 
ness. 
Areas where dress or grooming codes are treated as unlawful is 
where they lead to the employee being sexually harassed, under Fed- 
eral law where they have an adverse impact on transsexual 
employees who are discriminated against because of their sex (and 41) 
not because they are a transsexual) and where appropriate employees 
have a claim for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or 
being a transsexual under State law. Increasingly where a code inter- 
feres with employees' racial or religious beliefs the courts are willing 
to treat this as a breach of Title V 11. 
The case of The People v Santorelli"O which is not an employ- 
ment law case, is noteworthy because the Court underlines the fact 
that traditional stereotypes work against the interests of equality law. 
The New York Court of Appeals were asked to apply a provision of 
the penal code that made it an offence for women to expose their 
nipples in public. The women were arrested for appearing topless in 
a public park and argued that the provision was contrary to the 
equality guarantee in the Constitution. Their argument was successful 
and on appeal it was held that: 
'One of the most important purposes to be served by the Equal Pro- 
tection Clause is to ensure that 'public sensibilities' grounded in pre- 
judice and unexamined stereotypes do not become enshrined as part of 
the official policy of government. Tbus where 'public sensibilities' 
constitute the justification for , gender-based classification, 
the funda- 
mental question is whether the particular 'sensibility' to be protected 
is, in fact, a reflection of archaic prejudice or a manifestation of a 
legitimate Government objective"" ZP 
Flynn comments that Santorelli makes more demands in support 
of equality than most employment law cases. "' One would expect 
that because of today's diverse social conditions, any difference of 
treatment based on sex, sexual orientation, race or religion would not 
be tolerated. However, as can be seen there is a need for further 
reform either in the form of statutory intervention or judicial creativ- 
ity before such an egregious environment can be created in the 
United States. 
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COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 
In both jurisdictions there must be 'less favourable treatment', for 
discrimination to occur and this usually requires a comparison of like 
with like. "' In Rv Birmingham CC, ex p. EOC' 14 it was stated that 
less favourable treatment includes denial of an option which is 
valued by the employee. Unfortunately because of the 'swings and 
roundabouts' or gender neutral arguments there is difficulty in show- 
ing that there is inequality of treatment. 
The legal approach to this issue adopted by -the Employment Appeal Tribunal in the first stage of appeal in the case of Smith v 
Safeway Stores was in our opinion an appropriate one. 
Firstly it was asked whether Smith had been treated differently 
'but for' his sex? He was because if he were a woman he could have 
tied his hair back. Secondly, it was asked whether this amounts to 
less favourable treatment for the purposes of the Act? It did amount 
to less favourable treatment in Smith because he was dismissed when 
he refused to cut his hair. Thirdly, it must be determined whether he 
was less favourably treated on the grounds of his sex? The majority 
of the EAT felt that he was because women could pin up their hair 
rather than have to cut it. It is submitted that this approach is an 
appropriate means of deciding ., on 
the unlawfulness of dress codes in IM, 
discrimination cases. Unfortunately there is little scope for challeng- 
ing managerial discretion to operate dress codes and female 
employees would have difficulty in convincing the judiciary of the 
unreasonableness of enforcing such a code because it is contrary to 
the spirit and the word of equality legislation. 
The UK and US courts use a 'comparative model' when dealing 
with discrimination cases which on the face of it is fair and objective 
but in reality in some cases produces biased and unfair results from 
an employee's perspective. "5 The comparative model centres on: 
'less favourable treatment as opposed to purely unfavourable treat- 
ment'. 116 The imposition of dress or grooming codes on employees is 
a good case in point. 
It has become apparent that the main difference between the UK 
and US is the lengths the courts will go to test the validity of the 
business necessity defence. This defence is more developed in the 
US. Once discrimination has been established under Title VII it is 
open to the employer to establish the defence. The central difference 
between the two jurisdictions is that unlike the courts in the UK, the 
US courts investigate such claims of business necessity rather than 1_ý 
simply accepting them. "' Accordingly, the US courts give the &P impression of being more open and unbiased because they accept 
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contrary evidence and give equal attention to the arguments of both 
employee and employer. In effect they treat the discriminatory effect 
as seriously as the business need for it. 
In Diaz v Pan American World Airways Inc. "' it was held that 
the: 'primary function of an airline is to transport passengers safel y 
from one point to another' 119 
Accordingly, this function did not require a pleasant environ- 
ment, enhanced by the obvious cosmetic effect that female steward- 
esses provide. This was particularly significant because it helped 
reduce discriminatory dress policies for women in the airline 
industry. Diaz was applied in Bradley v Pizzaco of Nebraska Inc. & 
Domino's Pizza Inc"' where a requirement to be clean-shaven led tcý 
PFB sufferers claiming race discrimination. 12' The employer main- 
tained that the better the employees looked, the better their sales 
would be. This view was based on a public opinion survey that 
showed that up to 20 percent of those surveyed would react ne-(,, a- 
tively to bearded deliverymen. Despite the fact this argument was 
supported by the results of primary research, the business necessity 
defence failed. 
In addition, in referTing to Diaz, it was said that bearded 
employees have no effect on the company's ability to make or 
deliver pizzas. 122 However, a limitation of this decision is that the 
EEOC in this case sought an exemption from the no-beard policy for 
African-Americans. Although the employer granted this it was not 
extended to cover other male employees. 
The limitation of the application of the business necessity 
defence in Diaz to purposes that are related to the primary function 
of the orgyanisation is a development that could usefully be emulated 
by Employment Tribunals and courts in the UK. 
In relation to health and safety matters, both the US and UK 
will usually accept the business necessity defence in this context 
because for example to allow beards or loose hair is a safety hazard 
and will not be tolerated. "' In EEOC Decisions No. 72-0701"' it was 
decided that there was no violation of Title VII when an employee 
who handled hot lead was discharged after refusing to correct the 
safety hazard his long hair represented. It is important to note that he 
was given the option by the employer of cutting his hair or wearing 
a haimet. 
In the case of Grieg v Community Industry`- in the UK it was 
held by the EAT that employers could not justify their discriminatory 
behaviour on the basis that it was done in the interests of business 
or with a good motive. "' Similar reasoning has been adopted in later 
cases 127 but this approach does not appear to have been utilised in 
dress code cases in the UK since employers have been successfully 
using such a defence. 128 
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THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 
The Human Rights Act 1998, hereafter referred to as HRA, came 
into effect in England and Wales in October 2000. It incorporates 
certain rights and liberties guaranteed by the European Convention on 
Human Rights, hereafter referred to as ECHR, into national law, thus 
enabling Convention rights to be relied upon in domestic courts and 
tribunals. Section 3(l) of the HRA states that all legislation must be 
interpreted and given effect 'so far as it is possible to do so' to bring 
it in line with the ECHR. However, a court may issue a declaration 
under Section 4 if the relevant statute is incompatible with Conven- 
tion rights. Furthermore, the HRA only allows challenges to be made 
to the actions of public authorities. Section 6 states that a 'public 
authority' will include bodies undertaking functions of a public 
nature and in addition, privatised prisons or utilities which have 
emixed functions' are covered. 
The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1958 
and its role is to ensure that domestic courts uphold the ECHR. The 
significance of the European Court of Human Rights is undeniable 
and it has been ranked as one of the three premier courts of 'intema- 
tional adjudication'. 129 Moreover, domestic courts and tribunals must 
take account of 'relevant judgements, decisions, declarations and 
opinions made by the European Commission and Court of Human 
Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe' 
when. interpreting and developing their common law. 
It could be argued that the Convention rights impact on the 
legality of workplace appearance standards in that such standards 
may amount to an interference with an individual's right to a private 
life or freedom of expression. 
Each qualified right under the Convention under Articles 8,9,10 
and. 11 all follow the same format and assert a right whilst detailing 
the circumstances when interference is justifiable. It is essential that a 
restriction complies with three conditions. It must be in accordance with 
national law; seek a legitimate aim as specified in the Article; and the 
interference must be 'necessary in a democratic society'. This third con- 
dition is important, since it allows employers to justify the application 
of dress codes. In Deakin & MorriS130 it is stated that the term 'neces- 
sary' requires the existence of a 'pressing social need', 'interference' 
must be 'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' and that reasons 
given as evidence by domestic authorities must be 'relevant and suffi- 
cient'. Thus an employer will find it difficult to establish a 'pressing 
social need' if the restriction is only based on their personal whim or 
where it is not uniformly applied across the organisation. That said, 
managers are usually allowed some discretion when determining 
whether the interference is 'necessary'. 
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The concept of freedom of expression and how people dress is 
linked to this third condition in that 'democracy should be suffi- 
ciently robust to be able to cope with a certain level of dissent and 
disagreement. Hence, if these rights are to be interfered with, that 
interference must be necessary in a democratically minded society, 
and not an authoritarian one. The onus is on society to tolerate the 
freedom in question unless it can be shown to lead to destructive 
consequences'. 131 
In addition, the notion of 'proportionality' means that restrictions 
should be kept to a bare minimum, thus it might be deterTnined 
whether management's objective could have been achieved by sorne 
other means requiring less interference. 
. 
Ultimately the Court of Human Rights does not provide precise 
guidance on how the articles must be applied, however, it is respons- 
ible for ensuring that similar principles are used throughout all 
domestic justice systems. 
It is unlikely that the hair-length policy in Smith would be 
allowed under the HRA because the employers would have to show 
evidence that the rule was 'necessary in a democratic society' and 
there is no obvious 'pressing social need' for men to have short hair. 
Moreover, when looking at proportionality, it could now be argued 
that Smith should have been entitled to tie his hair back since this 
option was open to female employees. Furthennore, this would have 
prevented any health and safety arguments from being raised. 
Consequently, people should be able to do as they please pro- 
vided no harm is done to others. It is unlikely that clothes or hair- 
styles will harm others. The only exception to this would be cases 
involving health and safety issues. Commentators have argued that an 
individual's freedom to choose how to present themselves to the 
world at large is an aspect of freedom of expression. "' Furthermore, 
in Stevens v United Kingdom 133 the European Commission for Human 
Rights said that the right to freedom of expression might include the &D 
right to express oneself through ones clothes. 
However, it appears that the issue of freedom of expression has 
been widely ignored by UK courts or deemed to be inappropri- Z_ý 
ate, 
134 despite the fact that 'the choices of the shapes, colours and tex- 
tures we put onto our body are intensely personal statements of who, 
we are 
t 135 
and sexuality, and clothing is the means by which we 
fmana, g, e' our ambivalence'. 
136 
The views portrayed above suggest that it would be improper Cý 
for employers to impose their own personal taste on employees when 
creating dress codes. One commentator maintains that freedom of 
expression benefits society, and that the meaning of dress is based on 
convention and thus stereotypes. Moreover clothes are 'symbolic' in 
that wearing a suit is not power, but it may symbolise power. 137 
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Furthermore, one may think of dress as an expression of parti- 
cipation in a culture and if one is allowed to wear their chosen 
clothes in public then their identity or lifestyle is being validated., " 
In turn this has a positive effect on society since it warrants greater 
acceptance and tolerance. 
TRANSVESTITES AND THE ECHR 
In Kara v London Borough of Hackney mentioned earlier it became 
clear that under UK law an employer would not be liable for sex dis- 
crimination if they dismissed a male employee for attending work 
dressed as a woman. The applicant appealed against this decision to 
the European Commission of Human Rights and complained he was 
prevented from expressing himself as he wished through his dress ZO 
and that there had been a violation of Article 8 and Article 14 of the 
ECHR. However by a majority the Commission dismissed the com- 
plaint. 
The Commission agreed that under Article 8(l) constraints 
imposed on a person's mode of dress amounted to an interference 
with their private life. Neverthelessi they felt that in the circum- 
stances the restriction was 'in accordance with the law' since it was 
based on a lawful internal policy. The interference was held to 
pursue the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others and 
thought to be 'necessary in a democratic society, ' since employees 
who come into contact with the public may have to conform to 
reasonable dress codes. Such a requirement could be regarded as C) 
eenhancing the employer's public image. "" - 
Perhaps surprisingly the Commission takes a similar approach to 
that of courts in the UK and US and decides that the public image 
of the organisation is of greater importance than the individual's free- 
dom of expression. 
The Commission in Kara held that it had not been established 
that the applicant had been prevented by his employer from 
expressing a particular opinion or idea by means of his clothing. The 
employer was not acting in breach of Article 10(2) of the ECHR, 
despite the fact that the employee was a bisexual male transvestite 
and there was plenty of evidence to show that by wearing dresses he 
was indeed trying to express his own identity and opinions. In addi- 
tion, the Commission acknowledged that although there might have 4_ý IM rn 
been a wider range of dress available to females than to males, the 
complaint of discrimination under Article 14 was rejected since there 
was no evidence that the applicant was subjected to a different rule 
purely because he was male and not female. 
Under Article 9(2) of the Convention an individual's right to the 
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freedom of religious belief may be restricted by a public health 
exception that it is 'necessary in a democratic society'. Thus a pro- 
hibition on beards while representing a violation of religious observ- 4-P 
ance in certain religions will because of this exception not necessar- 
ily amount to a breach. There are various possibilities for legal 
actions being brought under the Human Rights Act although the case 
law to date does not suggest this is the most viable option. Article 
8 and Article 10 are the most relevant to dress codes preserving as 
they do a right to a private life (dress codes could impact on this) 
and right to freedom of expression. 
In order to comply with the HRA, a manager must determine 
whether their policy interferes with a qualified human zight, if so, 
they must show reasonable justification for the interference. For 
example by arguing that the company dress code is the only option 
available, or is in the interests of public health and safety, or protects 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
The HRA does offer employees some protection, however, dress 
codes tend to invoke the qualified rights which permit interference if 
necessary in a democratic society. The case law illustrates how quali- 
fying circumstances have been construed by the courts and the most 
common justifications given are that policies are necessary to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others or are in the interest of public 
safety. 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND DRESS CODES 
It is not our intention to give detailed consideration to the impact of z! ) 
European Community Law on the legal treatment of dress codes 
under the UK law. The Code of Conduct on Sexual Harassment and 
its definition of sexual harassment has played an important role ir, 
expanding the scope of sexual harassment law in the UK to include 
any behaviour that adversely affects an employee's dignity at work. 
Whether this extends to dress or grooming codes remains to be test d 4-ý e 
but seems likely. In PvS and Cornwall County Council, "O a trans- 
sexual was dismissed following minor surgical operations. There was 
uncertainty whether or not the employee was protected under the 
Equal Treatment Directive. "' As a result the case was referred to the 
ECJ and they emphasised that the principle of equality is central tco 
Community law and that the right not to be discriminated against on 
grounds of sex is a fundamental human right and one that the Court 
has a duty to enforce. They decided that Article 5(l) prohibited the 
dismissal of transsexuals for a reason related to gender reassignment. 
Moreover, it was felt that discrimination against a person as a result 
of gender reassignment is fundamentally based on the sex of the Cý 
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person and tolerating such behaviour would amount to a failure to 
respect their dignity and freedom. It seems likely that if transsexuals 
who live and dress as a member of the opposite sex were dismissed, 
then it would amount to unlawful discrimination under UK 142 and 
Community law. 
Legislation will be shortly forthcoming in the UK to implement 
the Council Framework Directive 2000/78/EC into UK law. The rules 
relating to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and reli- 
gious belief must be implemented by December 2003 and on grounds 
of age and disability discrimination by December 2006. 
There will be various additional grounds for a discrimination 
action in the UK that will potentially offer increased protection to 
persons suffering a detriment because of dress or grooming codes. 
Particularly in the areas of sexual orientation, religious belief and ZIP 
race. 
If this behaviour could be challenged under the heading of har- 
assment then the additional scope for legal action is considerable. If 
for example a homosexual man is subjected to verbal taunts by his 
colleagues because of the clothes he wears then an action for harass- 
ment based on sexual orientation could be taken against the 
employer. Alternatively the employer may harass an employee that 
refuses to comply with their dress or grooming code. 
Under Article 2(3) express provision is made for treating as 
unlawful harassment on all the grounds specified in Article I (namely 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation). In what cir- 
cumstances will harassment on these various grounds be treated as 
unlawful? 
'When unwanted conduct related , 
to any of the grounds referred 
to in Article 1 takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the 
dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrad- 
ing, humiliating or offensive environment. ' 
The Employment Directive offers new protection for employees 
who are unfairly treated as a result of their sexual orientation. It has 
been realised that sexual orientation rarely affects a worker's suitabil- 
ity or capacity to perform their duties. Although 'sexual orientation' 
is not defined, one of the Government's proposals is that the term 
should encompass heterosexual, homosexual and bisexual orientation. 
The Employment Directive requires Member States to introduce 
legislation that prohibits direct and indirect discrimination based on 
6religion or belief'. The UK Government chose not to define 'reli- 
gion' but clearly states that 'belief' only covers religious beliefs and 
profound philosophical convictions that deserve society's respect. 
Specific practical concerns for employers when laying down rules on 
diet, dress and uniform and these will be covered by detailed 
guidance. 
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Another legislative development in the EU is the Race Discrirn- Z-P ination Directive 2000/43/EU. For the first time in the UK racial har- 
assment in employment is specifically treated as unlawful discrimina- 
tion. It must be implemented in the UK by July 2003 and the victirr, 
will need to establish not only that the harassment affected his or her 
dignity at work and but also adversely affected his or her working 
environment. "' This requirement to establish both types of detriment 
may not stand given that it imposes a higher evidential burden theri 
the law does at the moment. Even if it does it may not prove an 
evidential obstacle to applicants claiming that appearance codes have 
interfered with their ability to dress in conformity with their racial or 
ethnic origins, interfering with their dignity at work and creating an 4D 4-: 0 
unwelcome working environment. What may prove more difficult if 
the Government's proposals are implemented is convincing a tribunal 
that a reasonable person would have regarded the conduct as violat- 
ing the dignity of the employee. 
The European Union have adopted a Directive which makes 
considerable amendment of the Equal Treatment Directive and will 
introduce inter alia: new measures on sexual harassment, including 
for the first time a binding legal definition and a requirement for 
employers to take preventative measures to deal with sexual harass- 
ment. Although the new Directive is as yet not formally adopted it 4", 
is likely to be in the near future and will be implemented in member 
states by 2005. 
Although the UK Government is only at the consultation phase,, 
the Directives are bound to have a future bearing on workplace dress 
codes, especially if they can be shown to be discriminatory or repres- 
ent harassment on one of the various grounds. 
SUMMARY OF THE EUROPEAN POSITION 
By the end of this year employers in the United Kingdom will be 
subject to legislation that will treat them as acting unlawfully if they 
discriminate against their workers on the grounds of religion or ZD 4-ý 
belief, or sexual orientation. The Government has already issued pro- 
posed legislation and consultative draft regulations for amending the 
Race Relations Act and the Disability Discrimination Act in order to, 
implement the new rights required by the EU Framework Employ- 
ment Directive and the Race Discrimination Directive. 
Amendments to the Race Relations Act will come into force in 
July 2003 and those relating to religion and sexual orientation will 
come into force in December 2003. "' The Directives define harass- 
ment as occurring when unwanted conduct based on one of the, 
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grounds of prohibited discrimination takes place 'with the purpose or 
effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimid- 
ating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment'. The 
wording of the definition requires the complainant to prove the har- 
assment had the requisite purpose or effect and that it damaged the 
working environment. 
The Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations which 
implements the EU Race Directive include a new definition of indir- 
ect discrimination, a freestanding definition of racial harassment and 
a change to the burden of proof. With regard to religion and belief, 
the structure of the draft Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003 is similar to other equality legislation. Direct and Z_D 
indirect discrimination in employment on grounds of religion or 
belief, by way of harassment, is prohibited. 116 Moreover, the regula- 
tions will cover discrimination against contractors and discrimination 
by qualifications bodies. The Council of the European Union has 
revised and approved a final text of the Directive implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin. 
The Framework Employment Directive does not contain a 
definition of 'religion' or 'belief' and the UK Government has 
chosen not to provide a detailed definition or set an exhaustive list 
of acceptable religious groupings. The Draft Regulations simply say 
that the two terms mean 'any religion, religious belief, or similar 
philosophical belief'. The definition of direct discrimination is note- 
worthy because it would make it unlawful on grounds of religion or 
belief for A to treat B less favourably. Because of the way it is cur- 
rently worded, this could be because of B's religion or because they 
do not follow A's religion. 147 Likewise the draft Employment Equal- 
ity (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 are also directly parallel to 
the SDA and RRA. Direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds 
of sexual orientation, by way of victimisation or by way of harass- 
ment, is prohibited. 
It is unclear at the moment the exact role the Directives will 
play in relation to workplace dress codes once they are implemented. 
However, the Government consultation document contains their stated 
aim to: 'develop practical, workable and effective legislation which 
fully meets the standards required by the Directive and will have a 
real impact on removing unfair discrimination and improving C1 
people's lives - but without stifling business with unnecessary bur- 
dens'. 148 These measures will clearly have far-reaching consequences Cý 
for discrimination law (including harassment) in the UK and all the 
other member states in the European Union, ensuring that all categor- ZP 
ies of victim of discrimination are provided with legal protection. Cý 
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CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the US and UK treatment of complaints relating to dress/ 
grooming codes are similar. This is probably as a result of the weight P C: 1 
given to managerial prerogative in this respect by the courts and their 
acceptance of the employer's right to use these techniques to deter- 
mine and maintain their corporate image. The unwillingness of the 
courts in both jurisdictions to challenge the legal basis for dress or 
grooming codes or favourably consider the human rights aspects is 
unfortunate for those persons whose behaviour is curtailed. 
There are some differences in approach and lessons that can be 
leamt from considering the approach to these cases in the US hich- 
lighted above, for example, investigation of an employer's defence of 
business necessity, primary purpose approach in Diaz. 
It is contended that the differences between the two systems will 
increase when the equality Directives are implemented into UK law, 
with the UK offering the prospect of much wider protection. Not 
only will the grounds for complaint increase but a more favourable 
definition of indirect discrimination will be introduced (making it 
easier to establish) and the concept of harassment will be given lecyis- Zý 
lative force for the first time. There is also the possibility that the 
courts will recognise that the human rights of the employee in terms 
of freedom of expression and the right to family life should take pre- 
cedence over the qualified defences in the Human Rights Act 1998. 
in support of this view John Stuart Mill"' claimed that indi- 
viduals are the best guardians of themselves: 'The only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant 
... Over himself, over 
his mind and body, the individual is sover- 
eign'. 
NOTES. 
Law Graduate, The Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen. 
Senior Lecturer in Law, The Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen. 
1 Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen. 
2P Skidmore, 'Dress to Impress: Employer Regulation of Gay and Les- 
bian Appearance' (1999) 8(4) Social and Legal Studies 509-512. 
3 Quinn v Calder Industrial Materials Ltd [1996] IRLR 126. 
4 I. T Smith, GH Thomas, Smith & Wood's Industrial Law 7th ed. (2000) 
(Butterworths) 258. 
5 The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford University Press, 1998. 
6 KT Bartlett, 'Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Stand- 
97 
ards, Community Norms and Workplace Equality' 92 Michigan Law 
Review 2541. 
7G Clayton, G Pitt 'Dress Codes and Freedom and Expression' [1997] 
1(54) European Human Rights Law Review 55. 
8 Large companies found that when they introduced casual Friday's in the 
workplace productivity went up on those days. Research in the United 
States by the Society for Human Resource Management found the 49% 
of the employers surveyed allowed casual dress every day. See AFH'S 
Hot Topics in Employment Law, Casual Dress Code Red. See 
www. ahipubs. conVnewsletter/121801. htmI 
9 [1977] IRLR 360; [1978] ICR 85. 
10 IDS Handbook (December 1998) p. 234. 
11 [1977] IRLR 360,361. 
12 D Pannick, Sex Discrimination Law, (1985) (Clarendon Press) 188. 
13 In Wilson v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc S/0590/89 the bank introduced 
a policy that men must wear suits instead of a uniform. Wilson refused 
to comply because his suit was not suitable for summer wear and he 
was unable to afford a new one. He claimed sex discrimination on the 
ground that women could wear anything as long as it was smart. Wil- 
son's claim failed because the tribunal felt that he had not suffered a 
detriment and both sexes were subject to a requirement, in that they had 
to dress smartly. 
14 [19771 ICR 85,88. 
15 [19771 IRLR 395. 
16 [1994] IRLR 7. 
17 [1996] IRLR 456. 
18 [19961 IRLR 456,459. 
19 [1995] IRLR 132,134. 
20 supra 3 p. 259. 
21 IDS Handbook (December 1998) p. 236. 
22 S Deakin, GS Morris, Labour Law, 3rd ed. (2001) (Butterworths) 603. 
23 In Ross v Wm. Low & Co plc SCOIT 3177/83 a male employee did 
night work in a supermarket. Although he had no contact with the 
public, he was dismissed when he tinted and streaked his hair. 
The Employment Tribunal held that there was no sex discrimination 
because if a female had done the same then she would have been 
treated in the same way as Ross. Interestingly, they stated that if Ross 
had had sufficient qualifying service he miaht have succeeded in a 
claim for unfair dismissal. 
24 supra 6, in this article various justifications are put forward for the 
view that dress codes are contrary to the right of freedom of expression. 
25 27 Feb 2001; EAT No. 1414/00. 
26 [1992] IRLR 561 NIHC. 
27 Ibid., at p 563. 
28 ET case No. S/626/83. 
29 In Carpenter v Kennings Ltd [1984] COIT 1571[78 a van driver was 
dismissed for refusing to remove an earring despite that fact that two 0 Cý 
fellow female drivers were allowed earrings. The Employment Tribunal 
held that there had been unlawful sex discrimination. 
98 
30 ET Case No. 22482/89. 
31 In Stoke-on-Trent-Community Transport v Cresswell EAT 359/93 the 
EAT upheld the tribunal's finding that a woman was directly discrimin- 
ated a 'cyainst when she was 
dismissed for wearing trousers. In this par- 
ticular case a dress code was imposed on one sex but no equivalent 
code was imposed on the other. Ibis clearly amounted to less favour- 
able treatment. 
32 Case No. 1303043/98. 
33 [1981]507 F Supp. 
34 'Sexual harassment means conduct of a sexual nature or other conduct 
based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work. ' 
35 [2000] IRLR 151. 
36 supra 10 p. 207. 
37 L Flynn, 'Gender equality law and employer's dress codes' (1995) 24 
Industrial Law Journal 272. 
38 Inserted by the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations C, 0 
1999 SI 1999/1102. 
39 EAT 325/95. 
40 [19831 IRLR 209. 
41 ET Case No. 29014f79. 
42 If BHS had allowed her request then the 14% of their customers, who 
were Muslim, could have identified with the assistant, which would 
have been in the company's favour. In addition, modifying their uni- 
form regulations to permit trousers beneath the overall would have been 
relatively simple. 
43 sections 11 & 12 provide the exemption. 
44 [ 1980] IRLR 6. 
45 The applicant argued that the prohibition struck at his right to freedom C. 
of religion under Article 9 of European Convention of Human Rights. 
46 Similar issues arose in a recent case where when a Mr Watson was 
turned down for a job in a Waitrose coffee shop because he had a 
beard. It was argued by him that the no-beard rule represented discrim- 
ination on grounds of sex because it was harder for a man to comply 
with than a woman. His claim was unsuccessful. See, D Pannick, 
'Beards give employers a hairy legal problem' The Times (13.03.02). 
47 [1981] ICR 631. 
48 Although the applicant was given leave to appeal against the EAT's 
decision she did not proceed because her employer agreed to amend its 
reaUlations to allow her to wear a uniform consisting of trousers and a 
tunic. 
49 New Law Journal (21 March, 2003) p. 418. 
50 Department for Work & Pensions v M. Thompson EAT No. 0254-03. 
51 Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, makes it unlawful employment 
practice for an employer: '(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ- 1P 
ment, because of such individuals race, colour, religion, sex or national 
origin; or (2) limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants rý z: 1 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
99 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, colour, reli- 
gion, sex or national origin'. 
52 42 USCA Section 20OOe-2(a)(1). 
53 Ibid., at 2(e) 1. 
54 [1973] 481 F 2d 1115. 
55 Roberts v General Mills Inc. [1971] 337 F Supp 1055 where there was 
a violation of s. 703 as a result of a requirement that allowed females to 
wear hairnets, but required men to wear hats which meant they had to 
keep their hair short, see Rafford v Randle Eastern Ambulance Service 
[1972] 348 F Supp 316 and Aros v McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
[1972] 348 F Supp 661. 
56 [1972] 337 F Supp 1357. 
57 [1973] 366 F Supp 763, [19741 374 F Supp 1382 (US District Court). 
58 [1979] 604 F 2d 1028 (7th Cir). 
59 Ibid., at 1032-3. 
60 supra 55. at 1033-4. 
61 [19821 326 N. W. 2d 519 (Mich. App. ). 
62 [19751 507 F 2d 1084, there was an 11-4 majority ruling. 
63 In its defence the management at Macon argued that the business com- 
munity on which it depended associated longhaired males with the 
&counter-culture types' who gained extensive unfavourable national and 
local exposure during the 'International Pop Festival' in Georgia during 
1970. 
64 Section 703(a) as amended by Title 42 U. S. C. A s. 20OOe-2(a). 
65 In addition it was stated that only immutable characteristics could frus- 
trate employment opportunities. Immutable characteristics include, race, 
national origin and gender, thus hair length enjoys no constitutional pro- 4-: 1 
tection since it is changeable. 
66 In Fagan v National Cash Register Co. [1973] 157 US App. D. C. 15, 
481 F 2d 1115, an employee was discharged and sued under s. 703 (a). 
His suit was dismissed because hair length is not constitutionally pro- 
tected and the grooming policy was designed to further the company's C. 
business interest and not for sex discrimination. 
67 Wisdom, Tuttle, Goldberg and Godbold (all Circuit Judges). t;, 68 In Earivood v Continental South-eastern Lines Inc [1976] 539 F 2f 
1349, Circuit Judge Winter refused to follow the Court of Appeals' 
decision and dissented (p. 1352) on the ground that the Willingham test: 
'imports constitutional notions of immutability and fundamentally into 
the process of statutory interpretation. 
69 [1973] 488 F 2d 1333. 
70 [1973] 488 F 2d 1333 at 1337. 
71 (1975) 376 N. Y. S. 2d 32N. Y. A. D. 3 Dept. 
72 [1975) 527 F 2d 1249. 
73 Ibid., at 1251-1252. 
74 Thomas v Firestone Tire & Rubber Company [19751 392 F Supp 373; 
Bertulli v First National Stores Inc [1979], 20 FEP Cases 1527. 
75 [ 1972] 348 F Supp 316. 
100 
76 Civil Rights Act 1964 s. 703(a)(1) as amended by Title 42 U. S. C. A. 
s. 2000e-2(a)(l)- 
77 Likewise in Indiana Civil Rights Commission v Sutherland Lumber 
[19791 394 NE 2d 949 Ind. App. 3 Dist. two male employees were dis- 
charged for failing to comply with the company's 'clean-shaven' rule. 
The policy did not amount to sex-based discrimination since it was 
enacted for business purposes. Moreover, the policy did not affect 
equal employment opportunities because it was uniformly enforced ori 
all employees. 
78 supra 21 at 601. 
79 [1980] 506 F Supp 909 (US District Court). 
80 United States Equal Opportunities Commission (Nov 1980) issued 
guidelines. 
81 where submission/rejection of conduct is made a condition of employ- 
ment; is used for employment decisions or where it has the effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance. 
82 supra 6 at 182. 
83 [1981]507 F Supp 599. 
84 [1971] 444 F 2d 1194. 
85 [1971] 444 F 2d 1194 at 1198. 
86 as amended by Title 42 U. S. C. A. s. 20OOe-2(a) see also Mathews v City 
of New York [20001 704 N. Y. S. 2d 49 N. Y. A. D. I Dept. 
87 [1975] 11 FEP Cases 1196. 
88 Ibid., at 1198. 
89 Sommers v Budget Marketing Inc. [1982] 667 F 2d 748; Wane v East- 
ern Airlines 35 [1984] FEP Cases 1348. 
90 [19771 566 F 2d 659. 
91 Ibid., at 664. 
92 supra 6 p. 222. 
93 [19781 569 F 2d 325. 
94 Ibid., at 328. 
95 [19791 595 F 2d 592 (Cal. ). 
96 This was the successful argument put forward in the early sexual har- 
assment cases. This behaviour is similarly left out of the detail of the 
Act. 
97 [1989] 490 US 228,109 S. Ct 1775,104 L. Ed. 2d 268. 
98 Decided July 3 2001, find at http: //Iawlibrary. rutcers. edu/courts/appel- 
late. html 
99 In Nichols v Azteca Restaurant Enterprises the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals relied on the Price Waterhouse ruling in deciding that a het- 
erosexual waiter who was subjected to homosexual taunts because of 
his effeminate manner was deemed to be the victim of sexual harass- 
ment Decision 1617/01, http: //caselaw. jp. findlaw. com/data2/Circs/9th/ 
9935579p. pdf 
100 [1976] 27 ALR Fed 274 2000 Supplement, Part 2(b). 
101 CCH EEOC Decisions 6241 [1971]. 
102 CCH EEOC Decisions 6343 [1972]. 
103 Fitzpatrick v City of Atlanta [1993] 2F 3d 1112 The employer's 
101 
defence was accepted on safety grounds since protective face masks 
would not fit unless employees were clean shaven. 
104 [1989] 713 F Supp 244. 
105 see also Richardson v Quick Trip Corporation [19841 591 F Supp 115. 
106 [1986] 530 F Supp. 
107 Carter v Bruce Oakley, Inc. [1993] 349 F Supp 673,64 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 967. 
108 June 20 2001, find at www. gospelcom. net/apologeticsindex/ýewsl/ 
anOI0621-12. html 
109 House unanimously passes Saudi dress-code bill May 15 2002, http: # 
cnn. allpolitics. printthis. clickability. com 
110 [1992] 587 NYS 2d 601. 
111 [19921 587 NYS 2d 601 at 605. 
112 L. Flynn, 'Gender Equality Laws and Employer Dress Codes' [19951 
24 Industrial Law Journal 255-272 at 270. 
113 Schmidt v Austick Bookshops Ltd [1977] IRLR 360 EAT acknow- 
ledged that valid comparison between men and women are usually 1P 
Impossible, however, it was permitted in this particular case. 
114 [19891 IRLR 173 (HL). 
115 S. Middlemiss, 'Shall I Compare Thee'? The Legal Dilemma, Choice C: - 
of Comparators in Discrimination Cases'(2000) 4/09 International 
Journal of Discrimination and Law, 293-317. 
116 N Lacey, 'Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a 
Feminist Perspective' (1987) 14 Journal of Law & Society 411. 
117 Smith v Safeway PIC [19961 IRLR 456; Boychuk v H. J Symons Hold- 
ings Ltd [19771 IRLR 395. 
118 [1971] 442 F 2d 385 (5th Cir) cert. denied, 404 US 950. 
119 [1971] 442 F 2d 385 at 388. 
120 [1993] F 3d 795 (8th Cir). 
121 pseudofolliculitis barbae, also known as 'razor bumps' most commonly 
suffered by African-American males. 
122 [19931 F 3d 795 at 799. 
123 Dripps v United Parcel Service, Inc [1974] 381 F Supp 421 (DC Pa) 
held that an employer's rule forbidding welders to have beards was a C) 
sound BFOQ based on reasonable safety concerns. 
124 CCH EEOC Decisions 6318 [1971]. 
125 [19791 IRLR 159, (EAT). 
126 ibid., at 15 9. 
127 James v Eastleigh Borough Council [19901 IRLR 298 HL. 
128 Smith V Safeway PIC, SuPra 15. 
129 MW Janis, R Kay, A Bradley, European Human Rights: Text and 
Materials 2nd ed. (2000) (Oxford University Press) 64. 
130 supra 21 at 72. 
131 P Villiers, Human Rights: A Practical Guide for Managers (2000) 
(Kogan Page) 50. 
132 supra 6 54-70. 
133 No. 11674/85 [19861 D&R 245. 
134 Boychuk v Symons [19771 IRLR 395 EAT 'What is necessary in a 
case of this kind ... 
is the striking of a balance between the need of 
102 
the employer to control the business for which he is responsible, in the 
interests of the business itself and after all, it is upon its continued 
prosperity that everyone's interests depend -a balance between that 
need, on the one hand, and the reasonable freedom of the employee on 
the other', Philips J at p. 396 para. 7. See Fuller v Mastercare Service 
and Distribution EATIO707100 where the Employment Tribunal ruled 
that dress codes were not contrary to the rights in Axticle 8& 10. 
135 supra 6 at 56. 
136 supra 5 at 2546. 
137 J Raz, 'Free Expression and Personal Identification' (1991) 11 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 303. 
138 supra 6 p. 59. 
139 [1999] 2 European Human Rights Law Review 232 at 233. 
140 (19961 IRLR 347 ECJ. 
141 EEC. 76/207. 
142 In Chessington World of Adventures Ltd v Reed [1998] ICR 97 it was 
held that in the circumstances the SDA was to be interpreted consist- 
ently with the ruling in PvS and Cornwall County Council. See sec- 
tion 2(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
143 [2000] Equal Opportunities Review, September/October at 34. 
144 see www. dti. gov. uk/er/equality -W 
145 (January, 2003) 'Consultative draft discrimination Regulations: an EOR 
guide' EOR No. 113 at 18. 
146 (January, 2003) 'Consultative draft discrimination Regulations: an EOR 
guide' EOR No. 113 at 20. 
147 (January, 2003) 'Consultative draft discrimination Regulations: an EOR 
guide' EOR No. 113 at 21. 
148 [2002] 'Towards Equality & Diversity: implementing the Employ- 
ment & Race Directives' EOR No. 101 at 16. 
149 English philosopher (1806-1873), wrote 'On Liberty' (Lerner, 1961) in 
1859. 
EDITOR'S BRIEFING 
ILT DIGEST 
Legislation and Superior Court Decisions 
IRISII LAW 
NUMBER 17 (261-276) TI 
" "" 
/ 
NOVEMBER 2003 
VOLUME 21 (NEW SERIES) 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Legal redress against employers for victims 
of wokplace bullying - Part 11 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Interference by the 1ýgislature in the judicial domain 
-1-HC)MSC: >FM 
ROUND H^LL 
SAM MIDDLEMISS* AND OLGA HAY** 
P art I of this article was pub 
lished in the last issue of the 
Irish Law 7-Imes. This sec- 
ond part deals with the key areas of 
UK law where victims of bullying; 
are currently protected: under the 
law of the tort, under equality law 
and the law dealing, with unfair dis- c) 
LIABILITY FOR MENTAL 
HARM CAUSED BY BULLY- 
ING UNDER THE LAW OF 
TORT 
T here is a causal link between 
bullying and stress and a con 
nection between stress and 
mental illness that is generally ac- 
cepted. Until recently, the courts 
were satisfied that. employers were 
acting in breach of their duty of care 
when they were directly or indirectly 
responsible for bullying leading to 
their employee suffering mental 
harin. 
In the Waters case mentioned 
earlier Lord Slynn surnmarised the 
position thus: 
If an employer knows that acts being 
done by his employees during their 
employment may cause mental or 
physical harm to a particular fellow 
employee and he does nothing to 91 
supervise or prevent such acts, when 
it is in his power to do so, it is clearly 
arguable he may be in breach of his 
duty to that employee. 
A case was taken against Strath- 
clyde Regional Council in 1998 by a 
residential social worker Ms 
Ballantyne for breach of their delict- 
ual duty of care'. She claimed that, 
along with other staff, she was de- 
liberately threatened, ignored, hu- 
miliated and offended by her supervi- 
sor who kept her ignorant of infor- 
mation necessary for the perform- 
missal. There are a number of prob- 
lems with bringing a case against an Zý 
employer under the law of tort, for 
breach of its duty care or on the basis 
of its vicarious liability and these are 
identified. There are also a few evi- 
dential difficulties associated with 
pursuing a case involving bullying un- : Z> 
ance of her jobs. He failed to con- 
sult her and subjected her to stress 
and confrontation. The conse- 
quences for Ms Ballantyne ofwork- 
ing in such an unfriendly and stress- 
ful working environment, were a 
peptic ulcer, severe anxiety and de- 
pression. She claimed that her em- 
ployer had failed in its duty to pro- 
vide a safe system of work and safe 
and co-operative colleagues. This 
case was settled out of court and 
Ms Ballantyne was awarded 
E66,000. 
In a more recent Scottish case', 
the difficulty in proving that a hos- 
tile working environment is respon- 
sible for psychological injury was il- 
lustrated. The pursuer, a welfare 
nurse, claimed that as a result of her 
line manager's behaviour, consisting 
ofunjustified criticism, putting pres- 
sure on her time and misunderstand- 
ing, her r6le, she suffered psycho- 
locical damacye in the form of severe CP C, 
anxiety and depression, panic at- 
tacks and loss of confidence and 
self-esteem. It was alleged she had 
suffered a nervous breakdown al- 
though no medical evidence was led Cý 
to corroborate this. She was un- 
successfiil in her claim, primarily be- 
cause she failed to, produce evidence 
of her medical condition or satisfy 
the court that the psychological harm 
she suffered was medically recog- 
nised under major diagnostic classi- 
fication systems. The Court of Ses- 
der equality law, e. g. the behaviour 
complained ofmust fall within a rec- 
ognised ground of discrimination. 
The evidential difficulties are possi- 
bly less where the bullying leads to 
a dismissal or to an employee resign- 
in, -, and claiming constructive dis- 
missal. 
sion adopted a restrictive interpre- 
tation of foreseeability in this con- 
text, arguing that, generally, the em- 
ployer as an "ordinary bystander" 
would not be in a position to foresee 
psychological harm being inflicted on 
its employees unless there was a 
"specific reason to foresee it in a 
particular case". The suggestion 
here is that the likely'consequences 
for the victim of intolerable behav- 
iour by an employer such as stress, 
anxiety, and depression would not be 
serious enough to establish a duty 
on the part of the employer to take 
care for the psychological well-be- 
ing of its employees. Lord Reed 
stated that "[flo suffer such emo- 
tions and others such as stress, anxi- 
ety, loss of confidence and low mood 
from time to time, not least because 
of problems at work, was a normal 
part of human experience. " 
Thus, there is no duty of care 
owed by an employer towards its 
employees in respect of psychologi- 
cal harm unless it is foreseeable by 
the employer that they will suffer 
harm. In these cases it will have to 
be shown that there is some special 
reason why the employer should 
have foreseen harm to its employee. 
Otherwise, it will be up to the psy- 
chiatric profession to judge these 
matters in the light of medical treat- 
ment of the victim. This lack of 
foreseeability will result in no duty 
of care being owed to the employee. =1 
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This means that most employees will 
be unable to substantiate a claim and 
this will be particularly true when the 
psychiatric illness only formally ma- 
terialises after the employee leaves 
his or herjob. 
In another Scottish case, Cross 
v Highlands and Islands Enter- 
prise Board, 3 thejudge was not con- 
vinced that an employer's failure to 
reduce undue levels of stress at 
work had materially contributed to 
an employee's suicide. 
Given that both these decisions 
are made by judges of the Outer 
House of the Court of Session, they 
have questionable authority in the 
lower courts in Scotland and no au- 
thority over the courts in England 
and Wales. 
These judgements were contrary 
to the decisions of the courts in a 
line of English cases starting with 
Walker and ending with an unre- 
ported case involving an action for 
breach of duty of care by a Mr 
Ingram against Hereford and 
Worcester County Council. ' Here, 
a council warden on a gypsy site 
was given an out of court settlement 
of E203,000 for stress-related illness 
caused by behaviour of the employer 
that was similar to that of the em- 
ployer in the Rorrison case. The 
main difference was that in this case 
he experienced instances of physi- 
cal assault by his client group. ' 
In a recent Court of Appeal de- 
cision, Sutherland v Hatton, 6 the 
English courts adopted a similar ap- 
proach to the judges in the Scottish 
cases of Rorrison and Cross. They 
stated that, for liability for stress re- 
lated illness to be established, it is 
necessary to show that the em- 
ployee informed the employer of the 
effect of stress on his health except 
where it would be reasonable in the 
particular case to assume that un- 
characteristic absences from work 
were caused by undue stress. It was 
stated that: "by its very nature a psy- 
chiatric disorder would be more dif- 
ficult to foresee than a physical in- 
jury", with an implication that an 
employer might presume that an 
employee can cope with the normal 
pressures of the job unless the em- 
ployee intimates otherwise. 
The question is whether the 
courts would regard bullying as a 
normal pressure of the job? Where 
it is a mild form of bullying, then 
there is now limited scope for vic- 
tims of bullying successfully pursu- 
ing an action against their employer C. 
on the basis of a breach of their duty 
of care (resulting from a failure to 
prevent bullying that caused stress- 
related illness). The presumption will 
be that they can cope with the stress 
caused by bullying and other causes 
of stress. Where the bullying is more 
severe, however, it would be treated 
as an abnormal pressure and em- 
ployers would be liable. 
In addition to owing a direct duty 
of care toward their employees, 
where another employee is a bully 
responsible for creating a stressful 
working environment, the employer 
may also be vicariously liable for the 
bully's actions. 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Even where the employer is not act- 
ing in breach of his duty of care he 
may be vicariously liable to compen- 
sate the victim for bull ina carried y0 
out by his employees. Where the 
bully is personally liable for the 
wronaftil acts and they are carried 
out within the scope of his employ- 
ment then liability could also extend 
to the employer: 
Vicarious liability for the act of a 
servant will only attach to the mas- 
ter if the act of the servant is done 
within the scope of the employment. 
It is probably not possible, and is 
certainly inadvisable to endeavour to 
lay down an exhaustive definition of 
what falls within the scope of the 
employment. Each case must de- 
pend to a considerable extent on its 
particular facts. ' 
The crucial factor which will de- 
termine if an employer is vicariously 
liable for its employee's actions is 
whether the actions which amount 
to harassment or bullying were car- 
ried out in the course of the employ- 
ment. It will certainly be liable where 
it authorises the wrongful act, ' al- 
though, in the absence of written 
authority it may be difficult to Prove 
that an employer instructed or au- 
thorised a supervisor to bully his or 
her victim. An employer might be 
liable, however where it perrnit a 
supervisor to use bullying to ensure 
subordinates are carrying out tasks Zý in a correct or timely manner. Here 
the supervisor is doing something be 
or she is employed to do (ensuring, 
staff carry out work) in a rnanner 
authorised by the employer. Where 
the victim suffers stress-related ill- 
ness brought on by an oppressive rý 
working environment in this context, 
the employer will be liable. It is Much 
less likely that the employer will be 
liable if the harasser or bully is a 
colleague of equal standing with the 
victim. 9 It is difficult to identify the 
circumstances where employers will 
be liable for harm caused by bully- 
incly - even if they are unaware of C 
the bullying they could still be liable 
because the supervisor is carrying 
out an authorised task in an unau_ 
thorised manner. Where the ern_ 
ployer prohibits bullying, liability is 
much less likely although it could 
arise where it can be shown that, 
despite the fact the bully in acting 
contrary to instruction, he or she still 
acted in the interest of the ern- 
ployer. 10 
Otherwise vicarious liability is 
unlikely to be established, as the be- 
haviour will be treated as occurriln,,, 
outside the contract of employrn, ' rit 
and as an independent act of the 
employee. In Irving v The P,,,, 
Office" the employee was a post_ 
man working for the Post Office in 
a sorting office. While at work-, 
wrote racist comments before de- 
livery on his neighbour's mail. -rhe 
employer was held not to be vicari_ 
ously liable for this act. It is not 
enough for the employer merely to 
put the employee in a position to 
cause the harm. '2 "It must be com_ 
mitted in the course of the busirless 
so as to form part of it, and not rnerel 
be coincident in time with it. "13 
Y 
In Waters v Commissioner 
Police for the Metropolis14 a 
Of 
fe- 
male police officer, while Off-duty, 
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was raped by a fellow officer. She 
claimed that she was subjected to 
victimisation contrary to the terms 
of s. 4 of the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 when she brought a complaint 
about her attacker to the attention 
of her employer. She was unsuc- 
cessful in her victimisation claim 
because she could not establish that 
it occurred because she had brought 
an action for sex discrimination. 15 
She subsequently brought a claim for 
negligence against her employer and 
an action for breach of contract be- 
cause ofthe bullying and harassment 
she had experienced. Lord Slynn, in 
the House of Lords summarised the 
case as: 
one of negligence - the employer 
failed to exercise due care to look af- 
ter his employee. Generically many 
of the acts alleged can be seen as a 
form of bullying, - the employer or 
those to whom he delegated respon- 
sibility for running his organisation, 
should have taken steps to stop it, 
to protect the employee from it. 
They decided that failure of an em- 
ployer to take steps to prevent bul- 
lying or where it is aware of it hap- 
pening, or failing to bring about its 0 z; - 
cessation is a breach of its duty of 
care. It was decided that a claim for 
negligence against her employer 
could proceed to trial. This decision 
representsjudicial recognition at the 
highest level that bullying is a ground 
for an action in tort and for breach 
of contract. 
In the important case of Lister 
and others v Hensley Hall, " the 
House of Lords was asked to con- 
sider whether an action in tort based 
on vicarious liability could be sus- 
tained against an employer of war- 
dens in a children's home who sexu- 
ally assaulted their charges. They 
decided that the appropriate test is 
not, are the acts carried out within 
the course of their employment, but 
are the wrongful acts of the em- 
ployee so closely connected with his 
employment that it would be just to 
hold the employer liable? The less 
stringent requirement could result in 
emplo ers being held vicariously li- y C. 
able in most cases ofbullying result- 
ing from the actions of a supervisor. 
Whether it would extend vicarious 
liability of the employer for wrong- 
ful acts (representing a breach of 
duty under tort) carried out by col- 
leagues of the victim is uncertain. 
The employer is unlikely to be liable 
where the bully is a colleague ofthe 
victim because bullying will not be 
treated as part of the job, and more 
significantly the wrongful acts ofthe 
employee will not be so closely con- 
nected with his employment that it 
would be just to hold the employer 
liable. "' 
Statutory protection against hul- 
lying in the workplace. 
Where the bullying leads to an em- 
ployee being discriminated against, 
then he or she could bring an action 
under equality law. If he or she is 
dismissed or forced to resign, then 
he or she can claim unfair dismissal 
under s. 95 ofthe Employment Rights 
Act 1996. 
A claim can also be brought 
against the workplace bully for the :M 
statutory tort of harassment as de- 
fined by s. 3 of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997.18 Finally, 
there may be some scope for pur- 
suing an action against an employer 
(covered by the Human Rights Act 
1998) for breach of the employee's 
human rights, e. g. under Art. 3 (de- 
gradingg, treatment) & Art. 4 (prohi- 
bition of forced labour) of the Euro- 
pean Convention. " Collectively 
these measures may appear to of- 
fer adequate protection to victims of 
workplace bullying; however, the 
reality is they only cover a narrow 
range of behaviour and with the ex- 
ception of the equality laws are 
largely untested as a remedy for 
bullying. 
RIGHTS UNDER EQUALITY 
LAW 
Where bullying in the workplace is 
perpetrated because of the victim's 
sex, race or disability, it will be held 
to represent unlawffil discrimina- 
tion. 20 "Bullying can clearly consti- 
tute discrimination if it is directed 
particularly at women or ethnic mi- 
nority workers. "21 The most likely 
claim is for sexual or racial harass- 
ment or harassment on the ground 
of disability. 22 The applicant will be 
successful if he or she can convince 
an Employment Tribunal that, as a 
consequence ofbullying, a detriment 
was suffered. 21 Applicants bringing 
a case against their employer for sex 
or race discrimination would need to 
show that a comparator of a differ- 
ent sex or race would not, in similar 
circumstances, have suffered the 
same detriment . 
24 Where the appli- 
cant is a disabled employee they 
need to establish that they were bul- 
lied and suffered a detriment be- 
cause of their disability. 25 
In discrimination cases where the 
bully is the supervisor of the victim, 
then the liability of the perpetrator 
and his or her employer can be eas- 
ily established . 
26 Even in circum- 
stances where the bully is a col- 
league of the victim, the employer 
can be held vicariously liable for his 
or her actions . 
27 This will arise 
where a complaint about the bully- 
ing behaviour was brought to the em- 
ployer's attention by the victim and 
it failed to take action to deter or 
control it. 29 Where bullying in the 
workplace is not undertaken be- 
cause of the victim's sex, race or 
disability, then there is no legal pro- 
tection under equality law at the 
present time. 19 
"While we have protection 
against sexual and racial harass- 
ment, there are many people who 
have no such protection because 
they fall into a gap in legislation to 
cover people who have complaints 
of this form of bullying. "" The em- 
ployerwill only be liable for discrimi- 
nation where it can be shown they 
are vicariously liable for the action 
of the bully. " 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY UN- 
DER STATUTE 
In Jones v Tower Boot Co. Ltd. . 
32 
a 16 year old, male employee was 
subjected to horrific acts of harass- 
ment and bullying by his colleagues, 
including being burnt by a hot screw- 
driver, whipped across the legs with 
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a piece of welt, and being subjected 
to verbal abuse because he was of 
mixed race. In a ground-breaking 
decision, the Court of Appeal de- 
parted from the restrictive effects 
of the common law rules on vicari- 
ous liability. 33 It was willing to as- 
cribe vicarious responsibility to an 
employer for the vicious acts of its 
employees on the basis they were 
carried out "in the course of employ- 
ment" (as defined in s. 32 of the 
Race Relations Act 1976). In de- 
termining this issue the Court applied 
a common sense application to this 
phrase to allow acts of colleagues 
to fall within the coverage of the 
Act. This is now accepted as being 
the correct approach to this issue. -' 
This means that victims ofbully- 
ing or other types of discriminatory 
acts perpetrated against them by a 
colleague on grounds of race, sex 
or disability can successfully sue 
their employer under the more lib- 
eral interpretation of vicarious liabil- 
ity. 
As a consequence of recent de- 
cisions on vicarious liability, where 
the harassment or bullying is perpe- 
trated by colleagues on the victim 
outside the working hours or the 
workplace liability may arise. 35 
Where third parties interact with em- 
ployees at the workplace and bully 
them and their actions are under the 
control of the employer then the em- 
ployer may be vicariously liable. " 
In Chessington World of Adven- 
tures Ltd v Reed, " the employer 
was held liable for failino, to control 
harassment by his workforce 
against an employee that was un- 
dergoing gender reassignment. 
The employer can avoid liability, 
however, when it can establish the 
defence that it has taken reasonably 
practical steps to prevent the act 
complained of or acts of that de- 
scription. " This defence in equality 
legislation was defined in Jones v 
Tower Boot Co Ltd as follows: 
The policy of the statutory provision 
on employer liability is to deter racial 
and sexual harassment in the 
workplace through a widening of the 0 
net of responsibility beyond the 
guilty employees themselves, by 
making all employers additionally li- 
able for such harassment, and then 
supplying them with the reasonable 
steps defence, which will exonerate 
the conscientious employer who has 
used his best endeavours to prevent 
such harassment .... 
What type of practical steps taken 
by the employer would justify this 
defence? Although it is possible that 
having a policy on bullying (or dig- 
nity at work) and making it known 
to all employees would be suff i- 
cientý39 it would be advisable for an 
employer to take additional steps. 
For example, ensuring adequate su- 
pervision is provided, disciplining 
known bullies and undertaking train- 
ing for supervisors on bullying, policy 
and procedures etc. 
UNFAIR DISMISSAL 
Where a supervisory employee in 
the process ofbullying his victim dis- 
misses him or her, or the employer 
dismisses him or her as a direct rc- 
sponse to a complaint of bullying, 
then this will be unfair dismissal un- 
der s. 95(l) of the Employment 
Rights Act 1996. Where the em- 
ployer fails to offer an employee an 
acceptable right of redress under 
internal procedures for grievances 
(or under a statutory grievance pro- 
cedure)"O or under procedures for 
equal opportunities or dignity at work 
he or she can resign and claim con- 
structive dismissal. It is important, 
however, that employees follow 
these procedures before bringing a 
legal claim because they will be act- 
ing contrary to the terms of the 
Employment Act 2002 and risk a 
reduction in the compensation 
awarded by the Employment Tribu- 
nal. Employment Tribunals will ex- 
pect employers to have a grievance 
procedure that complies with the 
statutory model in the Act but may, 
in addition, expect them to have pro- 
cedures in place that are designed 
to deal with harassment and bully- 
ing complaints. 
In any event in order to have a 
statutory or direct defence, and be 
able to demonstrate compliance with 
the statutory codes, it is necessary 
for the employer to have a proce- 
dure for dealing with harassrnent 
which is knowri to all employees and 
through which complainants are able 
to have their complaints taken seri- 
ously and investigated swiftly and 
confidentially, whilst ensuring all are 
protected. " 
Where the bully is dismissed be- 
cause of his or her behaviourý then it 
is unlikely to be treated as unfair 
unless the employer fails to prove 
that individual is a bully or harasser 
or fails to follow the correct discipli- 
nary procedure in dismissing thernýc Z.. 21 In most cases of dismissal, the vic- 
tim of bullying will have been forced 
to leave his or herjob to escape the 
bullying behaviour. Such a person wiU 
then be in a position to clairn con- 
structive dismissal. 
CONSTRUCTIVE DISIMSSAL 
Where victims ofbullying, are unable 
to continue in employment because 
bullying has created a hostile work- 
ing environment they can resi, " and 
claim constructive dismissal. 43 This 
action is taken on the basis that the 
employer's behaviour is SO unrea- 
sonable that they have breached the 
terms of the employee's contract of 
employment. 44 Where the basis of 
a claim for constructive disrnissa, is 
that a manager bullied his or her sub- 
ordinates who were forced to resilzn 
because of it, then the employer -. N7ill 
clearly be liable. " It is likely the be- 
haviour will be treated as being car. 
, M- 
ried out in furtherance of the e 
ployer's business interests and -. Aith 
its implied authority and conse- 
quently it will be held liable. In 
Palmanor Limited v Cedron 46 an 
employee was wrongly accused by 
his superior of a wrongful act and in 
the process was subjected to a ti- 
rade of abuse. The Emplckyrnent 
Appeal Tribunal held that this behav- 
iour represented grounds for con- 
structive dismissal. In Hiltol, Inter- 
national Hotels (UK) I-td r 
Protopopa, " an employee resigned 
when she was severely reprinlanded 
in front of other employees for fail- 
ing to ask permission ofthe ernpIO3. er 
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to attend a dental appointment. She 
claimed that she had been construc- 
tively dismissed and the issue of 
whether the supervisory employee's 
actions in this context could lead to 
an employer's vicarious liability was 
considered. 
In relation to repudiatory con- 
duct, by what we call a supervisory 
employee of the employer, the gen- 
eral law of contract governs the 
question of whether the conduct 
binds the employer. 
[i]f the supervisory employee is do- 
ing what he or she is employed to do 
and in the course of doing it he or PP 
she behaves in a way which if done 
by the employer would constitute a 
fundamental breach of the contract 
between the employer and the appli- 
cant, then, in our judgement, the em- 
ployer is bound by the supervisory 
employee's misdeeds. "' 
When managers use bullying tactics 
in fulfilment of their r6le, they are 
undermining the contractual duty of 
the employer to maintain the trust 
and confidence of the employee. 
Constructive dismissal can be estab- 
lished on the basis that bullying rep- 
resents breach of the implied duty 
to maintain an employee's trust and 
confidence. 
In (1) Reed and (2) Bull infor- 
mation Systems Ltd v Stedman, " a 
secretary was bullied and subjected 
to sexual comments and innuendoes 
by her boss, the marketing manager. F 
She brought a claim for sex discrinii- 
nation arguing that the discrimina- 
tory behaviour led to her construc- 
tive dismissal by the employer: 
The tribunal had not erred in finding 
that a course of unwanted and bully- 
ing behaviour by the applicant's 
manager, which amounted to sexual 
harassment was a breach of the duty 
of trust and confidence. When the 
employee was forced to leave herjob 
as a result this amounted to construc- 
tive dismissal and accordingly was 
an act of discrimination within the 
meaning of s. 6(2) of the Sex Discrimi- 
nation Act. 
This case was capable of being pur- 
sued under the Sex Discrimination 
cm 
Act 1975 because of the sexual con- 
tent of the manager's behaviour. 
In the event that the bully is a 
colleague ofthe victim, the employer 
is unlikely to be liable for his or her 
behaviour in the context of construc- 
tive dismissal, unless the victim com- 
plained about the behaviour and the 
employer failed to take any action 
to bring about its cessation. They 
may have failed in their duty to pro- 
vide and monitor a working environ- 
ment, which is reasonably suitable 
to allow their employee to carry out 
his or her contractual duties . 50 
Part III of this article will appear in 
the next issue of the Irish Law 
71mes. 
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P arts I and Il of this article have 
appeared in the last two issues 
of the Irish Law Times. In this 
final part, there are a diverse range zn 
of issues considered in the context 
of bullying under UK law, including 
the impact of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, the extent of 
criminal liability ofbullies under stat- 
ute and the cornmon law, the influ- 
ence of the Human Rights legisla- 
tion on this area of law and devel- 
opments in the European Union that 
could lead to enhanced protection for 
PROTECTION FROM HAR- 
ASSMENT ACT 1997 
T he Protection from Harass 
ment Act 1997 provides a 
civil remedy for victims of 
harassment (as defined in ss. 1& 3) 
against a harasser or bully. It is de- 
fined sufficiently broadly to include 
bullying behaviour. A person must 
not pursue "a course of conduct 
which amounts to harassment of 
another of which he knows or ought 
to know amounts to harassment of 
another. " The remedies for the civil 
action are set out in s. 3 of the Act. 
The victim of bullying can bring a 
claim for damages against a bully to 
obtain compensation for hann they 
have suffered (e. g. for the anxiety 
caused by the harassment and any 
financial loss resulting from it). 
Section 3 (2) places the award 
of such damages on a statutory foot- 
ing. Primafacie the harasser is li- 
able to compensate the victim for 
any financial loss resulting from the 
course of conduct that amounts to 
harassment. However the drafting 
of s. 3 suggests that the test for de- 
termining financial loss is causation 
and damages are payable in respect 
ofall financial loss resulting from the 
course of harassment., 
Alternatively, an application can 
., 
e for an injunction be made to ajudg 
to stop the bullying. In deciding C) 
whether to grant such an order, the 
primary consideration of thejudici- 
ary will be whether or not the le,, iti- 
mate interests of the alleged victim 
are adversely affected sufficiently 
tojustify curtailing or restraining the 
behaviour of the alleged harasser. 2 
A bully can also be prosecuted 
for the offence of criminal harass- 
ment (as defined in ss. I&2, see 
above) or the more serious offence 
of causing fear of violence (s. 4). 
These offences will apply to the 
most serious forms of bullying in- 41: 1 
volvin- violence or threats of vio- 
lence. Under s. 5 of the Act a re- 
straining order can be granted by the 
court to restrain the unlawful behav- 
iour of the bully, prior to a full hear- 
ing of the case and thereafter., The 
courts can also award an injunction 
but not where a restraining order is 
already in place. Where it is estab- 
lished that the harassment or bully- 
ing is ongoing within the workplace, 
the employee can apply to the court 
for an interlocutory injunction to re- 
strain the harasser or bully. It is not 
necessary to establish intention on 
the part of the harasser or bully. 4 It 
is sufficient that a reasonable per- 
son in possession of the same infor- 
mation would conclude that the 
course of conduct amounted to har- 
assment of another. 5 
Part I of the Public Order Act 
1986 (s. 5) introduces a minor of- 
fence of causing harassment, alarm 
or distress. 6 Also under s. 4(a) of the 
Public Order Act 1986, which was 
introduced by the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994, an of- 
victims of bullYing. The article fin- 
ishes with some broad conclusions 
about the law in this area (including 
details of recent attempts to legis- 
late and recommendations for 
changes in the law). 
fence of intentional harassment has 
been provided where bullies inten- 
tionally "use towards another per- 
son threatening, abusive or insulting 
words with intent to cause that per- 
son to believe that unlawful violence 
will be used against him. " There is 
no requirement that the behaviour is 
directed at another person but it must 
be proved that the accused intended 
his or her conduct to be threatening, 
abusive or insulting or disorderly or 
was cognisant of the fact it might 
have this effect. It must also be 
shown that the unlawful conduct 
took place within the hearing or sight 
of a person that is likely to be caused 
harassment, alum or distresS. 7 
VIOLENCE IN THE WORK- 
PLACE 
This is an area of growing impor- 
tance that is commonly associated 
with bullying and, therefore, wan-ants 
attention. The Home Office and 
Health & Safety Executive (HSE) 
published a joint report in October 
1999. Violence at work is defined 
as, "all assaults or threats which 
occurred while the victim was work- 
ing and were perpetrated by mem- 
bers of the public. ",, The report es- 
timates that there werejust over 1.2 
million incidents ofviolence at work 
in England and Wales in 1997, which 
means 2.8% of working adults have 
been the victims of at least one vio- 
lent incident. 
Approximately half of assaults at 
Irish Law Times - No. 18,2003 
LEGAL REDRESS AGAINST EMPLOYERS FOR VICTIMS OF WORKPLACE BULLYING -PART III 
EmPLOYMENT LAw 
work and a third of threats happened 
after 6pm, thus the risk of violence 
increases with evening or night 
work. 9 Moreover, one sixth of physi- 
cal assaults at work involved young 
offenders under the age of sixteen, 
just under a half of assaults resulted 
in some sort of injury to the victim 
and it has been estimated that 3.3 
million work hours were lost in 1997 
due to such incidents. 10 Patterns 
have emerged: for instance, occu- 
pational groupings strongly affect the 
risk ofassault at work, with the high- 
risk groups being, front-linejobs such 
as (in descending order) security and 
protective services; nurses; care 
workers; other education and wel- 
fare; catering, hotels and restau- 
rants; and public transport. " 
Trends regarding the character- Zý 
istics of offenders were also identi- 
fied, with the majority of offenders 
being persons known to the victim, 
most commonly a customer. 12The 
costs of violence at work can be 
broken into two areas. 13 The first is 
the cost of absent workers to the 
employer and economy as a whole. 
The second is the cost of human 
sufferino, to the victim which often C, 
results in compensation. 
It was concluded by the British 
Crime Survey that violence at work 
increased between 1991 and 1995, 
and that, despite a recent fall, it is 
still a significant problem facin. g 
employers. 14 The report gives some 
helpful advice, saying that employ- 
ers should follow the Management 
of Health and Safety Work Regula- 
tion (HSE, 1992), to identify the ex- 
tent and nature of risk of violence 
and to take the necessary steps to 
minimise risks.,, The Health and 
Safety Commission and Health and 
Safety Executive have issued addi- 
tional guidance to help employers 
manage and control violence at 
work. 16 
By failing to protect employees 
from violence, employers may be in 
breach ofvarious obligations, includ- 
ing the duty to provide a safe place 0 
and system of work for all employ- 
ers. 17 There is also the question of 
determining what should be done 
when the perpetrator of violence is 
another employee. It was argued in 
the June 2003 IDS Brief that the 
employer has greater liability for the 
actions of an employee, as opposed 
to those of a member of the public, 
because of the principle of vicari- 
ous liability for personal injury. Is 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR 
WORKPLACE BULLIES 
"The ancient right to chastise a serv- 
ant, an apprentice or a wife no longer 
exists. "19 There are limited in- 
stances where the bully will be pros- 
ecuted for a common law crime on 
the basis of their behaviour in the 
workplace. Where the action com- 
plained of consists of threats of 
physical force or actual force being 
used against an employee then the 
perpetrator could be prosecuted for 
assault or battery. '* 
"The typical case of assault as 
distinct from a battery is that where 
the defendant, by some physical 
movement, causes the plaintiff to 
apprehend that he is about to be 
struck. "21 There is some doubt 
whether a threatening statement 
could represent an assault, although 
modem authorities seem to support 
the view that it can. 22213ullying ges- 
tures, which could reasonably be in- 
terpreted as threatening that a vio- 
lent act will follow, could fall within 
the actus reus of assault as could 
verbal threats conveying the same 
message. 
In R. v Ireland, R. v Burstow 
(1997) 4 All ER 225, HL Lord Steyn 
in his judgement in the House of 
Lords made it clear that verbal state- 
ments threatening physical harm 
could represent an assault. "The 
proposition that a gesture may 
amount to assault, but that words can 
never suffice, is unrealistic and in- 
defensible. " 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY UN- 
DER HEALTH AND SAFETY 
STATUTES 
What represents a less obvious and 
less settled basis for criminal pros- 
ecution in this context are actions 
against an employer for breach of 
various provisions of health and 
safety legislation. Where bullying is 
perpetrated within the workplace or 
pen-nitted to be carried out by the 
employer it could represent a breach 
of its duties (in respect of employ- 
ees) under s. 2(2) of the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974. Under 
s. 2(2)(d) of the Act the employer 
must ensure (so far as is reasonably 
practicable) as regards any Place of 
work under its control, the rnainte- 
nance of it in a condition that is safe 
and without risks to health. Bullyin,, 
carried out in the workplace could 
represent a serious threat to an em- 
ployee's physical or mental well be- 
ing. Where such behaviour is directly 
or indirectly attributable to the em- 
ployer, it will be acting in breach of 
this section. 21 What is less certain is 
the means by which a serious breach 
of the Act will come to the attention 
of the agencies involved in cr-iminal 
prosecution. A breach Could be dis- 
covered and reported to the police 
by the Health and Safety Executive 
during an inspection ofthe prenlises, 
or where it is highlighted in a risk 
assessment of the workplace under. 
taken by the employer. 24 Employers 
must undertake a suitable and suffi- 
cient risk assessment in the 
workplace to assess the risks to the 
health and safety of their ernploy. 
ees. This would extend to identib, _ ing the risk of stress-related illness =1 
caused by bullying behaviour identi- 
fied as taking place in the 
workplace. 21 
There is little doubt that attach- 
ing criminal liability and criminal pen- 
alties for persons perpetrating bul- 
lying activities in the workplace,, vill 
act as a deterrent. There May be 
difficulties, however, in persuading 
the judiciary and the agencies in- 
volved in criminal prosecuti()n of the 
appropriateness of criminal prosecu_ 
tion for the perpetrators of bullying 
and/or their employers. 
There is a possibility that bully- 
ing will represent a breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 and this will 
now be considered. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
The Parliament of the United King- 
dom by passing the Human Rights 
Act 1998 incorporated the European 
Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) into its legal system. It 
mainly came into force on October 
2,2000 and has a far-reaching ef- 
fect on the legislative and judicial 
process. Legislators must take ac- 
count of the Convention in drafting 
primary and secondary legislation. 
Courts and tribunals also have to in- 
terpret domestic statutes and legal 
decisions in line with the convention 
andjudge-made law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
The convention rights are enforce- 
able against public bodies or private 
bodies fulfilling public functions. 
There have been no cases brought 
against employers under the ECHR 
or the Act for stress-related illness. 
Bullying has been considered in the 
context of human rights cases where 
homosexuals in the armed forces 
alleged bullying by their superiors 
was a breach of Art. 8 (the right to 
respect for private and family law). 21, 
In Prager Oberschlick v Austria" 
ajournalist alleged he was harassed 
and bullied by ajudge but the courts 
were not satisfied that he had been 
bullied 
In Haýbrd v United Kingdom, 28 
the applicant claimed that the inter- 
ception of her phone calls from her 
office and her home following set- 
tlement ofa sex discrimination claim 
was a breach of Art-8. 
The Government claimed that 
employers had the right to monitor 
phone calls made from their 
premises and on their equipment and 
that prior notification to the employee 
of this practice was not necessary. 
The ECHR disagreed, holding that Zý 
Ms Halford should have a reason- 
able expectation of privacy espe- 
cially as she had been given permis- 
sion to use her phone for the pur- 
poses ofthe sex discrimination claim 
and that this could fall within the 
ambit of Art. 8. Employers are given 
limited powers to intercept employ- 
ee's communications under statute 
in the form of Regulation of Investi- 
gatory Powers Act 2000 and the 
Telecommunications (Lawful Busi- 
ness Practice)(Interception of Com- 
munications) Regulations (SI 2000/ 
2699). 
Article 3 prohibits torture, inhu- 
man or degrading treatment or pun- 
ishment. Treatment is degrading if it 
arouses in the victim feelings of fear 
anguish and infýriority capable of 
humiliating or debasing them and 
bullying could easily have these ef- 
fects. `9 For punishment to be degrad- 
ing and inhuman, the suffering and 
humiliation it invokes must go be- 
yond that which a given form of le- 
gitimate treatment or punishment 
would incur. While intention to hu- 
miliate or debase may be important 
in determining if breach ofArt. 3 has 
occurred, absence of intention is not 
fatal to a claim. A public authority 
which had allowed bullying to con- 
tinue or acted unlawfully through 
omission may be vicariously liable 
for the bully's actions and be sub- 
ject to an injunction to restrain such 
behaviour. However the degree of 
humiliation suffered by the employee 
would need to be severe and pub- 
lic., * 
The other articles of the Conven- 
tion which could have a bearing on 
bullying are Art. 4 which prohibits 
forced labour, Art. 10 which gives 
everyone the right to freedom of 
expression and Art. 14 which prohib- 
its discrimination on various grounds. 
It is not possible to fully consider the 
likely impact these rights will have z; 1 
on bullying actions although the im- 
pact is likely to be fairly limited and 
will apply only in the most extreme 
cases of bullying. Art. 4 represents 
a prohibition of forced labour which 
means that it is carried out on an in- 
voluntary basis and the effect is on 
the victim is unjust and oppressive. 
With respect to Art. 10, the most 
likely application will be in working 
environment cases where freedom 
of expression has been circum- 
vented by bullying or harassment. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
As a consequence of EU interven- 
tion (in terms of Directives expand- 
ing the grounds of actions for dis- 
crimination) employers in the UK 
will have extensive liability for har- 
assment (that could include bullying). 
This has already led to changes in 
UK Law and other changes are set 
to happen in the not too distant fu- 
ture. Legislation has already been 
introduced to implement parts of the 
Council Framework Directive 2000/ 
78/EC into UK law., ' Under Art. 2(3) 
express provision is made for treat- 
ing as unlawful harassment on all the 
grounds specified in Art. I (namely 
religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation). In what circum- 
stances will harassment on these 
various grounds be treated as unlaw- 
ful? 
"When unwanted conduct re- 
lated to any of the grounds referred 
to in Article I takes place with the 
purpose or effect ofviolating the dig- 
nity of a person and of creating an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, hu- 
miliating or offensive environment. " 
This definition with its reference to 
dignity at work and intimidatory be- 
haviour is clearly capable of encom- 
passing most forms of bullying,. 
Under the Employment Equality 
(Sexual Equality) Regulations 2003 
that will come into force in the UK 
in December 2003, direct and indi- 
rect discrimination and discrimina- 
tion by way of victimisation and har- 
assment against employees on the 
ground of sexual orientation is cov- 
ered. With respect to comparators, 
it is enough to show that someone 
of a different sexual orientation 
would not have been harassed (or 
bullied). 
Another legislative development 
is the Race Discrimination Directive 
(2000/43/EU). For the first time in 
the UK, racial harassment in em- 
ployment is specifically treated as 
unlawful discrimination under stat- 
ute. The Race Relations Act 1976 
(Amendment) Regulations 2003 also 
change the burden of proof in dis- 
crimination cases and introduce a 
new definition of indirect discrimi- 
nation. The victim of racial harass- 
ment (or bullying) in the UK will need 
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to establish under the new section 
3A of the 76 Act, that on grounds of 
race or ethnic or natievial origins the 
bully engaged in unwanted conduct 
that violated his or her dignity or cre- 
ated an intimidating degrading, hu- 
miliating or offensive environment 
for him or her. 
The institutions of the European 
Union have also adopted a Direc- 
tive that has introduced considerable 
amendment to the Equal Treatment 
Directive 76/207 including inter alia: 
new measures on sexual harass- 
ment, introducing a legal definition Zý 
under statute for the first time and a 
requirement for employers to take 
preventative measures to deal with 
sexual harassment. 
These measures will clearly have 
far-reaching consequences for har- 
assment law in the UK and all the 
other member states in the Euro- 
pean Union. They will ensure that 
all categories of victims of harass- 
ment are provided will legal protec- 
tion that exceeds the level of pro- 
tection afforded to victims of har- 
assment in countries outside the 
European Union, including the 
United States. 
CONCLUSION 
The limited evidence provided by 
primary research shows that 
workplace bullying represents a 
common workplace practice within 
the United Kingdom. 12 "Too often to- 
day in the British workplace, stressed 
managers are applying negative 
pressure on workers. If that pres- 
sure takes the form of persistent in- 
timidation, undervaluing or undermin- 
ing ofan individual or group ofwork- 
ers, that is bullying. ",, As discussed, 
there is uncertainty surrounding the 
nature of existing legal protection in 
this area. The civil law and, more 
specifically actions in tort, offer the 
best prospect of successfully pursu- 
ing an action against the perpetrator ZIP 
at the present time. However rely- 
ing on the present system of legal 
protection for victims of bullying in 
the workplace (under civil and cnmi- 
nal law) requires them putting faith 
in a process that is uncertain and ill 
equipped to meet their needs. 
Where the bullying is discrimina- 
tory in nature then pursuing cases 
on the basis of discrimination under 
equality legislation offers a good 
prospect of success. Recent statutes 
have criminalised behaviour (such as 
harassment or disorderly conduct) 
that could encompass bullying and 
consequently the likelihood of a per- 
petrator being liable for criminal 
prosecution has increased. 
Whether this behaviour will rep- 
resent breach of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 is uncertain although the 
range of possible actions that can be 
pursued under the Human Rights 
legislation may persuade the Gov- 
ernment of a need to legislate. 
It is readily apparent that the le- 
gal framework to protect against 
workplace bullying is fraught with 
uncertainty. This unsatisfactory 
state of affairs could be remedied 
by the introduction of legal measures 
that are specifically designed to com- 
bat workplace bullying. The legisla- 
tion could take the form of broad 
legal duties set out in the statute ac- 
companied by guidance notes or a 
code of practice that details appro- 
priate standards of behaviour for 
employers and employees. Where 
there is a failure to comply with these 
duties or maintain the standards, the 
employer should be required to pro- 
vide civil remedies to the victim. -14 
It is also important that future 
legislation should include the remedy 
of interim relief in civil and criminal 
cases. " This could take the form of 
an interlocutory injunction or a re- 
straining order . 36 
In 1997 and in 
2001, the Dignity at Work Bill was 
an attempt to bring in legislation that 
would provide a civil remedy for 
bullying and would ensure everyone 
in employment was given the right 
to work free from bullying and in- 
timidation. The Bill was introduced 
by the House of Lords in the latter 
part of 2001 and was set to tackle 
bulling in the workplace by provid- 
ing employees with statutory protec- 
tion. 17 It was read a second and third 
time in March and May 2002 re- 
spectively. The degree of scepticism 
about the legislation invoked by the 
time of the second reading of the 
2001 Bill was shown by the stance 
taken by the Government. It re- 
mained undecided about its utility; 
however, it reiterated Labours, com- 
mitment to tackle the problems of bullying and stated that it believed 
the root of the trouble lay in the cul- 
ture of the workplace. 38 Thus, there 
was a general feeling that, althou 1ý gh the current law was not perfect, it 
was doubted whether new legisla- 
tion could stamp out all forms of 
workplace bullying. The'rbird read- 
ing (in the House of Commons) cre- 
ated further doubt wher, Lady 
Hermon (North Down) illustrated 
that measures already existed to pro- 
tect victims of bullying in the. form 
of the ECHR. The ECHR provides 
protection under Art. 3, which re- 
quires the Governments Of Member 
States to protect everyone, irrespec- 
tive of their nationality against de- 
grading treatment. " Surely bullying 
could fall under the terin "degradin'ty 
treatment". C 
Ultimately, the problems of bul- 
lying and violence at work have been 
gaining more importance following 
the debates that ensued at each read--' ing of the 2001 Bill and as a result 
there has been heightened aware- 
ness throughout the pub] ic: and Gov- 
emment Bodies of the need to tackle 
these issues more effectively. It can- 
not be said that the Bill came to noth- ing. Although it failed to becGrne leog- 
islation and fell by the wayside laws 
relating to bullying and viole_ýce in 
the workplace are likely to, be forth- 
coming in the near future and will inevitably follow the structulre set by 
the Dignity at Work Bill 200 1. Un- 
der the Bill. employees were entitled 
to work free from bullying or Other degrading treatment. 
Where employees werc' deni I ed 
such a right, their employer would be in breach of a statutor_V tort. Clause 1(2) of the 2001 Bill defined 
the nature of the behaviour that 
would represent a breach Of the' Bill. "If that employee suffers ... harass. 
ment or bullying or any act, Omis_ sion or conduct which causes hirn 
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to be alanned or distressed", then a 
breach occurs. - Clause 5(l) of the 
2001 Bill provides the employer with 
a defence: 
(a) if the employer has a Diggpity at 
Work Policy in force and com- 
plies with it in all respects; 
(b) the act/s complained of are re- 
pudiated by the competent per- 
son as soon as reasonably prac- 
ticable; and 
(c)as soon as is reasonably practi- 
cable, the employer takes all 
steps as are reasonably neces- 
sary to remedy any loss, damage 
or other detriment suffered by the 
complainant. 
While this is a commendable effort 
to introduce specific legal protection 
in this area, is it is uncertain whether 
it would have been successful in re- 
solving the problem. Reliance on a 
statutory tort, with remedies and 
concepts borrowed from equality 
legislation, could be insufficient to 
encourage employers to take 
proactive steps to prevent bullying. 
A combination of civil and criminal 
measures (as utilised in the Protec- 
tion from Harassment Act 1997) 
may prove more effective in per- 
suading them to combat this type of 
behaviour. Realistically, the type of 
civil model used in the Dignity at 
Work Bills will be adopted for any 
future legislation. 
This article has tried to define the 
current parameters of legal protec- 
tion available to victims of bullying. 
It has also identified where improve- 
ments can be made to provide spe- 
cific legal rights to victims of bully- 
ing. It is argued that this develop- 
ment is necessary to make legal en- 
forcement easier and extend protec- 
tion to all employees forced to ex- 
perience this type of destructive be- 
haviour. It is a widely held view that 
the UK Government should intro- 
duce legislation soon to achieve 
those outcomeS. 41 
"All professionals involved in the 
campaign to prevent bullying agree 
that if there is one thing their fight 
for legislation is achieving, it is that 
it signals to employers that bullying 
must be stamped OUt. 
"42 
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INTRODUCTION 
B ullying at work can seriously 
damage the lives of those 
employees unfortunate 
enough to be a victim of this behav- 
iour. It can cause them to suffer eco- 
nomic and social loss and experience 
physical and/or mental harm. De- 
spite this, the sad reality for many 
victims ofworkplace bullying is that 
there is no appropriate procedure for 
combating this behaviour 
' 
in the 
workplace and no specific legal rem- 
edy available to them. 
This article, which is written in 
three parts, will involve analysis of 
the existing avenues of legal redress 
in the UK for victims of bullying, 
T he lack of a suitable mecha 
nism for protecting victims of 
workplace bullying is due in 
part to reluctance on the part of Par- 
liament' employers and the judici- 
ary to take this matter seriously. 
This article will outline the sever- 
ity of this problem and highlight the 
shortfall in legal protection available 
to victims of bullying. 
THE NATURE OF BULLYING 
AT WORK 
All employees will have been a vic- 
tim of bullying at some point in their C1 
working life but not everyone will 
have been harmed by it. Bullying can 
take many forms including con- 
stantly criticising, belittling, deggrad- 
ing, shouting at, humiliating, 
overworking, denyingjob informa- C) 
tion, singling out for unfavourable 
treatment, threatening, ostracising, 
trivial fault-finding, applying unreal- 
istic deadlines, assaulting and ridicul- 
ing. Where such bullying or intimi- 
datory actions are perpetrated by 
supervisory employees against other 
employees in the workplace it is of- 
ten symptomatic ofan organisational 
culture, which perpetuates or con- 
dones the behaviour. 
While interpersonal bullying may 
arise in the context of a supervisor/ 
subordinate relationship or through 
personality clashes between col- 
leagues the most harmful type of 
bullying is institutional and this is very 
difficult to tackle. In the case of in- 
terpersonal bullying the perpetrator 
usually acts from a position of inse- 
curity or low confidence in his abili- 
ties. There will often be serious con- 
sequences for the victim including 
injury to confidence, forced depar- 
ture from theirjob, relationship prob- 
lems at work and at home and 
stress-related illness. The last of 
these consequences is probably the 
most harmful. 
"There can be little dispute against C, 
ever growing research that stress has 
a significant negative impact on the 
well-being of both the individual and 
the organ isati on. "2 
Victims will want the bullying to 
come to an end but will often be pow- 
erless to stop it. Grievance proce- 
dures, normally invoked to deal with 
internal complaints of employees, 
can be inappropriate for dealing with 
claims of bullying. This is particu- 
larly-true where the first stage of 
complaint for the employee is to 
raise the matter with their line man- 
ager and it is his or her behaviour 
that is the subject of the complaint'. 
Inability to resolve the matter satis- 
factorily by internal means may lead 
employees to absent themselves 
from the workplace or to resign to 
including, consideration of the im- 
pact ofhuman rights legislation, iden- 
tification of any obstacles involved 
in pursuing these legal rights and rec- 
ommendations for legal rules that will 
offer victims of bullying in the 
workplace adequate and effective 
means of legal redress. 
avoid the hostile working environ- 
ment caused by bullying. The only 
option available to them in these cir- 
cumstances is to pursue a legal ac- 
tion against the bully or his employer. 
Unfortunately the law in this area is 
uncertain and ill defined. 
CURRENT LEGAL PROTEC- 
TION FOR VICTIMS OF 
BULLYING 
Minor bullying incidents at work are 
unlikely to be treated as unlawful; 
however, bullying that causes mate- 
rial harm to the victim can represent 
a civil wrong (breach of contract, 
tort) and a serious incident of bully- 
ing may constitute a criminal of- 
fence. 
Where the employer of the bully 
is a public authority then the victim 
may be able to pursue an action 
against his or her employer under the 
Human Rights Act 1998 if it can be 
established that the bullying repre- 
sents a breach of one or more of 
the Human Rights enshrined in the 
European Convention, e. g. Art. 3 
prohibits torture, inhuman or degrad- 
ing treatment or punishment (see 
discussion below). 
There are no specific legal rules 
under statute or the common law 
that provide a remedy for victims of 
bullying and protection against the 
actions of the bully. Some protec- 
I= 
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tion has been extended to victims of 
bullying, however, by the judiciary, 
through broad interpretation of ex- 
isting laws to encompass workplace 
bullying. In the absence of any pro- 
posals for statutory intervention in 
the near future, this process ofjudi- 
cial creativity will no doubt continue. 
Where a bullying incident is trig- 
gered by a racist or sexist motive, 
or involves racist or sexist behav- 
iour, then the employer and the em- 
ployee perpetrating the bullying will 
be treated as acting unlawfully un- 
der equality legislation'. Where bul- 
lying is an intentional or negligent act 
of the employer leading to harmful 
consequences for his victim he 
maybe liable in tort for breach of his 
duty of care owed towards his em- 
ployee. An employer can also be li- 
able for the bullying activities of his 
employees where he is held vicari- 
ously liable for their actions that are 
directed at the victim. 
Where a manager physically in- 
timidates his workers or an employee 
assaults a colleague they could be 
guilty of a criminal offence under the 
common law, e. g. assault or trespass 
to the person or statute, e. g. putting =1 
in fear of violence under s. 4 of the 
Protection from Harassment Act 
1997. 
DEFINITION OF BULLYING 
There is no legal definition of bully- 
ing but it has been defined as "per- 
sistent, offensive, abusive, intimidat- 
ing, malicious or insulting behaviour, 
abuse ofpower or unfair penal sanc- 
tions which makes the recipient up- 
set, threatened, humiliated or vulner- 
able, which undermines their self 
confidence and may cause them to 
suffer stress. "5 While this definition 
is too imprecise to be used in a legal 
context, it does highlight the neces- 
sary elements of a legal definition. 
If the definition is to be capable of 
being utilised in a statute it should 
outline the nature of the behaviour, 
indicate the consequences for the 
victim, identify the disciplinary out- 
come for the bully and the neces- 
, ee of 
intention of the per- sary degr 
petrator, if any, for causing harm. 
On this last point it would prob- 
ably be inappropriate to include in a 
definition reference to the motive or 
intention of the bully to harm his vic- 
tim. This is because the motive of 
the bully is often largely irrelevant 
in a civil case. It is the effect the 
behaviour has on the victim that is 
important and not the reason under- 
lying the bully's actions. 6 Section I 
of the Protection from Harassment 
Act 1997 avoids any mention of the 
motive of the harasser by defining 
harassment broadly and introducing 
a reasonable man test to determine 
issues of intention and foreseeability. 
The test is, did the employer know 
(or would a reasonable employer 
have known) in all the circumstances 
that his behaviour amounted to har- 
assment? 
An employer can also be liable 
for the bullying activities of his em- 
ployees where he is held vicariously 
liable for their actions that are di- 
rected at the victim. 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
BULLYING 
The effects of bullying on the victim 
are often underrated although they 
can be severe. Tania Clayton, a fe- 
male fire fighter suffered severe 
depression when she was bullied and 
harassed by her male colleagues 
over a period of 15 months. The 
bullying and its effect on her led to 
the breakdown of her marriage. The 
bullying consisted ofbeing: left to sit C) zlý 
for an hour at the top of a turntable 
ladder 100 feet above the ground, 
being forced to serve tea to men in 
bed, experiencing physical and ver- 
bal abuse and being forced to carry 
out useless and dangerous drills. She 
received an out of court settlement 
of L200,000 from her employer fol- 
lowing a claim for sex discrimina- 
tion. ' 
Bullying in the workplace is now 
commonplace' and there is consid- 
erable evidence that bullying is a 
major cause of stress-related illness. 
Professor Cary Cooper, a leading 
expert on occupational stress from 
the University of Manchester's In- 
stitute of Science and Technology 
(UMIST), estimates that bullying is 
responsible for between a third and 
a half of all stress-related illness. it 
can cause symptoms of Psychiatric 
injury similar to Post-Traurnatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD)9. Victims 
may be forced to leave their jobs 
rather than continue to face a hos- 
tile and unwelcome working environ- 
ment caused by a bully. 10 
Employers may also suffer ad- 
verse consequences from their em- 
ployees bullying other members of 
staff. These can include lower pro- ductivity in the organisation, lower 
morale amongst staff, higher labour 
turnover, more frequent absenteeism 
and sickness absence. " This arti- 
cle will concentrate on one-to-one 
bullying perpetrated ag i , ainst employ- 
ees by their manager or colleague. 
There are instances where collec- 
tive bullying by all or part of the 
workforce is perpetrated against an individual but this is rare and not 
worthy of detailed consideration 
here. 12 
SOCIOLOGICAL ASPIECTS 
OF BULLYING 
It is outside the scope of this article 
to undertake detailed analysis Ofthe 
psychological or sociological reasons 
for bullying (including the psycl-lologi r: 1 - 
cal traits of bullies or their victirnsp 
or identify the factors leading to an increase in bullying in recent tirries" 
It is has been suggested that buIlV_ 
ing is symptomatic of a tougher aýd 
more competitive managerneni phi- losophy that has emerged in the last 
ten or twenty years. Emp1c)yers- of 
ten impose pressures on Manage- 
- I'D ment to meet unrealistic perform_ 
ance standards, comply with tight 
deadlines or cope with fewe 
Ir 
staff. The inevitable consequence is that 
these harassed managers bull, ý their 
staff. " Nigel de Gruchy, then Gen- 
eral Secretary of the UK's National 
Association of Schoolmasters, com_ 
mented on the escalating problýmof 
bullying in the teaching ProfesSionas 
follows, "The problem Is getting 
worse. We call it the cascade ef_- fect. If head teachers could l0se their jobs because of pressures they are 
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under, they pass the stress on. It is 
caused by pressure now on 
schools. "" 
Bullying is normally attributable 
to men, who are often in a supervi- 
sory position and victims are nor- 
mally female and subordinate to the 
bully in the workplace hierarchy. " 
"Bullying is the use of a position or 
power to coerce others by fear, per- 
secution or to oppress them by force 
or threat. The key to understanding 
bullying is power .... The position 
of power does not necessarily arise 
in the traditional workplace power 
hierarchy. " In a rare case where 
the victim of bullying was a man, a 
Chinese worker, David Chan was 
bullied and humiliated by his two 
bosses. He was awarded E172,000 
as compensation for race discrimi- 
nation (including E25,000 for injury 
to feelinas). 
The organisation or an individual 
manager may intentionally use bul- 
lyina to get better results from the 
victim or force them to leave their 
job. 19 It is important that such per- 
sons are provided with protection 
against these workplace tactics. 
Towards this end, it is important to 
analyse the extent of the legal pro- 
tection available to victims of bully- 
ing and identify any obstacles to its C) 
utilisation. 
The writers believe that the im- 
precision and uncertainty in the cur- 
rent system of legal protection and 
obstacles to accessing legal rights 
justify the need for a specific statu- 
tory remedy for victims ofbullying. -v 
However, there are no indications 
that legislation to combat bullying will 
be forthcoming and victims seeking Cý 0 
protection from bullying are obli-ed W =1 
to utilise legal remedies that are ill 21 
equipped to fulfil the r6le. 
LEGAL PROTECTION 
AGAINST BULLYING UN- 
DER THE COMMON LANV 
Protection under civil law for 
victims of bullying in the United 
Kingdom is mainly provided under 
common law rules. 
Breach of contract 
Employers are unlikely to offer pro- 
tection against bullying to employ- 
ees in the form of a written or oral 
express term in an employment con- 
tract. In the event that an employer 
introduces a policy for bullying or 
dignity at work and it is incorporated 
into employees' contracts ofemploy- 
ment, then an express contractual 
right to be protected against bully- 
ing would be provided. An action 
for breach of a contract will other- 
wise only be available to a victim of 
workplace bullying where it repre- 
sents a breach of an implied term of 
his contract. These terms are implied 
into employment contracts by the 
courts and normally place a duty on 
an employer to behave in a certain 
way towards their employee22 or 
vice versa. 23 
Where an employer breaches its 
implied duty, this can represent re- 
pudiation by him of an employee's 
contract ofemployment and provide 
the basis for an action against him Cý by the employee for breach of his 
contract. The most important of the 
implied terms is the mutual duty to 
maintain trust and confidence. This 
term and the term that places a duty 
on the employer to provide for the 
safety of his employees are the most 
relevant to bullying. 
Duty of employer to maintain his 
employee ý trust and confidence 
Although this is a mutual obligation, 
the duty owed by the employer to- 
wards his employee is most relevant 
here. Where bullying is perpetrated ZD 
by a supervisor or manager against 
a subordinate then it will represent 
a breach of an employer's duty to 
maintain his employees' trust and 
confidence: 
"[flhere is implied into a contract 
of employment a term that the em- 
ployers will not, without reasonable 
and proper cause, conduct them- 
selves in a manner calculated or 
likely to destroy or seriously dam- 
age the relationship of trust and con- 
fidence between employer and em- 
ployee. "24 Bullying in the workplace 
is a pernicious form of behaviour that 
is capable of destroying the position 
of trust and confidence inherent in 
the working relationship. 
In Courtalds v Andrews2l a su- 
pervisor was told by his boss "you 
can't do the bloodyjob" and this was 
deemed to be a breach of this im- 
plied term. The employer must be 
seen to manaae its business in an 
honest and upright manner. If the 
employer does not act appropriately 
and the employee suffers a loss, then 
the employer as a consequence of 
the Malik case (considered below) 
will be acting in breach of an im- 
plied term and the affected employee 
will be able to claim breach of con- 
tract and may be entitled to stigma 
damages 
. 
26 In Malik v BCCI SA, 27 
the House of Lords held that if the 
conduct complained of was operat- 
ing a business in a "dishonest and 
corrupt manner" and was viewed as 
"calculated or likely to destroy or 
seriously damage the relationship of 
confidence and trust between em- 
ployer and employee", then the em- 
ployer would be liable. " 
Whether creating or condoning Cý 
an organisational culture that per- 
mits perpetration of bullying in the 
workplace would be deemed by the 
courts to be operating the business 
in a dishonest and corrupt manner 
remains to be seen. What this deci- 
sion suggests is that, if an employer 
by operation ofhis business seriously 
compromises an employee's future 
employment and, in the process, 
breaches the relationship of trust and 
confidence with him, then this will 
probably represent a breach of con- 
tract. 
It is clear from the cases cited 
that there has been a significant ex- 
pansion in the scope of the implied 
term of trust and confidence and 
employers will be acting in breach z: 1 
of this term where they are discour- 
teous, intimidatory or insulting which C) 
are all aspects of bullying. 
Employer ý duty to take reason- 
able carefor the safety of his em- 
ployees 
The employer is under a duty to take 
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reasonable care for the safety of all 
his employees. There is a similar duty 
owed by the employer to his employ- 
ees under the law of tort. " The em- 
ployee, therefore, has a choice of 
suing his employer for breach of this 
duty under contract or tort. The 
aspects of this duty that apply to 
bullying are the employer's duty to CI 
provide a safe working environ- 
mentIO and reasonably safe and 
competent fellow employees. 
Where an employee suffers 
physical or mental harm because an 
employer fails to provide a safe 
working environment that is free 
from bullying, then the employer can 
be liable. Breach of this duty might 
arise where an employer fails to re- 
spond to a bullying complaint, insuf- 
ficient supervision is provided or he 
allows bullying to become part ofthe 
organisational culture. 31 
With respect to the duty to pro- 
vide safe and competent fellow em- 
ployees, if the employer knowingly 
allows their supervisor to bully an- 
other employee under their control 
and they are harmed then this will 
be a breach. 32 
OTHER IMPLIED 
CONTRACTUAL DUTIES 
In the case of Wigan Borough 
Council v Davies, 33 a junior man- 
a(Yer at an old folk's home failed to 
take the side of care assistants in a 
dispute with the warden. The care 
assistants harassed the junior man- 
ager and she requested the support 
of her employer. Despite its com- 
mitment to help her, it failed to give 
her any support. 31 The Employment 
Appeal Tribunal held that an em- 
ployer is under an obligation to take 
reasonable steps to ensure their em- 
ployees carry out their job free of 
harassment by fellow employees. 
Their failure in this respect was 
breach of their implied duty to pro- 
vide employees with reasonable sup- 
port. 
In Waltons & Morse v 
Dorrington '31 an employer that failed to operate a no-smoking policy 
was acting in breach of an implied 
duty (formulated by the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal) to provide and 
maintain a working environment 
which is reasonably suitable for the 
performance by their employees of 
their contractual duties. The scope 
of this term was summarised in the 
following way: 
"[flhe implied duty to provide a 
reasonably suitable working environ- 
ment also can be regarded as en- 
compassing a duty to protect the 
employee from violence or from 
harassment, whether sexual 'or ra- 
cial, or in the form of general bully- 
ing. 19 36 
Clearly, there is a range of im- 
plied terms which could apply to 
bullying and breach of any of these 
will entitle the victim to pursue an 
action in court against his or her 
employer for breach of contract or 
use the breach as the basis for re- 
signing theirjob and claiming con- 
structive dismissal. Where the 
breach arises or is outstanding at the 
termination of the employment con- 
tract, the victim of bullying can bring 
a case for breach of contract be- 
fore an Employment Tribunal. " 
While breach of any implied term 
will provide the basis for an action 
for breach of contract, it is more 
likely to be utilised as the basis for 
an action in tort or a claim for indi- 
vidual statutory ricy tS. 38 gh 
WRONGFUL DISMISSAL 
If instances of bullying or complaints 
from the victim to the employer 
about the behaviour leads to the vic- 
tim's dismissal, this may represent 
wrongful dismissal and that em- 
ployee could bring an action for darn- 
ages. This course of action will be 
highly relevant where an employee 
is dismissed summarily or without 
proper notice. However, the victim 
now has a choice of pursuing an 
action in court for wrongful dismissal 
or bringing a case before an employ- rý 
ment tribunal for breach of con- 
traCt. 39 
In Wilson v Racher, " a head 
gardener was subjected to wrong- 
ful and aggressive accusations of 
dereliction of duty. An argument en- 
sued and the employee swore at his 
boss whose response was to surn- 
marily dismiss him. In an action for 
wrongful dismissal, LJ Davies (find- 
ing in the plaintiff's favouT) surnma- 
rised the position as follows: 
here was a competent, diligent and 
efficient gardener who ... had done 
nothing which could regarded as blameworthy by any reasonable em- 
ployer. Here too was an employer 
who was resolved to get fid Of him; 
an employer who would use every 
barrel in the gun that he could find 
... and an employer who was pro- 
vocative from the outset and dealt 
with the plaintiff in an unseemly man_ 
ner. 
While the employee's insolent be- 
haviour represented a breach of his 
contract it was not capable of ne- 
gating a claim for wrongful disrnissal. 
The remedy for wrongful disrnissal 
is unlimited compensation, although 
the award is normally concerned 
with compensating the plaintiff for 
inadequate notice and the arnount of damages will often be firnited to the 
wages due under the notice Period. 
In a statutory claim for breach of 
contract the maximum CO111Pensa- 
tion an Employment Tribunal can 
award is E25,000. 
ACTIONS IN TORT 
Physical or non-physical bu]IY'inc, 41 
that causes the victim to suffer harm 
can be the basis for an action in tort 
against the bully under the law of 
negligence. It must be sho" that a duty of care exists between the bully 
and his victim that has been 
breached. The employer can be di- 
rectly liable for negligence where 
they have knowingly or negligently 
allowed bullying to take Place4:! or they can be held liable for the ac- tions of the bully on the basis 'Of their 
vicarious liability. 
LIABILITY FOR PHyS, CAL HARM 
A number of different actioxis In tort 
can be pursued against a buII_V (as_ 
sault, trespass to the person). , Where 
it is physical bullying, the victirn can pursue an action in tort for ; assault 
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against his or her attacker. An ac- 
tion for assault can be brought with 
or without an accompanying action 
for battery. Assault has been defined 
as: "an act of the defendant, which 
causes to the plaintiff reasonable 
apprehension of the infliction of a 
battery on him by the defendant". "I 
This is some gesture or physical act, 
which could reasonably be con- 
strued as leading to a physical at- 
tack or trespass to the person. 
In Stephen v Myers, 44 the de- 
fendant threatened the plaintiff and 
moved towards him with a clenched 
fist. Although his progress and as- 
sault were halted by the interven- 
tion of a third party, it was still held 
to be an assault. A battery requires 
that "there must be a voluntary act 
by the defendant intended to bring 
about ... contact with the plain- 
tiff'141 The contact referred to does 
not need to be substantial (e. g. spit- 
ting at someone, kissing someone rý 
against their will, slapping, or push- Cý ing them). Although the physical act zD 
must be intentional, the force need 
not be applied in a hostile manner. 
Where someone wilfully causes 
mental harm to another person it will 
be treated as a tort. In Wilkinson v 
Downton' the physical harm was 
psychiatric shock or injury caused 
by the defendant tell ing the plaintiff, 
as a practical joke that her husband 
had been in an accident causing in- 
jury to both his legs. Although liabil- 
ity arose from verbal statements 
causing nervous shock, cases 
brought on this ground are not re- 
stricted to such a %ause" or "ef- 
fect" and could extend to cases of 
verbal or physical bullying causing, 
mental harm. 
Unfortunately, the plaintiff may 
often find that the perpetrator of the 
harmful act is not in a financial po- 
sition to meet a claim for damages. 
Where it is viable, the victim of bul- 
lying can pursue an action in tort '0 
against his employer or against both 
his employer and the perpetrator. 
An employer is under a personal 
duty to take reasonable care for the 
safety of all its employees. Breach 
of this duty could arise where it has 
encouraged or condoned the bully- 
ing or it is in a position to control the 
bully's actions and fails to do So. 47 
DUTY OF CARE FOR SAFETY 
OF ALL EMPLOYEES 
An employer is under a duty to pro- 
vide all its employees on an individual 
basis with a safe system of work 
including a safe working environ- 
ment, adequate safety instruction 
and supervision and safe and com- 
petent fellow employees. Where bul- 
lying, occurs, it can lead to an op- 
pressive working environment that 
has an adverse affect on the health 
of targeted employees . 
41 There is a 
duty on the part of the employer to 
discipline staff that are a danger to 
the health and safety of its employ- 
ees and this could extend to their 
dismissal. " In Walker v Xorthum- 
herland County Council, 10 it was 
decided by the High Court that the 
employer's duty of care could be 
extended beyond protecting employ- 
ees from physical harm to risks to 
their mental health caused by the 
working environment. 
In an unreported case Ms 
Noonan a council worker brought an 
action against Liverpool City Coun- 
cil in 1999. She claimed that, as a 
result of being subjected to bullying, 
intimidation and harassment over 
several years her employer had 
breached his duty of care. This case 
was settled out of court, her em- 
ployer paying E84,000 as recom- 
pense. " 
There is now clear authority that 
an employer can be liable for the 
harm suffered by their employees as 
a result of bullyinc,. 52 
Part 11 of this article will appear 
in the next issue of the Irish Law 
Times. 
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tion of this principle (see subsequent 
parts of this piece). 
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Introduction 
While the Labour Government seem committed to increasing legal protection for 
atypical workers such as trainees, ' this category of worker is still denied certain 
ftindamental legal rights, which are necessary to ensure their employment protec- 
tion. This article attempts to define the scope of the liability of persons responsible 
for trainees' who are working for them for a fixed time period in furtherance of a 
work experience arrangement (e. g. a welfare-to-work scheme such as the New 
Deal). ' Tbere is a general acceptance that the term employer can be used to describe 
anyone enlisting the assistance of another in a work context. 'Employer ... is often 
used as a neutral word applicable to all engagers of labour. )4 Where the training 
arrangement consists only of providing training or education to a trainee in return 
for a fee then the term training provider is more appropriate. 
This article will not consider the legal position of apprenticeships or pro- 
fessional trainees such as lawyers, accountants and doctors because they tend to be 
treated as the same as or equivalent to employees and consequently their legal 
position is more settled-5 
Most persons engaged under training contracts will receive on-the-job training 
from the employer and will work alongside employees undertaking the same work as 
them but trainees will not be afforded the same legal status and consequently not 
share the same terms and conditions of employment or access to individual statutory 
rights. 
Employment rights available to trainees 
It is necessary to undertake an analysis of the legal position of trainees to ascertain 
whether or not they are disadvantaged compared with other groups of workers. 
There are certain important rights that are only available to employeeS6 as defined 
by the Employment Rights Act 1996, e. g. redundancy rights (right to receive 
ISSN 0953-9964 print; 1469-5774 online/03102/30115-19 Q 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd 
DOI: 10.1080/0953996032000164689 
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redundancy compensation and the right to be notified and consulted about redun- 
dancy) and protection against unfair dismissal 
judicial reasoning is that trainees should not to be treated as employees but 
instead as working under a training contract and as such they are not eligible fr 
most forms of statutory protection. 7 
Rights denied to trainees also include time off work for various duties, a 
minimum statutory period of notice of dismissal, right to receive written particul, -Irs 
of terms and conditions of employment, maternity rights including maternity pay, 
maternity leave and the right to return to work, and guaranteed payment for persons 
laid off work. 
However, workers as defined in s 230(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
are entitled to protection against unlawful deductions from their wages (as set out 
in section 27 of the same Act) the entitlement to a minimum wage and rights under 
the Working Time Regulations 
Trainees that carry out work for the employer which is 'effective and genuine, 
(as defined by the European Court of Justice (in various cases involving the freedon, 
of movement or workers) would fall within the definition of a worker NOrlizing 
under any other contract whereby the individual undertakes to work perfo)rrn 
personally any work or services for another party'). ' They would be entitled to the 
protection afforded to workers even though their remuneration takes the form Of a 
training allowance rather than a wage. 
Legal status of trainees 
A trainee will often undertake the same role as employees and be subjected to the 
same or a more onerous degree of control by employers. They will invariablY be 
worse off than employees in terms of entitlement to employment rights and health 
and safety protection. The training arrangement will normally be of a tripartite 
nature with the trainee being sponsored by a governmental agency or educational 
institution to undertake work for an employer. 
While the legislation of the European Union has led to the creation of certain 
rights directly for trainees in respect of health and safety etc. (discussed below) it, 
impact has been limited. 
The legislative component of the European Community's vocational train- 
ing policy were established gradually. This is unsurprising given ... the 
diversity of training systems of member states embedded as they are in 
state-specific systems of social relations, including industrial organisation 
and patterns of labour market participation. ' 
The treaty on European Union provided a new aspect to the Treaty of Rome in the 
shape of measures to encourage education vocational training and youth. " 
Article 127 is most relevant here as it gives EU Institutions the option Of 
enacting measures in order to introduce and implement a vocational training polic3r. 
Member states are also placed under a duty to cooperate in the exchange Of 
information and experience. "Me role of the EU institutions is to support arid 
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supplement national policies, and to promote cooperation, nothing more. "' The EU 
is unlikely to have much impact on the Government's UK political agenda for 
vocational training except where they promote measures that are supported by 
financial incentives for implementation. 
'Mere is a need to demystify the nature of the legal rights extended to trainees, 
which this article attempts to do. However, as already intimated this process is 
hindered by confusion over different definitions being utilised in employment 
statutes to determine entitlement to specific legal rights. This can lead to marginal 
workers such as trainees being entitled to some employment rights but not to others. 
Problems also stem from the difficulty experienced by the courts in characterising 
the nature of an employee and a contract of employment and uncertainties arising 
from application of the tests devised by the courts to resolve this issue. 
Distinguishing the contract of employment from other types of contract 
Access to most rights is restricted to employees rather than workers. The 
tests applied by the tribunals to determine employee status do not always 
afford protection to those that are in need of it. Although some are clearly 
excluded, other groups of workers ... are left in a grey area with both 
themselves and the tribunals uncertain as to their employee status. " 
In determining the type of contract applicable in a given situation the courts 
traditionally applied the control test. The question was who controls the work 
undertaken., the employer or the worker? 13 If the former applied it was a contract of 
employment if the latter applied it was not. It became apparent that this was a crude 
and imprecise test that failed to recognise the high degree of autonomy exercised by 
various categories of employees. It was therefore replaced by the organisational test. 
Here the courts considered the importance of the job carried out by the worker 
in relation to the organisation. " The more importance attached to the task by the 
organisation the more likely it would be a contract of employment. The flaw in this 
test was that in practice organisations would often contract out various important 
tasks to independent contractors. It therefore did not conform to economic reality. 
It was replaced by the entrepreneurial test, which asked the question, is the person 
who is undertaking the work carrying it out on his own account? The courts would 
consider factors such as financial risk involved in the work, the method of paying for 
it and the ability of the worker to employ their own replacements when they are 
unavailable to carry out the work. " 
The test that presently applies is the multiple test. 'Mis involves abandonment 
of a single factor test in favour of consideration of all the factors in the case before 
making a decision-'6 
Unfortunately in recent cases the judiciary have concentrated more on the 
existence or not of mutuality of obligation in the contract and/or an element of 
personal service than other factors. The consequence is that where there is a lack of 
mutual obligation between the parties or there is a substitution clause in the contract 
allowing for others to undertake the task then it may be treated as a contract for 
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services (contract with independent contractor) rather than a contract of employ- 
ment. " However, in McFarlane v. Glasgow City Council (20,01) IRLR 7 the F-AT 
attempted to limit the impact of the decision in Tanton by stating that the rnere 
existence of a substitution clause in a contract did not mean it could not be treated 
as a contract of service. 
Most training arrangements are founded on mutual obligation with the trainee 
providing their work in return for work experience and training. The employer will 
not normally allow the trainee to substitute someone else in his role. 'Mese tests will 
not present obstacles to trainees trying to establish that they should be treated as 
employees. Nevertheless the courts will still be reluctant to accept this argurnent. 
Legal status of trainees and their eligibility for employment rights 
Trainees are not normally attributed the status of working under a contract of 
employment" and their lack of employment status will result in denial of the norrnal 
contractual rights associated with a contract of employment or apprenticeship and 
ineligibility to benefit from the individual statutory employment rights iderltifled 
earlier and below. 
Female trainees will be unable to claim maternity rights such as the right to 
maternity pay and maternity leave. Where trainees are dismissed for reason of 
redundancy there will be no requirement for the employer to provide thern with 
consultation or notice of redundancy and no right for them to be compensated for 
the loss of their job. " Trainees will be unable to sue the employer for unfair 
dismissal where their contract is unfairly or unreasonably terminated and they will 
not be able to sue for constructive dismissal. This is defined in section 95(l)(c) Of 
the Employment Rights Act 1996) and provides the right to claim unfair disrnisSal 
where employees are forced to leave their jobs prematurely by resigning because of 
their employer's intolerable behaviour The combined effect on trainees being 
deprived of these and other statutory rights will be the denial of job security. 
The transient nature of most training agreements means that even where 
trainees were given employee status, their entitlement to job security rights would be 
limited because their continuity of employment would be insufficient to allow them 
to qualify for statutory protection (e. g. employment of less than one year with the 
same employer excludes the right to claim unfair dismissal) . 
20 They would be 
similarly placed to other marginal workers such as employees working on short fLxed 
term or temporary contracts that have insufficient continuity of employment to 
qualify for employment protection. 
It will be argued in some quarters that this is, as it should be because trainees 
are benefiting from employment training and the development of their skills arising 
from their placement. " They should therefore be treated as working under a training 
contract rather than a contract of employment. However, it seems inappropriate that 
a training contract should be used to cover all training agreements. An exce-Ption 
should be made where the trainee is being utilised in the same capacity as an 
employee with training only being provided on-the-job. The nature of the arraýnge_ 
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ment dictates that the relationship should be covered by a contract of employment, 
albeit one which is temporary and for a fixed-term 
It could be argued that to date employers have been free-riders benefiting from 
the services of workers, free from the statutory obligations outlined and liability for 
breach of health and safety duties imposed by statute and the common law. The 
employer will also directly benefit from any Government subsidy attached to these 
schemes. 
It will often not be necessary to offer trainees any financial consideration in 
terms of training unless it is a statutory requirement. The employer will benefit from 
the convenience of having in-house candidates for jobs that are readily available and 
suitable for future vacancies. 
Nature and status of training arrangements 
The welfare to work schemes adopted by successive Governments, as an aid to 
economic stabilisation has been the subject of some criticism. However there is no 
doubting the Government's commitment to the New Deal and other schemes as a 
way of reducing unemployment and creating a trained workforce. The Government 
devoted C5.2. billion to the New Deal over the first four years of the Parliament and 
a significant part of this (, CI. 4 billion) was directed at the young unemployed 
(18-24). The scheme although ultimately the brainchild of the Government and a 
central plank of its economic policy is administered on its behalf by the Employment 
Service. 
The Employment Service works in partnership with Training and Enterprise 
Councils, training providers, employers, voluntary bodies and other local agencies. 
There is diversity in the nature of training schemes available with some being more 
akin to an employment relationship (e. g. subsidised employment under the New 
Deal) than others (e. g. National Traineeships). The crucial question is, does a 
contractual relationship exist between an employer and a trainee, and, if so, is it a 
contract of employment? It will clearly depend on the precise nature of the training 
arrangement. 
There are four options under the New Deal for persons between the ages of 18 
and 24 who have been claiming job-seekers allowance for six months. They can 
carry out work with a private sector employer, which includes training towards an 
accredited qualification (which is : ftmded by the Government to the extent of L60 
per week). Similarly they can be given a funded placement with the Government's 
Environmental Taskforce or work for an employer in the voluntary sector, which will 
also involve study towards an accredited qualification. Finally they can undertake a 
year's full-time training or education leading to a qualification. There are also New 
Deal arrangements for single parents and the disabled that are primarily focused on 
getting them back into employment. Where the arrangement primarily involves 
training or education provision then the relationship should be regulated by a 
training contract (e. g. University for Industry, see below, Full-time education and 
training under the New Deal). Where there is a combination of training and work 
experience the situation is less clear. 
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The National Traineeships scheme gives young people the opportunity to 
acquire the skills, knowledge and qualifications needed by employers and the 
University for Industry has a role to provide information about learning opportuni- 
ties to employers and individuals and provide basic skills training. At the moment all 
these types of trainees are denied employment status and the legal nature of their 
relationship is ill -defined. 
If training arrangements are ascribed the status of an employment contract 
through the introduction of new statutory rules or through judicial intervention it 
would bring a degree of clarity to what is essentially a legal minefield. " At the 
moment judicial decisions and legislative measures in the UK are often at odds with 
legal measures or decisions emanating from the European Union. Confusion can 
result where different legal standards are applied. This is best illustrated by the 
introduction into domestic legislation of the concept of 'worker' as a consequence of 
implementation of the law of the European Union. 'Me concept of 'worker' is 
broader than that of 'employee' which until recently was the main category of person 
entitled to employment protection under UK law. Increasingly the term worker will 
be used instead of the term employee. 'Ibis is particularly noticeable in health and 
safety law, where under the auspices of Article 138 of the EC Treaty (formerly 
Article 118a)., Directives have been issued to member states which have allocated 
certain employment rights to workers and led to a number of important changes in 
UK employment law (e. g. Working Time Regulations 1998). It was clearly on the 
agenda of the European Union to broaden the availability of rights in protective legal 
measures, e. g. Article 3 of the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC extends rights to 
workers and specifically to trainees. The same rights are not provided by UK 
legislation that implements the Directive because its coverage is restricted to em- 
ployees. 23 This is despite the fact that Article 3 of the Directive was intended to 
obtain harmonisation amongst member states in respect of law and policy on health 
and safety. 24 'Article 118a refers to workers generally and states the objective it 
pursues is to be achieved by the harmonisation of conditions in general existing in 
the area of health and safety of those workers. 125 
Contractual nature of training arrangements 
In Daley v. Allied Suppliers Ltd2' the Employment Appeal Tribunal were unwilling to 
accept that a trainee under the Youth Opportunities Scheme was an employee for 
the purposes of section 78 of the Race Relations Act 1976. 
If a contract did exist between the applicant and respondent, it was a 
contract for the training of the applicant and not a contract of service or a 
contract to personally execute work or labour within the meaning of section 
7 27 8. 
The EAT decided there was a clear distinction to be drawn between a Youth 
Opportunities Scheme trainee working under a job creation scheme organised by the 
Manpower Services Commission and someone undertaking work for the employer 
under a normal contractual arrangement. 
THE LEGAL LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS FOR TRAINEES 121 
The primary object of the work experience scheme was to enable her to 
obtain some work experience and she was undertaking to work and comply 
with instructions as a trainee and not as an employee. 
It was concluded that there was no contractual arrangement between the Manpower 
Services Commission (the agency organising the training arrangement) and NEss 
Daley. Were training schemes only to involve on-the-job or off-the-job training 
being provided (that was their primary purpose) then the reasoning adopted by the 
EAT would seem reasonable. However, welfare-to-work schemes and other training 
arrangements will seldom have as their primary purpose the training function and 
will often involve the trainee carrying out work on behalf of the employer. 'Me real 
purpose of the schemes from the perspective of the Employment Service is to 
provide the employer with the services of a subsidised worker in return for providing 
them with relevant work skills. 
All of the welfare-to-work schemes (except the University for Industry scheme 
that involves study for a specific qualification) have characteristics of a contract of 
employment. In practice, however, they tend to have mixed elements of employment 
and training contracts. This makes it difficult for the judiciary charged with deter- 
mining this issue to decide on the primary purpose of the work arrangement. 
A cynic might argue the real purpose of these schemes is to get the people 
concerned off the unemployment register" and an advertising slogan adopted for the 
New Deal by the Governznent supported this view 'as more sign up, fewer sign on. 
It is difficult to accept the argument in the Daley case that all training 
agreements, by definition, are not to be extended employee status. Under the Youth 
Training Scheme (the successor to the Youth Opportunities Scheme) it was deemed 
necessary specifically to exclude any contractual tie (unless the parties wanted it) by 
including the following phrase in the training agreements for the scheme: 'nothing 
in this agreement is intended to form the basis of any legal contract between you and 
anyone else. ' 
The legal nature of the Youth Training Scheme, a welfare to work scheme 
which was a forerunner to the New Deal and similar in many respects was 
summarised in Daley v. Allied Suppliers. " 
The Youth Training Scheme consisted, in legal terms, of the administrative 
framework for a series of interlocking contracts. The MSC offered to make 
contracts with managing agents who in turn could make contracts with 
employers or educational institutions for the provision of training. The 
young people who participated in the scheme entered into training arrange- 
ments with employers or other providers of training which could be but 
generally were not contracts of employment. " 
This description of the legal status of YTS trainees could equally be applied to New 
Deal trainees. The likelihood of these arrangements representing a contract C)f 
employment seems remote given this historical position. There are also strong policy 
reasons for the Government and the courts maintaining it, not least because 
employers may be unwilling to take on trainees where they are extended the sarne 
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rights as employees. These schemes will lead to enhancement of the Government's 
economic record through reduction in unemployment and in the long-term to an 
improvement in the skill profile of the workforce. There would be no advantage to 
them in providing trainees with the protection of employment rights although they 
have provided relevant trainees with some statutory rights since coming to power, 
e. g. working time. Where the status of the trainee is unmentioned it will be the 
responsibility of Employment Tribunals and the courts to decide what it is. As in 
Wiltshire Police Authority v. Wynn" where the Court of Appeal used the 'primary 
purpose' test to determine the contractual purpose of the parties and thereby 
ascertained the nature of the contractual relationship. Put at its simplest where the 
primary purpose of the contract is to provide employment it would be a contract of 
employment and where it is to provide training it would be a training contract. 
The distinction between the cases where teaching and learning are the 
primary purpose - and the cases where the work done is the primary 
purpose - is helpful in the present context. 32 
What the primary purpose of the employer is in participating in these training 
arrangements will depend on their precise nature although it is unlikely their 
involvement will be for altruistic reasons. In the case of trainees working under 
Government schemes; employers benefit from financial incentives to encourage their 
utilisation of the services of trainees and to retain their involvement in the process. 
They will also be in a position to closely observe the progress of the trainee over 
this period and decide whether they want to employ them. 33 It could be seen as an 
academic exercise to distinguish these types of contract., given that trainees accepted 
by the courts as working under a contract of employment may still be denied certain 
important statutory employment rights due to their lack of continuity of employ- 
ment. However denial of an appropriate status will ensure trainees are treated as 
second-class workers and denied the most basic of employment rights. 
Welfare-to-work programmes, tend to be restricted to people who have a 
prescribed period of unemployment34 and only operate for a limited period of six 
months or a year. 35 There is a similar pattern in work experience placements, where 
the period in employment represents a small but significant part of their overall 
programme of study. The employment rights that are dependent on a lengthy period 
of service with the same employer will not be available to them. Rights that are not 
dependant on continuity of service are inter alia: cases of automatic unfair dismissal, 
an action for wrongful dismissal., breach of contract cases (before an Employment 
Tribunal)36 where the breach has led to termination of the employment contract and 
actions under the equality statutes. 
37 
Liabilities for employers arising outside the contract 
(a) Liability under health and safety legislation 
Trainees and students on work placement are often the most vulnerable persons 
undertaking work in an organisation, as they tend to be young and inexperienced. 38 
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Even older trainees that are new to the workplace and through unemployment have 
been absent from employment for a considerable time are. entitled to special 
consideration. 39 
The Health and Safety (Training for Employment) Regulations SI 1990/1380 
states that, 'for the purpose of the relevant statutory provisions (e. g. the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974) a person provided with relevant training shall be treated as 
being the employee of the person whose undertaking ... is for the time being the 
immediate provider to that person of the training. ' While this does not extend 
application of protective health and safety legislation to all trainees it will include any 
working under a Government welfare-to-work scheme. Those not covered (by the 
employment provisions set out in section 2(2) of HASAWA 1974) may be given 
protection by Section 3(l) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, which 
provides 'employers must conduct their undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so 
far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in their employment who may be 
affected thereby are not exposed to risks to their health and safety. ' 
This extends a duty on an employer to care for the safety of persons not in their 
employment but working on their premises and trainees will often be classified as 
non-employees. 
In R v. Associated OcteP' the House of Lords had to decide whether a mainte- 
nance operation carried out by employees of an independent contractor on behalf O: f 
Octel could be regarded as part of the 'conduct of an employer's undertaking'. If it 
were then the main contractor Octel would be liable for breach of section 3 (1) of the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. The employer's argument was that for liability 
to exist the contractor must be in a position to control the actions of non-employees 
(as a constituent element of 'conducting their undertaking' as defined in section 3). 
This argument was rejected and Octel were criminally liable for breach of section 3 
by failing to take care for the safety of non-employees. It was accepted that the 
degree of control or lack of it could be considered in the context of ascertaining 
whether or not the employer had done what is reasonably practicable in the 
circumstances to avoid harm to non-employees. In the case of trainees working 
under a Government training scheme or a student undertaking a work experience 
placement it is likely that their employer will be responsible for their health and 
safety. 41 Employers may also be liable for the safety of non-employees in the 
workplace in their role as controller of premises While trainees and other marginal 
workers may take comfort from knowing their employer is under a legal duty to 
care for their safety, in practical terms employers and controllers of premises are 
unlikely to give due consideration to their safety needs. Even though the employer's 
failure in this respect could lead to criminal prosecution under section 3 or 4 of the 
Act. 
The Temporary Workers Directive (91/383/EEC) imposes a duty on Mernber 
States to provide the same health and safety protection to temporary workers that 
apply to full-time employees under other Directives, such as the Framework Direc- 
tive (89/391/EEC). It seems likely that the Temporary Workers Directive which 
inter alia, sets out to extend the category of person covered by other Directives to 
include temporary workers, will extend rights to certain categories of trainees. 
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'The Directive applies to employment relationships of a fixed duration and 
workers employed by an agency who work for another undertaking. On its face the 
Directive appears to be restricted to employees ... But it is possible that the Direc- 
tive has in mind categories of worker wider than those defined in UK as em- 
ployees. "' The practical effects are that employers would be obliged to include 
temporary workers in their risk assessment, " and any other specific duties provided 
by the Statute, including informing them of risks to their health (see regulation 10 
of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 SI No 3242) 
providing safety training and a safe working environment. 11 
Other Directives that have Article 138 of the EC Treaty as their legal baSiS45 are 
the Working Time Directive (93/104/EEC) and the Young Workers Directive 
(94/33/EEC)41 and these also apply to temporary workers such as trainees . 
47 These 
Directive are now part of UK law as a consequence of the Working Time Regula- 
tions 1998 (SI 1998/1833). Regulation 42 specifically states that relevant trainees 
will be treated as a worker for the purpose of the regulations. The criminal 
prosecution of the wrongdoer under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 or 
associated legislation might not provide much consolation to an employee that has 
suffered harm or loss because of a negligent employer. While the importance of 
criminal liability as an inducement to employers to take measures to avoid pros- 
ecution should not be underestimated the party suffering the harm will often want 
some financial compensation. 
(b) Liability in tort for failing to protect the health and safety of trainees 
Trainees suffering injury or harm as a consequence of the employer's failure to 
comply with health and safety standards will be obliged to sue them under the law 
of tort for negligence or for breach of a statutory duty (where this is permissible 
under the statute and appropriate) in order to obtain financial compensation. 
This latter type of action is a dffficult and uncertain prospect for trainees 
because of the standard of proof required and therefore will not be considered in the 
context of this article. The trainee can be awarded compensation as a result of 
successfully pursuing an action in tort for negligence against the employer. 
The benefit for trainees of pursuing a tort action for negligence is their legal 
claim is not dependent on establishing a contractual connection (contract of service) 
between the employer and themselves. In Lane v. Shire Roofing C048 the Court of 
Appeal stated that it might be appropriate for the courts, in pursuance of the public 
interest in these types of cases, to assume that a normal employment relationship 
exists. However, it was also stated that where health and safety issues are involved 
establishing a contractual connection is less important than establishing the degree 
of control exercised by the employer over the actions of the worker. Under the law 
of negligence it is enough that the organization owes a duty of care to the trainee to 
establish an enforceable legal duty. 
4" Given that the duty extends towards anyone 
who it could reasonably be anticipated would be affected by their actions, persons 
working or undertaking training 
in the premises of the employer will clearly fall 
within the scope of their 
legal duty. 
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Mie essential point ... is that all cases of negligence need the requisite level C)f 
proximity, i. e. a sufficient level of relationship. In cases of personal injury or damage 
to property this requirement will be satisfied by foreseeability. "o The standard 4: )f 
care must not fall below that of a reasonable person in the position of the defender. 
In the case of an employer the standard of care is that which could be expected 
of a reasonably competent employer in all the circumstances. Reference can be made 
to standards of behaviour in an industry and good management practice to help 
determine the appropriate level of action but this evidence is not conclusive. The 
expected standard of care is higher where the trainee is inter alia, young, disabled or 
new to employment. Provided the employer's action or inaction is a foreseeable 
cause of the harm suffered and there is a clear link between the negligent act and the 
harm suffered then the employer will be liable. 
Vicarious liability for the unlawful acts of trainees 
Where trainees are working on a temporary basis in the premises of the employer the 
employer may be legally responsible (vicariously liable) for harm caused to a third 
party by the trainee's negligence (including other workers). 
'Vicarious liability is of importance to third parties injured as a result Of the 
negligence of employees and to employees themselves whose employer has instituted 
and operates a safe system of work, but which, because of the negligence of another 
employee, is not followed. "' Where the person committing the negligent act is 
deemed to be an employee then provided their wrongful act is undertaken within the 
scope of their employment then the employer will be liable. This may aPPear 
straightforward to determine however examination of the case law will illustrate the 
difficulty in defining when something is done within the context of employment Or 
not. 52 This difficulty is exacerbated in cases where the contract is ill defined which 
is the case in most training contracts. 
Where the courts decide that a trainee is not an employee then the empl()Yer 
may still be vicariously liable in limited circumstances defined in the decision in 
Marshall v. William Sharp & Sons" in respect of independent contractors (who have 
a comparable status to trainees). Where employers exercise a high degree of control 
over the activities of contractors in the workplace they will be liable for the actioll.. 
Employers will tend to closely monitor and regulate the activities of trainees or 
students and because of this could be liable for their unlawful acts as they would fr 
unlawful actions of an independent contractor. They may also be liable where they 
instruct or authorise the trainee to undertake the act leading to an action in tort. 
(d) Equality rights for trainees 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal in Daley v. Allied Suppliers Ltd' decided that 
trainees on a Youth Opportunities Programme were not capable of falling within t][1, 
definition of employment under section 78 of the Race Relations Act. " Ho, Ve *, Ile r' 
this is unlikely to lead to trainees being denied all forms of protection under the 
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equality laws. Trainees who are working under training arrangements which primarily 
involve employment would be entitled to a degree of protection under equality 
legislation because they are capable of falling within the definition of 'employment' 
in the Acts. " 
All trainees irrespective of their status will have a right not to be discriminated 
against in access to non-employment training. 'Hence the Acts can be said to 
entrench the right to equal treatment not simply at the level of the employing 
organisation but more generally at the level of the labour market as a whole, by 
seeking to protect individuals at the point of access to training and to the membership 
rights and qualifications which are a prerequisite of professional development. "' 
They would certainly be able to establish a case against the placement agency for 
discrimination where they are denied a training place or their rights to training are 
diminished or terminated on the basis of sex or race discrimination. With respect to 
training provisions in the Acts, Governrnent training agencies are specifically cov- 
ered. " Where trainees are deemed to be working under a training contract they may 
have a right of action against the training provider for discrimination in respect of 
training under section 14 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (and 13 of the Race 
Relations Act 1996). Section 14 specifically identifies discrimination'on the following 
grounds based on sex as unlawful activities; in the terms on which access to training 
is provided, by refusing or deliberately omitting to afford access to training, by 
terminating their training or subjecting them to any other detriment during training. " 
Interestingly no parallel provision can be found in the Disability Discrimination Act 
1995. If the trainee is deemed to be an employee of the host employer, then 
discriminatory behaviour, such as denying employment opportunities, offering em- 
ployment on less favourable terms than others, limiting or refusing access to 
promotion., training3 transfer and other benefits or facilities and dismissing or 
subjecting to any other detriment, will be unlawful under the discrimination 
statutes. 60 
All the provisions in the statutes relating to training should be read in conjunc- 
tion with sections 47 and 48 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and sections 37 and 
38 of the Race Relations Act 1976, which provide for positive action in the provision 
of training places in areas of employment where women, men or ethnic minorities 
are poorly represented. 'There are two types of permissible positive action under the 
legislation, one designed to persuade more of the disadvantaged group to apply for 
the job in question., and the other to equip members of such groups with the skills 
to enable them to effectively compete for such jobS. '61 The reality is that most 
employers do not utilise the right to take positive action in terms of offering 
employment or providing training through fear of getting it wrong or an inability to 
understand the complex legal provisions. As it is a voluntary process which employers 
tend to shy away from it is unlikely that trainees would benefit from these provisions. 62 
(e) Protection for trainees against dismissal 
Where a trainee is treated as an employee they will be entitled to various statutory 
rights including the right not to be unfairly dismissed and redundancy rights. 
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However, if the trainee is deemed to be working under a training contract these 
rights will be extremely limited. " They will have no right to claim unfair or wrongful 
dismissal. " 
A recent change in the law will benefit trainees working under an employment 
contract for a fixed duration. Employers will no longer be able to include a clause 
in a fixed term contract requiring employees to waive their right to bring a claim for 
unfair dismissal. " A trainee that makes a protected disclosure about an employer 
and is dismissed because of it can bring an automatic unfair dismissal claim under 
the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 irrespective of their length of service because 
this right is not dependent on continuity of employment. 66 
The unfortunate truth is that these contracts are normally for a fixed term and 
it is anticipated that they should cease at a given time, e. g. in the case of a 
Government scheme, when the period of training finishes and the financial support 
is at an end. Under the definition of dismissal in section 95(l)(b) of the Employ- 
ment Rights Act 1996, an employee is dismissed 'where he is employed under a 
contract for a fixed term, and that term expires without being renewed under the 
same contract. ' 
Under the New Deal and similar Government schemes there is normally a fixed 
period of training, which is set well below the qualifying period of employment 0 Br 
unfair dismissal protection. In the case of students on a work placement, often their 
training will last for a maximum period of a year and thereafter it is anticipated they 
will return to their studies. 
The tribunal may consider if it would have been reasonable for the training 
provider to extend the contractual arrangement by continuing with it or offering 
suitable alternative training or employment. 6' Their ability to continue to afford tc) 
train or employ someone in the absence of financial support would be a consider- 
ation. It is questionable whether the issue of redundancy would arise, unless the 
employee can prove their situation falls within the statutory definition of redundancy 
as per section 139 of the ERA 1996. "' The financial compensation for redundancy 
for trainees with short periods of service would be so poor that there would be little 
point for them in bringing a claim. There may be the possibility of suing for a breach 
of contract under the Employment Tribunal's jurisdiction" or bringing a case for a 
unlawful deduction of wages under sections 13-14 of the Employment Rights Act 
1996., where the employer fails to give adequate notice of dismissal. Pursuing these 
actions would not be dependent on establishing continuity of employment. Similarly 
he could sue for wrongful dismissal on the basis of an employer's breach of contract 
leading to wrongful termination of his contract. 
The unfortunate conclusion is that the prospect for trainees securing employ- 
ment protection through enforcement of statutory employment rights is extremely 
poor. While trainees could claim automatic unfair dismissal in limited circumstances 
(e. g. National Nlinimum Wage Act 1998., Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998) in 
other contexts their rights might be restricted because rights to claim automatic 
unfair dismissal are intended to apply only to employees. This applies where a 
dismissal is on grounds of pregnancy or childbirth as per section 99 of the Employ- 
ment Rights Act 1996, " membership of a trade union or involvement in trade union 
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actives or non-membership or non-involvement as per section 152(l) of the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1996 or dismissal for carrying out 
health and safety fimctions as defined by section 108 of the Employment Rights Act 
1996. Because of the transient nature of their employment, trainees are unlikely to 
be involved in or be members of trade unions or have any responsibility for health 
and safety. 
Conclusion 
Increasingly the need to include trainees within the ambit of employment law is 
being recognised by Parliament prompted in part by the provision of rights for 
trainees in the legislation of the European Union. 'Me Working Time Regulations 
SI 1998 No 1833 71 in their definition of a worker include 'trainees that are engaged 
on work experience or training other than that on a course run by an educational 
institution or training establishment. ' Anyone undertaking training under a Govern- 
ment sponsored training scheme will benefit from restricted working hours, rest 
breaks and annual leave under the Regulations, but other trainees will not. Although 
the Government is striving to ensure that any new employment laws provide trainees 
under welfare- to -work schemes (relevant trainees) with employment rights, they 
exclude other forms of trainee that need equal protection, and in the process create 
an underclass that experience the worst of all worlds. 72 
It may be difficult to determine which category of trainee is to be treated as an 
employee although some guidance has been provided by the case law and the tests 
provided by the courts e. g. primary purpose test, multiple test. There is a pressing 
need for legislation to clarify the legal status of participants in training schemes and 
the scope of their legal rights. " 
Utilising the term 'worker' in legislation to define its coverage (in some UK and 
EU legislation) has resulted in trainees irrespective of their contractual status being 
provided with new employment rightS74 and this process looks set to continue. 75 It 
is questionable whether the process of European intervention in social legislation will 
have a far-reaching impact on the legal position of trainees. 
With respect to the general issue of introducing measures to counteract unem- 
ployment, the European Union is determined to leave Member States to deal with 
this issue. 
According to the EU, the ball really lies in the court of the Member States. 
The European Union confines itself to mapping out guidelines to be 
implemented at national level, giving itself the role of Eurowatcher. 76 
A Council Decision (of 6.12.94,94/819/EC) set out an action programme for the 
implementation of a European Community vocational training policy. While 
schemes such as New Deal will fall within the scope of activities recommended by 
the programme, it is clearly anticipated that the participants in such a scheme should 
be treated as employees rather than trainees although this is never directly stated. 77 
Where the law of the European Union does impact directly on the rights of 
trainees is the requirement that availability of rights under social legislation should 
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extend to workers and specific rights extended to workers under the banner of health 
and safety. 
However, it is ultimately the member states that will decide the nature of the 
arrangements for vocational training and the employment status of the trainees 
involved. 
The ... capacity 
in which states are involved in vocational training is that of 
regulation of employer's training arrangements, that is the arrangements 
which employers make for providing or allowing for vocational training for 
employees, which they may do by way of apprenticeships or training 
contracts ... When operating 
in that capacity, states are faced with ques- 
tions of what employment rights trainees should have against employers, 
and also with questions of what employment rights in respect of training 
employees should have against employers. " 
Although it might be argued that trainees are in no worse position than temporary 
employees or employees working under short fixed-term contracts, there may be a 
difference in the degree of exploitation this category of worker experiences. ý111, 
following quote from a critical analysis of the Youth Training Scheme summarises 
the problem. 
Flexible employment is a general term for several tendencies which re- 
spond in differing ways to cyclical economic influences and its precise 
meaning and extent are a matter of some dispute. Especially contentious is 
how far flexibility is associated with exploitative and uncongenial work 
situations. 79 
Legislation to remove the uncertainty in this area of law could define the nature and 
scope of legal protection available to trainees in a similar way to the rights C)f 
part-time workers under the Employment Protection (Part-time Employees) Regu- 
lations SI 1995 No 31. 
A simpler means of ensuring that trainees are provided with basic employrnellt 
rights is to alter the status of trainees, where appropriate, to that of employees e. g. 
where the training arrangement involves a significant element of work for the 
employer. " 
Despite the commitment of the Government to the creation of a training 
culture and the encouragement of widespread training" as part of their plans '0 fr 
economic prosperity it is not in their interests or that of employers or training 
providers to alter the status quo and legislative intervention in the short-terrn is 
unlikely. 
'Me European Union is unlikely to pressurise the Government to change the 
law because their watching brief does not allow for direct intervention, although they 
can provide rights in their social legislation and in particular legislation to protect the 
health and safety of worker's. The European Court of Justice can also exert thir 
influence through judicial interpretation of legal rules that impact on employraellt 
law. This can be seen in a case involving the freedom of movement of workers. 
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In Law7ie-Blum v. Land Baden Wurtremburg" it was made clear that the term 
'worker' (as developed by several judgements of the ECJ) for the purposes of 
determining free movement of workers under the Treaty (as per Articles 39-42) 
should be defined by the European Union and not Member States. In the opinion 
of the court the term worker is broader than an employee. It necessarily involves 
someone in an employment relationship undertaking an economic activity. 
The essential feature of an employment relationship ... is that for a certain 
period of time a person performs work for and under the direction of 
another person in return for which he/she receives remuneration. 
This definition of a worker would certainly cover trainees in training arrangements 
where they undertake a significant amount of work for the employer in return for 
payment. 
Apart from trainees working under Government-sponsored training schemes 
there are other situations where training over a significant period of time is carried 
out by an employer such as where training is provided to prepare someone for 
employment, or where training is as an experiential element of an educational 
programme. 
It is important that trainees in this position do not continue to be excluded from 
the current protection extended to workers (relevant trainees) and they are not 
alienated from any process of reform. 
Despite the strength of the argument for reform, legal practitioners and the 
judiciary must be prepared to apply this complicated and uncertain law for the 
foreseeable future. 
The flexibility and casualness of the current work arrangements and the 
financial incentives attached will continue to attract employers. They are unlikely to 
willingly accept any change in the status of trainees or the additional obligations 
which accompany such a change. Their response might be to refuse to offer 
traineeships or reduce the number they currently offer. 
This article proceeds on the basis that legal acknowledgement that certain 
trainees should be deemed to work under a contract of service would be a welcome 
development It is hoped it will also contribute to the legal and political debate and 
help achieve enhanced rights for trainees and a clarification of the law. 
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Abstract Courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom and the United 
States are increasingly taxed with the problem of deciding if an em- 
ployer should be vicariously liable under statute for the discriminatory 
acts of their employees or third parties. This issue is particularly rele- 
vant in harassment cases where sexual or racial harassment of em- 
ployees can be perpetrated by anyone coming in contact with them 
inside and outside the workplace. Reference to and interpretation of 
relevant common law rules in both jurisdictions traditionally deter- 
mined the question of whether or not an employer is vicariously liable 
under 
the statutory rules. 
However, recently the judiciary in the UK has recognized that this 
approach was incorrect and inappropriate because of differences in the 
wording applicable to common law and statutory claims and the effect 
of the traditional approach in unreasonably restricting liability of an 
employer for a narrow range of employees and discriminatory behav- 
iour. We believe they have arrived at a modern and correct solution, 
namely that the statutory wording of the definition of vicarious liability 
should be interpreted in a manner consistent with common and every- 
day usage. This has meant increased recognition of an employer's duty 
to prevent discrimination and vicarious liability for the discriminatory 
acts (including harassment) of co-workers and third parties. This 
change in the law combined with the increasing impact of the law of the 
European Community (on the vicarious liability of employers for harass- 
ment) has led to a more liberal approach to this issue being adopted in 
the United Kingdom than in the United States. 
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1. Introduction 
Under the equality laws of the United Kingdom employers can be 
vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of supervisors, col- 
leagues, and even third parties. They can also be vicariously liable 
for discriminatory acts of employees perpetrated against other 
employees inside and outside of the workplace. Dramatic changes in 
the judicial interpretation of equality rules in the United Kingdom by 
the judiciary have led to an expansion of the circumstances where 
employers can be held liable for their employees' acts and the acts of 
others, particularly where they involve sexual or racial harassment. ' 
This has arisen because of a recent willingness on the part of the 
judiciary, in applying the statutory rules, to depart from reliance on 
common law rules. As a result they are free to ignore the restrictions 
inherent in the vicarious liability rules under the law of tort. 
Although the original discrimination law in the UK2 and decisions 
in early discrimination caseS3 were inspired by employment law in the 
United States, its influence has gradually declined as tribunals and 
courts have become more familiar with legal principles underlying 
discrimination law and the influence of the law of the European Com- 
munity has become more pervasive. " As a result of this there are now 
important differences in the discrimination and harassment laws in 
the United States and the United Kingdom and it seems an appro- 
priate juncture to carry out a comparative analysis of the current state 
of the law in the UK and the United States in these areas. 
As will become apparent, there have also been important develop- 
ments in the legal treatment of vicarious liability in discrimination 
cases in the United States but the law is less settled than in the UK, 
particularly as it relates to sexual harassment law. 
Although these Vegal decisions] have led to clarification of certain fun- 
damental issues there are still uncertainties. The controversy concerning 
employer liability standards for sexual harassment continues to spawn 
academic debate. 5 
The differences in approach to this narrow but nonetheless important 
area of law will be the subject of this article. 
1 See Jones v Tower Boot Co [19971 IRLR 168, CA and Burton v De Vere Hotels 
[19961 IRLR 156, EAT. For a discussion of the cases see S. Middlemiss and R. 
Mays, 'The Common Law and Statutory Concepts of Vicarious Liability: The 
Parting of the Ways' 1997 SLT 12,95-7. 
2 Indirect discrimination in the sex and race discrimination legislation was 
borrowed directly from the disparate impact theory as put forward by the US 
Supreme Court in the race discrimination case of Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 US 
424(1971). 
3 For example Hurley v Mustoe [19811 ICR 490 and Schmidt v Austicks Bookshops 
Ltd 119781 ICR 85. 
4 Article 137 of the Treaty of Rome 1957; Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 EEC; the 
European Commission's Recommendation and annexed code of practice 
protecting the dignity of women and men at work 92/131/EEC. 
5 M. Vinciguerra, 'I"he Aftermath of Meritoi% A Search for Standards in the Law of 
Sexual Harassment' (Notes) (1988-89) 98 Yale Law Journal 1717 at 1721. 
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Traditionally the judiciary in the United States has adopted a more 
enlightened approach to discrimination and harassment law than its 
counterparts in the UK, ' supported by more wide-ranging and liberal 
statutory rules. ' This has extended to the rules for determining the 
vicarious liability of employers for the discriminatory acts of their 
employees. Resolution of this issue hinges on whether or not the 
discriminatory act complained of was perpetrated within the scope or 
context of the harasser's employment. 'The issue of a servant's scope 
of employment is crucial in sexual harassment cases. 18 
What follows is a comparison of the law of the United States with 
the law in the United Kingdom to determine the similarities and dif- 
ferences in the legal rules applicable to determining the vicarious 
liability of employers for harassment. Analysis will be undertaken of 
the process whereby the UK courts have departed from the prevailing 
ideology in the US and arrived at a fairer and more liberal application 
of the law in this area. It will involve detailed analysis of the legal rules 
in each jurisdiction. 
11. Sexual Harassment Law in the United Kingdom 
Before carrying out a detailed analysis of vicarious liability it is useful 
to outline the general law of sexual harassment in the United King- 
dom. The legislation makes it unlawful for a person to discriminate 
against that employee by dismissing him, or subjecting him to any 
other detriment. 9 
The first case to provide protection for sexual harassment by a 
ruling that harassment was a detriment for the purposes of the Act 
was Strathclyde Regional Council v Porcelli. 11 In this case Mrs P was 
subjected to a campaign of harassment and bullying by two male 
colleagues to get her to leave her job. As a consequence she was 
forced to apply for a transfer and she brought a claim against her 
employer for sex discrimination. The court decided that sexual 
harassment with or without any corresponding threat for non- 
compliance with sexual demands was unlawful under the Sex Dis- 
crimination Act 1975. 
In the case of De Souza v Automobile Association" the Court of 
Appeal accepted that an employer could be liable for racial or sexual 
6 The law on sexual harassment covers aspects of discrimination such as sexual 
favouritism not covered in the UK and has more developed rules on grooming 
codes etc. 
7 In the United States there was protection against various forms of discrimination 
much earlier than in the UK, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 which 
covered a broader range of discriminatory behaviour, e. g. religious 
discrimination. 
8 K. S. Anderson, 'Employer Uability Under Title VII for Sexual Harassment After 
Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson'(1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 1258 at 1273. 
9 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s. 6(2) and Race Relations Act 1976, S. 4(2). 
10 [19861 IRLR 134. 
11 [19861 ICR 514. 
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harassment the effect of which was only to create a hostile or un- 
welcome working environment for the victim. In Bracebridge Engi- 
neering Ltd v Darby12 a single act in the form of physical assault by a 
supervisor was treated as unlawful discrimination as was a single 
comment made to a female employee at a management meeting in 
Insitu Cleaning Co Ltd v Heads. 13 Many more significant harassment 
cases will be considered later in this article. However, it is important 
to emphasize the persuasive impact on tribunals and courts of the 
European Commission Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment. Al- 
though the Code is not legally binding in the UK, the harassment of an 
employee is contrary to its provisions. 14 The Code sets out a definition 
of sexual harassment that has been adopted as the appropriate legal 
standard against which cases are judged in domestic tribunals and 
courts. 
Sexual harassment means unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or other 
conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of men and women at work. 
This can include unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct. 
This definition highlights the importance of determining the impact of 
the behaviour on the individual victim and underlines the diverse 
nature of harassment at work. 
The Code of Practice was issued under the auspices of a Commission 
Recommendation on the protection of women and men at work, with 
the purpose of giving practical guidance to employers ... [This states] that sexual harassment may be unlawful as a breach of the Equal Treat- 
ment Directive ... 11 
The EEC passed the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207) in 1976 and 
called on member nations to enact laws and regulations which guar- 
anteed the equal treatment of women and men at work. " 
The nature of sexual harassment was recently summarized by the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) in the case of (1) Reed and (2) Bull 
Information Services Ltd v Stedman: 17 
The essential characteristics of sexual harassment is that it is words or 
conduct which are unwelcome to the recipient and it is for the recipient 
themselves to decide what is acceptable to them and what they regard 
as offensive. A characteristic of sexual harassment is that it undermines 
the victim's dignity at work. It creates an offensive or hostile environ- 
ment for the victim and an arbitrary barrier to sexual equality in the 
workplace. 
12 119901 IRLR 3, EAT. 
13 [19951 IRLR 4, EAT. 
14 European Commission Recommendation and Code of Practice on the Protection 
of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work, 92/131/EEC, OJ 1992 L49/1- 
15 L Clarke, Discrimination, Ist edn (Institute of Personnel Management: London, 
1994) at 31-2. 
16 T. P. Lester, 'The EEC Code of Conduct on Sexual Harassment: Part 1'(1993) 143, 
No. 6621 New Law Journal 1473-4. 
17 [19991 IRLR 299. 
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i. The Scope of the Vicarious Liability of Employers in the 
United I(ingdorn 
Analysis of the rules relating to employers' vicarious liability in the UK 
for the discriminatory acts of employees and the defences available to 
employers will follow. The rules relating to vicarious liability can be 
found in section 41 of the Sex Discrimination Act (SDA) 1975 and 
section 32 of the Race Relations Act (RRA) 1976 . 
18 
Until recently it was necessary for the applicant in a sexual or racial 
harassment case trying to establish that an employer was vicariously 
liable under discrimination legislation to prove that the harasser was 
perpetrating his act while acting 'in the course of his or her employ- 
ment', in line with judicial interpretation under the common law. Al- 
though equality statutes use different wording-'anything done by a 
person in the course of his employment shall be treated for the pur- 
poses of this act as done by his employer as well as by him, whether 
or not it was done with the employer's knowledge or approval""- 
tribunals and courts chose to interpret the meaning of the statute by 
reference to the common law rules under the law of tort: 
It has long been established law that an employer is vicariously liable for 
the wrongful or negligent acts of his employee committed within the 
general course of his employment. " 
ii. Liability of Employer through Application of' 
Common Law Rules 
Application of the common law rules in determining vicarious liability 
can be seen in the racial discrimination case of Irving and Irving v The 
Post Office . 
21 This case involved Mr Edwards, a postman who lived 
next door to the Irvings who were Jamaican. Edwards, while working 
in the sorting office, wrote on an envelope addressed to his neigh- 
bours, 'Go back to Jamaica Sambo'and added a smiling face. When it 
was discovered that Edwards was the culprit, the Irvings brought 
proceedings against the Post Office under section 32 of the RRA 
1976. 
The Court of Appeal decided that the Post Office was not liable for 
the postman's actions for the reasons given below- 
It is clear that the master is responsible for acts actually authorised by 
him ... 
but a master ... is liable even for the acts which he has not 
authorised, provided they are so connected with acts which he has 
authorised that they might rightly be regarded as modes-although 
improper modes-of doing them. In other words a master is responsible 
18 Also see the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, s. 58 which is identical. 
19 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s. 41, s. 32 RRA 1976. 
20 W. A. Wilson er a)., Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland, 10th edn (W. 
Green/Sweet & Maxwell: Edinburgh, 1995) at 540, para. 33.6. 
21 [19871 IRLB 289. 
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not merely for what he authorises his servant to do, but also for the way 
in which he does it ... 
22 
To determine whether the Post Office was vicariously liable, the court 
had to decide whether the racist act of Edwards was a mode of doing 
his job that had been authorized by his employer. Edwards was au- 
thorized to write on letters for ensuring they were properly des- 
patched but for no other reason. 
The court decided that his act was 'not the performance of any duty 
for which he was employed. His employment provided the opportu- 
nity for his misconduct, but the misconduct formed no part of the 
P23 performance of his duties ... 
Edwards was not acting in the course 
of his employment and his employer was not vicariously liable for his 
actions. The court in applying common law principles did not con- 
sider that a different standard might be appropriate under the RRA 
1976: 
The Irving decision confirmed that the same test for vicarious liability 
applies in the context of the RRA and the SDA, as in the general area of 
tort law, and this decision has been accepted and applied ever since. 21 
iii. New Approach to Vicarious Liability 
Judicial interpretation of the words, in equality statutes, 'anything 
done in the course of his employment 125 changed following the land- 
26 mark decision of Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd. In the Tower Boot case 
a 16-year-old male employee of mixed ethnic parentage was phys- 
ically and verbally abused and buUied by fellow employees because of 
his race. This consisted of burning his arms with a hot screwdriver, 
throwing metal bolts at his head, whipping his legs with a rubber welt 
and calling him racially insulting names. He brought a complaint of 
racial discrimination against his employer on the basis of vicarious 
liability for these actions under the RRA 1976. 
The EAT at the first stage of appeal held that the employer was not 
vicariously liable. 
The majority view was that the phrase'in the course of employment'has 
(and had at the time the draughtsmen penned s. 32) a well-established 
meaning in law and they could see no reason not to adopt that meaning 
in the present context ... since it had been adopted by other decisions of the tribunal and by the Court of Appeal in the IMng case. . . 27 
The EAT was of the opinion that, 'by any stretch of the imagination ... the acts complained of by Mr Jones ... could not be described as an improper mode of performing authorised tasks'. 18 
22 Canadian Pacific Railway v Lockhart 119421 AC 591 at 599. 
23 [19871 lRLR 289. 
24 L. Buckley, 'Vicarious Liability and Employment Discrimination' (1997) 26(2) 
Industrial LawJoumal 158 at 159, 
25 For example, RRA 1976, s. 32(l). 
26 [19971 ICR 254. 
27 [19951 IRLR 529 at 539. 
28 Ibid. at 530. 
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The outcome of this decision was clearly unfair and unjust but in 
terms of application of the common law rules it was correctly decided. 
It seemed that the more outrageous and harmful the behaviour of the 
employee the less likely the employer would be liable even if it had 
harmed another of their employees. 'In conventional tort law, there is 
a sliding scale: the more serious the act of the employee, the less likely 
it will be attributable to the employer. "' 
The Court of Appeal went on to reverse the EAT's decision30 and 
McCowan U concluded that, 'Irving does not decide that "in the 
course of his employment" in section 320) incorporates the common 
law concept of vicarious liability and we are not accordingly bound so 
to hold. 131 
The Court of Appeal went on to consider the interpretation that 
should be given to the phrase 'in the course of employment' in dis- 
crimination cases and concluded that, 'tribunals are free and are in- 
deed bound, to interpret the ordinarily, and readily understandable, 
words, "in the course of his employment" in the sense in which every 
layman would understand them' . 
32 
Waite LJ was of the opinion that, 'it would be particularly wrong to 
allow racial harassment on the scale that it was suffered ... to slip 
through the net of employer responsibility by applying to it a common 
law principle -.. 
To do so would seriously undermine the statutory 
scheme of the discrimination Acts and flout the purposes which they 
were passed to achieve. 133 
Following Tower Boot the definition of an employer's responsibility 
under section 320) of the RRA 1976, section 41(l) of the SDA 1975 and 
section 58(l) of the DDA 1995 is now considerably wider than pre- 
viously thought as the phrase 'in the course of employment' is to be 
broadly interpreted. The fact that the discriminatory acts took place in 
the workplace, were undertaken while both bully and victim were 
supposed to be working and under the direct supervision and control 
of the employer would all be relevant factors pointing to vicarious 
liability. 
Although the Tower Boot ruling has increased the circumstances in 
which an employer will be vicariously liable for employees' discrim- 
inatory acts there are still problems associated with determining 
when an employee is acting in the course of his employment. Waite Li 
in his conclusion in Tower Boot stated that, Mie application of the 
phrase will be a question of fact for each industrial tribunal to resolve, 
29 Equal Opportunities Review, Law Reports, 'Employer not liable for Racial 
Harassment' (1995) No. 64 (November/December, 1995) 37 at 39. 
30 Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd (1997) ICR 254. 
31 Ibid. at 259. 
32 Ibid. at 265. 
33 Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd 119971 ICR 254 at 265. 
260 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS 
in the light of circumstances presented to it. '34 He usefully gave exam- 
ples of the kinds of factors to be considered, such as whether or not 
the employee is within or outwith the workplace, in or out of uniform 
and in or out of rest-breaks when the incident occurred. 35 
Problems associated with defining the scope of the term 'in the 
course of employment' since Tower Boot were highlighted in ST v 
North Yorkshire County CounCil. 36 The Court of Appeal held that an 
employer was not vicariously liable for the indecent assault of a pupil 
on a school trip by the deputy headmaster of a special school. His act 
'could not be regarded as a mode, albeit an improper and un- 
authorised mode, of doing what the deputy headmaster was em- 
137 ployed to do .... In Waters v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, " the Court of 
Appeal reached a similar conclusion. A policewoman complained that 
a fellow male officer had sexually assaulted her when both were off 
duty at the police section house where she stayed. The policewoman 
brought proceedings against the Commissioner of Police on the basis 
of inter alia vicarious liability for the assault under the SDA, section 
41(l). The Court of Appeal held that the assault had not been corn- 
mitted by the officer in the course of his employment. Waite U stated 
that the circumstances of the assault 'placed him and her in no differ- 
ent position from that which would have applied if they had been 
social acquaintances only, with no working connection at all . 
39 
The court discussed the decision in Tower Boot. However, Waite U 
decided it was inconceivable in the circumstances that any tribunal 
applying the reasoning used in Tower Boot could find that the alleged 
assault was committed in the course of the male officerps 
employment. 40 
Because the act was held to be outwith the course of the officer's 
employment the policewoman was also unsuccessful in establishing a 
separate claim of discrimination by way of victimization pursuant to 
the SDA, section 4(l)(d). She had complained that due to her earlier 
allegation of assault she was removed from a list of specialist officers 
and subject to detriment in other ways that represented victimization. 
Her employer was not vicariously liable for the assault as he had not 
contravened the SDA and consequently the policewoman failed to 
establish that victimization (based on an action brought before a tri- 
bunal for sex discrimination) had taken place. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 [19991 IRLR 98. 
37 Ibid at 98. 
38 119971 ICR 1073. 
39 Ibid. at 1095. 
40 Ibid. at 1095-6. 
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It is vital that discrimination, including victimisation, should be defined 
in language sufficiently precise to enable people to know where they 
stand before the law. 41 
The law in this instance was given a strict interpretation that frus- 
trated protection of the law being provided to a genuine victim of 
discrimination. If an applicant fails to establish the employer's vicari- 
ous liability under section 41, they will also be unsuccessful in a claim 
against the employer for victimization under section 4(1)(d) of the 
SDA. 42 
In her appeal to the House of LordS43 Ms Waters brought a claim 
for negligence against her employer and an action for breach of con- 
tract because of the bullying and harassment she had experienced 
following her complaint about a fellow officer. 
Lord Slynn, in the House of Lords summarized the case as: 
one of negligence-the employer failed to exercise due care to look after 
his employee. Generically many of the acts alleged can be seen as a form 
of bullying-the employer, or those to whom he delegated responsibility 
for running his organisation, should have taken steps to stop it, to 
protect the employee from it. 
The House of Lords decided that failure of an employer to take steps 
to prevent bullying or harassment, or where they are aware of it 
happening and failed to bring about its cessation, is a breach of duty 
of care. it was decided that a claim for negligence against her em- 
ployer could proceed to trial. This decision represents judicial recog- 
nition at the highest level that bullying or harassment is a ground for 
an action in tort and breach of contract. 
In Stubbs v Chief Constable Lincolnshire Police and others, 44 a 
policewoman was sexually harassed on a number of occasions by 
a male officer in public houses after work. The employment tribunal 
held that the incidents were in the course of employment, and so the 
Chief Constable was vicariously liable. The tribunal took the view 
that: 
the pub incidents were connected to the work and the workplace. They 
would not have happened but for the applicant's work. Work related 
social functions are an extension of employment and they could see no 
reason to restrict the course of employment to purely what goes on in 
the workplace. 45 
41 Ibid. at 1097. 
42 C. Bourn and J. Whitmore, Anti-Discrimination Law in Britain, 3rd edn (Sweet & 
Maxwell: London, 1996) 167. 
43 Waters v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] IRLR 720, HL 
44 9 September 1997, Case No. 38395/96 0998) EOR Discrimination Case Law 
Digest, at 11). See S. Middlemiss, 'Tower Boot Revisited: The Impact Continues' 
(1998) 66(4) Scottish Law Gazeffe 180-1. The EAT upheld the tribunal decision 
(reported in (1999) IRLR 81). 
45 EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest, n. 44 above at 12. 
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This conclusion was affirmed by the EAT46 which stated that the initial 
tribunal 'were in the best possible position to judge whether, despite 
the fact that the first incident occurred *in a pub" it was nonetheless to 
be regarded as part of the employment relationshi pl. 47 This decision 
clearly contradicts the view of Waite U in Tower Boot that an em- 
ployer cannot be liable for behaviour perpetrated outwith the con- 
fines of the working relationship. 
In UP and GS vN and RJ1 a further issue was raised with regard to 
the phrase 'acting in the course of employment'. In this case, the 
tribunal upheld a submission that the EC Equal Treatment Directive 
and the subsequent European Commission Code of Practice on 
Sexual Harassment make no mention of an employer being able to 
avoid his obligation by claiming that in perpetrating the act his em- 
ployee was not acting in the course of employment. The tribunal 
decided that section 41 of the SDA was incompatible with the Direc- 
tive and so the defence was not open to the first respondents. Al- 
though the decision in this case did not establish a binding precedent 
because it only entailed the decision of an employment tribunal, it did 
raise an important issue that may be considered by courts in the 
future. Whether or not the wording of the SDA and the RRA in this 
respect are contrary to European Community law will ultimately be a 
matter for the European Court of Justice to determine. In the process 
it could consider whether courts need some yardstick to determine 
when the behaviour is employment related or not. 
TTie interpretation of the term 'in the course of employment' has 
considerably changed since the introduction of the SDA and the RRA. 
The strict application of common law rules to determine liability fol- 
lowing Irving meant that employers were avoiding liability in cases 
where the harasser was a supervisor (working environment cases) 
and in most cases of co-worker harassment. However, the Tower Boot 
decision means that an employer is no longer able to avoid liability 
merely because the conduct of the harasser does not directly relate to 
the duties under their contract. 
The Stubbs decision has resulted in employers being potentially 
liable for the actions of employees outside the workplace. They may 
also be liable where third parties are the harasser and actually or 
potentially are under the control of the employer-19 In a Canadian case 
Janzen v Platy Enterprises Ltd" it was decided that'... "work-related' 
was defined broadly to include anyone whose opportunity to harass 
was directly related to his or her employment'. " 
46 [19991 IRLR 81. 
47 Ibid. at 85. 
48 (19991 IRLR 81. 
49 See Burton and Rhule v De Vere Hotels Ltd 119971 ICR 1. 
50 [198911 SCR 1252. 
51 For an analysis of this case see S. Fredman, Women and the Law (Clarendon 
Press: Oxford, 1997) 326. 
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Where a serious assault is committed in the employment context (as 
in Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v Darby5l and the Waters case) the 
harasser could be prosecuted under the criminal law. 'Where an em- 
ployee is the victim of physical manhandling by the harasser, this 
could constitute the basis of an action for assault. The development of 
sexual harassment as a wrong in itself, giving rise to civil, and where 
appropriate criminal liability, may serve to turn the spotlight on the 
, 53 perpetrators. 
Where the employer potentially has legal responsibility for the ac- 
tions of a harasser, he may have the defence that he did all that was 
reasonably practical in the circumstances to prevent this occurring. 
In proceedings brought under this Act against any person in respect of 
an act alleged to have been done by an employee of his it shall be a 
defence for that person to prove that he took such steps as were reason- 
ably practicable to prevent the employee from doing that act, or from 
doing in the course of his employment acts of that description. 54 
Once it has been shown that an employee has been the victim of 
harassment and that it was perpetrated by the harasser in the course 
of their employment, then it is up to the employer to show he has 
taken action to prevent the discriminatory behaviour. 
iv. Employer-s Defence that He Took Reasonably Pr-actical Steps to 
Prevent the Discriminatory Acts 
'The burden of proof is on the employer to show that he has taken 
151 such steps. Over the years since the enactment of the legislation 
tribunals have developed the standard of behaviour required for 
proof of the defence. Both the Equal Opportunities Commission 
(EOQ and Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) have recommended 
in codes of practice that employers adopt equal opportunities poli- 
cieS56 and in early harassment cases tribunals were satisfied that the 
mere existence of a policy was sufficient to meet the requirements of 
section 41(3) of the SDA. 
In Balgobin and Francis v London Borough of Tower Hamlets5l two 
females were employed as cleaners in the canteen area in a hostel. Mr 
Clarke was appointed as a cook and he harassed both employees. In 
October 1985 they complained to management and Mr Clarke was 
52 [19901 IRLR 3, EAT. 
53 1 Dine and B. Watt, 'Sexual Harassment: Moving Away from Discrimination' 
(1995) 58(3) Modem Law Review 343-63 at 363. 
54 SDA 1975, s. 41(3) and RRA 1976, s. 32(3). 
55 J. Hemming, Discrimination in the Workplace: A Practical Guide (John Wiley & 
Sons: Chichester, 1997) 170. 
56 Equal opportunities Commission, Code Of Practice. Equal Opportunities Policies, 
Procedures and Practices in Employment (HMSO: London, 1985) 6 and 
Commission for Racial Equality, Code of Practice hor the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity in Employment 
(HMSO: London, 1994) 6. 
57 119871 IRLR 401. 
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suspended; however, as the employees could not prove the harass- 
ment, Mr Clarke was allowed to continue to work in the canteen. The 
women complained to an industrial tribunal. However, the tribunal 
was: 
... satisfied that no one in authority knew what was going on prior to 
24 
October 1985. Prior to that time, the respondents were running the 
hostel with proper and adequate supervision insofar as the staff was 
concerned. They had made known their policy of equal opportunities. 
We do not think that there were any other practicable steps which they 
could have taken to foresee or prevent the acts complained of. 58 
The EAT upheld the tribunal's decision stating that it was very 
difficult to see what steps in practical terms the employers could 
reasonably have taken to prevent that which occurred from 
occurring'. 5" 
The decision in Balgobin was controversial for a number of rea- 
sons. First, the employer's contention that no one knew what was 
happening before October is not a valid defence under equality legis- 
lation. The Acts provide that discrimination shall be treated as done 
by an employer, whether or not it was done with the employer's 
knowledge or approval. 60 Therefore, the opinion of the EAT'seems to 
conflict with the express wording of s. 410) which says that "the 
employer's knowledge or approval* is irrelevant'. " The employer's 
lack of knowledge of Mr Clarke's actions and the employees' distress 
was more likely due to improper and inadequate supervision . 
62 Sec- 
ondly, the decision in Balgobin has been criticized because it 'would 
indicate that the requirements to establish a defence under s. 41(3) are 
not very rigorous'. 31 The minority view in Balgobin was that the em- 
ployers had not provided a satisfactory defence under the 1975 Act. 64 
Proof of the defence did 'not extend to requiring an explanation or 
guidance on the policy's application ... or ensur[ing] supervision was in place to guarantee that the policy ... was enforced 
P. 65 
Because of criticism of this decision employment tribunals have 
adopted a more robust approach to the requirements for this defence, 
'. .. 
Industrial tribunals have been rather more demanding ... merely 
adopting an equal opportunities policy, and doing nothing more, is 
notenough ... 0.66 ojt is more likely now with the added 
impact of the 
EC Code on the Protection of the Dignity of Women at Work, that 
58 Ibid. at 402. 
59 ]bid. at 403. 
60 See SDA 1975, s. 41(l). 
61 Income Data Services, 'Bullying and Harassment at Work' (1996) 76 IDS 
Employment Law Supplement (10 May) para. 76.3-4. 
62 119871 IRLR 401 at 402. 
63 H. Houghton-James, Sexual Harassment (Cavendish Publishing Ltd: London, 1995) 
140. 
64 (19871 IRLB 401 at 403. 
65 Houghton-James, above n. 63 at 139. 
66 S. Cox, 'Employer Liability for Employees' Discriminatory Acts' (1990) 33 Equal 
Opportunities Review 19-24 at 23. 
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were the circumstances of this particular case to be repeated the 
minority view would prevail. 67 
This EC Code recommends that for the defence, not only should 
there be a policy, ' but it should be communicated effectively to all 
employees19 and there should be provision for training of mana- 
gers and supervisors. 70 These steps are also recommended in the 
71 EOC71 and CRE Codes of Practice. Counsel for the claimant in Bal- 
gobin had averred that, 'there was no evidence given at the tribunal 
that any of the employees were given any instruction or guidance as 
to the policy's operation'. " Employment tribunals dealing with sexual 
or racial harassment currently'have a well-developed awareness that 
they must take into account the recommendations of the statutory 
Codes of Practice issued by the CRE and the EOC ... whenever they 
consider them relevant to the issues before them ... in addition [to] 
... a duty to take 
into account the content of the [EC Code] 1.74 
Tribunals now accept that, 'an employer should either show that he 
has complied with the Code of Practice in adopting, implementing 
and monitoring an equal opportunities policy or that there is a good 
reason for not doing S01.71 
As detailed above, by following the recommendations in the EC 
Code, an employer must show that he has effectively communicated 
the policy to all employees. Where this duty is neglected, the employer 
may be held liable, as in the case of Taylor v Adlam, Adlam and 
Hanley. 76 Here a charge nurse of African origin complained of racist 
comments made to him by the director of nursing but no action was 
taken. The tribunal held that, 'although the employer had a 'perfectly 
satisfactory equal opportunities policy" it was not enough ... and that 
there was no evidence that this ... policy was pointed out to the 
director on his appointment'. 77 
In addition, the EC Code recommends that managers and super- 
visors and those playing an official role in any formal complaints 
procedure receive training for dealing with any problems. Training on 
the organization's harassment policy and procedures for dealing with 
harassment (where they exist) should also form part of appropriate 
67 Bourn and Whitmore. above n. 42 at 168. 
68 European Commission Recommendation and Code of Practice on the Protection 
of the Dignity of Women and Men at Work, 92/131/EEC, OJ 1992 L49/5,5(A)(ii). 
69 ]bid. 
70 [bid. at 5(A)(iv). 
71 Equal Opportunities Commission. above n. 56 at 6 and 14. 
72 Commission for Racial Equality, above n. 56 at 6,11 and 12. 
73 119871 IRLR 401 at 402. 
74 S. Cox, Ilie Buck Stops Here: Employer Liability for Discrimination' (1998) 82 
Equal Opportunities Review 18-24 at 21. 
75 Johnson v ABC Employment Agency and Whitworths Ltd, 21 June 1990, Case Nos. 
19643-4/89 (1991), EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest 9-10 at 10. 
76 2 December 1996, Case No. 43213/96 (1997) 32 EOR Discrimination Case Law 
Digest 8. 
77 ]bid. 
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induction and training programmes. 78 It is conceivable that proper 
compliance with the EC Code would involve the entire workforce 
receiving such training as part of their induction. In AvB Ltd and 
others19 following a complaint of insulting language being used, the 
company put up a notice warning that sexual harassment was un- 
acceptable. However, an employee, Ms A, was later assaulted and the 
tribunal held that the employer had not taken reasonably practicable 
steps to prevent the behaviour occurring. 'Nothing was done to edu- 
cate or train the workforce ... Putting a notice on a noticeboard is 
simply not enough. '80 
Any training given must be deemed to be adequate by a tribunal in 
order to constitute a defence. In Williams v Bass Inns and Tavernel 
Greenhaigh, the acting manager of a public house, racially abused a 
contract doorman. Although the acting manager had received some 
equal opportunities training, in the tribunal's opinion, 'such training 
given by the employer was insufficient to show that adequate steps 
182 had been taken .... In Martins v Marks & Spencer plC, 83 a woman of Afro-Caribbean 
origin applied four times for a post as a trainee manager with the 
company but was rejected without an interview. She pursued a griev- 
ance for race discrimination; however, the claim was eventually set- 
tled on the basis that amongst other things she would be granted an 
interview. The interviewing panel was composed of a male of Afro- 
Caribbean origin and a Caucasian female and they graded her poorly 
for not communicating effectively. On bringing her case to a tribunal 
the communication argument was rejected by the tribunal which 
found that in relation to the decision to reject her 'nothing but bias' 
could explain it and drew the inference that this was due to racial 
discrimination. The company was held liable because in the opinion of 
the tribunal it had failed to take reasonable steps to inquire into the 
applicant's allegations. The EAT ruled that the tribunal's findings were 
perverse and held that, 'on the findings of fact about the arrange- 
ments for the interview, the employers' equal opportunities policy, 
their compliance with the CRE Code of Practice in relation to selection 
procedures, criteria and interviewing, and their selection of an inter- 
viewing panel to include a person with an interest in recruiting from 
ethnic minorities, there could be no doubt that the employers had 
84 made out the defence'. 
78 European Commission Code, above n. 68 at 5(A)(iv). 
79 19 September 1997, Case No. 2600329/97 (1998) 37 EOR Discrimination Case Law 
Digest 6. 
80 ]bid. 
81 16 October 1991, Case No. 8149/91 (1992) 11 EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest 
6. 
82 Ibid. 
83 [19981 IRLR 326. 
84 Ibid. at 327. 
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In addition to adopting, implementing and monitoring an anti- 
harassment policy, an employer must demonstrate that he has proce- 
dures in place for dealing with harassment once it has been reported. 
The EC Code recommends that, 'violations of the organisation's policy 
protecting the dignity of employees at work should be treated as a 
disciplinary offence'. ' In addition it suggests that, 'even where a com- 
plaint is not upheld, for example because the evidence is regarded as 
inconclusive, consideration should be given to transferring or re- 
scheduling the work of one of the employees concerned rather than 
requiring them to continue to work together against the wishes of 
either partY. 86 
In Wagstaff v Elida Gibbs Ltd and Laverick, " the employment tri- 
bunal recommended that the employer 'should transfer a proven 
harasser so that he does not come into contact with the complainant 
even though the case was heard prior to the introduction of the EC 
Code'. 88 
v. Employer Liability for Harassment by a Third Party 
An employer not only has a duty to protect an employee from fellow 
employees but following recent case law also has a duty to protect an 
employee from harassment by third parties. 'This duty clearly arises in 
the employment context whether the harasser be ... a customer, a 
member of the public, or anyone else who comes into contact with the 
employee while she is at work. '89 The Acts require the victim to show 
they suffered a detriment and this can be established by showing that 
the employer failed in his duty to regulate the behaviour of employees 
and others under his control. 'A person "subjects" another to a detri- 
ment if he causes or aBows that thing to happen in circumstances 
which he could control whether it happens or not. '90 
The element of 'control' is, therefore, important in establishing that 
an employee has been subjected to a detriment for which the em- 
ployer is liable. This was Wustrated in Go Kidz Go Ltd v Bourdouane, 91 
in which Miss Bourdouane in the course of her employment was in 
charge of a children's party when one of the male parents made sexual 
remarks to her. She left the party and complained to a company 
director but he encouraged her to return. The parent then physically 
abused her and she brought a complaint of sex discrimination against 
her employer. The employment tribunal upheld her complaint and on 
appeal the EAT held that the employer could not be responsible for 
the initial verbal sexual harassment but was liable for the assault. 'He 
85 European Conimission Code, above n. 68 at 5(B)(v). 
86 Ibid. 
87 3 June 1991, Case No. 23259190 (1991) 8 EOR Discrimination Case Law Digest 4. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Rj Townshend-Smith, Discrimination Law. - Text, Cases and Materials (Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd. London, 1998) 250. 
go 119971 ICR 1 at 10. 
91 (1996) 70 EOR (Nov-Dec) at 49. 
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did not know and could not have foreseen that such treatment would 
be meted out to her ... However, once the initial complaint had been 
made, the employer had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment 
and by allowing the employee to return ... had subjected her to a detriment by permitting the sexual harassment to continue in circum- 
stances where he could have controlled whether it happened or not. ' 
In Burton and Rhule v De Vere Hotels Ltd" two waitresses of Afro- 
Caribbean origin were made the object of racially and sexually offen- 
sive remarks by the comedian Bernard Manning and consequently 
other guests at an after-dinner speech in the hotel in which they 
worked. The waitresses brought racial harassment complaints under 
section 4(2)(c) of the RRA. The EAT stated that the question for the 
tribunal was'whether the event in question was something which was 
sufficiently under the control of the employer that he could, by the 
application of good employment practice have prevented the harass- 
ment or reduced the extent of it'. 93 As in the previous case the crucial 
factor for the EAT is to what extent the employer could have con- 
trolled the behaviour of the third party. 
In Thompson v Black Country Housing Association Ltd, 91 the site 
foreman, who was not an employee of the company, sexually as- 
saulted a female site sale negotiator. She resigned, complaining of 
unlawful discrimination. However, the tribunal held that, 'the respon- 
dent did not have a degree of control ... because the applicant and 
other managers were not on site and there had been no complaint 
from the applicant about the site foreman .. . '. 
95 
Even where the employer has control over the situation, he has a 
defence where he can prove that he had applied good employment 
practice to prevent or reduce the possibility of harassment. It has 
been suggested that to demonstrate 'good employment practice' an 
employer'shouId now put up notices in areas accessible to the public 
that racial or any other form of abuse or harassment will not be 
accepted whether from employees or customers. He should also take 
steps to deal with it if it does occur. 9" 
A Summary of Position in the United lCingdom 
Waite IJ in Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd stated that the statutory de- 
fence for vicarious liability had 'a pro-active function, designed as 
much to eliminate the occasions for discrimination as to compensate 
its victims or punish its perpetrators'. 97 He also declared that the 
defence would 'exonerate the conscientious employer ... and will 
92 [19971 ICR 1. 
93 Lbid. at 10. 
94 16 November 1998, Case No. 1301643/98 (1999) 39 EOR Discrimination Case Law 
Digest 6. 
95 Lbid. at 7. 
96 K. Monaghan and M. Javaid, 'No Laughing Matter'(1997) 147 New LawJoumal 
350-2 at 352. 
97 119971 ICR 254 at 262. 
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encourage all employers who have not yet undertaken such 
endeavours to take the steps necessary to make the same defence 
available. - . '. 
1 
Employers are often in a financial position to meet the costs in- 
volved in preventing or combating sexual harassment in the work- 
place. '. .. In the context of the workplace, employers are, 
in a broad 
range of circumstances, in a position to provide protection from such 
a detriment more cost-effectively than anyone else. '19 
Such protection could take the form of: introducing broad-ranging 
equality policies and procedures (which may include dignity at work 
policies) and taking proactive steps to communicate these to all em- 
ployees and implement them fully; ensuring staff are trained to deal 
with this problem; providing adequate supervision to control harass- 
ment; and appointing an independent party to offer employees sup- 
port and represent them where they bring an internal complaint of 
sexual harassment. These steps will ensure the employer has a de- 
fence to a claim that he is vicariously liable. 
Ill. The Law Relating to Sexual and Racial Harassment 
in the United States 
Cases of sexual harassment in the United States are divided into either 
quid pro quo harassment or harassment caused by the creation of a 
hostile work environment for the employee. The nature of these types 
of cases is summarized below. 
The former requires sexual compliance in exchange for the retention of 
some current job opportunity or the possibility of some future opportu- 
nity. The latter involves a situation in which sexual conduct has the 
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
work environment. " 
It will become apparent that the type of harassment case involved will 
be a determinative factor for the court in deciding whether or not the 
harasser is deemed to be acting in the course of his employment. 
i. Nature and Scope of Quid Pro Quo Har-assment 
The first appellate case to recognize that sexual harassment was un- 
lawful sexual discrimination was Barnes v Castle. 101 In this case, 
Barnes lost her job after refusing to go to bed with her supervisor. 
The case was 'authority for regarding sexual harassment as unlawful 
98 Ibid. at 263-4. 
99 R. Muilender, 'Racial Harassment, Sexual Harassment and the Expressive 
Function of Law' (1998) 61(2) Modem Law Review 236-44 at 236. 
100 R. L Paetzold and A. M. O'Leary-Kelly, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: 
Perspectives, Frontiers and Response Str-ategies (Sage Publications: California, 
USA, 1996) ch. 5 at 86. 
101 15 FEP Cases 345. (D. C. Cir 1977) FEPM 405: 6684,421: 452. 
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where it could be established that an employee was threatened or 
suffered a tangible job detriment in retaliation for rejecting a sexual 
advance'. 101 in Bames the conduct amounted to a straightforward 
case of quid pro quo harassment. Quid pro quo harassment is un- 
lawful under the US Civil Rights Act 1964 103 as it discriminates against 
an employee by threatening them with a deterioration in their terms 
and conditions of employment on sexual grounds. Section 20OOe-2(a) 
of Title VII of the CRA 1964 states that, 'It shall be unlawful employ- 
ment practice for an employer to ... discriminate against any in- dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment because of such individual's race, colour, 
religion, sex or national origin. '. " 
It is important to recognize that quid pro quo harassment can only 
be perpetrated by a supervisor (and not by a colleague) because only a 
supervisor has the power in the workplace to alter or threaten to 
diminish the terms and conditions of employment of the victim. The 
power to extort sexual favours by threatening someone's employment 
rights where they refuse to comply is extended to the employee by the 
employer directly, impliedly or ostensibly. Supervisors are deemed to 
have a delegated power that 'results in a tangible employment deci- 
sion, hiring, firing, failing to promote, etc. '. 101 The employer delegates 
this power and so the supervisor is relying 'upon actual or ostensible 
authority "to extort sexual consideration from an employee". 106 
The US Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) 
guidelines state that in 'applying general Title VII principles, an em- 
ployer ... 
is responsible for his acts and those of his agents and 
supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment, regardless 
of whether the specific acts complained of were authorised or even 
forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer 
107 knew or should have known of their occurrence'. The courts have 
applied the EEOC guidelines in reaching their decisions in quid pro 
quo harassment cases and have consequently held that employers are 
vicariously liable. This liability has been extended on the basis that in 
such cases the supervisor is acting on the authority of the employer 
and so his acts are held to be equivalent to those of the employer. 
102 M. Rubinstein, 'Sexual Harassment Law in the United States' (1987) 12 Equal 
Opportunities Review 18 at 20. 
103 From this point in the article onwards this wiN be abbreviated to CRA 1964. 
104 US Code: Title 42, Me Public Health and Welfare', ch. VI, Section 20OOe-2(a), 
http: //www4. law. corneU. edu/uscode/42/20OOe-2. text. html 
105 1 Chafetz, The High Court's Convoluted Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence' 
(1998) 19M Yale Political Quarterly, http: //www. yal. edu/ypnVarticles/oct98/ 
oct98a. htrnl, p. 1 of 5. 
106 D. Pannick, Sex Discrimination Law (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1985) 179. 
107 US Government, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter XIV-Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission, Section 1604.11, Guidelines on Discrimination 
Because of Sex, http: //frwebgate. access. gpo 
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ii. Hostile Working Environment Cases 
In 1981 the judiciary in the United States in Bundy v Jackson'08 recog- 
nized the basis for pursuing a second type of sexual harassment case, 
where the harassment has no detrimental effect beyond the fact that it 
leads to the creation of a hostile work environment. Bundy received 
unwelcome sexual advances but retained her employment and was 
promoted and so did not suffer any tangible economic loss, but the 
court ruled that, '. -. sexual harassment, in and of itself, is a violation 
of the law and does not require further proof that the employee was 
penalised or lost tangible job benefits as a result. The [court] accepted 
the contention that "conditions of employment" include the psycho- 
logical and emotional work environment. "' 
However, it was not until 'the landmark case of Meritor Savings 
Bank FSB v Vinson 477 US 57 (1986) that the Supreme Court held that 
sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment was prohib- 
ited employment discrimination under the CRN. 110 
In Meritor a female employee named Vinson was allegedly sub- 
jected to public fondling and sexual demands by Taylor, her male 
supervisor. She submitted to these advances out of fear that she 
would otherwise lose her job. Despite this she managed to obtain 
promotion in the bank branch with Taylor as her supervisor although 
it was undisputed that her advancement was based on merit alone. 
Ms Vinson brought an action for sexual harassment against the bank 
after she was discharged for excessive use of sick leave. 
The Supreme Court, in determining whether a hostile work envi- 
ronment was actionable under the CRA, held that, '. .. the language of 
Title VIT is not limited to 'economic' or "tangible" discrimination'. "' 
In making its decision, the court considered the guidelines of the 
EEOC. They define sexual harassment as: 
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favours, and other ver- 
bal or physical conduct of a sexual nature ... when submission to or 
rejection of such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term 
or condition of an individual's employment ... or when ... such conduct 
has the ... effect of unreasonably 
interfering %vith an individual's work 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work 
environment. 112 
The Supreme Court accepted that both the EEOC and the lower 
courts have recognized that a hostile work environment was a viola- 
tion of Title VIT and concurred with that opinion. 113 However, the 
108 24 FEP Cases 1155. (D. C. Cir. 1981) FEPM 405- 6700,421: 454,431: 8. 
109 M. Rubinstein, 7he Law of Sexual Harassment at Work' (1983) 12 Industrial Law 
Journal I at 6. 
110 S. T. Bradford, 'Relief for Hostile Work Environment Discrimination: Restoring 
Title VIT's Remedial Powers'(1989-90) 99(2) Yale Law Review 1611. 
111 477 US 57,91 L Ed 2d 49 at 58. 
112 US Government, Code of Federal Regulations, above n. 107. 
113 Above n. Ill at 59. 
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Supreme Court declined to issue a definitive rule on employer liability 
in this respect, agreeing with the EEOC that Congress intended 
courts would look to agency principles for guidance in this area. ' 14 
The agency principles are part of the common law of tort and are 
contained in the Restatement of the Law. "' 'Under traditional princi- 
ples of agency, employees act as their employer's agents when their 
actions fall within the scope of their employment. "" 
The scope of their employment will be determined by reference to 
the task they were employed to undertake on behalf of the employer. 
'The conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but 
only if ... it is of the kind he is employed to perform ... [and] it is 
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. " 17 
The US courts held that in quid pro quo harassment cases, because 
the supervisor's retaliatory conduct (for example to dismiss or de- 
mote) is of the kind he is employed to perform and its purpose is to 
serve his employer, then the supervisor is acting in the course of his 
employment and so is acting as his employer's agent. 
... In the wake of Meritor ... if the plaintiff established a quid pro quo 
claim, the Courts of Appeal held, the employer was subject to vicarious 
liability. "' 
As is the case in the UK, an employer in the USA is likely to be 
vicariously liable where an employee is acting in the scope of his 
employment; however, in the UK the employer has a defence that he 
did all that was reasonably practicable to prevent the harassment. 
There are complications in working environment cases because the 
courts will be reluctant to accept that these are carried out within 
the context of the supervisor's job. 'The Supreme Court's refusal to 
delineate the scope of employer liability for sexual harassment in 
Meritor assures the perpetuation of confusion in the area of liability 
for a hostile work environment. "" This confusion persists because in 
general the lower courts consider that a hostile work environment is 
not actuated for the purpose of the employee to serve his employer. 
They contend that an employee is '. .. acting out of gender-based 
animus or a desire to fulfil sexual urges ... and often acts for personal 
motives, or motives unrelated and even in opposition to the employ- 
er's objectives'. 120 Therefore, the employee will not be deemed to be 
acting in the scope of his employment. The Restatement of Agency 
§228(2) declares that the 'conduct of a servant is not within the scope 
114 Ibid. at 63. 
115 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second Agency 2d, Vol. 1,1958. 
116 'Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment under Title VIl' 
(1983-84) 97 Harvard Law Review 1449 at 1460. 
117 Above n. 115 at §2280)(a) and (c). 
118 Burlington Industries Inc v Ellerth (97-569), http: //supct. law. cornell-edu/supctl 
htmU97-569. ZO. html, p. 4 of 10. 
119 Vinciguerra, above n. 5 at 1730. 
120 Above n. 118 at p. 6 of 10. 
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of employment if it is different in kind from that authorised or too 
little actuated by a purpose to serve the master'. "' 
As a consequence of the Supreme Court declining to issue a defini- 
tive rule and simply referring courts to the agency principles, the 
lower courts 'have used various standards of employer liability based 
on several agency theories'. 122 
The Restatement of Law §219 gives four situations in which an 
employer may be liable although the employee is not acting in the 
scope of his employment. 121 Subsection §219(2)(a) states that the em- 
ployer will be directly liable if he intended the consequences. Under 
subsection (b) an employer is liable if he is negligent, for example he 
was aware of the conduct and failed to Stop it. 124 Subsection (c) ap- 
plies if the conduct violates a non-delegable duty of the employer, 
which is a duty that can be delegated. liability follows if the person to 
whom it was delegated acts improperly. 125 The first part of subsection 
(d) relates to the'apparent authority standard', for example where the 
agent purports to exercise a power which he does not have. The 
second part is called the 'aided in agency relation standard' and ap- 
plies where the agency relationship aided the supervisor to accom- 
plish the tort. 126 
The confusion over whether or not a supervisor who creates a 
hostile environment for a subordinate employee can make an em- 
ployer vicariously liable in sexual harassment cases was ended by two 
recent decisions in the US Supreme Court. 127 These cases were Bur- 
lington Industries Inc v Ellerth"I and Faragher v City of Boca Raton. 129 
In Burlington, Ellerth alleged that she was subjected to constant sex- 
ual harassment by her supervisor, Slowik, and that he threatened to 
deny her tangible job benefits. Although Ellerth did not suffer any 
tangible job loss and was, in fact, promoted, she resigned after being 
disciplined by another supervisor and then brought an action for 
Slowik's sexual harassment. The issue for the Supreme Court was 
'whether an employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor cre- 
ates a hostile work environment by making explicit threats to alter a 
subordinate's terms or conditions of employment, based on sex, but 
does not fulfil the threats'. 130 
121 American Law Institute, above n. 115 at §228(2). 
122 J. S. Weddle, Mtle VII Sexual Harassment: Recognising an Employer's Non- 
Delegable Duty to Prevent a Hostile Workplace' (1995) 95 Columbia Law Review 
724 at 734. 
123 American Law Institute, above n. 115 at §219(2)(a)-(d). 
124 Burlington Industries Inc v Ellerth, above n. 118 at pp. 6-7 of 1(). 
125 Above n. 122 at 743. 
126 Burlington Industries Inc v Ellerth, above n. 118 at p. 7 of 10. 
127 Editorial, 'Tough Ruling on Harassment', The Record, httP: //www. bergen. com/ 
editorials/harl9980629. htm 
128 Above n. 118. 
129 (97-282), http-J/supct. law. cornell-edu/supct/html/97-282. ZO. htmi 
130 Burlington Industries Inc v Ellerth, above n. 118 at p. 5 of 10. 
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The Supreme Court ruled in Burlington and the co-joined case of 
Faragher that, 'an employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victi- 
mised employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a 
supervisor with immediate or successively higher authority over the 
employee'. "' The court, in making its decision, followed the recom- 
mendation in Meritor to refer to agency principles. In particular, it 
considered the second part of §219(2)(d), the'aided in agency relation' 
standard, and suggested that: 
... a supervisor's power and authority invests his or her harassing 
conduct with a particular threatening character, and in this sense, a 
supervisor is always aided by the agency relation ... It is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer's 
authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on 
subordinates. 112 
The Supreme Court recognized that in these cases even where an 
employee suffered no economic loss the employer is still vicariously 
liable. 
The US courts have also applied both statutory and common law 
rules to determine issues related to employer's liability for harass- 
ment. This is because the CRA failed to set out standards of employer 
liability, for example vicarious liability, and so the Supreme Court in 
Meritor had to direct courts to look to the common law for 
assistance. 
This has resulted in courts in the US applying a variety of standards 
and this lack of consistency only serves to make the system extremely 
confusing. In an article commenting on the case of Jansen v Packaging 
Corporation of Arnefica133 it was suggested that, 'when resolving the 
confusion engendered by Meritor, the Supreme Court should discard 
the distinction between quid pro quo and supervisor hostile work 
environment sexual harassment and establish a single standard of 
employer liability for all claims of supervisor sexual harassment'. 134 
This essentially is what has happened in the UK where there is no 
significant difference between cases involving sexual blackmail and 
working environment cases in terms of the liability of the employer, 
although in the former it is much easier to prove necessary harm or 
detriment than in the latter. 
iii. Employer Liability for Harassment by Co-workers 
In general an employer is not vicariously liable for co-workers who 
create a hostile work environment for victims of harassment. In these 
131 Lbid. at 9. 
132 Nd. at 8-9. 
133 123 F 3d 49 (7th Cir. 1997). 
134 'Title VII-Sexual Harassment-Seventh Circuit Adopts Employer Uability 
Standards for Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Employees--Jansen v Packaging 
Corporation of America' (1998) 111(6) Harvard Law Review 1602 at 1605-6. 
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cases, the courts usually employ a 'knowledge standard' to assess 
employer liability. 135 This means that the employer will only be liable if 
he knew of the harassment and did nothing to prevent it. In adopting 
this standard, the courts have applied the Restatement of Law 
§219(2)(b) which provides that an employer is liable if he is negligent 
in his duty to protect his employee. '[The lower courts] by uniformly 
judging employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negli- 
gence standard --. have ... implicitly treated such harassment as 
outside the scope of employment. 1136 
In the US, employer liability for the acts of co-workers is not the 
same as for the acts of supervisors. A co-worker is not capable of quid 
pro quo harassment; however, he can create a hostile environment 
because this type of harassment does not rely on proof of the victim 
suffering an economic loss. The Supreme Court held that employers 
could not be vicariously liable for co-worker harassment because 'the 
employer has a greater opportunity to guard against misconduct by 
supervisors than by common workers' . 
137 
As was the case for supervisors prior to Burlington and Faragher, a 
co-worker who creates a hostile environment is not acting in the 
scope of his employment. As stated earlier the lower courts have 
applied a variety of standards of direct liability based on the principles 
in §219 of the Restatement of the Law. " However, the dominant 
standard in the lower courts has been §219(2)(b) 139 where an employer 
is subject to liability for the torts of his employees acting outside 
the scope of their employment because he is negligent in his duty 
to the victim of the harassment. As stated earlier this is also called 
the 'knew-or-should-have-known-standard'. 11 This negligence stan- 
dard is recommended in the guidelines on sexual harassment devel- 
oped by the US EEOC. These guidelines state that, 'with respect to 
conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for 
acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or his 
agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the 
conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective ac- 
tion'. 141 These guidelines, therefore, make 'an employer liable for the 
acts of ... co-workers ... 
if nothing was done after a complaint was 
brought to the employer's attention'. 142 
135 Anderson, above n. 8 at 1262. 
136 Faragher v City of Boca Raton, above n. 129 at p. 8 of 12. 
137 ]bid. at p. 9 of 12. 
138 American Law Institute, above n. 115. 
139 Weddle, above n. 122 at 734. 
140 ]bid. at 737. 
141 US Government, Code of Federal Regulations, above n. 107, http: //frwebgate. 
access. gpo, p. 1 of 7. 
142 K. Segrave, The Sexual Harassment of Women in the Workplace (Farland & Co Inc: 
North Carolina, USA, 1994) 211. 
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The focus on action taken after an incident is reported is demon- 
strated in Varner v National Super Markets Inc. 143 In this case, fol. low- 
ing two incidents of sexual assault by a co-worker, the victim, Varner, 
informed her flanc6 who was also an employee of the supermarket. 
On both occasions her flanc& contacted the store manager but was 
told that nothing could be done until Varner herself reported the 
incidents to him. Nevertheless, the court held that, 'the relevant ques- 
tion is whether National knew or should have known of the harass- 
ment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective 
action ... It concluded that Varner's reports of the incident sufficiently 
put National on notice of the incidents'. 144 
In the UK an employer can be vicariously liable for harassment by 
co-workers. This has been illustrated in a number of cases, including 
Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd. 145 Additionally, the emphasis in the UK is 
on showing that preventive action was taken prior to the harassment 
occurring. In comparison, an employer in the USA only needs to 
demonstrate that he took immediate action once an incident came 
to his attention. 
The knew-or-should-have-known standard has been criticized be- 
cause it could mean that, 'the employer is virtually able to ignore the 
1 146 possibility of workplace harassment until it is reported . For this 
reason it has been critically termed the 'see-no-evil' defence. ", It has 
led to unsatisfactory decisions such as Blankenship v Parke Care Cen- 
ters Inc" where a 17-Year-old woman claimed she had been sexually 
harassed by a fellow male colleague. Following her first complaint his 
work area was moved to minimize his interaction with her, however, 
none of the administrators confronted him in any way. He continued 
harassing Blankenship and then a second female complained that he 
had harassed her. The supervisory staff then met with him and issued 
a warning but Blankenship still needed to complain to her supervisor 
of his actions. She was told that it could not be guaranteed that she 
could continue to work without coming into contact with him and if 
she could not accept this she would have to resign. The court held 
that, 'the act of discrimination by the employer in such a case is not 
the harassment but rather the inappropriate response to the charges 
of harassment'. "' Nevertheless, the court found that the employer's 
behaviour was appropriate. " '0 
143 94 F 3d 473,480 (CA7 1996), ftp: //server. wulaw. wustl. edu/8th. cir/960909/95361 I. P8 
144 Ibid. at p. 7 of 10 (web address). 
145 [19971 ICR 254. 
146 Weddle, above n. 122 at 737. 
147 National Organisation for Women (NOW), 'NOW Applauds Today's Supreme 
Court Rulings', NOW, 26 June 1998, http: //now. org/now/press/ 
06-98/06-26a98. htrnl 
148 123 F. 3d 868,872-3 (6th Cir. 1997), http: //www. law. emory. edu/6circuit/aug97/ 
97a0250p. 06. html 
149 Ibid. p. 4 of 8. 
150 Ibid. p. 5 of B. 
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iv. Employer's Liabilityfor Harassment by Third Parties 
As is the case in the UK, in the United States employers can be liable 
for the harassment of employees by third parties. The EEOC guide- 
lines recommend that in these cases the knew-or-should-have-known 
standard be applied. It also states that, 'in reviewing these cases the 
Commission will consider the extent of the employer's control .. . 
'. 151 
In Lambertsen v Utah Department of Corrections'12 it was held that in 
'determining whether a plaintiff has demonstrated an employee- 
employer relationship for purposes of federal anti-discrimination leg- 
islation, courts have generally applied either the economic realities 
test or the hybrid test ... Under the hybrid test, the main focus of the 
court's enquiry is the employer's right to control the "means and 
manner' of the worker's performance. 1.1-13 These statements demon- 
strate that in the US, as in the UK, where employers have knowledge 
of customer harassment and the means to prevent it, they may be held 
154 liable if they fail to take action to bring about its cessation. 
The similarity of the law in the two jurisdictions is illustrated by the 
case of Lockard v Pizza Hut Inc, 155 where the circumstances of the case 
were very similar to those in Burton and Rhule v De Vere Hotels Ltd. "' 
The plaintiff worked as a waitress in Pizza Hut where she was sexually 
harassed by two male customers. Lockard complained of their actions 
on a number of occasions but was instructed to continue serving them 
by her shift manager. In an action for sexual harassment against her 
employer the court held that, 'an employer who condones or tolerates 
the creation of such an environment should be held liable regardless 
of whether the environment was created by a co-employee or a non- 
employee, since the employer ultimately controls the conditions of the 
work environment'. 157 
v. Defences and Employer Liability in the United States 
As already discussed, employer's liability in the US will be dependent 
on the type of sexual harassment case, namely whether it is quid pro 
quo harassment or harassment creating a hostile work environment. 
The former 'involves a direct exchange; sexual compliance for an 
employment benefit, such as job retention, promotion, improved pay 
or conditions ... [In the latter] no tangible employment benefits are 
lost, but the work atmosphere is "intimidating, hostile or threatening' 
151 US Government, Code of Federal Regulations, above n. 107 at p. I of 7 (web 
address). 
152 79 F 3d 1024 (10th Cir. ) 1996, http-. //Iaw. emory. edu/10circuit/mar96/ 
95-4072. wpd. htn-d 
153 Nd. 
154 D. Hatch, and J. E. Hall. 'Employer liable for Customer Harassment of Employee' 
(1999) Workforce, March, 108. 
155 97-7027,97-7078 (CAIO 1998), http-J/v^vw. kscourts. org, calO/cases/ 
1998/12/97-7027. htm 
156 [19971 ICR 1. 
157 Above n. 155 at p. 7 of 11. 
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because of constant touching, leering, personal comments, sexual 
abuse. . . '. 
'-98 
In Meritor Savings Bank FSB v Vinson"' the Supreme Court recog- 
nized that both quid pro quo harassment and a claim of hostile envi- 
ronment sex discrimination were actionable under Title VII11 of the 
Civil Rights Act (CRA) 1964. 'Ibis decision was particularly important, 
as the remedies available under Title VII are such that they can only be 
provided by the employer. '161 
However, this type of claim would only succeed where the super- 
visor is the harasser and the behaviour can be directly or indirectly 
linked with the performance of the supervisory role. 
'Under current law, only supervisors are deemed capable of com- 
mitting quid pro quo harassment. The rationale is that only super- 
visors have sufficient delegated power in the workplace to engage in 
the blackmail of quid pro quo harassment. "62 Where there has been 
quid pro quo harassment, 'employers have been held strictly liable for 
the conduct of supervisors because such persons rely upon their ac- 
tual or ostensible authority. 163 Therefore, 'courts hold employers 
automatically liable* in quid pro quo cases because the supervisor's 
actions in conferring or withholding employment benefits, are 
deemed as a matter of law to be those of the employer'. " 
The imposition of strict liability by courts was confirmed by the 
Supreme Court in the cases of Burlington Industries Inc v Ellerth165 
and Faragher v City of Boca Raton. 166 The court held that 'no affirma- 
tive defence is available ... when the supervisor's harassment culmi- 
nates in a tangible economic employment action, such as discharge, 
demotion, or undesirable re-assignment'. 161 
The Supreme Court in Burlington and Faragher clarified the extent 
of the liability of employers in sexual harassment lawsuits, 168 when it 
held that an employer was vicariously liable for a hostile environment 
created by a supervisor with authority over the employee. 169 However, 
the court also stated that: 
when no tangible employment action Is taken a defending employer 
may raise an affirmative defence to liability ... [Which] comprises two 
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
correct promptly any sexually harassing behaviour, and (b) that the 
158 L Clarke, 'Sexual Harassment and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975'(1982) 132 
New LawJournal 1116 at 1118. 
159 Above n. 111. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Clarke, above n. 158 at 1118. 
162 Anderson, above n. 8 at 1260. 
163 Parinick, above n. 106 at 179. 
164 Faragher v City of Boca Raton, above n. 129 at p. 5 of 12. 
165 http: //supct. law. cornell. edu/supctlhtml/97-569. ZO. htmi 
166 Above n. 129. 
167 Above n. 165 at p. 9 of 10. 
168 Editorial, above n. 127 at 1. 
169 Above n. 129 at p. 11 of 12. 
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plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any pre- 
ventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
harm othenwise. 170 
The terminology adopted in the first part of the defence is reminiscent 
of the statutory defence provided under UK law allowing the em- 
ployer to prove that he 'took such steps as were reasonably practic- 
able'to prevent the discrimination. 171 However, there is no equivalent 
to the second part. It has not been necessary in the UK to demonstrate 
that the claimant (plaintiff in the US) unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by 
the employer. 172 Also in the US both defences are only available in 
cases where the strict liability of the employer does not apply; how- 
ever, the defence in the UK is available in all cases. 
In the US, the recommendations on what will constitute 'reasonable 
care' are very similar to the standards of behaviour required of em- 
ployers in the UK. Namely that an employer should 'have specific 
sexual harassment policies, train supervisors and employees ... and 
promptly investigate any allegation of sexual harassment by any 
171 employee'. 
Following the rulings in Burlington and Faragher, the National 
Organisation for Women stated that, 'while the decisions are good 
signs for women, we are concerned with what will be held "reason- 
able" and "unreasonable' under the facts of future cases'. 174 Manage- 
ment attorneys have complained that, 'it will take the courts years to 
define ambiguous words like "reasonable care". .. 1.17 -1 The difficulty of deciding the correct interpretation of a statutory phrase has also been 
experienced in the UK. It was not until several years after the in- 
troduction of the discrimination legislation that tribunals and courts 
were in a position to determine what constituted the defence of taking 
'such steps as were reasonably practicable'. 
The action that an employer must take in the United States was 
discussed by the Supreme Court in the Faragher case where the peti- 
tioner was an ocean lifeguard who alleged that her immediate super- 
visors had created a sexually hostile environment and that this 
amounted to discrimination under the CRA 1964. Her employer, the 
City of Boca Raton, had adopted a sexual harassment policy but failed 
170 Ibid. 
171 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s. 41(3) and RRA 1976, s. 32(3). 
172 The Employment Bill before Parliament at the moment provides for a statutor-Y 
grievance procedure whereby a standard grievance procedure will be implied into 
all contracts of employment and cover all equality disputes and where such claims 
are not undertaken or are incomplete internally it may prevent them from being 
presented to tribunals. 
173 G. Flynn. 'Sexual Harassment ClarifiedT (1998) Workforce, May, 105 at 108. 
174 National Organisation for Women (NOW), above n. 147. 
175 D. Bencivenga, 'Looking for Guidance: High Court Rulings Leave Key Terms 
Undefined' New York Law Journal, 2 July 1998, http: //Www. ljx. com/practice/ 
laboremployment/07021aguide. html, p. I of 3. 
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to disseminate this to the employees in Faragher's section. The peti- 
tioner did not complain to higher management about the harassment 
because lifeguards had no significant contact with higher city officials; 
however, she did complain to another supervisor, a Mr Gordon. The 
Supreme Court held that: 
the City had entirely failed to disseminate its policy against sexual har- 
assment among the beach employees and that its officials made no 
attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors ... [In addition] the City's policy did not include any assurance that the harassing super- 
visors could be bypassed in registering complaints ... land so] the City 176 could not be found to have exercised reasonable care ... 
IV. Conclusion 
There are many similarities in the discrimination law in the UK and 
the US which partly stem from the fact that originally UK legislation 
borrowed legal concepts from the US Civil Rights Act 1964 and case 
law. However, because the equality legislation in both countries failed 
to refer specifically to harassment both have encountered difficulties 
in adapting their legislation to acts of harassment. Due to this inade- 
quacy, courts in the UK and US have found it necessary to refer to the 
common law of tort for assistance where disputes over an employer's 
vicarious liability in cases of harassment arise. Traditionally the judici- 
ary in both countries put considerable emphasis on the common law 
tort principle of determining whether or not an employee, in commit- 
ting the unlawful act, was acting in the course of his employment, as a 
threshold device to determine breach of a legal duty by employers. 
However, reliance on this principle was never intended to be applied 
in discrimination cases or for this purpose, especially in cases of 
discrimination involving serious consequences for the employee such 
as sexual or racial harassment cases. The judiciary encountered diffi- 
culties when they attempted to apply traditional legal principles to a 
modern phenomenon. 
It is claimed in the US that strict liability is imposed on an employer 
to encourage him 'to act responsibly in delegating power to super- 
visors -.. because employers are in the best position to review and 
evaluate supervisors' conduct, they should expect to be held responsi- 
ble for those to whom they grant authority'. "' However, strict liability 
also means that, 'if the worker suffers a Otangible job action'ý-is 
demoted, sacked or otherwise penalised by the harasser-then the 
employer is liable even if he has in place a good anti-harassment 
policy and the victim failed to use W. "' 
In the US some employers' response to strict liability for sexual 
harassment may be considered excessive in that, "many companies 
176 Above n. 129 at p. lt of 12. 
177 Harvard Law Review, above n. 116 at 1462. 
178 'Men, Women, Work and Law' The Economist, 4 July 1998,49. 
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have written policies that forbid dating between persons with super- 
visory responsibility and employees who are subject to that 
supervision'. "9 
In the US, where there is already an excessive amount of litiga- 
tion, 180 it has been claimed that strict liability may eventually 'induce 
employers to take excessive precautions. The employer might not hire 
women, or might segregate them from men in the workplace, solely to 
avoid such liability. 1181 
In respect of harassment by co-workers, the kn ew-or-should -have- 
known standard may not encourage employers to have in place poli- 
cies and procedures actively to prevent harassment because the 
standard means employers can avoid taking any action until an in- 
cident has occurred. 
The reasoning of the US courts in applying this unsatisfactory stan- 
dard is probably because they do not consider co-worker harassment 
as serious as harassment by supervisors. The Supreme Court in Far- 
agher stated that where there is harassment by a co-worker, 'the 
victim can walk away or tell the offender where to go'. "" However, it 
has been demonstrated in many cases in the UK (for example Jones v 
Tower Boot Co Ltd") that such action is not always feasible. A person 
may fear the harasser because of his age, build or sex, as was illus- 
trated in the Blankenship case in the US. Where an employer was to 
be held vicariously liable for co-worker harassment in the United 
States then he could avoid liability by establishing the defence that he 
had taken reasonable care to avoid liability. It is clearly a nonsense 
that the courts should deprive someone of protection against co- 
worker harassment on the flawed premise that everyone is equally 
placed physically and mentally to provide an assertive response to this 
type of behaviour. 
With regard to an employer's direct liability to protect an employee 
from harassment by third parties, 'the question of whether or not 
employers were in a position to control a particular situation might 
well lead to as much legal argument as the question of whether or not 
acts of harassment were done "in the course of employment"'. "' Is the 
employer in a position to control behaviour that takes place outside 
the workplace and working hours? The employer was deemed to be in 
such a position in the Burton and Stubbs cases in the UK. In addition, 
179 S. D. Aaron and I Thomas, 'Consensual Sexual Relationships Between 
Supervisors and Subordinates' New York Law Journal, 26 May 1998, 
http: //www. ljx. com/practiceAaboremployment/0526 supersex. htm), pp. 3-4 and 
'Much Ado in the Office'The Lawyer, 3 October 1998, http: //www. the-lawyer/ 
co. uk 
180 Bencivenga, above n. 175 at 2. 
181 Anderson, above n. 8 at 1278. 
182 Above n. 129 at p. 9 of 12. 
183 [1997] ICR 254. 
184 V. Edmunds, Harassment at Work (Jordan Publishing Ltd: Bristol, 1998) 118, para. 
8.3.3. 
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problems may arise in respect of what will be considered to be good 
employment practice in the context of interaction with third parties. 
These issues are more difficult to resolve because the harasser is not 
an employee but a third party and an employer cannot discipline them 
or easily predict their actions. 
In the UK, an employer can be vicariously liable for the acts of 
supervisors and co-workers (this has been demonstrated in a number 
of cases, including Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd). An employer must 
prove that he has taken reasonable steps to prevent harassment by all 
employees, independent of their seniority. In the recent case of AM v 
WC and SPV11 the EAT held that employee harassers could be sued 
personally under section 42 of the SDA for aiding and abetting a 
discriminatory act by their employer. " 
Section 42 makes the employee personally liable, as well as the employer 
and this also applies to race and disability discrimination. The result of 
this decision is to make clear that wherever the employer is presump- 
tively liable for an act of discrimination the individual employee who 
committed the act of discrimination is also liable. 181 
The significance of this decision is unclear. Employees perpetrating 
discriminatory acts may not always be in a position to pay compensa- 
tion where they are held liable. However, the victim of harassment will 
no doubt obtain a degree of satisfaction from co-joining the harasser 
in a legal action for discrimination against their employer. Employ- 
ment tribunals can use their power to make recommendations to 
instruct employers to discipline harassers and ensure their activities 
are curtailed. 
In the US, the standard of employer liability applied by the court 
also reflects on the defence that should be demonstrated by an em- 
ployer. In general, there are three standards of liability applied. For 
quid pro quo harassment, the courts adopt strict liability with no 
defence. Vicarious liability and the 'reasonable care' defence is ap- 
plied to supervisors who create a hostile environment. With respect to 
the employer's defence that the victim failed to exhaust internal griev- 
ance mechanisms, this is unsuitable in many harassment cases. The 
sensitive and personal nature of the issues involved for employees in 
racial and sexual harassment cases will mean they are extremely re- 
luctant to pursue an internal grievance against their harasser. They 
are also unlikely to want to bring an internal complaint to an employer 
that appears to tolerate or condone this type of behaviour. Under the 
Employment Bill at present before Parliament in the UK there is a 
185 [19991 IRLR 411. 
186 Section 42(t): a person who knowingly aids another person to do an act made 
unlawful by the SDA shaU be treated for the purposes of the statute 'as himself 
doing an unlawful act of like description'. Section 42(2): for the purposes of s. 
420) an employee ... for whose act the employer 
is liable under s. 41 shaH be 
deemed to aid the doing of the act by the employer. 
187 M. Rubinstein [19991 IRLR 394. 
283 
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW 
statutory grievance procedure provided which will be a minimum 
requirement for all employers and be treated as an implied term in all 
employment contracts. There are three stages in the procedure: a 
statement of grievance, a meeting and an appeal. The employee bring- 
ing a discrimination claim must have complied with the first stage of 
the procedure (submitting a written grievance to their employer) oth- 
erwise they will not be able to pursue a claim before the tribunal. The 
only exception to this requirement is where the applicant is a victim of 
extreme bullying or threats of violence in the workplace. Finally, 
where co-workers create a hostile environment for an employee the 
vicarious liability of the employer is questionable. However, where it 
is established, there is a full defence for the employer that he took 
prompt action once he knew of the harassment. 
These different standards of liability and the attached defences 
make the law in the US complex and confusing, whereas the law in the 
UK is commendable for its relative straightforwardness and reflects a 
growing recognition by the judiciary of the importance of eradicating 
harassment within all organizations. This is only likely to occur when 
the employer is potentially liable for all kinds of harassment. 
This extensive liability for employers in the UK looks set to happen 
in the not too distant future as a consequence of EU intervention. 
Legislation will be forthcoming shortly to implement the Council 
Framework Directive 2000/78/EC into UK law. 188 Under Article 2(3) 
express provision is made for treating as unlawful harassment on all 
the grounds specified in Article I (namely religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation). In what circumstances will harassment on 
these various grounds be treated as unlawful? 
When unwanted conduct related to any of the grounds referred to in 
Article I takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of 
a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating 
or offensive environment. 
Another legislative development in the EU that deserves mention is 
the Race Discrimination Directive 2000/43/EU. For the first time in the 
UK racial harassment in employment is specifically treated as un- 
lawful discrimination. Once implemented in the UK189 the victim will 
need to establish not only that the harassment affected his or her 
dignity at work but also adversely affected his or her working envi- 
ronment-190 This requirement to establish both types of detriment will 
not prove an evidential obstacle to applicants in the more extreme 
cases of racial harassment or where it represents a continuous mode 
of behaviour. 
188 The rules relating to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and religious 
belief must be implemented by December 2003 and on grounds of age and 
disability discrimination by December 2006. 
189 By July 2003. 
190 2000 Equal Opportunities Review, September/October at 34. 
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The Council and Parliament have recently agreed to considerable 
amendment of the Equal Treatment Directive in the form of a Directive 
which will introduce, inter alia, new measures on sexual harassment, 
including a legal definition for the first time and a requirement for 
employers to take preventive measures to deal with sexual harass- 
ment. Although the new Directive is as yet not formally adopted it is 
likely to be in the near future and will be implemented in Member 
States by 2005. 
These measures will clearly have far-reaching consequences for 
harassment law in the UK and for all the other Member States in the 
European Community, ensuring that all categories of victims of har- 
assment are provided with legal protection that exceeds the level of 
protection afforded to victims of harassment in countries outside the 
European Community, including the United States. 
It is now the case that in this context the apprentice (the UK) has 
usurped the position of the master (the US) in terms of developing 
more liberal legal principles relating to harassment, although it could 
be argued that a new master has emerged (the EQ. 
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The Equality Deficit: Protection 
against Discrimination on the 
Grounds of Sexual Orientation in 
Employment 
Nicole Busby* and Sam Middlemiss 
The provisions of UK law offer no specific protection to gay men and 
lesbians suffering discrimination in the workplace on the grounds of 
sexual orientation. Such discrimination may take many forms and can 
result in 'fair' dismissal in certain circumstances. -This article considers 
the degree of legal protection available under current provisions and 
investigates possible sources for the development of specific anti- 
discrimination legislation. It is concluded that, despite the application 
of certain aspects of employment law, the level of protection afforded to 
this group of workers amounts to an equality deficit in comparison to the 
legal redress available to those discriminated against on other grounds. 
Although the development of human rights legislation may have some 
application in this context, the combination of institutionalized discrim- 
ination and wider public policy concerns suggest that the introduction of 
specific legislation aimed at eliminating such discrimination in the 
United Kingdom is still some way off. 
Keywords: equality, sex discrimination, sexual orientation, employment law 
Introduction 
T he legal rules covering equality of opportunity in the workplace in the 
UK do not extend to protecting gay men and lesbians from 
discriminatory practices. The Equal Opportunities Commission has recently 
called for the introduction of new laws to protect such employees against 
discrimination (EOC 1998). Furthermore, the European Court of justice 
(ECJ) has ruled that European Community law, in the form of Article 119 
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(now Article 141) of the EC Treaty and the Equal Pay Directive (75/117/EC), 
does not extend rights to persons discriminated against on grounds of 
sexual orientation. 
In Grant v South West Trains Ltd (1998) IRLR 206 (discussed later) the 
Court stated: IA'hile the European Parliament ... has indeed declared it deplores all forms of discrimination based on a person's sexual orientation, 
it is nevertheless the case that the Community has not as yet adopted rules 
providing for such equivalence' (at p. 218). Although protection may be 
available through pursuance of fundamental human rights under the 
European Convention of Human Rights which is now part of UK law 
following the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, the ECJ in Grant 
stated, 'homosexual relationships do not fall within the scope of the right to 
respect for family We under Article 8 of the Convention. ' (at 33). 1 
This appears to be an area of some uncertainty. In two recent cases before 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 2 the Court found that a 
Ministry of Defence policy which prol-dbited lesbians and gay men from 
serving in the armed forces did, in fact, constitute a violation of Article 8.3 
The potential scope offered to those pursuing claims involving discrimin- 
ation on the grounds of sexual orientation appears to have been signifi- 
cantly widened by this decision. This will be particularly relevant from 
2 October 2000 when the Human Rights Act 1998 will require all 'public 
authorities' to act in a manner compatible with rights and obligations under 
the Convention. However, as discussed later, the Court's judgment may 
be far more restrictive in terms of impact than a preliminary assessment 
might suggest as it will be limited by the particular facts of the case under 
consideration. This is not to say that the route for legal reform offered by 
way of intervention arising from the human rights legislation should be 
underestimated, rather that acceptance of this particular route as a viable 
engine of change may take some time and will never be a truly effect- 
ive substitute for specific legislation prohibiting discrimination on such 
grounds. 
Attempts at introducing legislation in this area in the UK have beert 
unsuccessful to date, although specific legislation at the European Com- 
munity level is now possible. The Sexual Orientation Discrimination Bill, a 
Private Member's Bill which was dropped at the Commons stage in October 
1998, was the third legislative proposal on this issue to be given parlia- 
mentary consideration in recent years. Progress at the European level, albeit 
slow, has been somewhat more promising to date. The European Parliament 
passed a Resolution on equal rights for gay men and lesbians in 1994' and 
an amendment to the EC Treaty by way of the new Article 131 confers new 
powers within the Community law-making process for the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of 'sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation'. The significance of this new Article is 
that it forms a suitable legal base for the introduction of specific legislation, 
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although the success of any such initiatives will depend on the attainment of 
unanimity at the Council of Ministers. 
In this article the current shortcomings of the law in failing to adequately 
address workplace discrimination against lesbians and gay men will be 
outlined with a view to considering possible future developments. The main 
difficulty encountered during previous attempts at the introduction of 
legislation appears to have been in the potential scope of such provisions 
and it is worth considering these concerns in order to assess the form future 
legal intervention should take. General employment protection provisions 
may currently offer some limited protection against discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation and merit scrutiny in the absence of specific 
measures. However, before considering the limited extent of current legal 
protection and the appropriate forms of potential legal remedies, it is 
necessary to analyse the nature and scope of discrimination against gay 
male and lesbian employees. 
Background to sexual orientation discrimination 
The independent advice agency, Lesbian and Gay Employment Rights 
(LAGER) has, for the past 15 years, provided advice, information and 
casework support to lesbians and gay men. The organization reports that, 
during this time, it has 
found discrimination against lesbians and gay men in all areas of the job 
market, covering many different professions ... Few employers have a 
spotless record when it comes to equal treatment for lesbians and gay 
men. This is true for both the public and private sectors, from the smallest 
of employers to the very large. (LAGER 1998, p. 4)6 
In the financial year 1997/8, LAGER received a total of 2098 calls requesting 
advice and information (an increase of 36% on the previous year) and took 
on 153 long-term cases -a number that could have been increased if 
additional resources had been available. The nature of the case work with 
which LAGER is involved is diverse, but includes incidences of workplace 
harassment of lesbians and gay men and the denial of promotion and career 
advancement and dismissal on the grounds of sexual orientation. 7 
Stonewall, 'a national lobbying organization working for legal equality 
and social justice for lesbians, bisexuals and gay men"8 undertook a survey 
of 2000 gay, lesbian and bisexual employees in 1993 (Palmer 1993). The 
results provided clear evidence of workplace discrimination: 16% of the 
respondents stated they had experienced discrimination at work; 48% had 
been harassed because of their sexual orientation and 68% felt the need to 
conceal their sexual orientation from some or all of their co-workers. 
Similar results were obtained in the first independent survey of lesbian, 
bisexual and gay male employees, undertaken by the Social and Community 
0 Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001 Volume 8 Number 4 October 2001 
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Plaru-dng Research Group in 1995 (Snape et al. 1995) in wl-dch it was found 
that 4% of respondents had been dismissed because of their sexuality, 8% 
had been refused promotion on such grounds and 21% had been the victims 
of harassment. 
The forms of discriminatory acts which arise in this context are re- 
markably similar to those arising in race, sex or disability discrimination, 
where legal protection is available by virtue of specific legislation (for 
examples of successful claims in the context of racial and sexual harassment 
respectively see Burton and Rhule v De Vere Hotels Ltd (1996) IRLR 596 and 
Strathclyde Regional Council v Porcell! (1986) IRLR 134). As the analyses of 
relevant cases involving lesbian and gay male workers below illustrate, 
there is evidence of such discrimination in recruitment and selection, during 
the currency of the employment contract (such as denial of access to 
promotion or training or subjection to harassment) and in termination of 
employment on discriminatory grounds. 9 
The unequal treatment of gay men and lesbians 
The ECJ has summed up the position of gay men and lesbians under 
European law in the following, clear terms, 'Community law as it stands at 
present does not cover discrimination based on sex orientation' (Grant v 
South West Trains Ltd (1998) at 47). TI-ds is also the position in the United 
Kingdom where the scope of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 has been 
narrowly interpreted in terms of sex and does not extend to discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. 10 Although this may seem somewhat out of step 
with the emergence in contemporary society of a more egalitarian stance, 
until spedfic legislative measures are forthcoming in either the European or 
domestic contexts there is little or, in some respects, no protection available 
against discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. The result of 
this is that such employees are in an inequitable position compared with 
other groups facing disadvantage in employment. 
Wintemute (1995) has asserted that sexual orientation discrin-dnation is, 
in itself, a form of sex discrimination and should, therefore, be actionable 
under the existing legislation. His argument is based on the premise that the 
imposition of legal restrictions on an individual's choices which are based 
on emotional-sexual conduct are wholly dependent on the sex/gender of the 
individual concerned. Thus, prevention of the use of legal redress as a 
means of remedying discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation 
amounts to sex-based discrimination. This is a compelling argument, 
particularly when placed in the human rights context. As Wintemute 
asserts: 
What advocates of sexual orientation discrimination must be persuaded 
to do is to accept and respect this extremely difficult and deeply personal 
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choice, whether or not they understand or approve of it. Most would be 
willing to do so in the case of persons who choose minority religious 
beliefs, and would not see the teaching of the existence of and respect for 
those beliefs as 'promoting' them. " 
The protection afforded by the provisions of human rights legislation will be 
considered later, but the line of reasoning adopted and subsequently 
developed by Wintemute (1997) also has application in the context of the 
current anti-discrimination provisions. The effective application of both the 
domestic and European Community provisions depends on successfully 
showing that the claimant has received less favourable treatment than a 
person of the 
12 
opposite sex has or would have received in the same 
circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is 
necessarily sex-based and could, therefore, simply be interpreted as direct 
sex discrimination which, in contrast to indirect sex discrimination, 13 is not 
subject to potential justifications. 71he logic applied in reaching such a 
position is similar to that successfully advanced in order to extend the Equal 
Treatment Directive (76/207) to cases involving discrimination on the 
grounds of pregnancy (see Dekker v Stichting, Case C-177/88 (1990) ECR I- 
3941). This line of reasoning is based on the assertion that prohibition of 
workplace discrimination entitles the individual to be judged on merit 
rather than on the basis of gender stereotyping which, as the cases analysed 
below demonstrate, is generally the underlying reason for discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. 14 
Furthermore, as the case law regarding discrimination on the grounds of 
pregnancy demonstrates, 15 the nature of certain discriminatory acts may 
obviate the need for a comparator altogether, thus assisting greatly in the 
advancement of such claims. This occurs where the act in question 
constitutes the application of a sex-based criterion. In the case of pregnancy, 
the relevant criterion is easily identified as pregnancy is 'a condition wl-dch 
affects only women'. 1' ' In cases involving discrimination on the grounds of 
homosexuality, the application of such reasoning is possible but necessitates 
acceptance of the notion that differential treatment on the grounds of 
sexuality also arises by application of a sex-based criterion - be it a gay 
man's sexual preference (see Saunders v Scottish National Camps 
Association (1981) IRLR 277 discussed below) or a lesbian's relationship 
with another woman (see Grant v South West Trains Ltd (1998) IRLR 206 
discussed below). The root causes of such discrimination are clearly linked 
to the sex of the individual to whom the differential treatment is applied - 
in specific terms, because the gay man or lesbian engages in (or would 
engage in) a same-sex relationship. 
The comparison between discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy 
and sexual orientation may appear, prima facie, to be spurious given that the 
former treatment arises due to biological difference and the latter, it could be 
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argued, due to a lifestyle choice. However, the application of anti- 
discrimination legislation to cases involving transsexualism has been 
successful on the same grounds and it is the development of the law in 
tl-Lis context that, perhaps, offers a more suitable parallel for consideration of 
the possible extension of the current provisions to discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation. 
The transsexual case law 
In PvS and Cornwall County Council (Case C-13/94 (1996) IRLR 347), a 
male employee who intended to undergo gender reassignment was 
dismissed. The Employment Tribunal referred the case to the European 
Court of Justice for consideration of whether the Equal Treatment Directive 
applied. In finding that discrimination on such grounds is contrary to 
European Con-anunity law, the Court held that 'the scope of the Directive 
cannot be confined simply to discrimination based on the fact that a person 
is of one or other sex' (at p. 20). In applying the provisions of the Directive to 
cases of gender reassignment, the Court held that such discrin-dnation 'is 
based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned' (at 
p. 21). 17 The appropriate comparison, as deemed by the Court, was between 
P's status as a non-transsexual male (as perceived by her employers prior to 
their knowledge of her decision to undergo gender reassignment) and her 
actual status as a male-to-female transsexual. This is a complex distinction 
under UK law as a transsexual, even after the successful completion of 
gender reassignment, retains the legal status of his/her sex at birtlL 
Accordingly, the comparison applied is, de facto, an intra-sex comparison 
and is not dependent on biological difference. 18 
The UK courts were soon given the opportunity to apply the reasoning of 
the ECJ in Chessington World of Adventures Ltd v Reed (1997) IRLR 556. In 
this case, the EAT held that the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 could be 
extended to cover unfavourable treatment on the grounds of a statement of 
intention to undergo gender reassignment. The tribunal found that, in such 
cases: 'there is no requirement for a male/female comparison to be made' (at 
pp. 518-19). If this line of reasoning were to be extended to cases involving 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, the correct comparator 
in such cases would be a heterosexual person of the same sex as the 
complainant. 19 The decision in PvS actually removed completely the need 
for any external comparator 
An attempt to apply the ratio in the transsexual cases to sexual 
orientation discrimination was made in the Grant case in which a lesbian 
employee was denied access to travel concessions in respect of her partner 
even though such concessions were granted to unmarried heterosexual 
couples. 20 In support of her claim, Grant argued that the appropriate 
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comparator should be a heterosexual woman whose male partner had been 
granted the travel concessions denied Grant's female partner. However, the 
ECJ chose to apply a narrow interpretation of its earlier decision in PvS by 
stating- 
The Court [in Pv S] considered that discrimination [in that case] was in 
fact based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person 
concerned. That reasoning ... is limited to the case of a worker's gender 
reassignment and does not therefore apply to differences of treatment 
based on a person's sexual orientation. (at p. 31) 
The distinction made by the Court is questionable and will be considered 
later in the context of the corresponding policy implications arising from the 
possible extension of protection under existing legislation to cases involving 
sexual orientation discrimination. However, as the current judicial inter- 
pretation of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 excludes protection on such 
grounds, it is pertinent to explore other legislative provisions in the 
domestic context under which claims of differential treatment may be 
advanced. 
The limited protection presently afforded to such workers arises in the 
context of certain statutory rights in respect of which-gay men and lesbians 
will be in the same legal position as other employees, for example, in 
relation to transfers of undertakings and redundancy. Furthermore, some 
types of discriminatory acts could substantiate the basis for other statutory 
claims (such as unfair dismissal) or directly or indirectly represent the basis 
for cornmon law actions under contract or tort. 
Protection against discriminatory acts 
It seems likely that there is no existing remedy for gay men or lesbian 
employees discriminated against because of their sexual orientation in the 
context of the recruitment and selection process. 2' Although the anti- 
discrimination provisions are intended to convey equality of opportunity, 
this right is specifically restricted to certain definitions contained within the 
legislation and, for this reason, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 is unlikely to 
offer much protection. The Act is only applicable where the ground for 
discrimination is clearly related to sex but not sexual orientation. 
Where discrimination takes place during the currency of contract, given 
that equality rights do not apply, the only likely remedy may be to bring a 
claim for breach of the contract. However, it is hard to envisage that such a 
claim could be based on breach of an express term in the contract as it is 
unlikely the employee would have express contractual rights to promotion, 
training or transfer, which could be enforced if denied them on discrim- 
inatory grounds. It is also difficult to determine how application of implied 
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terms in this context would provide much assistance without an element of 
creative application by the courts. An action for constructive dismissal on 
the basis of breach of an implied term may be justifiable, but a remedy 
against homosexual harassment is unlikely to be given. Both types of statu- 
tory claim and appropriate common law actions will be considered later. 
Unfair dismissal 
Where the gay man or lesbian is dismissed simply because of their sexua 
orientation, this may amount to a 'fair' dismissal in certain circumstances 
Dismissal will often occur in circumstances where the employer become. - 
aware of their employee's sexual orientation during the currency of thi 
contract and takes the view that continuation of employment has becorn, 
untenable. 
The employer's defence in such cases is often presented as being that th. 
dismissal was necessary in order to protect other employees. This wa 
illustrated by the Bell case (discussed below), in which a threat by policeme: 
to boycott a canteen that employed a homosexual chef would probably hav 
justified a dismissal if the correct procedure had been followed. A 
alternative line of defence is that it was deemed necessary to dismiss th 
employee in order to protect the client base of the company (as in Boychuc 
below). The scant case law on homosexual disrnissal does not give ground 
for optimism that a case brought under the current provisions of e 
Employment Rights Act 1996 (ss. 94-98) would be successful. 
In Boychuck v Symons Holdings Ltd (1977) IRLR 395 the dismissal of 
lesbian for wearing a badge with the words 'lesbians igr-dte', was held to t 
fair on the basis that the badge was likely to cause offence to colleagues ar 
customers of the firm. However, in the following year in Bell v Devon ar 
Cornwall Police Authority (1978) IRLR 283 a tribunal found in favour 
a cook employed in a police canteen who had been dismissed because I 
was a homosexual, although their ruling of unfair disn-Lissal was strong 
influenced by a failure on the part of the employer to follow a prop 
disciplinary procedure. 
Any optimism concerning gay men and lesbians' prospects for success 
unfair dismissal claims arising from the Bell case were short-lived 
evidenced by the Employment Appeal Tribunal's (EAT) ruling in Saundt 
v Scottish National Camps Association (1981) IRLR 277. In this case, ag 
man working as a handyman at a children's camp was dismissed because 
his homosexuality. His job did not require him to come into contact with t 
children, and, in any event, a psychiatrist's report showed he was no danj 
to them, but his dismissal was held to be fair. The decision was justifi 
on the spurious basis that there was a commonly-held perception tl 
homosexuals are a danger to children and, therefore, a reasonable emplo, 
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would have dismissed him. Here, assumptions based on stereotyping 
(which have so effectively been outlawed in the context of sex discrim- 
ination in cases such as Skyrail Oceanic Ltd v Coleman (1981) ICR 864 and 
Hurley v Mustoe (1981) ICR 490) regarding the perceived behaviour of gay 
men were at the root of the EAT's decision. 
It is hardly surprising that gay men and lesbians are disinclined to pursue 
unfair dismissal rights and have attempted instead to claim compensation 
for dismissal under equality legislation. However, as indicated earlier, this 
approach has also proved fruitless to date with both UK and European 
courts refusing to grant such a remedy. 
Protection against harassment on grounds of 
sexual orientation 
The surveys referred to earlier concerning the extent and nature of such 
discrimination have indicated a high incidence of workplace harassment of 
gay and lesbian employees. Workplace harassment can also adversely affect 
women (see Strathclyde Regional Council v Porceffi (1986) IRLR 134, Ct of 
Session), members of a racial grouping or ethnic minority (see Jones v Tower 
Boot CO (1997) IRLR 168, CA), a physically or mentally impaired employee 
or a transsexual (see Chessington World of Adventures Ltd v Reed (1997) 
IRLR 556, EAT). Unlike these other categories of employee, gay men and 
lesbians are denied any statutory protection against harassment as there is 
currently no legislation specifically prohibiting sexual orientation discrim- 
ination. The United Kingdom and European courts have been unable to 
extend protection against discrimination on such grounds under the existing 
provisions of domestic and European Community equality law and the 
reasoning applied in relevant case law can be illustrated by the case of 
Smith v Gardner Merchant (1998) IRLR 510. 
Smith, a gay man, was employed as a barman. He was dismissed by his 
employer because he had been accused of treating a female colleague in a 
threatening and aggressive manner. He claimed she had sexually harassed 
him on the basis of his sexual orientation and that this represented 
discrimination under section 1(1)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The 
Court of Appeal recognized that if a gay man were subjected to less 
favourable treatment than a comparable lesbian, such treatment would 
constitute unlawful discrimination. However, as this argument was not 
advanced in the context of Smith's claim, the Court held that '[d]iscrimin- 
ation on grounds of sexual orientation is not discrimination on ground of 
sex within the meaning of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. A person's 
sexual orientation is not an aspect of his or her sex. ' 
In cases of this nature, the obstacle for the gay man or lesbian apph- 
cant often lies in the terminology adopted in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
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and the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EC). The requireme 
produce evidence of inequality of treatment which underpin 
application of the legislation involves comparison with another emp 
not of the same sex within the same employment who has rec 
preferential treatment. Where the harassment is on the grounds of s 
orientation, the real comparator (i. e. a fellow male employee who -' 
gay) will be deemed inappropriate under the legislation as both indivi 
are of the same sex. Furthermore, in using an inter-sex comparison, th 
man may be unable to claim unequal treatment because a lesbiar 
appropriate comparator as deemed by the courts, is likely to suffer si 
treatment. 
As discussed earlier, transsexuals are protected from discrirnir 
under European Community Law on the basis that discriminator) 
undertaken on the ground of gender reassignment are contrary to the I 
Treatment Directive. Following this interpretation of European Comm 
law, most employment lawyers assumed that the Equal Treatment Dire 
would be interpreted as extending equality rights to gay men and lesl 
However, the decisions in the Grant and Smith cases (mentioned ez 
and Rv Secretary of State for Defence, ex: parte Perkins (No 2) (1998) 
S08 have dispelled such a view unequivocally. This is surprising give 
fact that the EC Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment specif 
identifies lesbian and gay employees as being particularly vulneral 
harassment and is intended to extend rights to such employees. 22 
In Johnson v Gateway Supermarkets Ltd COIT 4079/90 a woman 
was indecently touched by a female colleague was able to establisl 
discrimination on the basis that a male colleague would not have 
similarly treated. In Gates v Security Express Guards COIT 45152/i 
employee who was subjected to homosexual harassment by his super 
was able to establish sex discrimination on the basis that the behavioui 
contrary to the EC code of practice. It appears that where the harasse 
gay man or a lesbian, as in these cases, the victim may have a right of a 
under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. In cases where the harass 
heterosexual and the victim is homosexual and the harassment is 
bullying nature, a strict application of the principles of equality will 
result in victims being denied any legal remedy under discrimination 
as long as the heterosexual harasser can show that they are equally likc 
harass gay men and lesbians on the grounds of their sexual orientatioi 
regardless of their gender. 
One avenue of legal redress under statute for victims of homos( 
harassment is through pursuance of a case under sections I and 
England and Wales (or section 8 in Scotland) of the Protection 
Harassment Act 1997. This provides a tort of harassment which is brea 
where a person pursues a course of conduct which amounts to harassi 
of another and 'is intended to amount to harassment of that persor 
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occurs in circumstances where it would appear to a reasonable person that it 
would 'amount to harassment of that person' (section 8(1) (a) and (b)). 
In relying on these provisions as the basis for a claim, the concepts of 
equality of treatment and sexual orientation would not be central features 
which, given the shortcomings of the law which have been identified, would 
clearly be of benefit in this context. There is also a possibility of obtaining an 
injunction to stop the harassment which would clearly be in the interests of 
the victim. Under English law, the new crin-dnal offence of intentional 
harassment under section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 (inserted by The 
Criminal justice and Public Order Act 1994) is 'wide enough to cover 
harassment on the grounds of sexual orientation' (IRLB 1996, p. 7). 
As illustrated, it is possible in some limited respects for gay men and 
lesbians to claim protection against discrimination by the use of general 
provisions. The application of such provisions to cases involving sexual 
orientation often requires some creativity on the part of the judiciary which 
has not always been forthcoming. The obvious solution to such short- 
con-dngs would be to introduce specific legislation to protect gay men and 
lesbians against all forms of discrimination in employment, including 
harassment. This would obviate the need in the future for the introduction 
of complicated legal arguments designed to overcome the obstacles 
presented by the current equality laws. David Pannick writing on this 
matter thirteen years ago stated: 
An anti-discrimination law prohibiting discrimination against persons on 
the ground of their sexual preferences in certain contexts and with 
defined exceptions, coupled with a repeal of the barriers to homosexual 
equality contained in existing legislation and common law, would be an 
important statement of the values of tolerance of a civilised society. (1985, 
p. 207) 
The level of protection for gay men and lesbians against discrimination in 
employment has not improved in recent years and the prospect for victims 
of such harassment successfully pursuing a case under existing discrin-Lin- 
ation law is very poor. Cases brought under other provisions may offer some 
chance of success although such actions will undeniably be subject to 
uncertainty. The Sexual Orientation Discrimination Bill 1998 was a recent 
attempt to address some of these issues and, although the Bill was dropped, 
it is salient to analyse its provisions and the reasons for its failure in order to 
consider the form of future legislative measures. 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Bill 1998 
The failure of the Sexual Orientation Discrimination Bill 1998 to make it 
through the Commons during the 1997/98 session was a case of third time 
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unlucky for Baroness Turner of Camden who has attempted to bring a 
Private Members Bill extending protection against discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation on two previous occasions. On her first 
attempt in 1995, the Bill failed due to lack of time and, in 1996, the Bill was 
adopted by the House of Lords but failed to make progress in the Coinmons. 
Baroness Turner has described her proposal as 'a simple Bill designed to 
protect vulneTable people, 23 and the length and drafting of the Bill certainly 
support this statement. However, during its second reading in the Lords, it 
emerged that the Government's position with respect to the Bill, as 
presented by Baroness Blackstone, Minister of State, DfEE, was far from 
simple. It is worth setting out the Government's objections to the Bill in 
order to consider the perceived complexities presented by such legislation, 
but first, the 'simplicity' of the proposals can be illustrated by a brief 
overview. 
The aim of the Bill was to extend the provisions of the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation 
using the definition contained in New Zealand's Human Rights Act which is 
'a person's heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation. 
Clause 5 proposed to extend the powers of the Equal Opportunities 
Commission to enable that organization to bring proceedings on the 
grounds of sexual orientation discrimination and Clause 7 sought to apply 
the provisions of the Equal Pay Act 1970 to gay men, lesbians and bisexuals. 
In presenting the Government's response to the Bill, Baroness Blackstone 
quoted from the Labour Party's manifesto: 'The country's attitudes to race, 
sex and sexuality have changed fundamentally. The Labour Party's task is to 
combine change and social stability ... We will seek to end unjustifiable discrimination where it exists. ' In defending the Government's stance on the 
furtherance of the legal rights of gay men and lesbians, various reforms 
were cited such as the insertion of a new Article 13 into the Amsterdam 
Treaty which was introduced during the UK's presidency of the European 
Union24 and the Government's commitment to review the position of 
homosexuals in the Armed Forces. However, on turning to the Bill, Baroness 
Blackstone stressed the Government's commitment to 'the need to consider 
how all policies impact on the family'. The real difficulty faced by the 
Government in considering the wider implications of the Bill was 
represented as the treatment of 'same sex couples as the equivalent of a 
family unit' with the necessary policy approach being 'to tread a careful 
path between taking account of social reality and at the same time ensuring 
that we do not undermine the family'. 
Areas of specific difficulty supporting this line of argument were 
presented as being the prohibition of indirect discrimination on the grounds 
of sexual orientation (which could have the effect of making any benefits 
derived through marriage unlawful); the possible impact on occupational 
pensions paying survivors' benefits; the impact on the armed forces' rules 
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, vl-, ich presently prohibit 
the accompaniment of unmarried partners on 
overseas tours; the 
blanket exclusion of non-married couples from adoption 
and succession rights 
in housing tenancies which currently exist for 
surviving heterosexual but, not 
homosexual, partners. In sumn-dng up, the 
Baroness stressed the Government's reservations were 'about scope and 
fz-Ling, not about the good intentions of the Bill'. It is difficult to accept this 
line of argument as the potential problem areas outlined by Baroness 
Blackstone arise largely out of fundamental policy concerns which will not 
be easily addressed by a slight shift of emphasis or a delay in the 
introduction of such legislation. 
The UK policy dimension 
The Government's primary concern. appears to have been the extension of 
rights currently enjoyed exclusively by those residing withdn the traditional 
, family unit' founded on marriage to unmarried, co-habiting couples, be 
they heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual. Emphasis was placed on the 
costs involved in extending such rights to this large group; the cost to 
the Civil Service of conferring survivors' pension benefits to unmarried 
couples would amount to approximately : E20 million a year alone. 
The stance adopted by the Government in this context, although not 
overtly anti-homosexual has an unfortunate effect in its juxtapositioning of 
the central value of the fan-dly and marriage' and 'other forms of 
partnersl-dP and other ways of bringing up children which are also valid'. 
In stating its primary concern, as being to support and perpetuate the 'family 
unit' (but not a same sex couple, which the Bill 'invites us to treat as the 
equivalent of a family urtit'), the Government's position is both prescriptive 
and moralistic although apparently justifiable on economic grounds. 
An interesting contrast can be drawn between the failure of the Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination Bill and the recently-introduced government 
legislation aimed at prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of intending 
to undergo, undergoing or having undergone gender reassignment. 25 The 
legislation takes the form of an amendment to the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 by way of Regulations made under the European Communities Act. 
The need to legislate arose due to the UK's obligation to ensure that 
domestic law complied with the provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive 
following the ECJ's decision in the UK referral, PvS and Cornwall County 
Council (discussed earlier). In tl-ds and subsequent cases, the Court has 
drawn a distinction between discrimination on the grounds of sex or gender, 
for example on the grounds of transsexualism, which is contrary to the prin- 
ciple of equal treatment under Community law and discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation, which is not. This is a crucial distinction 
which, if sustained, means that existing provisions regarding the prohibitiort 
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of discrimination in both the LTK and European contexts can never be 
applied in order to extend the employment rights of gay men and lesbians. 
Given this position and the failure of legislative measures at the UK level, it 
would appear that new forms of legal intervention arising in the European 
context offer the only viable means by which such discrimination could be 
effectively outlawed. 
European Community Law and sexual orientation 
The existing provisions of European law which are relevant in this area can 
be divided into two categories: 'soft law' measures which are not legally 
binding but which operate as sources of guidance, such as the existing Code 
of Practice and Recommendation on the protection of the dignity of women 
and men at work (1991) and existing 'hard law' measures, such as the 
equality directives. In the introduction to the Code of Practice, the specific 
groups identified as being particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment in 
the workplace are identified and gay men and lesbians are expressly 
included in this categorization. The Code states, 'It is undeniable that 
harassment on grounds of sexual orientation undermines the dignity at 
work of those affected and it is impossible to regard such harassment as 
appropriate workplace behaviour. ' 
Although tribunals and courts have attached some weight to the 
provisions of the Code in deciding on issues of heterosexual harassment, 
in the context of harassment on the grounds of sexual orientation, the lack of 
any supporting 'hard law' provisions means that, in this respect, the Code is 
little more than a statement of good intent. As we have seen, existing 'hard 
law' measures such as the Equal Treatment and Equal Pay Directives do not 
have application in this area and, thus, cannot be said to provide a route for 
legal redress. 
In October 1997 the Member States of the European Union agreed to the 
inclusion of a new Article 13 in the Treaty of Amsterdam which will bestow 
upon the Commission the power to take 'appropriate action' regarding 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. By virtue of this 
provision, the introduction of specific legal measures in this respect is at 
least possible. Assessment of whether such intervention at European level is 
likely requires further analysis of previous attempts at the application of 
existing provisions which, although unsuccessful to date, provides some 
insight into the wider jurisprudential issues involved. 
In the transsexual case, PvS and Cornwall County Council (discussed 
earlier), the ECJ held that Articles 2(l) and 5(l) of the Equal Treatment 
Directive preclude dismissal on account of gender reassignment. Advocate- 
General Tesauro's opinion, which appears to have been followed by the 
Court, offers some interesting insights into the reasoning applied in this 
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case, particularly in the context of the extension of legal protection to 
individuals whose circumstances may not have been directly considered at 
the time that the legislation was drafted: 
in society as it is today in which customs and morals are changing 
rapidly, citizens are guaranteed ever wider and deeper protection of their 
freedoms ... To my mind the 
law cannot cut itself off from society as it 
actually is and must not fail to adjust to it as quickly as possible. 
otherwise it risks imposing outdated views and taking on a static role. 
(at p. 9) 
The apparent 'widening' of the scope of the Equal Treatment Directive to 
enable discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment to fall under 
its auspices, was justified by the Court in PvS on the grounds that toler- 
ance of such discrimination 'would be tantamount ... to a failure to respect 
the dignity and freedom to which [the transsexual] is entitled, and which the 
Court has a duty to safeguard' (at p. 22). Subsequent attempts at proving a 
similar degree of protection against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation would appear to suggest that gay men and lesbians are not 
entitled to the same degree of 'respect and freedom', under European law. 
However, if closer attention is paid to the Court's consideration of the Grant 
case and subsequent developments a different picture emerges which is by 
no means as definitive as a scant consideration might suggest. 
Grant's claim before the European Court was based on the denial of equal 
pay on the grounds of sexual orientation and, in order to consider tl-ds claim, 
the Court was asked to rule on the applicability of Article 141 and the Equal 
Pay Directive to such cases. This fact distinguishes the claim in PvS from 
that in Grant as the cases were concerned with different provisions of 
European Community law. It could be argued that the general concept of 
equality which is present in all Community instruments dealing with such 
issues confers a common goal and a common approach. However, the 
jurisprudential development of the concept of equality is subject to different 
standards depending on the context of the claim. Equal pay, having as it 
does a clear connection with economic factors, has traditionally been 
interpreted in a more conservative vein than the corresponding provision of 
equal treatment. 
In Advocate-General Elmer's opinion in the Grant case, from which the 
Court on this occasion dissented, the issue of justification for discrimination 
on moral grounds is considered on the basis that the employer's attempted 
defence arises from the fact that 'cohabitation with a person of the same sex 
is not traditionally regarded as equivalent to a heterosexual relationship'. 
The Advocate-General rejected this assertion out of hand in finding that, in 
his opinion, such discrimination on the basis of gender cannot be justified 
by reference to the fact that the employer's intention is to confer benefits on 
heterosexual couples as opposed to homosexual couples'. 
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In general. terms, this line of reasoning appears to be consistent with the 
Court's earlier ruling in PvS and the 'widening' of the scope of the prin- 
ciple of equality on the basis that it is social reality rather than subjective 
notions of morality wl-dch should be the guiding influences in this respect. 
In giving its decision in Grant, the Court expressly chose not to support this 
line of reasoning in finding that, 'an employer is not required by 
Community law to treat the situation of a person who has a stable 
relationship with a partner of the same sex as equivalent to that of a person 
who is married to or has a stable relationship outside marriage with a 
partner of the opposite sex. ' Justification for this stance was presented as 
being based on 'the present state of the law within the Community' which, 
at present, does not provide specific protection against discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation. 
A later UK referral to the ECJ concerning the applicability of the Equal 
Treatment Directive was withdrawn following the Court's decision in Grant 
and this case is worthy of consideration at least in terms of the missed 
opportunity it represents. In Rv Secretary of State for Defence, ex parte 
Perkins (1997) IRLR 297, the claimant was dismissed from his post as a 
medical assistant at a Royal Navy hospital in pursuance of the armed forces' 
policy 'Of discharging any person of homosexual orientation. Mr Perkins 
sought judicial review contending that this policy was in contravention of 
Article 2(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive which provides that, 'the 
principle of equal treatment shall mean that there will be no discrimination 
whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in 
particular to marital or family status'. Accordingly, a reference to the 
European Court of Justice was made under Article 177 of the EC Treaty. 
Following the European Court's ruling in the Grant case, the High Court 
took the decision to withdraw this reference on the grounds that the 
decision in Grant had established that Community law does not render 
discrimination based on sexual orientation unlawful. In giving his decision, 
Lightman, J. expressed his reluctance in withdrawing the case and 
recognized the possibility that the ECJ could depart from its previous 
decision in Grant if given the opportunity to consider the present case. 
However, he went on to state, 'to justify a reference the possibility that the 
ECJ will depart from its previous decision must be more than theoretical: it 
must be a realistic possibility ... I can see no realistic prospect of any change 
of mind on the part of the ECJ' (R v Secretary of State for Defence, ex parte 
Perkins (No 2) (1998) IRLR 508 at 698). 
That the European Court was not given the opportunity to consider 
Perkins' claim is unfortunate, not least due to the substantive differences 
that exist between the two cases, Grant's claim being based on the pro- 
visions of Article 141 and the Equal Pay Directive and Perkins' claim on the 
Equal Treatment Directive. The nature and corresponding implications of 
the claims are diverse: Grant was concerned with the provision of financial 
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benefits to homosexual partners 
thus rendering direct consideration of the 
nature of such relationships 
and the resultant policy implications, whereas 
the central issue in 
Perkins was the application of the fundamental principle 
equal treatment to 
homosexuals in respect of their working conditions. 
'With 
respect to the factual and legal bases of the original claims, Perkins 
to have had more in common with the successful transsexual case appears 
p, v S (see earlier) than with the unsuccessful claim 
by Grant. 
That the line of reasoning applied in order to confer the provisions of the 
Equal Treatment Directive to transsexuals could have been sustained with 
dd lesbians by the Court's consideration of the Perkins ýegar to gay men I 
case, is by no means certain. 
However, such consideration would have 
provided a valuable insight into the jurisprudential development of the 
principle of equal treatment as well as a test of the Court's cornmitment to 
adapt in line with social reality. 
The lasting impact of the Court's decision in 
the Grant case, as evidenced by the fate of Perkins' claim, is that application 
the ECJ as a viable means of furthering the legal rights of gay men and 
-dnation in the workplace has been effectively 'blocked lesbians facing discrin 
-off, with regard to future claims regardless of the nature of such claims. 
Given the perceived inability or reluctance of the judiciary in either the 
UK or European courts to effectively utilize existing legal provisions in 
order to assist in the furtherance of protection from discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation, it is relevant to consider alternative means by 
which such discrimination may be effectively addressed. In the current 
absence of specific statutory provisions, the application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the recently introduced Human Rights 
Act 1998 will be considered. 
The European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 
The European Convention on Human Rights was ratified by the post-war 
Labour government in 1951 and came into force in 1953. Under the terms of 
the Convention, the High Contracting Parties undertake to secure everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. 
The procedure for enforcement of these rights was recently reformed26 With 
the creation of a new Court with new powers. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 was introduced in order to honour the 
Government's manifesto pledge to incorporate the European Convention on 
Human Rights into domestic law. Operation of the Act is by the imposition 
of a duty on domestic courts to interpret legislation in order to give effect to 
the rights contained in the Convention. The Act comes fully into force on 
2 October 2000 when the rights created by the Convention will be dir- 
ectly enforceable against 'public authorities' through the domestic courts. 
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However, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has directly held, 
in two recent cases brought by British subjects, that the armed forces'blanket 
ban on homosexuals contravenes the right to respect for private life under 
Article 8 of the Convention. 
Respect for private life as a fundamental human right 
The basis of the claims in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom and Lustig- 
Prean and Another v United Kingdom" was a Ministry of Defence policy 
which prohibits gay men and lesbians from serving in the UK armed forces 
on the basis of sexual orientation. The policy states, 'homosexuality is 
incompatible with service in the Armed Forces. Service personnel who are 
known to be homosexual or who engage in homosexual activity are 
administratively discharged from the Armed Forces. ' 
The four applicants, who were serving in the Royal Navy and the 
RAF, were subjected to an investigative procedure involving searches of 
their personal belongings and intimate questions about their sexual 
orientation and practices. The investigations continued after they had 
admitted they were gay. The four applicants were discharged from the 
Royal Navy and the RAF in 1994. Their application for judicial review 
was rejected by the High Court and the Court of Appeal upheld thic 
decision. 28 The applicants then commenced proceedings in the ECI-B 
arguing that the blanket ban and the treatment that they had receivee 
during the investigation amounted to, inter alia, a violation of thei: 
human rights under Article 8 of the Convention which provides a right t( 
respect for private and family life. 
The Court found the armed forces' ban on homosexuals to be in violatioi 
of Article 8 and that enquiries made into the applicants' sex lives afte 
admission of sexual orientation also constituted violation of Article 8. Th 
Ministry of Defence's attempted justifications (on bases of national secui 
ity and prevention of disorder) were held to be for legitimate aims an 
in accordance with UK law generally. However, the Court expressed doub- 
about whether such severe treatment was 'necessary in a democratic societ 
and found no evidence to substantiate the claims that a change of poli( 
would damage morale and fighting power. The UK's assertion that int 
gration was impossible at tl-ds stage was rejected as most European cou 
tries allowed homosexuals to serve in the armed forces with no particul 
difficulties. 
At first glance, the judgments of the Court appear to have far-reaclib 
implications that have been lauded by some as 'extremely wide' (EOR ISK. 
IDS 1999). Whereas the significance of these historic decisions should r 
be underestimated, the present authors take a rather more sceptical vif 
on the grounds that the particular facts of the cases and the provisions 
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Convention themselves will place certain restrictions on their future 
pplicatiOn- 
ý, First, that the application of 
Article 8 to a policy which serves as an 
: ýsolute bar has resulted in a finding of violation is hardly -surprising. 
ffýwever, to assume that this will provide an effective remedy in a range of 
Aisilissal cases involving sexual orientation discrimination requires a huge 
leýp. As the cases analysed earlier in this article illustrate, the current 
difficulties faced by gay men and lesbians in fl-ds respect do not generally 
e application of explicit policy, but rather due to more covert iiiiseout of th 
j6d intangible motives. Furthermore, the protection offered by Article 8 is 
tia]ly subject to justification on certain grounds and it was here that the =try 
of Defence policy fell down. In other words, justification on 
accýptable grounds would 
have deemed the policy legitimate and it is this 
poýential defence which could 
be utilized by employers in the future in 
; eJer to escape liability (for example, on the grounds of the protection of a 
diýnt base as in the Boychuc-k case discussed earlier). 
-'Scond, the ECHR's judgments are further limited in terms of the other 
aspect of the particular claims 
before the Court, namely the nature and 
extent of the investigations carried out in those cases. Again it is hardly 
ýýrprising that the Court found a violation of Article 8 in ffids respect. The 
nwans employed were extremely intrusive and heavy-handed, particularly 
as the investization continued after the individuals concerned had admitted 
q1eir homosexuality. The future application of these cases, which clearly 
. 
'represent a victory for gay men and lesbians facing exclusion from cer- 
taý professions, is limited by the extreme and unusual facts of the claims. 
offered by way of the implementation of the Con 
into domestic law remains to be seen, but, given the 
ti tradition of judicial interpretation in this respect to date, it conserva, ve 
seems prudent to proceed with caution rather than opffir-Lism. 
Despite the widespread enthusiasm with which employment lawyers 
initially greeted the introduction of the Human Rights Act, it is uncertain 
whether the provisions will prove particularly useful in the furtherance of 
hitherto non-existent employment rights. The effectiveness of human rights 
legislation in this respect will not necessarily be hindered by the nature of 
the approach taken by such provisions, but rather by the scope of the 
,, ýConvention itself and corresponding 
domestic law. In other jurisdictions 
human rights legislation has been specifically targeted in order to extend 
I rights to homosexual employees. New Zealand's Human Rights Act 1993 
--which was used as the 
template in definitional terms for the unsuccessful 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Bill (discussed earlier), specifically 
prohibits discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation in the area of 
employment. 
The effectiveness of the new UK legislation in this respect is, of course, 
purely speculative at this stage. However, as Ewing has noted, the 
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Convention applies to a such a narrow range of employment-related issues 
that 'it may provide a useful basis for filling in gaps, but it is no substitute 
for carefully tailored legislation dealing with such matters as sexual 
orientation discrimination' (Ewing 1998, p. 291). 
Conclusion 
Despite the lack of protection against discrimination in employment 
currently endured by gay men and lesbian employees under UK law which 
has been identified, there appears to be little cause for optimism with regard 
to future developments. The judiciary in both the UK and European con- 
texts, although largely sympathetic to the absence of legal remedies in this 
respect, appear to be united in the belief that discrimination on such 
grounds is outwith the scope of existing anti-discrin-tination measures. The 
extension of the Equal Treatment Directive to discrimination on the grounds 
of transsexualism which has led to legislative initiatives in both the UK and 
European jurisdictions has been disallowed with respect to homosexuality, 
thereby removing the possibility of similar developments regardless of the 
nature of future claims. 
The possibility of the introduction of specific legislation seems unlikely in 
the UK context due to the wider policy implications which would arise from 
the equal treatment of homosexual relationships with heterosexual relation- 
ships, particularly with regard to benefits currently enjoyed by marrieý 
couples. Existing legislation which currently provides basic employmen 
rights may be useful in some respects but is fairly limited in this context 
Recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are encouragin, 
and tl-ds certainly appears to be an area with scope for future developmew 
The future use of human rights legislation, relatively new to the UI< 
may also have some application, but it is possible that the judiciary in th 
UK will continue to apply conservative interpretations to potentially usef, 
provisions. 
The most likely source of future legislative intervention appears to I 
through European Community law, where the introduction of the ne 
Article 13 at least places the prohibition of such discrimination on the poli( 
agenda. However, the main hurdle to be overcome in this respect is tl 
requirement of unanimity at the Council of Ministers. At a recent address 
the European Parliamentary Intergroup of Gay and Lesbian Rights, Padra 
Flynn, Social Affairs Commissioner, made the following statement, 
to be quite frank, it is much too early, at this juncture, to come to any ffi 
conclusions about what should be done and what could be done in ter, 
of specific anti-discrimination measures. We should also be conscious 
the limitations of the new Treaty article. Action to combat discri1r, 
ation can only be taken on foot of a unanimous Council decision (a 
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consultation with parliament). We all know how difficult it can be to get 
unanimity in what may be, let's face it, controversial areas. The provision 
falls far short of providing for the outlawing of discrimination with direct 
effect, which many had sought. ' 
For the gay male or lesbian applicant facing discriminatory practices in 
relation to access to employment or during the currency of the contract in 
the UK, such slow progress will be of little comfort. The current state of UK 
law in this context is a sad reflection of workplace culture where it appears, 
in terms of a black letter application of the law at least, homophobic 
practices will continue to be tolerated for the foreseeable future. 
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Notes 
1. See Rv Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith and Others (1996) IRLR 100 where the 
Court of Appeal was of the same opinion. 
2_ Lustig-Prean and Anor v United Kingdom; Smith and Anor v United Kingdom, 
ECHRý 27.9.99, (31417/96,32377/96,33985/96,33986/96). 
3. The provisions of the Convention that have application here are Article 8 which 
provides the right to respect for private and family life and Article 14, which is 
not in itself a free standing right, but which guarantees access to the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Convention without 'discrimination on any ground' 
expressly in the contexts of sex, race, colour, religion, political or other opinion and 
national or social origin, but not specifically on the ground of sexual orientation. 
Although the Convention has been successfully invoked in previous cases 
dealing with homosexuality, most notably Dudgeon v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 149 and 
Norris v Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186, the scope of such judgments has tended to 
be outwith the specific field of employment, rather in respect of the right to a 
homosexual lifestyle. 
4. Resolution of the European Parliament on equal rights for gay men and lesbians 
in the EC, QJ No C 61/41,28.2.94. 
, 5. Which replaced 
Article 6a when the Amsterdam Treaty came into force on 1 May 
1999. 
6. For empirical research relating to the experiences of lesbians and gay men 
employed in the public sector, see Humphrey (1999). 
7. For examples of the range of cases handled by LAGER, see the case studies 
outlined in the LAGER Annual Report (1997/8, pp. 4-8). 
8. See Stonewall Factsheet (1998) 'Stonewall: Working for Lesbian and Gay 
Equali 
9. For sptfic examples of the nature and range of discriminatory acts in this 
th 
context, see Lager Annual Report (1997/8, note 5) and for studies concerning the 
o Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001 Volume 8 Number 4 October 2001 
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impact and underlying causes of such acts see Campaign for Homosexi 
Equality (1981); Greasley (1986); Taylor (1986). 
10. As detailed later, it should be noted that the Grant case was concerned witl 
claim for equal pay under Article 119 (now 141) of the Treaty of Rome and I 
Equal Pay Directive (75/117), not the Equal Treatment Directive which is imp 
mented in domestic law by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. However, the cent 
point at this juncture is that the anti-discrimination provisions in both the EC a 
UK contexts have been effectively 'blocked off' from providing a possible mez 
of legal remedy in cases concerned with sexual orientation discrimination. 
11. Wintemute (1995, p. 495). 
12. See the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s. 1(1)(a), the Equal Treatment Direct 
(76/207), Articles (2)1 and 5(l). 
13. Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s. 1(1)(b). 
14. For an example of how the explicit stereotyping of gay men has been used a 
basis for 'justified' discrimination, see Saunders v Scottish National Carr 
Assoc. (1981) IRLR 277, discussed infra. 
15. See Webb v EMO Air Cargo Case C-32/93 (1994) IRLR 482 in which the I 
accepted that dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy constituted dir 
discrimination and was therefore prohibited under Articles 2(l) and 5(l) of 
Equal Treatment Directive 76/207. The provisions of domestic law, nam 
ss. 1(1)(a) and 5(3) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 were subsequently founc 
be in accordance with this ruling, albeit in fairly limited circumstances, by 
House of Lords in Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd (No 2) (1995) IRLR 645 
16. (5pinion of Advocate-General in Case 32/93 Webb v EMO Air Cargo Ltd, sul 
at p. 491. 
17. See further discussion of this case at p. 23 et seq. 
18. For a clear exposition of this issue, see Flynn (1997). 
19. The decision in PvS actually removed completely the need for any exter 
comparator at the European level allowing the individual him or herself to 
the comparator on the basis that the characteristic in question had been remov 
Chessington World of Adventures confirmed this at EAT level thus opening 
way for discrimination related to any aspect of a person's 'sex' to form the bi 
of a potential claim. 
20. This line of argument was successfully advanced before the Human Rig 
Committee of the United Nations in Toonen v Australia CCPR/C/50/D/4; 
1992, No 488 1992 in which the Tribunal accepted that the word 'sex' could 
applied to include orientation. 
21. This may be one area in which the European Court of Human Rights'judgmc 
in the Smith and Lustig-Prean cases have a substantial impact (supra note 2), 1 
to the Court's finding that -an unjustified blanket ban on homosexuals wl 
serves as an absolute bar to employment is in direct violation of Article 8 of 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
22. European Commission Recommendation No 92/131/EEC on the protectior 
the dignity of women and men at work. 
23. The quotations reproduced in this section are taken from the debate at the sec4 
reading of the Bill, Lords, Hansard, 5 June 1998, Columns 640-657. 
24. Which gives new powers under European Community law to opp 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. 
25. Regulation Z The Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations I 
which came into force on May 1999 following the Government's decision I 
the interpretation of the SDA applied in the transsexual case law placed 
legislation under excessive strain. For the background to the legislation, see 
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Consultation Paper, 'Legislation regarding discrimination on grounds of 
transsexualism in employment', January 1998. 
26.13y protocol 11 which came into force in November 1998. 
27. See note 2, ibid. 
28. RV Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith and Anor; Rv Admiralty Board of the 
Defence Council, ex parte Lustig-Prean and Anor 1996 (IRLR) 100. 
29. Meeting with EP Intergroup of Gay and Lesbian Rights, Strasbourg, Tuesday 
13 January 1998, transcript available at http: //europa-eu-int/Dialogue: 
Mar-Apr 1999 
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SHALL I COMPARE THEE? THE LEGAL DILEMMA: 
THE CHOICE OF COMPARATORS IN DISCRIMINATION 
CASES 
SAM MIDDLEMISS 
School of Public Administration and Law, The Robert Gordon 
Univershy. Aberdeen, UK 
ABSTRACT 
There have been remarkable developments in Some areas of discrimination law in 
the United Kingdom over recent years along with a notable lack of development in 
other areas with both relative success or failure (in terms of extending the protec- 
tion of the law) qfren being determined kv the appropriate comparator which can 
he used in presenting a claim jor discrimination andlor the influence and con- 
straints ()f rules set down in UK and European Community Legislation. It is con- 
tended that a lack of uniformity of approach to these issues both hinders and helps 
the equality cause. It hinders by presenting uncertainty about the appropriate com- 
parator in these cases and helps where the law recognises uniformity of approach 
in determining comparators across differing kinds of equality cases is both ill- 
advised and inappropriate. It is contended in this article that reform of the areas 
()f law where protection is weak or badly-structured is best served by borrowing 
front approaches in the better protected areas of UK discrimination law or from 
strategies utilised in other jurisdictions. In the interests of brevity and consistency 
of argument and analysis it has been necessary to refrain from considering this 
issue as it relates to equal pay. 
INTRODUCTION 
Inequality of treatment based on the notion that certain individuals or 
classes of people are more deserving of rights than others is endemic 
within society. Tberefore attempts to address the issue of inequality 
through legal intervention are likely to be limited in their effect- 
iveness or frustrated altogether. This will be especially true where the 
legal rules and institutions utilised for this purpose are operating on 
principles or rules, which have a discriminatory aspect: 
'Social elites within Western society have conventionally displayed a 
very ambivalent attitude towards people who appear different from 
themselves, whether it is in terms of ablebodiedness, race, sexuality, 
or social ascriptions. Social elites are able to use their power to con- 
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struct normativity in their own image and to construct difference as 
otherness. ' (Iliornton 1997: 183) 
This highlights the difficulty of developing legislative rules to 
achieve equality. The tendency has been for legislators to specify a 
normative comparator which will always represent the benchmark 
against which the aggrieved victim of discrimination will be com- 
pared, irrespective of the difficulties this may cause. 
The definition of direct discrimination in section 1 (1) of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 illustrates this where 'a person discriminates 
against a woman if ... on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or would treat a man. ' This has become 
known by some employment lawyers as the assimilationist approach 
and is characteristic of anti-discrimination laws in the United King- 
dom. 'An assimilist argues that the purposes of anti-discrimination 
law includes a commitment to assimilating all the parties in a polity 
to a common outcome. ' (Dine and Watt 1996: 9) 
The preferable strategy is known as the pluralist approach. 'A plur- 
alist recognises that there may be a number of different, but funda- 
mentally equal outcomes or positions arising from the operation of 
anti-discrimination law. ' (Dine and Watt 1996: 9) The emphasis 
should be on the outcome of the behaviour (analysing whether it is 
discriminatory) rather than analysing whether the behaviour falls 
within some formulaic pattern set down by statute. 
The following quote outlines the difficulty for legislators and the 
judiciary in challenging discriminatory practices (presented here in 
the context of sex discrimination in employment) through application 
of the law: 
'women are segregated by sex into lower paying occupations and 
workplaces, and are invariably found at lower levels than men in 
those occupations they share. Even within occupations, women earn 
less than men. This is particularly true of part-time workers, who tend 
to be most segregated in terrns of sex and who are denied the wage 
rates and other benefits available to men and, to a less extent, to 
women who work full-time. ' (McColgan 2000: 133) 
This article will highlight the difficulties arising from the provi- 
sions in equality legislation that require applicants in discrimination 
cases to find a comparator (of a different category of person from 
themselves) within the same employment, who has been treated more 
favourably by their employer. ' In direct discrimination cases a 
straight like-for like comparison of treatment by the employer is 
made between two category of employee. Indirect discrimination 
cases however are more complicated involving two main issues to be 
determined (which are often interlinked). Firstly is a requirement or 
condition imposed by an employer on all employees in practical 
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terms more difficult to comply with for one category of employee 
compared with another and secondly is the effect of this discrimin- 
atory and detrimental? In considering these issues the tribunal are 
required to compare two categories of employees (e. g. men and 
women, disabled and non-disabled) to determine whether there is suf- 
ficient disparate impact for one to justify a finding of discrimination 
and whether the inequality arising is sufficiently detrimental to the 
employees discriminated against to be treated as unlawful (see 
definitions of direct and indirect discrimination below). 
DIFFICULTIES IN ENFORCING EQUALITY LEGISLATION 
Problems with Legislative Rules 
The notion of inequality applied in the statutes presents the applicant 
with the difficulty of proving that certain employees are better off 
than themself because they are different, and favoured by the 
employer because of that difference. 
'The outlawing of certain types of discrimination is justified on the 
basis of the simple premise that there are certain criteria for treating 
people differently which will never bc regarded as morally relevant, or 
0 
which are relevant in an admissible way only in a restricted range of 
situations which can be defined by law. ' (Feldman 1993: 959) 
The requirement for differential treatment to substantiate a dis- 
crimination claim necessarily involves some form of comparison of 
treatment between different categories of person. However, as will 
become apparent, this comparative requirement is not always neces- 
sary or desirable. Also legislators will often fail to define compar- 
ators in broad enough terms to encompass all type of relevant 
claims. 2 
judicial Treatment of Equality Issues 
In indirect discrimination cases, in determining issues of inequality 
the applicant will be expected to bring forward evidence that an 
employee or employees (of a different sex, race, married status, 
nationality etc. ) within the same employment receive preferential 
treatment in comparison with them. 'A person discriminates against a 
woman in circumstances where he applies to her a requirement or 
condition which he applies or would equally apply to a man but 
which is such that the proportion of women that can comply with it 
is considerably smaller than the proportion of men that can comply 
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with it. ' (e. g. as per sl(l)(b)(1) of the SDA 1975). Because the basis 
for comparison is a generic characteristic it inevitably leads to com- 
parison between groups of employees that are of that generic type 
and those that are not within and/or outside employment. It will ulti- 
mately be up to the judiciary to decide if the collective comparators 
(known as the pool for comparison) put forward by the applicant are 
appropriate or not. Where the Employment Tribunal's choice of pool 
is different from that of the applicant it will serve to undermine their 
case, and will not always serve the interests of equality. 3 The pro- 
position that the judiciary have, at worst made this whole process 
unnecessarily elaborate and unworkable and, at best brought a high 
degree of uncertainty into the comparative aspects of discrimination 
cases, will be explored in this article through analysis of relevant 
statutory rules and legal decisions. Alternative approaches for deter- Cý 
mining whether someone has been subjected to unfavourable treat- 
ment will be considered based on analysis of approaches in other jur- 
isdictions. 
Employment tribunals and courts faced with the problem of decid- 
ing on appropriate comparators in differing contexts of discrimina- 
tion, do not always make the logical and appropriate choice. They 
may be constrained by inflexible notions of equality which cannot 
accommodate inherent differences between the legally prescribed 
comparators. In indirect discrimination cases they may be inclined to 
opt in favour of a broad-based comparative sample, which is often 
too general to be of relevance to the discriminatory nature of the par- 
ticular case. Another difficulty arises where the courts having made 
the comparison conclude that there is no inequality of treatment in a 
case. This can arise where an incomplete understanding of the per- 
ceptions of the comparators in the case can lead them to an unsatis- 
factory conclusion. 4 
'A law is ... discriminatory if, although there is a relevant difference, it proceeds as though there is no such difference or, in other words, 
if it treats equally things that are unequal - unless perhaps, there is no 
practical basis for differentiation. " 
The problem of finding an appropriate comparator in discrimina- 
tion cases has recently come to the fore in disability discrimination 
cases 6 and sexual orientation cases' and the issues raised by these 
important decisions will be considered later in the article. The uncer- 
tainties arising from judicial interpretation of equality statutes is not 
a recent phenomenon. As the following quote suggests, their 
approach of strict adherence to the requirement to establish inequality 
of treatment by comparison with someone that has very different 
characteristics or circumstances (an approach underlined by the ter- 
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minolo4g,, Y in equality statutes), can serve to undermine the original 
purpose of the legislation. (Skidmore 1997) 
The point has frequently been made that formal inequality is inappro- 
priate because it focuses on difference rather than the disadvantaged 
position associated with differences, and thus fails to address many of 
the problems resulting from the difference. (Pitt 1996: 198) 
The recent sexual harassment case British Telecommunications 
p1c v Williams [1997] IRLR 669 illustrates the type of problem that 
can arise. A female employee claimed that, in an appraisal meeting 
with her supervisor, he became sexually aroused, arranged the paper- 
work so as to ensure close proximity between them, stared at her 
throughout the meeting and made the meeting last for an excessive 
amount of time. The ET were of the opinion that she had failed to 
prove that the accusations of sexual arousal and staring were true, 
and because of this, the claim failed. The EAT upheld this decision 
without considering the cumulative effect of the alleged behaviour, 
which would be to harass the woman by creating an oppressive 
working environment. It is unlikely a man in this particular case 
would have been treated in a similar manner, and if he were the con- 
sequences of the behaviour would be less oppressive. 
'There was no willingness to analyse the overall atmosphere created 
by the manager's actions, which together might understandably have 
been regarded as creating an atmosphere intimidating to a reasonable 
woman. As it is the effect of the behaviour that is determinative, the 
fact that the manager might not have been aware of the reaction he 
was creating would not be relevant. ' (Townshend-Smith 1998: 244) 
The applicants in indirect discrimination cases and their repres- 
entatives will face the often complex decision concerning the appro- 
priate choice of comparator to underpin their case' only to be 
informed at the hearing stage by employment tribunals that their 
choice was incorrect. ' 
The choice of an appropriate section of the population is in our judge- 
ment an issue of fact ... entrusted by Parliament to the good senses 
of tribunals. " 
Even where a straightforward like-for-like comparison is made 
in direct discrimination cases based on sex it may turn out that the 
effect of the alleged discriminatory act is gender-neutral. " There 
could also be instances, particularly in sex discrimination cases where 
there is no comparator available. 
It should be recognised that the stereotyping of women has far- 
reaching consequences, in that it can lead to job segregation, which in 
tum may prevent women obtaining equality in respect of their terms 
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and conditions of employment due to a lack of comparator. (Painter, 
Holmes and Migdal 1995: 209) 
Given that equality legislation broadly covers both discrimina- 
tion in recruitment and selection and discrimination within the 
employment relationship" it is relevant to examine the issue of com- 
parators under each of these headings. " In considering the law as it 
relates to comparators in discrimination cases (involving recruitment 
and selection) it is necessary to consider this under the separate head- 
ings of direct and indirect discrimination. 
COMPARATORS IN RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION CASES 
Direct Discrimination Cases 
In direct discrimination cases, applicants pursuing claims concerning 
the process of recruitment and selection will not normally have great 
difficulty in proving inequality of treatment between themselves and 
a different category of employee. If a man is appointed to a position 
where a woman is better qualified or more experienced, then pro- 
vided the evidence is available to substantiate this, it will amount to 
a prima facie case of discrimination. "' If the availability of employ- 
ment is restricted by job specifications relating to nationality, resid- 
ence or language skills which are unrelated to the requirements of the 
job, then a reasonable presumption of race discrimination can be 
established. Similarly where a disabled applicant is asked detailed 
questions about their disability at an interview which are unconnected 
with their ability to do the job, then it is likely to amount to discrim- 
inatory behaviour. In a sex or race discrimination case, it is incum- 
bent on the applicant to introduce evidence that someone of a differ- 
ent sex or race has, or would have, been treated more favourably in 
the circumstances. In disability discrimination cases, as a result of the 
decision of Clark v TDG Ltd (da Novacold) [1999] IRLR 318 there 
is no need to find a like-for-like comparator to establish discrimina- 
tion has taken place, although some form of comparison will be 
undertaken. In cases of direct discrimination the applicant must prove 
that they have been subjected to discriminatory behaviour and then 
the employer must then show that it is not the case. 's 
Indirect Discrimination Cases 
The main difficulties arise in the context of proving indirect discrim- 
ination: namely unfair treatment in, the process of recruitment and 
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selection, terms and conditions of employment offered or refusal to 
employ (as per sl(l)(b) of the SDA 1975 and RRA 1976). 
In Price v Civil Service Commission (No 2) [1978] IRLR 3 an age 
requirement of 17-28 for the post of executive officer was deemed 
discriminatory against women, because more women than men would 
be absent from the job market during these ages because of their 
responsibility for looking after children. 
'This case shows how easy it is to get dazzled by looking at the 
wrong statistics. If in this case the pool of actual applicants had been 
considered rather than the pool of potential (that is qualified) applic- 
ants, the decision would have been different. ' (Pitt 1998: 55) 
Another difficulty is that in reaching their conclusions after corn- 
paring the treatment of two different category of prospective 
employee the courts may unwittingly import inherently discriminatory 
standards. In Perera v Civil Service Commission (No 2) [19831 ICR 
428 CA the Court of Appeal dismissed a claim by a Sri Lankan of 
indirect race discrimination based on the assertion that selection cri- 
teria utilised by the Civil Service concerning nationality, experience 
in the UK and command of the English language were not a require- 
ment or condition. The court decided that a requirement or condition 
had to be an 'absolute bar' and in this case the specified character- 
istics were merely preferred qualities which did not represent a bar 
to employment. They went on to say that in comparative terrns a Sri 
Lankan (with poor language skills) would need to be much more tal- 4n 
ented and intelligent than a UK National before they would be 
selected for the job. 
The whole of the evidence indicates that a brilliant man whose per- 
sonal qualities made him suitable as a legal assistant might well have 
been sent forward on a short list by the interview board in spite of 
being, perhaps, below standard in his knowledge of English and his 
ability to communicate in that language. " 
In Kidd v DRG (UK) Ltd [19851 IRLR 190 the EAT proceeded 
to decide the case on the basis of a false assumption, namely that 
there was no discernible difference between the number of men and 
women who stay at home or work part-time because of child-care 
responsibilities. 
While the natural response for the applicant in choosing compar- 
ators is to localise the pools for comparison and confine the issue 
within the sphere of their own employment, the Employment Tribu- 
nal will tend to adopt a much broader pool for comparison. In Jones 
v University of Manchester [19931 IRLR 218 CA, a 46 year old 
woman unsuccessfully claimed she had been discriminated against 
when she applied for a job as a careers adviser, because there was 
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a stated preference for graduates between the ages of 27-35. Her 
claim that comparatively mature female students (entering higher 
education after 25) were disadvantaged compared with male mature 
students was rejected. The Court of Appeal held that it was not 
appropriate in comparing pools to introduce subdivisions of the sexes 
and that the appropriate comparators in this case were all suitably 
qualified men and women. Similarly in Pearse v City of Bradford 
Metropolitan County Council [1988] IRLR 379, EAT it was deemed 
inappropriate to consider a college-wide pool to determine if part- 
time female lecturers had been discriminated against by being denied 
the right to apply for a senior lecturer post. The preferred pool was 
suitably qualified people generally and as no evidence concerning this 
had been led the case failed. Where, through the comparative pro- 
cess, discrimination has been shown to have taken place in indirect 
discrimination cases the employer would be required to justify it on 
grounds other than sex or race (as per sI (b)(2) of the SDA 1975 and 
RRA 1976). " 
The applicant in discrimination cases involving recruitment and 
selection may face a tough challenge in proving their entitlement to 
legal protection. There are certain occupations (modelling. acting, 
nursing etc. ) which the equality statutes recognise as reserved for a 
particular sex or racial group and these arc defined as genuine occu- 
pational qualifications. In direct race and sex discrimination cases, 
deciding on the appropriate comparator will not often be an issue, 
however proving that discrimination has taken place may be more 
problematic. " 
Difficulties with the use of Comparators in Indirect Discrimination 
Cases 
The essential nature of indirect discrimination cases is that a class of 
employees are disadvantaged in their treatment by their employer in 
relation to another collective group of employees. The challenge is to 
bring forward evidence (often of a statistical nature) which substanti- 
ates the claim. In indirect discrimination cases it is clearly advisable, 
in producing statistical evidence to underpin a claim, to pick the 
widest range of comparators available and resist the temptation to 
localise the sample to cover the situation they are familiar with. The 
problem is that local information will often be relevant where you 
are trying to establish historical discriminatory attitudes and behavi- 
our on the part of the employer. "' As intimated earlier no matter how 
sensible and rational the applicant's choice of comparator may appear 
the tribunal or court will readily substitute their own pool and defeat 
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the claim, because it is pursued on the wrong premise (as per Jones 
and Pearse). 
One commentator suggests that the best approach is to present 
a range of statistical data to the employment tribunal so that they can 
then choose the most appropriate. 'It may be necessary in some cases 
to have statistical information on various pools to hand and present 
this to the tribunal. ' (Mackay, Simon 1998: 50). Unfortunately they 
may not all support the applicant's case and although this solution 
may be appropriate for applicants who are in a position to employ 
the services of a solicitor (who can help them find and present the 
statistical information), this may be an unrealistic option for unrep- 
resented applicants. 
There is clearly scope for employment tribunals to be more sup- 
portive in these cases. This could be achieved by adjourning the pro- 
ceedings where the wrong pool has been chosen to allow the applic- 
ant time to collect the relevant data and present it to the tribunal. 
Where the matter goes on appeal to the EAT then they could refer 
it back to a differently constituted tribunal to re-hear the case on the 
correct grounds. Unfortunately both these options will tend to over- 
load a tribunal system which is already struggling to cope with its 
workload. What may be a preferable solution is legislation being 
introduced which provides a mechanism for the issue of the appropri- 
ate pool for comparison to be sorted out prior to the tribunal hearing. 
The discussion to date has been concerned with forms of dis- 
crimination where there is protection under employment law, how- 
ever there are a number of areas of discrimination where no such 
protection is afforded. In cases of discrimination based on sexual ori- 
entation there will be no remedy" and in religious discrimination 
cases no remedy will apply unless the behaviour is found to be on 
grounds covered by the Race Relations Act 1976, such as ethnic 
origin. " Similarly where the discrimination in the recruitment situ- 
ation is on the ground of age, as is often the case, then unless the 
ageism has its roots in sex discrimination, as in Price, then there is 
22 no legal remedy. The next section will involve analysis of compar- 
isons made in discrimination cases arising from acts perpetrated 
within employment or causing its termination. These will be consid- 
ered under the broad headings of discriminatory behaviour (e. g. race, 
sex, disability). 
COMPARATORS IN DISCRIMINATION CASES ARISING 
WITHIN EMPLOYMENT 
For sirnplicitY's sake this heading will be deemed to cover a wide 
range of discriminatory behaviour including discrimination, in access 
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COMPARATORS IN DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CASES 
In disability discrimination cases, the Disability Discrimination Act 
1975 Act provides that 'an employer discriminates against a disabled 
person if- 
(a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he 
treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat others to 
whom that reason does not or would not apply' (0(1)). In Clark v 
Novacold [1998) IRLR 420 the EAT in applying the relevant provi- 
sions of the Act, decided that disabled employees could only be com- 
pared with someone that is similarly disadvantaged but for a different 
reason. namely a non-disabled but sick person who has been absent 
from work for a long time. Mr Clark suffered a back injury at work 
and as a consequence was absent from his employment for a consid- 
erable period of time. He was dismissed by his employer and brought 
a case against him on the basis that he had been discriminated 
against contrary to section 5(l). The EAT accepted the employer's 
defence that a similar fate would have befallen someone who was off 
sick for a considerable period of time. In British Sugar v Kirk-er 
[19981 IRLR 624, a differently constituted EAT took the view in a 
similar case that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 is materially 
different from the SDA 1975 and RRA 1976, in that the like-for-like 
comparison required in these Acts did not apply in discrimination 
cases. 
'Put at its simplest, establishing a prima facie case of discrimination 
on the basis of disability (which does not apply to non-disabled job 
applicants or employees) will be sufficient to discharge any further 
evidential requirement on the part of the applicant and place the onus 
on the employer to show the discrimination is justifiable. ' (Middlemiss 
1999) 
This reasoning was followed in the Clark appeal by the Court of 
Appeal"' where it was stated that the essential issue for an employ- 
ment tribunal will be to determine the underlying reason for less 
favourable treatment in the particular case and not concern itself with 
like-to-like comparison with other real or hypothetical employees. 
The Australian Disability Discrimination Act 1992 gets round this 
problem by spelling out the type of comparison which can be made. 
In section 5(l) direct discrimination applies where: 
aa person discriminates against another person on the ground of disab- 
ility of the aggrieved person if because of the aggrieved person's dis- 
ability, the discriminator treats or proposes to treat the aggrieved 
person less favourably than, in circumstances that are the same or are 
not materially different, the discriminator treats or would treat a 
person without the disability. ' 
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NVbat this lacks in brevity and clarity it makes up for in sense, 
in that the obvious comparator here is someone who is simply not 
disadvantaged in the same way. In a Canadian case Eldridge and 
Others v A-G of British Columbia and Another [1997] 3 SCR 624, 
the following statement by La Forest J on behalf of the Supreme 
Court is instructive in identifying the particular nature of disability 
discrimination. 
'Exclusion from the mainstream of society results from the construc- 
tion of a society based solely on 'mainstream' attributes to which dis- 
abled persons will never be able to gain access... Rather, it is the 
failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fine tune society so that 
its structures and assumptions do not result in the relegation and ban- 
ishment of disabled persons from participation, which results in dis- 
crimination against them. The discrimination enquiry which uses the 
attribution of stereotypical characteristics reasoning as commonly 
understood is simply inappropriate here. It may be seen as a case of 
reverse stereotyping which, by not allowing for the condition of the 
disabled individual, ignores his or her disability and forces the indi- 
vidual to sink or swim within the mainstream enviroru-nent. ' 
The essential point here is that the standards and practices which 
are introduced by employers to counteract disability discrimination in 
employment must be much more proactive and far-reaching than 
those applied to deal with other forms of discrimination. 
COMPARATORS IN SEX AND RACE DISCRIMINATION CASES 
CONCERNING DISCRIMINATION WITHIN EMPLOYMENT 
The equality statutes (SDA 1975, RRA 1976, DDA 1995) outline the 
types of activities which will be treated as unlawful including dis- 
crimination in the way an employer provides access to training, trans- 
fer or promotion or any other benefit or facility, and dismissal or 
subjecting employees to any other detriment on discriminatory 
grounds-25 
'The vast majority of litigation under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
and the Race Relations Act 1976 concerns discrirnination in employ- 
ment. This reflects the importance of employment in our society, in 
financial terms and in terms of self-esteem and psychological well 
being, especially where that employment relationship is ongoing and 
semi-permanent. ' (Townshend-Sn-dth 1998: 321) 
In Home Office v Holmes [1984] ICR 678 EAT an indirect dis- 
crimination case was brought on the basis that requiring women to 
work full-time discriminated against them because their role of prim- 
ary child-carer made it more difficult to work on a full-time basis. 
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The applicant was employed as an executive officer and she worked 
full-time, as did other employees at her grade. After the birth of her 
second child she asked to work part-time as she found it difficult to 
continue working on a full-time basis. Her employer refused and she 
claimed that by being denied this opportunity, she was the victim of 
indirect discrimination because women would find it more difficult to 
comply with the full-time requirement than men. The EAT found in 
her favour although it stressed that it did not intend to create the pre- 
cedent that women working full-time can claim a right to work on a 
part-time basis. However, where the employer is a large, profitable 
organization it will be difficult for them to justify an inflexible full- 
time rule for employees. 
In Nicholas Smith v Safeway [1996] IRLR 456 a male employee 
was disciplined and eventually dismissed because he insisted on 
wearing his hair in a ponytail. He argued that a woman would not 
have been dismissed in similar circumstances. The EAT accepted that 
he had not suffered less favourable treatment and that different treat- 
ment of men could be non-discriminatory. The reasoning was that 
any dress code which reinforces traditional gender stereotypes 
(complies with conventional expectations of appearance) cannot give 
rise to less favourable treatment. 16 The difficulty with dress codes is 
that they need to operate on a basis of social custom and stereotyp- 
ical assumptions because there are no other parameters for determin- 
ing the acceptabilty or otherwise of certain kinds of dress. 'An 
employer is entitled to a large measure of discretion in controlling 
the image of his establishment. including the appearance of staff, and 
especially so when, as a result of their duties, they come in contact 
with the public"" In indirect discrimination cases the employer will 
need to justify discrimination on grounds other than race or sex, and 
although the justification may appear on the face of it to be 
reasonable, it may in fact be rooted in discriminatory attitudes and 
practices. 
The fact that there is an explanation for a practice which disad- 
vantages one sex does not make the disadvantage disappear. If indir- 
ect discrimination is concemed with removing disadvantages the 
existence of a justification, even a genuine justification, should not 
per se be conclusive. In other words, justifiable discrimination does 
not cease to constitute discrimination. What the law should be con- 
cemed with is not merely discriminatory practices for which there is 
no alternative explanation but discriminatory practices generally. 
(Bernard 1996: 84) 
In Betts v Brintel Helicopters Ltd and KLM ERA Helicopters 
(UK) Ltd [1996], the EAT upheld the decision of an industrial tribu- 
nal that Muslim Asian employees were found to be indirectly dis- 
criminated against on grounds of race by the their employer's insist- 
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ence that no holidays could be taken during the company's busiest 
period. Their request for a day off work to celebrate a religious holi- 
day was turned down and they were disciplined when they took the 
time off. The difficulty for those employees of complying with the 
requirement was unique to them (working on an important religious 
holiday) and the employer intended to discriminate by denying them 
the time off. The employer's unwillingness to recognise an important 
cultural difference between one group of employees and another and 
make allowance for such a difference was clearly discriminatory 
here. However if the standard of behaviour adopted by management 
is based on the fact that employees are caucasian and U. K. nationals 
by birth, it will be difficult for them to accommodate the needs of 
employees falling outside that model and accept that a failure to do 
so may be discriminatory. 
Comparators in Cases Involving Discriminatory Access to Promotion 
The area of promotion within employment is one, which can be 
inherently discriminatory, often favouring those employees with long 
service and in full-time employment and thereby indirectly discrim- 
inating against female employees (particularly those working part- 
time or on fixed terms), disabled employees or those from ethnic 
minorities. 
, it is clear that many women and black people are working, in jobs 0 
from which there is no promotion pathways. An assumption that part- 
time employees are unsuitable for promotion may be unjustifiable 
indirect discrimination. "" 
In Gerster v Freistaat Bayern [1997] IRLR 699 ECJ the Euro- 
pean Court ruled that legal measures which treat part-time employees 
less favourably than full-timers in respect of requiring them to accrue 
much longer continuity of employment than full-timers to be eligible 
for promotion will be contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive 76/ 
207. ' 
The case of West Midlands Passenger Transport Executive v 
singh (1988) IRLR 186, CA illustrates the potential importance of 
obtaining evidence of the past practice of an employer (in respect of 
offering promotion) to substantiate claims of racial discrimination. 
Where there is a low incidence of members of ethnic minorities 
being promoted in the past it will create a presumption that there is 
discriminatory regime in place in that particular place of employ- 
ment. 
In respect of sex discrimination, organisational barriers which 
deny women the opportunity to progress to the highest levels in the 
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organisation are collectively known as the 'glass ceiling'. An 
explanation offered for this phonomenom is that 
,... pressures on women to combine work and family life. which may 
force them to take career breaks or part-time employment ... may. in turn. jeopardise their chances of promotion or raise doubts about their 
commitment to the job. ' (Morris, O'Donnell 1999: 204) 
Thus employers will be reluctant to provide them with the same 
chances of progression which are available to men (e. g. in 1998, 
75% of barristers in England and Wales were men and 93% of 
Queen's Council were men, and in 1997 women comprised 15% of 
all senior civil servants in Britain). 
Comparators in Cases Involving Dismissal on the Ground of Sex 
and Race 
The primary difference between discriminatory dismissal provisions 
under equality legislation and unfair dismissal provisions is that enti- 
tlement to the protection of the former statutes does not require any 
continuity of employment whereas the latter protection is restricted to 
those persons that have one year continuous employment with their 
employer. ' An important development in race discrimination law has 
been to extend its coverage to persons who are not racially discrimin- 
ated against personally but are instructed to discriminate against 
others on racial grounds. " The issue of comparators does not arise 
here as the applicant is claiming redress for being forced to be dis- 
criminatory to others. 
In Weathersfield Ltd (t/a Van & Truck Rentals) v Sargent [1998] 
IRLR 14 EAT a white woman employed by a car rental company 
was told in no uncertain terms not to hire vehicles to 'coloureds or 
Asians'. She left the company and claimed constructive dismissal on 
the basis that she could not continue working for a company that had 
a racist policy. The Court of Appeal upheld the tribunal's decision 
that she had been constructively dismissed on racial grounds and 
entitled to E5,000 as compensation. 32 In Rv Secretary of State for 
Employment ex parte EOC (1995) 1 AC I the weekly hours thresh- 
old for part-time employees which applied to restrict the availability 
of statutory employment rights including unfair dismissal was held to 
be indirectly discriminatory against women (given part-time workers 
are mainly women). 
Comparators in Sexual Harassment Claims 
As well as dismissal being a ground for an action as specified in sec- 
tion 6(2)(b) of the SDA 1975 this legal measure also applies to 'sub- 
309 
jecting to any other detriment' which has been defined by the judi- 
ciary as including sexual harassment. The difficulties for the victim 
associated with bringing harassment claims is convincing the employ- 
ment tribunal that their treatment at the hands of the harasser is suf- 
ficiently detrimental to them to qualify for a legal remedy and that 
it involves an element of inequality, in that, the same treatment 
would not be meted out to a comparator of a different sex, race etc. " 
On the latter point, the leading case of Porcelli v Sri-athclyde 
Regional Council [19861 ICR 564 CS demonstrates a purposive 
approach to this issue. Mrs Porcelli was harassed as part of a cam- 
paign to try and get her to leave her job as laboratory technician. 
Two male colleagues made suggestive remarks and gestures to her 
and brushed against her in an aggressive manner. 
The employer argued that a male colleague that was disliked 
would be subjected to the same treatment. The Court of Session was 
not convinced of this. 
'It does not follow that because ... the campaign as a whole had no 
sex-related motive or objective, the treatment ... which was of the 
nature of sexual harassment is not to be treated as having been on the 
ground of her sex .... It was particular kind of weapon, based on the 
sex of the victim ... which would not have been used against an 
equally disliked man. " 
A similarly enlightened approach was adopted in Insitu Cleaning 
Co v Heads [1995] IRLR 4 EAT. Here an employer argued that a 
sexist comment about a female employee's physical attributes could 
be equated with a non-offensive remark directed to a male employee 
about their lack of hair or their facial growth, and therefore no 
inequality of treatment applied. The EAT found such an assertion to 
be absurd. 
In Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd (1994] IRLR 
440, EAT (Middlemiss 1996) a female employee complained that she 
was being discriminated against by being required to walk through 
the workplace with pornographic images of women on display. The 
EAT were of the opinion that as these images were not directed at 
Ms Stewart personally and men are as likely to be offended by such 
images as women, then the conduct was gender-neutral and there was 
no ground for complaint under the Act. This decision took no 
account of the images creating a work environment, which demeaned 
women and objectified them as sex objects rather than employees of 
equal status to men within employment . 
35 
In British Telecommunications v Smith [1997] IRLR 668, discus- 
sed earlier, Justice Morison (p 669) was of the opinion that 'because 
the conduct which constitutes sexual harassment is gender-specific 
there is no necessity to look for a male comparator. ' Providing the 
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evidence showed that sexual harassment had taken place, this would 
be sufficient to substantiate a claim without the need for evidence 
beina introduced showing someone of the opposite sex would not be C) 
similarly treated. 
Comparators in Discrimination Cases based on Sexual Orientation 
The most contentious area involving comparators and discrimination 
is in the area of sexual orientation. In Smith %, Gardner Merchant 
[1998] IRLR 510 (Middlemiss 1999) a homosexual barman claimed 
he had been subjected to abusive harassment (in the form of offens- 
ive remarks and a punch directed to his back) by a female colleague 
who in turn had complained of Mr Smith's threatening and aggress- 
ive manner towards her. The counterclaim was upheld and Mr Smith 
was dismissed for gross misconduct. He brought a claim for unlawful 
dismissal on the ground of sex under the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975. Both the tribunal and the EAT rejected his claim on the basis 
that they had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the discrimina- 
tion was not related to his sex, but his sexual orientation. The Court 
of Appeal concurred with their judgement. They found that the 
appropriate comparator for the purposes of establishing discrimination 
was a female homosexual. 
'If the applicant was subjected to sexual harassment, in the form of 
homophobic abuse, by his colleague it was for the tribunal to deter- 
mine whether that treatment would have been meted out to a homo- 
sexual woman in a similar position to him. If the facts were to show 
she would have subjected a female homosexual to like treatment no 
discrimination under sl(l)(a) would have been established. ' 
In the unlikely event that an employee can introduce evidence to 
show that the harasser is only homophobic in relation to male homo- 
sexuals and not their female equivalent they may have some chance 
of establishing a case. In LJ Beldam's view sexual harassment based 
on someone's sexual orientation would not fall within the ambit of 
the Act. 
I do not see how the sexual orientation of the victim is to be regarded 
as a relevant circumstance and, if it is not relevant to the case of the 
victim, it cannot be relevant in the case of the person of the opposite 
sex with whom comparison is made. ' (p 521). 
'It was decided in Rv Secretary of State for Defence ex parte 
Perk-ins (No 2) (1998] 2 C. M. L. R. 1116 where a medical orderly was 
dismissed from the Royal Navy on grounds of sexual orientation, that 
European Community Law (in the form of the Equal Treatment 
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Directive) does not cover or render unlawful discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. 36 
What is needed here is a different approach to this issue, namely 
to introduce legislation along the lines of the Sex Discrimination 
(Gender Reassignment) Regulations Sl 1999 No 1102 37 or accept that 
sexual orientation is not so much a matter of choice as an instinctive 
and natural path which is largely determined by people's genetic 
make-up and life experiences. Once the judiciary accept this then 
they can interpret existing legislation as providing a remedy possibly 
using the more sensible intra-sex comparison with a heterosexual 
male. 38 
Where an employee intends to or has undertaken an operation to 
reassign their gender it was decided by the European Court of Justice 
in PvS and Cornwall County Council (1996] IRLR 347 that they 
should have a remedy under European Community law (and sub- 
sequently under United Kingdom law). 39 
, Where a person is dismissed on the ground that he or she intends to 
undergo, or has undergone, gender reassignment, he or she is treated 
unfavourably in comparison with persons of the sex to which he or 
she was deemed to belong before undergoing gender reassignment. ' C: 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of identifying appropriate comparators in discrimination 
cases is fraught with difficulties, which stem from ill-defined statut- 
ory concepts and dependence on the views of the judiciary on how 
inequality should be defined and the legal rules applied. The inherent 
problems associated with this process are identified by one comment- 
ator thus: 
'The objectification theory ... views sex and race discrimination as 
social practices which treat people as unworthy of full consideration 
as human beings due to a characteristic which they are assumed to 
possess by virtue of their actual or perceived or actual membership of 
a group to which social sensitivity attaches ... Human beings, under 
this theory, should always be worthy of consideration as subjects, and 
it is this which justifies the use of anti-discrimination law. ' (Barnforth 
1996: 60) 
There is no standard comparator which can referred to for dif- 
ferent kinds of equality cases and it is inconceivable that there could 
be, given the diverse nature of the claims involved. However the 
judiciary's insistence on establishing inequality of treatment to under- 
pin most claims and imposing their own pools of comparison in 
indirect discrimination claims mitigates against the protection of the 
312 
law being extended to minority groups who deserve it (either within 
society or within specific employment situations). 
It is difficult for the judiciary to defy the accepted norin (as was 
done by the ECJ in following the Advocate-General's opinion in P 
vS and Cornwall County Council) without the reassurance of the 
existence of legislative rules, which are capable of being interpreted 
as supporting a departure from convention. There has been important 
positive developments such as the decline in importance of the hypo- 
thetical comparator (see Webb), the departure from the need for a 
like-for-like comparator in disability cases (see the Clark case)" and 
the legislative rule that employees undergoing gender reassignment 
should be compared with employees of the sex they are changing 
from. There have also been negative developments such as the 
requirement that homosexual men should be compared with lesbian 
employees that are real or hypothetical. "' 
The need to reform the law relating to equal opportunities is 
firmly on the agenda of the Equal Opportunities Commission with 
proposals being submitted for 'new sex equality laws being intro- 
duced which protects sex equality as a basic human right. "" 
There should be a clear agenda for a change in the law. which 
will ensure as many categories of employees as possible are pro- 
tected against discrimination. 'For many workers and campaigners, 
the aim is to have sufficient freedom in law for all workers to have 
control over their gendered appearance and relationships, without this 
infringing the autonomy of others. Using sex discrimination law to 
the full is one way of attempting this. ' (Skidmore 1997: 60). As sug- 
gested earlier allowing intra-sex comparisons in sexual orientation 
cases as has been done in gender reassignment cases would resolve 
the inequalities in the system, particularly where this change was 
enshrined in specific legislative rules. In the United States the Civil 
Rights Act 1964 covered grounds for discrimination in the areas of 
race, colour religion, sex or national origin. Subsequently legislation 
has been introduced to cover areas of discrimination not included in 
the original Act, e. g. Americans with Disabilities Act 1980. Canada 
has a single anti -discrimination Act called the Human Rights Act 
1985 which prohibits multiple kinds of discrimination (including reli- 
gion, age and sexual orientation) and in Ireland the Employment 
Equality Act 1996 bars discrimination on the same grounds. Some 
commentators have argued that we should move towards a similar 
model in the United Kingdom and at a stroke overcome most of the 
problems identified in this article (Wintermute 1997; Hepple, Ellis, 
Rose, Singh 1997). While the statute would include all forms of dis- 
crimination it would have different rules for determining whether dis- 
crimination applies including different approaches to comparators. 
Unfortunately the signs are that the present Government is unlikely 
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to pursue this option, choosing instead to avoid or delay resolution of 
the issue, as in the case of sexual orientation or religious discrimina- 
tion 43 or resolve it by introducing codes of practice, 44 with little like- 
lihood of success in changing discriminatory behaviour. In response 
to proposals for changes in the law submitted by the EOC and the 
Commission for Racial Equality, 45 the Government stated it has no 
plans to overhaul discrimination law in the immediate future and 
changes in the law will only come about where they are required 
under European Community Law. ' This is a missed opportunity to 
formalise, but at the same time simplify the law as it relates to har- 
assment and bullying, and introduce legal protection for employees 
who are denied it at present because of their age, religious beliefs 
and sexual orientation. In Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (Equal 
Opprtunities Review, No 88, November/December 1999, pp 49-50) 
the European Court of Human Rights decided that investigations of 
allegations of homosexuality and discharge from the services on 
grounds of homosexuality, experienced by two female services per- 
sonnel, were acts contrary to Article 8 of the Convention of Human 
Rights which covers the right to respect for their private and family 
life. Whether this decision is likely to be broadly interpreted by the 
judiciary and legislators to ensure homosexual men and lesbians are 
fully protected under employment law or given a narrow interpreta- 
tion by domestic courts restricting its impact on the law relating to 
sexual orientation discrimination remains to be seen. However in the 
long term the European Convention of Human Rights (which will be 
integrated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998 by October 
2000) could be instrumental in broadening the grounds for discrimin- 
atory action. The existing legislation needs to be changed to ensure 
the provisions have sufficient flexibility to. permit relaxation of the 
need for comparison on the basis of equality and thereby dispense 
with the requirement for relevant comparators to be involved in cases 
where it is not appropriate. The judiciary has already gone down this 
road to some extent. I finish with a rather inscrutable quote from 
Justice Frankfurter in the case of Dennis v United States 339 US 162 
at p 184. 'It is a wise man who said there is no greater inequality 
than the equal treatment of unequals. ' 
NOTES 
I Section 5(3) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, section 3(4) of the 
Race Relations Act 1976 
2 The failure of equality legislation to directly include sexual or racial 
harassment has required creative interpretation by the judiciary of statut- 
ory rules to ensure these type of cases can be pursued under the stat- 
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utes. Certain other discriminatory grounds are not covered by statute 
e. g. religion, sexual orientation. 
3 In Pearse v City of Bradford Metropolitan Council [1988) IRLR 379, 
EAT a part-time lecturer who was denied the opportunity to apply for a 
full-time promoted post because of her part-time status claimed indirect 
discrimination and used statistical evidence concerning staff in the col- 
Icge to support her claim. The EAT decided that the appropriate pool 
was men and women eligible to apply within society in general and 
therefore her case failed. 
4 In Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Lid [1994) IRLR 3, EAT 
the tribunal failed to appreciate the effect of pornographic images in the 
workplace would have on women's feelings of self-worth, and the 
impression they would create could lead them to be objectified as sex 
objects rather than employees. 
5 See judgement of Justices Gaudron and McHugh in Castlemaine 
Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436 at p 478. 
6 Clark, %, TDG Ltd (t/a Novacold) [19991 IRLR 318 
7 Smith v Gardner Merchant [1998] IRLR 510 
8 Referred to as the 'pool for comparison' 
9 In Jones v University of Manchester [1993] IRLR 218, CA it was the 
Courl of Appeal that decided to 'move the goalposts' and instead of 
accepting the pool for comparison as mature graduates, chose all eli- 
gible graduates, which defeated a claim for indirect sex discrimination. 
Pearse v City of Bradford Metropolitan Council 119981 IRLR 379. EAT 
also illustrates the difficulty. 
10 Waite J in Kidd v DRG (UK) Ltd (1985] IRLR 190 EAT 
11 Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd [1996] IRLR 440, EAT, 
Mascia v Dowell Schumberger Case No S/1560/89 
12 S6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and s4 of the Race Relations 
Act 1976 sets out the unlawful activities covered by the Act. 
13 While comparators feature significantly in equal pay cases it is outside 
the scope of this article to analyse this aspect of discrimination law. 
14 In Miller v Strathclyde Regional Council (Unreported) 1986, see Scots- 
man 6.3.86, an assistant head-teacher at a school was successful in 
showing that she was discriminated against, by not being interviewed 
for a head teacher job, despite being the best qualified and most experi- 
enced candidate. 
15 In James v Eastleigh Borough Council [19901 IRLR 298, HL the House 
of Lords decided that a lack of motive or intent to discriminate on the 
part of the employer would be irrelevant in determining whether direct 
discrimination had taken place. 
16 For a critique of this decision see Pitt 1998 (1) p 53 
17 In Bilka-Kaujhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz (19871 ICR 110 the ECJ 
applied a strict interpretation of justification to mean, that it corre- 
sponded with a real need of the organisation, and is appropriate to fulfil 
that need and necessary to achieve that end. 
18 Saunders v Richmond-upon-Thames Borough Council [1977) IRLR 362 
EAT, Noble v David Gold & Son (Holdings) Lid [1980] IRLR 252 CA 
19 In West Midlands Passenger Transport Executive v Singh [19981 ICR 
315 
614 CA a Sikh that was refused employment as an inspector asked for 
a discovery of documents concerning the ethnic origins, qualifications 
and experience of applicant for the equivalent post over a two Year 
period. This was granted on the basis that this evidence would be 
highly relevant in determining the attitudes and behaviour of the 
employer. 
20 This was confirmed in the case Grant v South West Trains [1988] IRLR 
206. 
21 In Seide v Gillette Industries [1980] IRLR 427 discrimination against 
Jews held to amount to discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin. 
22 The Department for Education and Employment are in the process of 
issuing a code of practice on age discrimination which could underpin 
a claim at an employment tribunal where an employer acts contrary to 
its provisions. The Government will consider legislating in the event the 
code of practice is unsuccessful. 
23 In Coleman v Skyrail Oceanic Ltd [1981] IRLR 398 CA the employer 
dismissed women on the basis that they were unlikely to be the primary 
bread-winner as this role fell upon husbands. 
24 Clark v TDG Ltd (t/a Novacold) [1999] IRLR 318 
25 Section 4 (2) (b) & (c) RRA 1976,6(2) (a) & (b) of the SDA 1975 
26 This case follows the line of reasoning adopted in Schmidt v Austick 
Bookshop (1977] IRLR 360 and is based on stereotypical assumptions 
about dress and appearance within the sexes. c/f Rewcastle v Safeway 
(1990) 2 AC 751 where an industrial tribunal took the view that such 
behaviour was discriminatory. (Skidmore 1997: 54-55) 
27 ibid Schmidt, J Phillips p 361 
28 Clark v TDG Ltd (t/a Novacold) [1999] IRLR 318 at p 333 
29 In the United Kindorn the Employment Protection (Part-Time 
Employees) Regulations SI 1995/31 extends many of the employment 
rights that full-time employees have under statute to part-time 
employees. 
30 There is no upper limit for compensation in discrimination dismissals 
however the upper limit for unfair dismissal cases currently stands at 
; E50,000 
31 S(I) of the RRA 1976 'A person discriminates against another in any 
circumstances relevant for the purposes of the Act (a) on racial grounds 
he treats that person less favourably than he treats or would treat other 
persons. 
32 Similar issues arose in Showboat Entertainment Centre Ltd v Owens 
[1984] IRLR 7 
33 The term detriment is defined in the Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah 
(1980) QB 97 as 'putting at a disadvantage. ' 
34 Lord President Emslie p 137 
35 See also British Telecommunications plc v Williams [1997] IRLR 669 
commented on earlier when it was decided that the lack of proof of 
overt sexual overtures was sufficient to defeat a working environment 
sexual harassment case. 
36 This followed the decision of the ECJ in Grant v South West Trains 
[19981 IRLR 206 ECJ- 
316 
37 For a description of the regulations see Equal Opportunities Review. No 
85, May/June 1999, pp 36-42 
38 See PvS and Cornwall County Council (1997) 34 CML Rev 367 
where an intra-sex comparison was made. 
39 Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations Sl 1999 No 
1102 
40 In Sidhu rAerospace Composite Technology Ltd 18.3.99. EAT 675/98 
the EAT ruled that conduct which is race specific is less favourable 
treatment on grounds of race without the need for any comparison 
41 Although such a comparison is unlikely to benefit an homosexual 
applicant against a background where discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation has been ruled as being outwith the scope of U. K. 
and European Community legislation see Grant %, South West Trains 
mentioned earlier. 
42 Making equality work: the challenge for Government, 1998, EOC Pub- 
lications 
43 The Religious Discrimination and Remedies Bill 1998 did not get the 
Government's support and was dropped from the legislative programme. 
44 In the case of age discrimination the Department For Employment and 
Education issued a code of practice on it in 1998 which is rccognised 
as not having the evidential weight of the ACAS Code of Practice on 
Discipline. 
45 Reform of the Race Relations Act 1976: Proposals from the CRE, April 
1998. 
46 The Burden of Proof Directive (No 97/80) is requiring the Government 
to legislate in this area and they in turn have agreed to exceed the 
legislative requirement by extending its coverage to race discrimination 
cases. This only a commitment at this stage. 
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Employment Law 
Comparators in Discrimination Cases brought under the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
An enlightened Court of Appeal in Clark v 7DG Ltd ftla Novacold) [1999] IRIP, 318 
has resolved the thorny issue of who is an appropriate comparator in disability dis- 
crimination cases. The issue was first raised by the Employment Appeal Tribunal at an 
earlier stage (Clark v Novacold [1998] IRIR, 420) where they held that the appropriate 
152 SCOTTISH LAW & PRACTICE QUAR. TER. Ly 
comparator in a disability dismissal case should be a non-disabled employee who is 
absent from work for a long period. 
'The proper comparator where a disabled person is dismissed for absence related to their 
disability is someone who is off work for the same amount of time, but for a reason other than 
disability. Such a comparator would possess all the characteristics of the applicant save for the 
fact of disability, and thus a comparison between them would prove whether the treatment 
was due to the applicant's disability. ' 
While this decision only applied directly to dismissal cases it did potentially underinine 
the disability rules generally by presenting the argument that a disabled person can c)nly 
be compared with someone who is similarly disadvantaged but for a different reasoll. 
This decision was sensibly contradicted by a differently constituted Employment Appeal 
Tribunal in British Sugar v Kirker [1998] IRLR 624 where they differentiated cases 
arising under the DDA 1995 from cases brought under the other discrimination statutes. 
In this case, the applicant was chosen for redundancy because he was physically imPaired, 
being partly-sighted, and the EAT considered evidence of discrimination during his 
employment to substantiate his claim under the DDA 1995. In dismissing the emplc)Yer's 
contention that the case failed because no appropriate comparator had been nomiriated 
the EAT made it clear this was not a necessary requirement for such cases. 
'In the present case there was no suggestion that other employees in the relevant redundancy 
selection pool suffered from a disability. That was not, therefore, a factor in their assessnients 
but was, on the tribunal's findings, a detrimental factor in Mr Kirker's assessment. His cornplaint 
was he was undermarked by reason of his disability not that other employees in the redundancy 
selection pool had been overmarked. ' 
They were of the opinion that the DDA 1995 did not require a like-for-like comparison 
(which is a requirement under sI (a) of the SDA 1975 and s1 (a) of the RRA 1976) but 
simply required the disabled person to show that he or she was less favourablY treated 
than other employees where the reason for his or her treatment, being a reason related 
to his or her disability, does not apply to those other employees. Put at its sirnplest, 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of disability (which does clot 
apply to non-disabled job applicants or employees) will be sufficient to discharge any further evidential requirement on the part of the applicant and place the onus 01, the 
employer to show that the discrimination is justifiable (as per s 5(l) of the Act). -rhe 
Court of Appeal in Clark followed the EAT's ruling in the Kirker case, and distinguished 
disability cases from sex and race discrimination cases as outlined earlier. It is sinPly a 
case of identifying others to whom the reason for the treatment does not, or would not, 
apply. The essential issue for an employment tribunal will be to determine the underlying 
reason for less favourable treatment in the particular case and not to concern itself with 
like-for-like comparison with other hypothetical employees. The difficulties with using 
hypothetical employees in discrimination cases was overcome in the area of pregnancy 
discrimination in the case of Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd [1994] IRLR 482 vvhere 
comparison between pregnant women and sick men was disallowed. It is still a Problem 
for homosexual men whose hypothetical comparator in discrimination cases is a lesbian 
in the same employment (Smith v Gardner Merchant [1998] IR. L& 510, Rv Secretaryof 
Statefor Defence, ex parte Perkins (No 2) (1998] IRLR 508). 
UPDATES 153 
The eminently sensible approach of departing from strict reliance on finding an 
equivalent comparator has rescued the disability provisions in the legislation from an 
unworkable and inequitable position and ensured that the spirit and purpose of the 
legislation can be upheld. 
The Court of Appeal took the opportunity to clarify other issues which have arisen 
or potentially will arise from the operation of the provisions of the Act. A claim for 
dismissal based on disability discrimination must be pursued under s5 (1) of the Act, but 
where an employer refuses to make a reasonable adjustment to someone's job or the 
premises (contrary to s6 of the Act) and subsequently dismisses them (eg on grounds of 
capability or redundancy as per s 98(2) of Employment Rights Act 1996), where a 
reasonable adjustment would obviate the need to dismiss, then a claim for discrimination 
based on as6 failure prior to the dismissal can be brought under s 5(2). In other words, 
two separate claims can be brought in a case such as Clark v 7DG Ltd ftla Novacold) 
[1999] IRLR 318 (Court of Appeal) where the employee was dismissed because his 
disability, an injured back, made it impossible to do his job, which was physically 
demanding, and led to him being absent from work for a considerable period. Instead of 
considering reasonable adjustments to the job or the workplace to acconunodate Mr 
Clark and his physical impairment, the employer chose instead to dismiss him. Here, a 
claim could be brought in respect of the dismissal under s 5(1) and a separate claim for 
discrimination could be brought under s 5(2) for failing to make reasonable adjustments. 
The Court of Appeal pointed out that it was not necessary to pursue as 5(1) claim 
before bringing a claim under s 5(2) as these were separate headings of claim, and while 
often there will be some overlap between them they were not interdependent. 
The Clark decision, is clearly important for overruling a narrow application of the 
discrimination rules in disability cases, continuation of which would have undoubtedly 
presented a serious evidential obstacle to applicants which would have the effect of 
nullifying the application of the legislation in certain respects. What is potentially more 
important in the long term is the courts' willingness to depart from strict reliance on the 
need for a hypothetical comparator who in terms of their personal situation, closely 
resembles the applicant in discrimination cases. This could have an impact on other 
types of discrimination cases (such as those brought by homosexual men or lesbians) 
which at the moment are frustrated by this inappropriate approach. 
Sam Middlemiss 
Senior Lecturer in Law 
Robert Gordon University 
Published by T&T Clark 
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I ýugations. it is unlikely that the resignation of the Commission will be enough to 
. ý. slure that the new Commission is entirely disassociated from the 'sins' of the old 
Or, unission since the report's criticisms relate in part to problems of resources and 
, countability 
which affect the Commission as a whole. In these circumstances, calls to 
form the institutions will become harder to resist. The Commission has acknowledged 
j challenge it now faces. A Commission spokesman recently stated: 'There is a new 
jI game amongst institutions. We are fighting for competences with the Parliament 
j the Council of Ministers and if we do not get involved we will lose the battle for 
)wer. " 
'.. The European Parliament has already demonstrated its determination to exploit the 
=its of the legal powers available under the EC treaty to achieve effective political 
it is continuing to assert its right to superior powers. The debate surrounding the 
16don of censure has highlighted the need for greater accountability of the activities of 4vidual Commissioners. The European Parliament wants to improve its ability to 
1pervise the Commission by acquiring the power to dismiss individual Commissioners. 
: aho seeks to strengthen its legislative powers. Support is already forthcoming from "date-designate Romano Prodi who favours an increased use of the co-decisioa 
rocedure which gives the European Parliament equal powers with the Council in the 
16ption of legislation. 
It may well be the case that the next report from the Independent Committee of 
sperts, due in September, will uncover further evidence of mismanagement within the 
ýnunission. If so, the pressure for much needed institutional reform will become hard 
ýýesist and it is likely that the European Parliament will stand to gain from the next 
ý=ty review. The extent of the European Parliament's gains will depend in part upon 
s ability to exploit the current constitutional and legitimacy crisis within the Conunission. 
Lynne Ramsay 
Lecturer in Law 
University of Glasgow 
E, furopean Voice, 4-10 March. 
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fact of disability, and thus a comparison between them would prove whether the treatment 
was due to the applicant's disability. ' 
While this decision only applied directly to dismissal cases it did potentially undermine 
the disability rules generally by presenting the argument that a disabled person can only 
be compared with someone who is similarly disadvantaged but for a different reason. 
This decision was sensibly contradicted by 2 differently constituted Employment Appeal 
Tribunal in British Sugar v Kirker [1998] IRLR 624 where they differentiated cases 
arising under the DDA 1995 from cases brought under the other discrimination statutes. 
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being partly-ýighted, and the EAT considered evidence of discrimination during his 
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the EAT made it clear this was not a necessary requirement for such cases. 
'In the present case there was no suggestion that other employees in the relevant redundanc) 
selection pool suffered from a disability. That was not, therefore, a factor in their assessments 
but was, on the tribunal's findings, a detrimental factor in Mr Kirker's assessment. His complaint 
was he was undermarked by reason of his disability not that other employees in the redundancy 
selection pool had been overmarked. ' 
They were of the opinion that the DDA 1995 did not require a like-for-like comparison 
(which is a requirement under sI (a) of the SDA 1975 and sI (a) of the RRA 1976) but 
simply required the disabled person to show that he or she was less favourably treated 
than other employees where the reason for his or her treatment, being a reason related 
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establishing a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of disability (which does not 
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chastisement of children is prohibited in the jurisdiction of some member 
States of the Council of Europe. ) The crucial aspect of this case was the severity 
of the treatment/punishment administered to the child - the bruises and marks 
remained visible after several days and the paediatrician inferred that the blows 
with the garden cane had been administered with "considerable force" 
Oudgment, para. 9). Ile United Kingdom breached its obligations under the 
Convention because this severity was found justifiable by the jury on grounds 
of reasonable chastisement. 
The importance of this case lies in the advancement of the scope of 
application of the Convention. The onus on a State has been extended by 
this case. Rather than a State's liability being restricted to the actions of its 
"servants" (soldiers, teachers, prison officers, police, etc. ), the judgment of 
the Court in this case could be viewed as extending a State's obligation to 
the providing of a legal mechanism for securing the rights and obligations 
articulated in the Convention to all its citizens, even in circumstances where 
the violation of the right is precipitated by the acts of a natural or legal 
person. "Beating a brat" is clearly a serious violation of the rights of the 
child. Accordingly, the State (usually under national law) should strive to 
protect the child from such physical abuse. Carefully chastising a child, 
however, assuming no excessive force is used, does not occasion a violation 
of the Convention. 
RHONA K. M. SmrrH, LL. B. (HONS. ) PH. D. 
EQUALITY IN EUROPE RESEARCH UNIT, 
ROBERT GORDON UNIVERSITY, ABERDEEN 
Smith v. Gardner Merchant (1998) I. R. L. R. 510 
One of the possible consequences of being a homosexual within employment 
is that at some juncture within your working life, you will be subjected to 
harassment of a sexual or bullying nature by your superior or work colleagues. 
Stonewall, the organisation lobbying for equal rights for lesbians and gay 
men, in their survey in 1993 (with 1,873 respondents), found one in two 
homosexuals had been harassed at work. This fate could also face a woman 
(Porcelli v. Strathclyde District Council (1986) I. C. R. 564, Court of Session), 
a member of a racial or an ethnic minority (Jones v. Tower Boot Co. (1997) 
I. R. L-PL 168, C. A. ), a physically or mentally challenged person or a transsexual 
(P v. S. (1996) I. R. L. R. 347, E. C. J. ). Unlike these categories of victim, who 
have a legally recognised protection against harassment (under statute, e. g. 
s. 4(2)(d) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 orjudicially), homosexuals 
are denied the right of protection from such behaviour under United Kingdom 
equality law and European Community legislation, as is illustrated in the case 
of Smith v. Gardner Merchant, (1998) I. R. L. R. 5 10. 
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In this case Mr Smith was employed as a barman and was dismissed by 
his employer because he had been accused of treating a female colleague 
in a threatening and aggressive manner. He claimed he was sexually 
harassed by her, because of his sexual orientation, and this represented 
discrimination under section I (1)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
as she would not have sexually harassed a gay woman. The Court of Appeal 
rejected his claim on the basis that: "discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation is not discrimination on ground of sex within the meaning of 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. A person's sexual orientation is not an 
aspect of his or her sex". 
The problem for the homosexual applicant partly lies in the terminology 
adopted in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Equal Treatment Directive 
(E. E. C. 76/207). While the legislation is intended to protect against 
discrimination on the grounds of someone's sex it cannot be interpreted as 
including within its remit discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (see 
Grant v. South West Trains Ltd (1998) I. R. L. R. 206, E. C. J. ). The question of 
equality (or inequality) of treatment applies here, in that the legislation (the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975) requires comparison with someone else within 
employment not of the same sex, who has received prefirential treatment. In 
a case of homosexual harassment, if a homosexual is harassed or bullied by 
his co-workers; when they find out about his sexual orientation (as in Smith) 
he cannot claim unequal treatment because a lesbian is just as likely to face a 
similar fate. Any type of discrimination claim brought by a homosexual is 
likely to suffer defeat on the same grounds (see Perkins below or Mascia v. 
Dowell Schlumberger, S/1560/89). Such rigid adherence to the concept of 
equality of treatment has produced some intriguing, albeit unfair, results in 
other cases (see Stewart v. Cleveland Guest (Engineering) (1994) I. R. L. R. 440, 
E. A. T. ). 
In P v. S. (1996) I. R. L. R. 347, E. C. L, where transsexuals were deemed to be 
protected from discrimination by European Community Law (on the basis that 
discriminatory acts undertaken on the ground of gender re-assignment were 
contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive), most commentators reasonably 
assumed a similar interpretation would be extended to homosexual 
discrimination. It has become apparent in cases such as Grant and Smith 
mentioned earlier, and in R. v. Secretary of Statefor Defence, ex parte Perkins 
(No. 2) (1998) IRLR 508 (where the Royal Navy dismissed the applicant from 
his post as medical assistant when they found out he was a homosexual), that 
the judiciary are unwilling or unable to broaden the interpretation of the 
underlying concepts in equality legislation to encompass homosexuals. This is 
despite the fact that the E. C. Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment specifically 
identifies lesbian and homosexual employees as particularly vulnerable to 
harassment and is intended to extend rights to this category of employee. 
In Johnson v. Gateway Supermarkets Ltd, COIT 4079/90 a woman who was 
indecently touched by a female colleague was able to establish sex discrimination 
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on the basis that a male colleague would not have been similarly treated. Similarly 
in Gates v. Security Express Guards, COIT 45152/92 an employee who was 
subjected to homosexual harassment by his supervisor was able to establish sex 
discrimination on the basis that the behaviour was contrary to the European 
Cominission's code of practice and recommendation on harassment at work. 
(European Commission Recommendation No. 92/131/EEC on the protection 
of the dignity of women and men at work. ) Where the harasser is a homosexual 
or lesbian, as in these cases, the victim may have a right of action under the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975. In cases where the harasser is heterosexual, and the 
homosexual harassment is of a bullying nature, strict application of principles 
of equality, may result in victims being denied any legal remedy under 
discrimination laws. They could argue here that they are just as likely to give a 
hard time to lesbian employees. 
A possible avenue of legal redress under statute for victims of homosexual 
harassment, is pursuance of a case under section 8 of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 in Scotland (or under ss. 1 and 3 in England). This 
provides a delict of harassment which is breached where a person pursues a 
course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another and "is intended 
to amount to harassment of that person", or "occurs in circumstances where it 
would appear to a reasonable person that it would amount to harassment of 
that person" (s. 8(l)(a) and (b)). 
While this case would need to be pursued in a court of law, the concepts of 
equality of treatment or sexual orientation would not be central features of the 
claim, which would clearly be of benefit in this context. Also there is a 
possibility of obtaining an interim interdict to stop the harassment, which is 
clearly in the interests of the victim. (Under English law "The new criminal 
offence of intentional harassment under s. 4(a) of the Public Order Act 1986 
is wide enough to cover harassment on the grounds of sexual orientation", 
Industrial Relations Law Bulletin, Vol. 559, December 1996 at p. 7. ) 
The simple solution would be to introduce specific legislation to protect 
homosexuals and lesbians against all forms of discrimination in employment, 
including harassment, and this would obviate the need in the future for the 
refinement of complicated judicial arguments which can overcome the obstacles 
presented by ill-defined and overly prescriptive equality laws. David Pannick 
writing 13 years ago stated: 
"An anti-discrimination law prohibiting discrin-dnation against persons 
on the ground of their sexual preferences in certain contexts and with 
defined exceptions, coupled with a repeal of the barriers to homosexual 
equality contained in existing legislation and common law, would be 
an important statement of the values of tolerance of a civilised society. " 
(D. Pannick, Sex Discrimination Law (1985) at p. 207. ) 
Nothing much has changed in the arena of protection against discrimination 
in employment against homosexuals and the prospect for homosexual victims 
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of harassment succeeding in a case under existing discrimination law is very 
poor. Although other legislation may offer some prospect of success, this course 
of action is full of uncertainty and common law actions are ill-suited to provide 
accessible and effective remedies. 
SAM MIDDLEMISS 
ROBERT GORDON UNIVERsiTy, ABERDEEN 
Limited Liability Partnerships - Draft Bill and Consultation Paper 
Background 
Seen largely as a response to calls for action from the accountancy 
profession for the introduction of some form of limitation of liability for 
partners in professional firms, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
issued a consultation paper in 1997 outlining proposals for a new form ()f 
business organisation to be known as a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) 
(DTI, Limited Liability Partnership -a new form of business association 
for professions (Consultation Paper, URN 97/597, February 1997), 
(hereafter "1997 consultation paper"). ) Following completion of the 
original consultation process the DTI has issued a further consultation 
document (DTI, Limited Liability Partnerships (Consultation Paper, URN 
98/874, September 1998), hereafter "1998 consultation paper") which 
outlines the responses to the 1997 consultation document, contains a draft 
Bill and associated draft regulations and calls for comments thereon no 
later than November 16,1998. 
Key Principles 
The 1998 consultation document introduces the proposed LLP as combining 
features of the structure both of companies and of partnerships (1998 
consultation paper, p. 7). What is intended is that the internal affairs and 
organisation of the LLP will retain the flexibility associated with a conventional 
partnership while its external affairs and duties will be defined and regulated 
by reference to those prevailing in respect of an existing registered company 
with limited liability. Based upon this general statement of intent the draft bill 
is stated to be based upon three general principles drawn from existing coinpany 
and partnership law: limited liability; corporate personality; and partnership 
flexibility (1998 consultation paper, p. 7). 
Limited Liability 
Clause 1(3) of the draft bill provides no initial surprises for Scots lawyers by 
defining a limited liability partnership as: "a body corporate (having separate 
legal personality) with unlimited capacity". The first radical departure frorn 
existing principles is also to be found in Clause 1(3) which stated that an LLP 
shall have: "such liability on the part of its members to contribute to its assets 
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Employers' liability for the actions and safety of 
non-employees 
By SAM MIDDLEMISS BA MIPD M. Phil* 
Abstract 
In the past, the nature of the legal health 
and safety regime meant that employers 
needed to concern themselves only with 
taking reasonable care for the safety of their 
employees. Over recent years, the judiciary 
has interpreted statutes and applied com- 
mon law rules to make employers liable for 
the actions of non-employees and responsi- 
ble for protecting the health and saf: ty of 
persons not employed by them, but work- 
ing in premises they control or carrying out 
work on their behalf as independent con- 
tractors. This paper represents an analysis 
of legal developments in this area and a 
serious attempt to identify the nature and 
extent of an employer's liability for non- 
employees. 
Key words 
Controllers of premises, criminal and civil 
liability, extension of primary duty of care, 
liability for contractors, statutory duties, vic- 
arious liability. 
Introduction 
One of the most interesting and problemat- 
ic aspects of employment law concerns the 
liability of employers for the actions of their 
employees, agents and other parties outside 
the employment relationship. This area of 
law is mainly defmcd by the rules relating to 
vicarious liability derived from common law 
and statutes, although direct duties arc also 
imposed on employers (eg in their role as a 
controller of premises under section 3 of the 
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 
*Senior Lecturer in Law, School Of Public 
Administration and Law, Robert Gordon 
University, Aberdeen, UK 
(HSW Act) and in the duty set out in sec- 
tion 1(2) of the Occupiers' Liability Act 
1957 (OLA57)). 
"The result of vicarious liability is to 
make one person compensate another for 
the loss not due to his fault at all, although 
it may be due to the fault of his servant, 
agent or independent contractor" (Atiyah 
1967). This paper concentrates on cxamin- 
ing the rules governing the liability of 
employers for independent contractors and 
non-employecs in the context of health and 
safety. It is not necessary here to consider in 
any depth the vicarious liability of an 
employer for the actions of an agent or 
employee. This area of law is given detailed 
consideration elsewhere (see Hendy & Ford 
1995) but derives from application of the 
doctrine of respondeatsuperior, which is s=- 
marised as: "The principal is held liable for 
the acts of his agent committed within the 
scope of his employment and in the course 
of business; the principal cannot escape lia- 
bility even by proving that the tort was 
committed against his express command. It 
is liability frequently without fault and quite 
outside of the ordinary principles of causa- 
tion7 (Sayre 1930). 
For the purpose of establishing the extent 
of the legal obligations of the parties 
involved, the courts will often be faced with 
the problem of distinguishing between a 
contract of service and a contract for ser- 
vices. While it might be interesting to con- 
sider the development of the legal tests 
which the courts have developed to deter- 
mine this issue, it is outside the scope of this 
paper (see Brodie 1997). Nevertheless, with 
the development of rules which increase the 
lec, a]. responsibility of employers for the 
wrongful actions of independent contrac- 
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tors and other non-employces that affect the 
health and safety of those persons in or 
around their premises, employers and their 
advisers need to be aware of the circum- 
stances in which legal liability will arise. 
The common law rules determining 
when an employer will be vicariously liable 
for the acts or omissions of independent 
contractors are relatively well defined 
(Atiyah 1967, Hendy & Ford 1995, Craig 
& Miller 1995). As a result of the judicial 
interpretation of statutes, employers now 
have a clear duty to consider the safety of 
non-employees, as illustrated in the case of 
R -v- Swan Hunter Sbipbuilders Ltd and 
Telemeter Installations Ltd (1981), and con- 
trol the actions of non-employees where 
they might pose a threat to the safety of 
their own employees or third parties pre- 
sent on their premises. In R -v- Associated 
Octcl Co. Ltd (1997) it was decided an 
employer can be criminally liable (under 
section 3 of the HSW Act) for the action of 
independent contractors where these acts 
are carried out on the employer's premises 
and under his control. Similar reasoning 
was adopted by the judiciary in the case of 
Burton -v- De Vere Hotels (1996) where 
employers were held vicariously liable in a 
racial discrimination case for racial insults 
and jokes directed by a third party at their 
employees. Consequently, employers' lia- 
bility for the wrongfill acts of non-employ- 
ees has increased, as has legal responsibili- 
ty for the safety and wellbeing of non- 
employees. 
In the light of recent developments in 
these areas, it seems an opportune time to 
evaluate the extent to which an employer 
can be held legally liable for the wrongful 
behaviour of non-employees in the context 
of health and safety, and, on the other side of 
the equation, liable for the protection of the 
health or welfare of non-employees working 
in or visiting his premises. 
a2m 
Vicarious liability for 
independent contractors: 
common law rules 
"71bere is evidence to suggest that in certain 
spheres of industry ... employers are finding 
it convenient to 'sub-contrace work rather 
than do it by employing their own men [sic], 
simply because it enables them to get the 
advantages of employing labour without the 
corresponding obligations" (Atiyah 1967). 
It is questionable whether this statement 
still holds true in respect of employers' 
obligations in health and safety law which 
arise from their dealings with independent 
contractors. The author will analysc various 
areas of law where employers' legal duties 
extend to non-cmployecs. 
Delegation of primary duty of care 
Under the law of contract, liability often 
now remains with the employer where a pri- 
mary duty is carried out on behalf of an 
employer by an independent contractor. In 
Davie -v- New Merton Board Mills (1959), 
the House of Lords held that an employer 
had discharged his duty of care towards his 
employee to provide safe plant and equip- 
ment by buying a chisel (negligently manu- 
factured) from a reputable supplier, who in 
rum had bought it from a reputable manu- 
factu=r. The Employer's Liability (Defective 
Equipment) Act 1969 provided the oppor- 
tux-ýity for an injured employee in such cir- 
cumstances to suc either his employer or the 
manufacturer of the defective equipment. 
Where employers arc under an obligation 
to fiffil a primary legal duty towards their 
employees (ic to take reasonable care for their 
safety) under the law of contract or tort, but 
in place of fulfilling it themselves they dele- 
gate this duty to another, then the employer 
will continue to be liable under the contract 
where the duty is breached by that other per- 
son. This was decided in respect of contrac_ 
nial duties in Wilsons and Clyde Coal C. Om 'pany 
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Ltd -v- English (1938). In this case, mine- 
owners in Fife tried unsuccessffilly to disclaim 
liability for the harm suffered by one of their 
employees as a consequence of failure to fi: dfil 
their contractual duty to provide a safe system 
of work, on the basis that this duty had been 
delegated to a colliery agent, appointment of 
whom was compulsory under the Coal Mines 
Act 1911. This is known as a non-dclegable 
duty (McKendrick 1990). The doctrine first 
emerged in the case of lIkkard -v- Smith 
(1861). justice Williams differentiated 
between the situation where independent 
contractors are employed to do a specific task 
and are negligent in its performance, and that 
where they arc employed to undertake a task 
in fiffilment of an employer's primary duty 
and do so negligently- "Unquestionably no- 
one can be made liable for an act or breach of 
duty unless it be traceable to himself or his 
servant in the course of their employment. 
Týhis rule is, however; inapplicable to cases in 
which the contractor-is entrusted with the per- 
formance of a duty incumbent on his employer 
and neglects its fiff-ilment, whereby an injury 
is occasioned. ... The performance of this 
duty 
he omitted and the fact of his having entrusted 
it to a person who also neglected it, fi=ishes 
no ffzuse, either in good sense or law. " 
In the case of AkDe"nid -v- Nash Dredging 
and Rcclanotion Go. Ltd (1987) a young boy 
was sent to work as a deckhand for the defcn- 
dants and was injured as a result of the negli- 
gence of a ship's captain who was not 
employed by the defendants. They were still 
held liable on the basis that their duty towards 
their employee - to provide a safe system of 
work - was non-delegablc 
(after Wdson; & 
Cbý* Coal Cmnpany Ltd -v- B&Ysh (1938)). 
In Cook -v- Square D. 
Ltd (1992) an 
employee was sent to Saudi 
Arabia to work 
in the premises of another employer where 
he suffered injury as a result of a 
hazard on 
the premises. The circumstances were similar 
to those in the McDermid case. 
Howeve; 
the court was prepared to depart from that 
decision in view of the extreme distance 
between the employee and his employer. 
"The Court of Appeal accepted that the duty 
owed by the UK employers could not be del- 
egated but held that that duty, which was 
only to do what was reasonable in the cir- 
cumstances, has not been breached merely by 
the presence of a hazard on a site abroad 
occupied by supposedly competent interna- 
tional contractors" (Buckley 1993). The 
decision in the Cook case was that the prin- 
ciple laid down in the McDermid case can be 
limited by the coures interpretation of what 
could be expected reasonably of an employer 
in a particular case. Further, there is some 
authority for the assertion that the duty of an 
employer to ensure that fellow workers are 
safe and competent extends to independent 
contractors. "The employer's general duty 
requires reasonable care to be taken to ensure 
that employees are not exposed to risks by 
the appointment of fellow employees and 
there would appear to be no reason in prin- 
ciple that this would not extend to the sclec- 
tion of others, for example independent con- 
tractors with whom an employee may be 
required to work7 (Stair 1996). 
Under the law of tort the primary duty of 
care owed to employees will be discharged 
only in the rare circumstances where it is 
treated as capable of being delegated to an 
independent contractor. Lord Tucker in 
Davie -v- New Merton Board Mills (1959) 
stated: "The employer may delegate the per- 
formance of his obligations in this sphere to 
someone who is more properly described as 
a contractor than a servant, but this does not 
affect the liability of the employer; he will be 
just as much liable for his negligence as for 
that of his servant. " 
Negligence 
"71he duties owed by an employer have tradi- 
tionaUy not extended to independent contrac- 
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tors. ... But under the general law of negli- 
gence, duties, perhaps similar to those owed 
to employees, may be owed by an undcrtak- 
ing to persons not in its employment" 
(Hendy & Ford 1995). It is well established 
that in the event where the employer specifi- 
cally instructs an independent contractor to 
undertake a tortious act, legal liability will 
remain with the employer in respect of any 
parties harmed by that act. The employer will 
also be liable where he has carelessly chosen 
to avail himself of the services of an incompe- 
tent independent contractor. This arose as an 
issue in Salsbu? y -v- Woodland (1969), but the 
Court of Appeal refused to accept that the 
defendant had enlisted the services of an 
incompetent contractor. It had been accepted 
in a much earlier case, Pinn -v- Rtw (1916). 
The employer may also be liable where he 
exercises control over the actions of the inde- 
pendent contractors (or sub-contractors). 
This will apply particularly where the 
employer and the contractors are working 
alongside each other on the same premises or 
on the same piece of land (as often happens 
in the construction industry and offshore 
working in the oil industry). In the case of 
Marshall -v- Milliam Sbarp & Sons (1991) 
the defendant hired the services of a worker 
at an hourly rate and had complete control 
over the actions of the worker. The worker 
was negligent in carrying out his duties and 
as a result injured an employee of the defcn- 
dant. The employee sued the defendant argu- 
ing that he was vicariously liable for the 
actions of the independent contractor. While 
the judges in the Court of Session did not 
accept that the defendant had employed an 
incompetent contractor, they still found the 
defendant liable on the basis of the degree of 
control exercised over the contractor's 
actions. Thomson (1994) summarised the 
effect of this decision: "Unless the hirer has 
the filll plethora of control over an indepen- 
dent contractor, he will not be vicariously 
liable for the delicts of an independent con- 
tractor in carrying out a job. " 
In many instances the services of indepen- 
dent contractors or sub-contractors will be 
engaged because of their specialist skill and, 
more often than not where this is the case, 
the amount of control exercised over their 
activities by the employer will be minimal. 
The 'control' test was the traditional test 
used by the courts to determine whether a 
contract with an employer was a contract of 
employment or a contract for services (Ivca- 
tio opcris). It is stiU one of the factors to be 
considered in detem-iining this issue. More 
significantly, it is also used to determine 
whether an employer is vicariously liable for 
the actions of an independent contractor 
and, where an employee is loaned or hired 
out to a second employer, it will be used to 
determine which of the employers is vicari- 
ously liable for the seconded employees 
actions. 
The rules for deciding which employer is 
vicariously liable for the wrongful actions of 
seconded employees wiU be considered later. 
In the meantime, it is important to consider 
the liability of employers for the actions of 
independent contractors carrying out extra- 
hazardous tasks on their behalf. The leading 
English case is Honquill and Stein Ltd -v- 
Larkin Brother; (1933) where a cinema 
owner hired the plaintiffs to carry out 
acoustic work and they in turn engaged the 
services of the defendants, a firm of photog- 
raphcrs, to take photographs of the cinema's 
interior. The photographic process at the 
time involved inherent dangers, in that mag- 
nesium powder was held in a metal tray 
above the Icns of the camera and ignited 
when the photo was taken. This process was 
executed too close to the curtains which, as 
a result, caught fire, causing serious damage 
to the premises. The plaintiff paid damages 
to the owner of the cinema and claimed the 
fuU amount from the defendants. 
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The Court of Appeal decided in favour of 
the plaintiffs, on the basis that they were vic- 
ariously liable for the actions of the defcn- 
dants as they undertook a task which was 
extra hazardous. 'They were therefore enti- 
tled to an indemnity for the money which 
had been paid out to recompense the cinema 
owner for the cost of repairing the damage 
to their premises resulting from the defen- 
danes negligence. Lord justice Slesser sum- 
marised: "Hence it may be said in one sense 
that such operations are not necessarily 
attended with risk. But the rule of liability 
for independent contractors attaches to 
those operations because they are inherently 
dangerous, and hence are done at the princi- 
pal employer's peril. " This decision has been 
the subject of some criticism (Hepplc & 
Matthews 1980). There is something to be 
said for the view that this case was rightly 
decided for the wrong reasons, although it is 
perhaps unlikely that any court short of the 
House of Lords could undertake the drastic 
reinterpretation necessary to straighten out 
this branch of law (Atiyah 1967). 
The employer will never be liable for 
casual or collateral negligence on the part of 
an independent contractor or the latter's 
employee. "Collateral negligence is negli- 
gent conduct incidental to, but not inherent 
in, the performance of the contractor's opcr- 
ation, disassociated from the normal risks of 
the operation, as distinct from negligence in 
that performance, or in the manner of the 
performance" (Walker 1981). It will often 
be difficult for the courts to determine 
whether a negligent act was within the 
nature of an independent contractor's work 
or a collateral matter falling outside the task 
he was employed to do (Penny -v- 
WImbledon UDC and Iles (1899), Padbuty - 
v- Holliday and Greenwood Ltd (1912)). 
There is some doubt whether this distinc- 
tion should continue to be applied 
in these 
cases (Buckley 1993). 
Vicarious liability for actions of 
seconded employees and others 
Where the services of an employee are lent 
or hired out by his employer to a secondary 
employer, the issue of which of the employ- 
ers will be vicariously liable for the employ- 
ees negligent acts may arise. "Where the ser- 
vant is supplied to the temporary employer 
under some contractual arrangement - as is 
almost invariably the case - the question 
whether one is liable to the other for the tort 
of the servant should, it is submitted, be 
treated as depending on the express or 
implied terms of the contract and not 
according to the principles which determine 
which of them would be liable to a third 
party for the servant's torts" (Atiyah 1967). 
One of the ways that the primary employ- 
er can try to ensure he does not lose out 
financially where he is held to be liable for 
the unlawful actions of a seconded employ- 
ee is to place an indemnity clause in the con- 
tract between himself and the temporary 
employer, providing that he will be reim- 
bursed by the other in the event he has to 
meet a claim for damages in this respect 
(Artbur Tnite -v- Tarnzac Civil Engineering 
(1967)). However, the courts will be reluc- 
tant to accept that liability has transferred 
from the main or primary employer, and 
contractual arrangements between employ- 
ers which are designed to transfer liability 
may not bind them (Smitb -v- Bland/ortb Get 
Cementation Co. Ltd (1970)). 
In the event that there is no formal agree- 
ment between the employers, the courts will 
determine this issue by reference to common 
law rules, particularly the 'contror test 
referred to earlier. The leading case is Mersey 
Docks Harbour Board -v - Coggins and Griffith 
(Liver pool) Ltd (1947) in which the House 
of Lords decided that there is a presumption 
against responsibility transferring away from 
the primary employer, which can only be 
rebutted by clear evidence that the sec- 
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ondary employer has a high degree of con- V, 
trol over the seconded employee's work. 
Lord Uthwatt said: "The workman may 
remain the employee of his general employ- 
er, but, at the same time, the result of the 
arrangements may be that there is vested in 
the hirer a power of control over the work- 
man7s activities sufficient to attach to the 
hirer responsibility for the workman's acts 
and defaults and to exempt the general 
employer from that responsibility. " 
There are factors which may assist the 
courts in determining d-iis issue (Hendy, & 
Ford 1995), in particular the level of skill 
the employee has (highly skilled employees 
will be less likely to be subject to a sec- 
ondary employer's control) and whether the 
employee is transferred with equipment. In 
the Mersey Docks case, for instance, a crane 
driver was transferred along with a crane 
(see also Savmy -v- Holland Hannen and 
Cubitts (Southern) Ltd (1964)). 
A similar approach is adopted in deter- 
mining whether the employer can be held 
vicariously liable for the unlawful actions of 
persons present on his premises who are not 
employees of his or independent contractors 
(eg visitors, students or clients). The ulti- 
mate determinant of whether or not the 
employer is vicariously liable to compensate 
third parties (which might include his 
employees) who have been injured as a 
result of non-employees' actions is: 'was the 
employer in a position to control these 
actions? '. Interestingly, this was the test 
which was applied by the Court of Appeal 
in the racial harassment case Burton -v- De 
Vere Hotels (1996). 
Employers may be obliged to take rea- 
sonable care for the safety of non-employees 
when they are in their premises or in the 
vicinity of their premises, provided such 
persons fall within the ambit of the employ- 
er's duty of care (under the 'neighbour prin- 
cipic', the parameters of which were set out 
Now 
by Lord Atkin in Donoghue -v- Stevenson 
(1932)). 
Occupiers of premises in Great Britain 
have a similar statutory duty under the 
OLA57 or the Occupiers' Liability 
(Scotland) Act 1960 to take care for the 
safýty of persons who are invited by them to 
enter or use the premises. 
Often an independent contractor (usually 
known as the main contractor) working on 
behalf of the employer will need to engage 
the services of a sub-contractor to assist him 
in fiffilling his task for the employer, nor- 
mally by providing some sort of specialist 
service. The question which may arise is: 
'can the employer ever be liable for the 
wrongful acts of the sub-contractors? '. Such 
a relationship exists in the Scottish case, 
junior Books -v - Vietchi (1982), although the 
legal issue was whether an employer could 
sue a sub-contractor (not a party to a con- 
tractual relationship with him) under delict 
for pure economic loss. While the Scottish 
courts ruled in favour of the employer, 
upholding his claim, the English courts have 
been reluctant to follow this decision. In D 
and F Estates -v- Church Commissioners for 
. gland 
(1989), a claim for economic loss En 
against main contractors and sub-contrac- 
tors was unsuccessful as there was no con- 
tractual arrangement between them and the 
plaintiffs. 
Where the employer knows that sub-con- 
tractors will be cn-aged by the main con- 
tractor, such knowledge may involve him in 
incurring liability for their unlawful acts, on 
the basis that he has been a willing partici- 
pant in the delegation of the task to the sub- 
contractors. Employers will certainly be 
liable where they themselves nominate the 
engagement of sub-contractors. The lack of 
a contractual nexus between the employer 
and sub-contractor will not necessarily 
defeat claims for personal injury (Donoghue 
_v- Stevenson (1932)), but it will ensure that 
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an action cannot be brought against the 
employer for recovery of economic loss 
caused by a sub-contractor. 
There are certain defences that can be 
established in order to escape or reduce the 
extent of an employer's liability under the 
law of tort, although they are of limited 
application. It could be shown that the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff was a consequence 
of his own actions which were the sole cause. 
It could also be established that the plaintiff 
voluntarily assumed the risk attached to the 
job he was doing, thereby raising the defence 
of voknti non fit injutia. This defence also 
applies to statutory claims and will be con- 
sidered more fiffly in the context of the OL 
Acts in England and Scotland. 
Finally, the partial defence of contributory 
negligence may apply, with the result that 
the award of damages may be reduced if it 
can be shown that the plaintiff contributed 
in some way to the eventual harm he suf- 
fered. Section 1(1) of the Law Reform 
(contributory Negligence) Act 1945 states: 
"Where any person suffers damage as a result 
partly of his own fault and partly of die fault 
of any other person ... the 
damages recover- 
able in respect thereof shall be reduced to 
such an extent as the courts think just and 
equitable having regard to the claimanes 
share in the responsibility for the damage. " 
statutory liability of the employer 
for actions of independent 
contractors 
Liability arising for an employer under 
statute in respect of non-employces mainly 
derives from primary duties imposed on 
him by health and safety statutes (OLA57, 
Occupiers' Liability Act 1984 (OLA84) 
and HSW Act). Liability may also arise 
where an employer is under a strict or 
absolute duty to fiffi a 
legal obligation 
towards I-, is employees or other parties. 
He 
cannot escape liability where 
he delegates 
such a task to an independent contractor. A 
good example is the duty to safeguard 
machinery under regulation 11 of the 
Provision and Use of Equipment 
Regulations 1992. Under common law 
rules, strict liability is rare. The ruling in 
Rylands -v- Fletcher (1868) is a form of strict 
liability and imposes a duty on the owner or 
occupier of land in respect of his neigh- 
bours, not to allow harm to come to them 
through bringing something onto their land 
which subsequently escapes and causes 
harm. Justice Blackburn summarised the 
position thus: "We think that the true rule 
of law is that the person [owner or occupi- 
er], for his own purposes brings on his land, 
and collects and keeps there anything likely 
to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in 
at his peril, and if he does not do so, he is 
pýima facie answerable for all the damage 
which is the natural consequence of its 
escape. " 
Strict liability in the context of statute law 
mainly arises in the area of health and safetý 
such as section 22(l) of the Factories Act 
1961 which imposes an absolute duty on an 
employer to ensure "every hoist or lift shall 
be of good mechanical construction, sound 
materialand adequate strength, and be prop- 
erly maintained" or in the context of the pro- 
tection of the public health or environment 
(eg Nuclear Installations Act 1965, Merchant 
Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 and the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990). 
Employer's duty to protect the 
health and safety of non- 
employees 
An employer has a primary duty to conduct 
the undertaking in such a way that ensures, 
so far as is reasonably practicable, non- 
employees (including members of the pub- 
lic) are not exposed to risks to their health 
and safety under section 3 of the HSW Act. 
An expansive interpretation of this duty by 
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the judiciary has created one of the most 
dynamic and contentious areas of health and 
safety law (Barrett 1997, Blaikie 1997). 
A duty is also imposed on self-employed 
persons under section 3(2) to conduct their 
undertaking in such a way as to take care for 
their own safety and the safety of persons 
likely to be affected by their actions. 
The significance of section 3 first became 
apparent in the case of R -v- Swan Hunter 
ShipbuiUers Ltd and Telemeter Instafiations 
Ltd (1981). Swan Hunter had informed its 
own employees of the proper and safe use of 
oxygen. However, it failed to give the same 
instruction to employees of sub-contractors 
working alongside Swan Hunter's employ- 
ces repairing the ship, HMS Glasgow. As a 
consequence, a sub-contractor's employee 
failed to switch off the oxygen supply at the 
end of the working day which led to a build 
up of oxygen in the atmosphere. Some time 
later another employee ignited a welding 
torch and there was a serious explosion. The 
Court of Appeal found that Swan Hunter 
had breached section 2(1) of the Act (w]-iich 
requires an employer to take care for the safe- 
ty of all his employees) and specific duties 
under section 2(2). The basis for this Part of 
the ruling was that by failing to inform sub- 
contractors' employees of the risks involved 
in using oxygen, the company had put its 
own employees at risk. The employer's fail- 
ure to inform non-employees about the risks 
of the operation they were involved in also 
constituted a breach of section 3. Hence it 
was found that: "Ilie duty of an employer 
under section 3(1) to conduct his undertak- 
ing in such a way as to ensure that persons 
not in his employment who may be affected 
are not put at risk, includes the giving of 
information and instruction to employees of 
other employers. " 
Attempts by employers to evade liability 
under the HSW Act by putting the blame on 
senior management under the auspices of 
section 36(l) (which provides that "where 
the commission by any person of an offence 
under any of the relevant statutory provisions 
is due to the act or default of some other per- 
son, that other person shall be guilty of the 
offence, and a person may be charged with 
and convicted of the offence by virtue of this 
subsection whether or not proceedings am 
taken against the first-named person7) were 
emphatica. lly rejected in the case of R -v- 
Ditisb Steel pk (1995). The legislation pro- 
posed on corporate manslaughter will ensure 
that corporations can be held responsible for 
breaches of criminal statutes and individual 
directors held liable for breaches of the legis- 
lation. At Presentý under section 37 of the 
HSW Act, a director or manager can be 
jointly liable with the employer for a breach 
of the Act. While it would represent a 
defence for an employer to show that he had 
done all that was reasonably practicable to 
avoid a breach of the Act, employers will 
tend to try to establish that the responsibility 
for non-employees is not theirs and therefore 
the duties under the Act do not apply. The 
case of R -v- Associated Octel Co. Ltd (1997) 
illustrates the difficulties with this approach. 
It was decided by the House of Lords that 
there is no need for the employer to be in a 
position to control the activities of the inde- 
pendent contractor for him to be liable for 
the consequences of the contractor's actions. 
In this case, an employee of an independent 
contractor involved in carrying out repair 
work to a chlorine tank at Associated Octers 
chemical works was badly burned when a fire 
started in the tank followed by an explosion. 
It was argued on behalf of the main corýtrac_ 
tor that an element of control over indepen- 
dent contractors' actions was necessary 
before main contractors could be held 
responsible for a breach of section 3 in this 
context. 
This line of reasoning had been given jucti- 
cial approval in RMC Roadstont Pývductr Ltd 
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-v- jester (1994), where the Queen7s Bench 
Division decided that for employers to be 
liable for a breach of section 3(1) in respect 
of the actions of sub-contractors, such action 
must fall within the employer's "conduct of 
his undertaking" and this will apply only 
where the employer exercises some degree of 
control over the activities of the sub-contrac- 
tor. This argument was rejected in R -v- 
Associated Octel Co. Ltd (1997): "Section 3 is 
not concerned with vicarious liability. It 
imposes a duty upon the employer himself 
which is defmcd by reference to a certain 
kind of activity, namely the conduct by the 
employer of his undertaking. " 
The duty under this section is direct. The 
consequence of this is that where activities 
are carried out on behalf of an employer by 
an independent contractor which could be 
said to be assisting the employer in 'con- 
ducting his undertaking, the employer will 
be liable for the contractor's breach of statu- 
tory provisions arising from such an activity, 
unless he can show he has done all that is 
reasonably practicable to avoid such a 
breach. This will certainly extend to the pro- 
vision of information on safety hazards to 
sub-contractors and their employees and 
could include the provision of instruction, 
training and supervision. 
It is questionable whether the issue of rea- 
sonable practicability arises as a serious one 
in these cases, given that the central issue 
occupying the courts in most of the prose- 
cutions is the liability or otherwise of the 
employer for the safety of non-employees 
(Barrett 1997). "Section 3(1) of the Act cre- 
ated a duty of strict liability and the words 
'so far as is reasonable practicable' are simply 
referable to measures necessary to avert the 
risk" (R -v- British SteelPk 
(1995))- 
Criminal liability of the employer as 
controller or occupier of premises 
Under section 4 of the HSW Act, persons 
in 
control of premises have a duty to care for 
the safety of persons not in their employ- 
ment who are using the premises as a place 
of work. They must, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, ensure that access to and exit 
from the premises are safe and that plant 
and substances provided for non-employees' 
use arc safe. There can be more than one 
controller of premises, and anyone exercis- 
ing control, however slight, will owe a duty 
to non-employees under section 4(2) of the 
Act. In Mailer -v- Austin Rover Group 
(1989) (Austin Rover Group Ltd -v- HM 
Ins pector of Factories (1990)), the car manu- 
facturer was held liable for a breach of sec- 
tion 4(2) when the employee of a sub-con- 
tractor carrying out cleaning work on its 
premises was killed. Lord Jauncey sum- 
marised the position thus: "Subject to the 
limited qualification embodied in the phrase 
'so far as is reasonably practicable' it seems 
to me that the duty imposed on the defen- 
dant to ensure that the relevant premises are 
safe and without risk to health for any use 
they are made available is prima facie 
absolute. " 
The sub-contractor was prosecuted and 
convicted for breach of duty to take care for 
the safety of his own employees (by failing 
to provide a safe system of work). However, 
Austin Rover was also held liable under sec- 
tion 4(2) as controller of the premises, even 
though the degree of control exercised over 
the activities of the sub-contractor's employ- 
ees was minimal. 
Civil liability of the employer as 
occupier or controller of premises 
Under civil law, employers who arc con- 
trollers or occupiers of premises have a duty 
under the law of tort in relation to non- 
employees (where they are their legal neigh- 
bours) to take care for their safety. The legal 
ncighbour test was set out by Lord Atkin in 
DonoSbue -v- Stevenson (1932): "You must 
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not injure your neighbour, and the lawyer's 
question 'who is my neighbour? ' receives a 
restricted reply. You must take reasonable 
care to avoid acts or omissions which you 
can reasonably foresee would be likely to 
injure your neighbour. Who then, in law, is 
'my neighbour'? The answer seems to be 
persons who arc so closely and directly 
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to 
have them in contemplation as being so 
affected. " The plaintiff will have to establish 
that the employer owes him a duty of care. 
The ffilfilment of this evidential requirement 
is more difficult where there is no legal con- 
nection between the employer and the per- 
son harmed, for example visitors to or mcm- 
bers of the public on their premises. 
Where a duty of care exists, the next ques- 
tion is: 'to what extent was the harm suf- 
fered by the person in attendance at or near 
the premises reasonably foreseeable to the 
employer? '. If the resultant harm could have 
been foreseen and the employer failed to 
take any steps to alleviate the risk of harm, 
then liability for breach of duty of care will 
be established. 
A similar duty of care arises under OLA5 7 
and OLA84. The Occupiers' Liability 
(Scotland) Act 1960 applies north of the 
border and imposes a duty on the occupier 
(employer) to take reasonable care for the 
safety of third parties on his premises (tres- 
passers may be included in this category). 
An occupier can be liable for the unlawful 
actions of independent contractors pcrpc- 
trated on his premises. 
These Acts serve to clarify the issue of the 
legal responsibilities of occupiers of premis- 
es towards the safety and wcUbcing of visi- 
tors to their premises and other parties com- 
ing within their duty of care. 
The term 'Premises' is widely defined to 
include not only land and buildings, but also 
fixed or moveable structures such as vehicles, 
aircraft, ships, ladders and scaffolding. The 
question of who is an occupier is decided by 
resort to the common law 'controP test, to 
the extent that an occupier is any person 
who exercises active control over the prcmis- 
cs. The case of "eat -v- E. Lacon & Co Ltd 
(1966) clarificd the meanings of section 
1(2) of OIA57 and section 1(2)(a) of 
OLA84 which lcft this issue to be deter- 
mined by resort to common law rules. Given 
that the control of premises can be shared, 
this means that there may be a number of 
occupiers for the purposes of the legislation. 
Each will have liability under the Acts, 
although the extent of their liability will be 
commensurate with the degree of control 
exercised over the premises. Lord Denning's 
judgment in the House of Lords appeal in 
the Wheat case offered a detailed rationale' 
for this approach. 
The types of visitor which OLA57 is 
designed to protect arc lessees and those per- 
sons invited onto the prernises: by the occu- 
pier for whatever purpose. However, section 
I of OLA84 extended the liability of occu- 
piers to trespassers. Liability for the safety of 
trespassers and others arises only where the 
occupier knows of a risk or has reasonable 
grounds to believe it exists, and the person 
concerned is already in the vicinity of the 
danger or may come within its vicinity. The 
occupier will only be liable where the per- 
ceived danger is such that he ought to have 
offered protection against it. 
Occupiers will be liable for the faulty 
work of independent contractors only in 
limited circumstances, similar to those 
applying under common law in relation to, 
the vicarious Lability of employers for the 
actions of independent contractors. These 
arc set out in section 2(4) of OIA57, which 
states that liability will apply only wherv. 
employers fail to act reasonably in appoint- 
ing an independent contractor, or fail to 
ensure that the contractor was competent or 
that the work was carried out safely. Where 
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they know that faulty work had been carried 
out by the contractor, the occupier is under 
a duty to have the defect remedied. "In prac- 
tice the general approach adopted by the 
courts to cases involving personal injury is 
unlikely now to differ substantially whether 
the claim is made by a 'visitor' under 
OLA57, someone 'other than a visitor' 
under OLA84, or someone relying on gen- 
cral DonoSbue -v- Stevenson negligence at 
common law (although where activities are 
carried out on the occupier's land which are 
unrelated to condition or safety of the lapd. 
itself or any buildings upon it, then any neg- 
hgcnce action must be pursued under the 
common law). This does not, of course, 
imply that the precautions which an occupi- 
er will need to take to avoid liability will 
now be the same regardless of the nature of 
the potential plaintiff" (Buckley 1993). 
The occupier may attempt to avoid liabil- 
ity by the use of warnings and this may be 
successful in certain cases. Under section 
2(4) of OLA57, warnings are recognised as 
being capable of 'absolving the occupier of 
liability', where following the warning 
would enable the visitor to be reasonably 
safe. They may also attempt to exclude lia- 
bility for their negligence, through the use 
of exclusion clauses in a contract (where 
there is a contractual relationship between 
the occupier and the visitor) or by a notice. 
Section 2 of the Unfair Contracts Act 1977 
(section 16 in Scotland) prohibits the use of 
exclusion clauses where businesses or public 
bodies attempt to use them to escape liabili- 
ty for death or injury caused by their negli- 
gence. 
The defence of volenti non fit iniu? ia may 
apply here (section 2(4) of OLA57) where 
it can be shown that the visitor was aware 
of a risk (possibly through seeing a wam- 
ing or notice or being told of 
it by the 
occupier or others) and willingly accepted 
it as his own- 
The remedy for the person harmed as a 
result of the occupier's negligence (which 
represents a breach of the Acts) will be 
damages, which will be calculated in the 
same way as under the law of tort. The 
defence of contributory negligence may 
also apply here, in line with the provisions 
of the Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act 1945 (mentioned earlier) 
resulting in damages awards being reduced 
in line with the contributory fault of the 
victim. 
Direct liability of the employer for 
negligence of manufacturers 
In the case of Davie -v- New Merton Board 
Mills Ltd (1959) an employer had acquired 
equipment from a reputable manufacturer 
which, at the time of purchase, appeared 
sound, but turned out to have a latent defect 
which caused injury to an employee of the 
defendant. The employee sued his employer 
but was unsuccessful on the basis that the 
employer had discharged his duty by taking 
reasonable care when acquirino; the equip- 
ment. This decision was superseded by the 
Employer's Liability (Defective Equipment) 
Act 1969 which provides that where the 
defect in the equipment causes injury to the 
employee and the defect arises from the fault 
of the manufacturer (or his employer), the 
employee can recover damages directly from 
his employer. 
Conclusions 
The legal liabilities held by employers in 
respect of non-employees represent an area 
of law that is too vast to be covered in just 
one paper. Consideration in this paper is 
restricted to health and safety law and, even 
then, only to general areas. Industry-specific 
legislation, in particular, the Construction 
(Design and Management) Regulations 
1994, introduces yet fin-ther complications. 
There are, however, certain inescapable 
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truths that employers must accept and 
respond to. 
1. Employers cannot afford to ignore their 
responsibilities in respect of health and 
safety arising from their dealings with 
independent contractors, but they must 
also consider the safety and wcllbeing of 
independent contractors' employees, visi- 
tors to their premises, persons working in 
premises under their control or which 
they occupy, and even trespassers. 
2. Civil law, while still wrestling with con- 
cepts such as the 'controP test, has devel- 
oped sufficiently to be clear about the 
nature and extent of the liability of 
employers for these categories of persons. 
"Under the general law of negligence 
duties perhaps similar to those owed to 
employees may be owed by an undertak- 
ing to persons not in its employment. 
The cases have often been viewed as 
exceptions. Yet they increasingly illustrate 
the readiness of the law to award dam- 
ages where one person has assumed 
responsibility to another - whether 
through contract or through the factual 
nature of the relationship" (Hcndy & 
Ford 1995). 
3. The parameters of the coverage of crimi- 
nal law (primarily in the guise of the 
HSW Act, although there are also the var- 
ious regulations implementing European 
Union directives introduced under the 
auspices of the Act) are still being defined 
by the judiciary. It is clear that employers 
are not in a position to delegate responsi- 
bility for a task to another and then with- 
draw, secure in the knowledge that they 
have no further liability. Similarly, they 
cannot allow access to their premises for 
certain purposes while ignoring the safety 
and wellbeing of the individuals present 
there. 
4. Regulation 3 of the Management of 
Health and Safety at Work Regulations 
In= 
1992 requires that employers, in carrying 
out a risk assessment, should consider 
risks to the health and safety of persons 
who arc not employees, but arc involved 
directly or indirectly in the conduct of the 
undertaking. Where risks are identified, 
the employer is expected to take measures 
to avoid them. Under regulation 10(3), 
they arc also required to provide self- 
employed workers or employees from an 
outside undertaking with instruction and 
appropriate information conccrning ris" 
to their health and safety if they arc work- 
ing in the undertaking. "Section 3 of the 
1974 Act provides that the employer's 
duty is to conduct his undertaking in such 
a way that persons who are not employ- 
ces are not exposed to risks to health and 
safety. This duty extends not only to other 
workers but to the general public" 
(Hendy & Ford 1995). 
5. The liability of an cmployer who fails to 
comply with civil and criminal rules in 
this area is too great to be ignored. 
Undoubtedly the maxim 'do unto others 
as you would have done to yourself' 
takes on a new meanino, in this context. V 
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joURNAL OF THE INSTrTUTION 
OF OCCUpA'nONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 

CIVIL REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT: DELICTUAL ACTIONS 
SAM MIDDLEMISS 
his article, Sain Middlemiss analvSes the civil remedies open to victinis qf 
harassment. He concludes that. while a statuton, ren? edv is available 
i4y, against the employer, a remedýy in delict is available against the 
,-1, , Vloy-er and the 
harasser. a consideration which )night be important to an. 1 
II 
here are very few cases where victims of sexual harassment have pursued 
a delictual claim a* gainst their harasser. Relatively recently however, the 
bilish courts recog-nised an extension of the employer's personal duty of 
ýi, to include a duty to refrain from causing an employee to suffer stress and 
Suety brought on by overwork. 
' They also recognised the existence of a tort 
ibarassment. 2 While neither of these developments impact directly on the 
jýj rules relating to sexual harassment, they could prove to be instrumental 5CI 
xpanding the legal protection for victims of sexual harassment under the 
kwof tort. These decisions will undoubtedly be persuasive to Scottish courts 
IýIribunals, however there 
is no guarantee that the Scottish courts will apply 
ý'Iegal principles to sexual harassment cases or further expand their 
iý61opment in this direction. 
I seems an appropriate juncture to analyse the importance of these 
jjýsions, and in the process identify the types of defictual action which could 
ijursued against a harasser or their employer, in the absence of a specific 
iqictual remedy in Scotland. Before undertaking this analysis it is important 
II consider the potential advantages of a delictual claim and its underlying 
1, 
There may be difficulties in proving that the harasser has breached his or 
iýelictual duty of care owed to the victim (not to cause them harm), or that 
ý! mployer is in breach of their personal duty of care toward their employee 
rl, vicariously liable for the harasser's breach. On the positive side it is not 
Fessary for the victim to base a delictual action on inequality of treatment 
athe basis of gender, as is required in statutory claims.. ' 
ýhere are also serious financial considerations in deciding between 
I Senior Lecturer in Law. Robert Gordon University. 
Walker %,. Northuntherland Count ,v 
Council (1995) I. C. R. 701. 
Khorasandjan v. Bush 119931 Q. B. 727.119931 3 W. L. R. 476. [19931 .1 All E. R. 669. 
There have been cases where strict application of this principle has created difficulties for 
ýkants in establi%hine their eligibility to bring a statutory claim. See Webb v. EMO Air Carýeo 
rt) lid [ 199212 Alr ER, 43 11992 1 I. C. R. 
ý445. C. A.: Dixen? v. Ree. % 119931 I. R. L. R. 468: 
It & Stewari r. Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltel 119941 I. R. L. R. 440. E. A. T. 
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pursuing a delictual (or contractual) claim before a court' or bringing 
4' statutory claim (e. g. sex discrimination. constructive dismissal) be o f re a tribunal. "Although more time-consurring and potentially costly fro C, In 
standpoint of the complainant an acti( in the ordinary courts has the 
advantage that, unlike industrial tribunal procet: ligs. legal aid may 
available in appropriate circurnstances. '" In fact je-al aid is available to- 
applicants in tribunal cases to cover the legal costs involved in providing 
advice and assistance in connection with the case, but not for the costs arisintr 
from representation at the tribunal. ' 
As suggested it is potentially more expensive to pursue a delic I tua action in 
the courts, than to bring a statutory claim to an industrial tribunal. Legzl`,,, ý 
representation, with its attached cost, is more of a prerequisite in the form' er,, type of claim. Also the unsuccessful party may be ordered by the courts to pa- ý Y11""', the other party's costs, which according, to Craig & Miller' seldom happens 95 CP 
tribunal proceedings: "It is rare for expenses to be awarded to the succes fu S 
party after an industrial tribunal hearing. " 
With this reservation in mind, it is important to analyse the nature of delictual action and the types of delictual liability which may arise fr in 
sexual or racial harassment. 
Nature of a Delictual Action 
"The law of delict deals with the injuries, harm, losses and oth 
damages which persons cause unwittingly or not to others living in tlteý,, 
same organised society, on whose lives their conduct in some wký - 
impinges. -8 
The type of conduct which this definition covers is extremely wide arA 
varied. and this area of law can be utilised to protect against new forms 
delictual harm through judicial intervention. Lack of judicial precedent in 
particular area is not necessarily a bar to an action. In respect of sex'ýa 11 
harassment an action may be brought against a harasser for an intentional debij 
such as assault or where the harm caused is unintentional for a breach of duo 
under the law of negligence. An action may also lie against the harassers, 
employer for breach of their personal duty of care under the law of delicýl 
Alternatively. where this does not apply, the employer may be vicariously liablý 
for the harasser's actions. Intentional delicts and vicarious liability will ý 
' For potential contractual actions see S. Middlemiss. "Remedies for Victims of Sexad. 
Harassment: the Contractual Dimension, " 1997 S. L. T. (News). 1 
M. Rubinstein, Preventing and Remedying Sexual Harassment at Work (1989). at p. It In August 1996 the Government conffirmed their decision to refmin from extending ICO 
aid assistance to tribunal cases. despite an earlier intention to consider this. set out in a greq 
paper. See Industrial Relations Law Bulletin. No. 523, June 1995 at p. 16 for full details of 
proposals. 
V. Craig. K. Miller, Emplownent Law in Scotland (199 1). at p. 227. 
Walker. D. M.. Delict (2nded., 1981). at pp. 4-5. 
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at a later stage: however it is important to consider whether a victim Cý 
ent is owed a duty of care by their harasser or their employer. 
of DutY of Care 
F &lictual action the pursuer has to establish that they are owed a duty of 
by the person causing them harm. Where there is a contractual relation- 
between the pursuer and the defender, this can be relatively easy to prove. 
$, is well settled that the mere 
fact A and B are parties to a contract does not 1"'ielit 
A being liable in delict provided the criteria for delictual liability are 
e 
-I 
lished. "' Unfortunately the parties involved in incidents of sexual or #ý111 * harassment are often not directly linked by a contract (e. g. where they 
-ýIýcolleagues or where a relationship 
between supervisor and subordinate is 
A-Dived). The lack of a contractual nexus is not fatal however, because a duty 
4ve under the law of delict can exist independent of a contract. In cases 
, jere the pursuer 
is claiming damages against their employer for pure econ- 
loss (e. g. loss of promotion opportunities), the existence of a contractual Oic 
, zýfionship can act as a 
barrier to a delictual claim. 10 "Where ... the delictual 
is for pure economic loss ... if the parties have direct privity of contract ,a 
*reappears to be no room for delictual liability as there is no obligation- 
Vgt from the contract itself-to prevent economic loss arising as a result of a 
, gure to take reasonable care 
to perform a contract. " The existence of a 
Ontractual relationship will establish the necessary proximity for a duty of 
=owed by the employer where the claim is based on psychiatric damage. " 
In the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson, " the "neighbour principle" (as 
ifined by Lord Atkin), established that a duty of care will exist where the 
pates involved are legal neighbours. This is where person's acts or omissions 
kýe injured another, and such harm is reasonably foreseeable. The person 
ismed must be so closely and directly affected by the act or omission that the 
3tgojigent party ought to have considered them. "' The pursuer must prove they 
ýave suffered some harm or loss as a consequence of the wrongful act, and a 
=sal connection exists between the breach of delictual duty and the actual 
, mm suffered. 
A person will only be liable where it is reasonably foreseeable that harm will 
- j. Thomson. "Delictual Liability Between Parties to a Contract", 1994 S. L. T. (News) 
10 The leading case on economic loss in Scotland is Junior Books v. Vietchi. 1982 S. C. (H. L. ) 
A. 
11 Above. n. 9 at p. 34. 
a in Frost v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, The Thnes. November 6,1996. the 
ýxft of Appeal stated that employees who are acting in the course of their employment and 
ider nervous shock or psychiatric injury as primary and not secondary victims of a trauma or 
ccident and are therefore not required to bring themselves within the ambit of dutyý of care on 
kview that. -in the context of the master and servant relationship a duty of care existed solely 
,. rreason of that relationship. " 
* 1932 S. C. (H. L. ) 31,1932 S. L. T. 317. 
* Bourhill v. Young. 1942 S. C. (H. L. ) 78.1943 S. L. T. 66 illustrates this point well. 
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result from their wrongful act. although it is not necessary that the precise 
nature of the harm is foreseen. " In sexual harassment claims the causal 
connection between the harm suffered and the harasser's actions will be easilv 
established. -It seems likely. ... that when a victim is threatened with so `ýý 
penalty unless the harasser is permitted some physical contact. then an assau 
, it 
16 
will have taken place. " The penalty in this context will invariably have sot 
economic aspect, such as loss of employment. It also seems reasonable to, ý 
conclude that a foreseeable outcome of physical or verbal harassment 
physical or mental injury to the victim. Whether or not the employer is 
breach of their duty of care will depend on the context in which the harassmel'it 
takes place. If the harassment can be shown to be as a consequence of a failurý, ý,, 
to provide a safe system of work (e. g. resulting in psychiatric injury) or safe'-, ' 
and competent fellow employees, the employer wil I undoubtedly be liable, ', ý- ' 
On this latter point: "at common law, liability for intentional assault might,, 
arise,... where the employer has been negligent in recruiting or supervisingthý- C> Cý 
wrongdoer. -" Where an employer knows about the activities of a harasser be', 
would be expected to take positive steps to remove them from the workplac'e--, -, " 
-It seems to me that if in fact a fellow workman ... by his habitual conduct likely to prove a source of danger to his fellow employees. a duty lies fairly and, ', 
squarely on employers to remove that source of danger. " " The pursuer musjl`-. ýi, 
prove that on the balance of probabilities the harasser or his employer breached 
their duty of care. "The onus of proof is on the pursuer initially in all cases 0(1 , 
delict, it is for him to prove fault, and not for the defender to rebut it ... there is'ý' 
a general presumption against wrong whether deliberate or negligent. The',, 
burden may however shift from time to time during a proof or trial. '"' 
The initial evidential burden may serve to disincline employees from', 
pursuing their actions through the courts, although where the harasser is the' 
victim's superior, a breach of duty of care will be easily established. 2' 
What follows is an analysis of the specific types of delictual liability whicb, 
could apply to cases of sexual or racial harassment. 
Delictual Liability 
In Walker v. Northumberland County Council, 21 the High Court decided ft 
the employer's duty of care could be extended to protecting their employees 
See Miller v. SSEB. 1958 S. C. (H. L. ) 20.1958 S. L. T. 229; Hughes v. Lord Advocate. 1963. 
S. C. (H. L. ) 31.1963 S. L. T. 150. 
11 J. Dine. B. Watt, "Sexual Harassment: Moving Away From Discrimination". M. LR- 
Vol. 58. No. 3. at p. 362. 
J. Ross. "Tower Boot Co. Ltd v. Jones-. 1996 J. R. 284. 
Hudson v. Ridge Manufacturing Co. Ltd 1195712 Q. B. 348.1195712 W. L. R. 948. (19511 
2 All E. R. 229. 
Above. n. 8 at pp. 379-380. 
See Bracebridge Engineering v. Darby 119901 lRLR 3. E. A. T. where common law nb 
were applied to a sexual harassment claim under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. ensurin. 0 &I 
the employer was liable for the harasser*. % lascivious act. because the perpetrator of 'k 
behaviour was the victim's supervisor. A 2' [19951 I. R. L. R. 36. 
I 
CIVIL REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 245 
risks to their mental health caused by the working environment. 
i though the law on the extent of the duty of an employer to provide a safe 
m of work and to take reasonable steps to protect him from risks which 0 . str 
reasonably foreseeable had developed almost exclusively in cases 
ý61ving physical injury to the employee, there is no logical reason why risk 
of injury to an employee's mental 
health should be excluded from the scope of 
employer's duty. "22 Where the employer is aware that a colleague or L_ 
. ýýpervisor 
is sexually harassing one or more of their employees, and the 
; ýpient of this behaviour suffers mental harm as a consequence. then on the 
1- ý' - basis of the Walker decision. it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
,,,, Mployer 
will be liable for failing to provide a safe system of work. In 
ýiýcordance with the individual focus of negligence, an employer will owe a 
t, `jiiýher standard of care to an employee, known or who should reasonably be 
123 wn to be susceptible to a stress-based illness. ' If such a duty of care can 
established, the need to establish the vicarious liability of the employer will 
, tircumvented. "be 
, L, ln 
Khorasandjan %. Bush. 2' the Eng, 'A'4 - glish courts recognised the existence of a 
of harassment. A woman was the recipient of indecent phone calls, made 
ý6 her at her mother's house. She sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain 
ýIbe phone calls. The County Court granted an injunction to restrain the 
, selephone calls and acts of violence or pestering of the plaintiff and forbade 
, communication 
with her. The defendant appealed on the basis that the judge 
, didnot 
have jurisdiction to issue the injunction as the plaintiff's complaint did 
, wt relate to a specific 
tort and injunctions can only be granted to protect 
,, specific legal rights. The Court of Appeal decided to extend the tort of private 
ý=sance (which had been developed to protect private property rights and the 
fije and enjoyment of land) to include harassment directed toward a person at 
,;, place where they have no proprietary interest but do have a riOrht of 
-, xcupation. 2' It is difficult to predict the full effect this decision will have in 
, 
ingland and Scotland. The court has decided that injunctions can be ranted a 0 
restrain harassment which causes or is likely to cause physical or 
Pised that the tort of harassment is a 
,, 
psychiatric illness. They have also reco 
gh it is difficult to envisage how this tort . species of private nuisance. althou 
, could 
be crenerally applied to harassment in the workplace. without further 
,, 
Oicial creativity-26 
jý , The Walker and Khorasandjan decisions. while not directly impacting on 
ýsexual harassment law, indicate a willingness on the part of the courts to 
22 Above n. 21. at p. 36. 
-ep-'s Liability (12th ed.. 1995). at p. 129. 2' J. Hendy. M Ford. Ahinkman (pit Eiprpleý% 
' Above n. 2. 
is In arriving at their decision they relied upon the reasoning adopted by the judiciary in an 
-'unerican case Aforhem-ell v. Mothenvell (1976) 73 D. L. R. Ord) 62. where a wife living in (but iaýng 
no propfietary interest in) the marital home. had sufficient right of occupation to found 
ýn action for private nuisance. 
I Possibly b) including within the arnbit of the tort behaviour which represents an *ngement of privacy. nervous shock or a threat to their physical or mental well-being. 
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extend the law of tort to provide further protection to recipients of b havlýo e 
which adversely affects their physical or mental well-being. Contin'%-!, 
development of such protection will inevitably have a direct impact %, victims of sexual harassment. 2' While it is uncertain whether these decisi* 
will prove to be influential on courts north of the border, there are varir; ý 
well -established delictual actions in Scotland which will be applicable't 
sexual harassment. : 11 
Intentional Delicts 
Delictual actions for assault may be most appropriate here, given that it Uý be relevant to pursue such an action where behaviour involves physical foQ, 
of sexual harassment. Assault has been defined as: "An overt physical 
intended to insult, affront or harm another, done without lawful justiricatQ 
or excuse. "28 
This definition refers to acts which have a physical element, althouerh it'! 
not necessary that the pursuer is struck or caused any physical harm. proviQ 
the consequence is an affront to the pursuer. Using abusive or threateni 
language or behaviour (e. g. shaking a fist) would be an assault, as would aip 1 4D immodest gesture which would affront a woman, such as attempted or actua 
fondlin- or handlin- of a woman, or kissina her acainst her will. 
The defender can bring forward the defence that the pursuer consented J 
the assault, and if this is proven it will negate any claim. Most defenct 
available under the law of delict would not apply to assault cases, howeveri 
circumstances where it can be shown that the assault was provoked by it 
pursuer's verbal statement or physical act, this may serve to reduce a 
amount of damages awarded (representing contributory negligence). In ord C, 0 Cý 
to substantiate these defences of consent or provocation it is possible th 
evidence relating to the pursuer's sexual attitude or background will 1 
introduced as evidence. Victims of harassment should be cognisant of tt 
fact. 
Where there is an aggravation of the assault (e. g. where the injury inflict 
is serious or the insult or affront is enormous), then the amount of damag 
awarded will be increased to take account of this. The most extrei 
aggravation of assault is rape. "In the case of assault the essence of the del 
is the invasion of a person's bodily integrity. . .. rape is actionable as 
assault because sexual intercourse was obtained without the wome. 
consent. "29 
As in the case of assault, a complete defence to an action for rape. is t 
the pursuer consented to the behaviour. 
" The Protection from Harassment Bill creates a criminal oGence of harassment 
provides a civil remedy for breach of the statute, entitling the victim to an injunctiol 
damages. 
2' G. J. Bell. Principlesof the Law of Scarland (10th ed.. 1899). at p. 2028. ' 1. M. Thomson. Delictual Liability (1994). at p. 15. 
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vous Shock 
someone unintentionally or negligently causes psychiatric harm to 
her without physically harming them this may represent the delict of 
DIIs shock, or as it has become known in recent time s-psych iatri c 
ý. 30 Where the injury is inflicted directly the recipient of the behaviour is 
, wn as the primary victim. 
"The primary victim. is a person to whom a 
of care is due because the defender ought to have reasonably foreseen 
his or her conduct would lead to the risk of personal -injury, regardless of 
tber that illness is psychiatric or physical. "" 
I pursuing such a claim the victim would 
be obliged to substantiate the 
tence of a psychiatric illness by medical opinion. The expectation of the 
I is that such physical consequences would continue well after the 
Jence that provoked it has passed. 
1 the context of sexual harassment psychiatric injury may be caused by the 
act of harassment provided it is sufficiently traumatic for the victim. 
, ing that someone 
has experienced a severe shock may not be necessary in 
light of recent authority, which suggests that liability can extend to 
ons who cause psychiatric damage over a period of time. 12 
Liability 
Ae a delictual action can be pursued against the harasser, it can also be 
ught against the employer where it can be established that they are C 
Iriously liable for the harasser's actions. The wrongful act must have been 
ýtrated within the course of the harasser's employment. Where the 
asser is the victim's supervisor then the vicarious liability of the employer 
be easily established. " "The tribunal correctly concluded that the acts 
petrated by the harassers were acts committed in the course of their 
? loyment since they were engaged in the course of exercising a dis- 
inary and supervisory function. " Where the harasser is a co-worker of 
'victim, then it may be difficult to prove that their actions should give rise 
-icarious liability for the employer, the reason being that the delict must be C) 
iode or method. albeit wrongful. of the kind of work the employee is 
a, ged to do. " 
t is questionable whether sexual or racial harassment would qualify as part 
Althou. -h Bourhill V. Young. above, n. 14. is a case where the pursuer was unable to satisfy ik-court that they were entitled to recover damages for nervous shock, it is a good illustration 
Aow the courts deal with these cases. 
4H M. J. M. Bogie. -A Shocking Future?: Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric 
Imss in Scotland-. 1997 J. R. 39 at p. 41. 
42 Moffat v. Secrctarý- of Statejor Scotland. 1995 S. L. T. 729. Clark v. Scottish Power. 1994 
LT. 924. 
t -' A good example is the case of Bracebridge Engineering v. Darby [ 19901 IRLR 3. E. A. T.. 
mere a supervisor physically assaulted a subordinate and the employer was held liable. 
ibid. at p. 5. per Lord Justice Wood. 
For a full explanation of the law in thi% area see Salmond and Heuston. The Law of Torts 
-15(b ed.. 1 992). at p. 457. 
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of an employee's duties. "' The vicarious liability of the employer may 
justified on the basis that the employer has failed to create a culture Wher, 
is perceived by their employees that sexual or racial harassment is unacce 
able (e. g. by failing to inform or train staff, or introduce a procedure 
dealing with complaints )r to provide adequate supervision to ens, 
harassment does not take piace. These issues will now be relevant to a tribu. 
in determining whether employers are vicariously liable under statute. " -ft 
will not however be of relevance to the courts in del iberating over this issue 
a delictual action, where their sole concern will be the -course 
employment" issue. In determining if the vicarious liability of the emplo, 
applies in delictual actions it is not enough to show that the employer put I 
employee in a position to cause the harm. " 
Conclusion 
The scope for victims of sexual or racial harassment to pursue delict, 
actions against harassers or their employers is increasing %%ith the advent 
more enlightened judicial decisions and statutory developments which imp., 
on t. he common law rules. The advantages and disadvantages for the victirn 
harassment at work pursuing delictual claims (as opposed to Statutory clain 
have been hiohliahted in this article. 
One aspect of this which has not been mentioned relates to the question 
remedy. It is doubtful whether the remedies provided by statute are sufficit 
to satisfy the needs of the victim or, for that matter, the European Union 
"The opinion is widely shared among lawyers that the remedies for unlav4 
discrimination in employment ... are 
inadequate and that, for example 
comparison with the remedies provided for in the equivalent legislation in t 
USA (Title VI I of the Civil Rights Act 1964), they indicate a lack of rc 
commitment on the part of the legislature to the eradication of cmploymc 
discrimination. ""' While this view was expressed prior to the removal of t 
upper limit for compensation" it is still valid today. "An appropriate reme, 
does not mean compensation, but a cessation of the harassment. Sext 
harassment is usually not just a single incident but is likely to be a particul 
aspect of the working environment. It is changing this so that the work-i! 
conditions improve which is what those harassed often wish for. rather th. 
' in Tower Boot %-. Jones 119951 lRLR 529, E. A. T. (which is a race discrimination ca: 
-here common law rules were relied upon to determine this issue. the E. A. T. had no difficu in excluding vicarious liability. This decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal in Jones Tower Boot Co. Ltd. 119971 I. R. L. R. 168. The court declared that it was the wrong approach 
resort to common law rules in determining if the employer is vicariously liable under statutt Race Relations Act 1976. s. 32. Sex Discrimination Act 1975. s. 41. See Heasinans v. ClaritY Cleaning Co. Ltd 119871 I. C. R. 949: Irving %-. Post Qffice [M I. R. L. R. 289. 
Van Colson and Kainarin v. 1-ind Nordrhein-Westfalen [ 19901 I. R. L. R. 48 1. P. R. Ghandi. P. G. Schofield. "Damages for Employment Discrimination-. 1990 N. L 
Vol. 140. at p. 57. " Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay (Remedies) Regulations 1993 MI. 1993 No. 2798X 
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With these reservations in mind it is important to ýIliary compensation. 
ýer what improved prospects in terms of remedy a delictual action offers. 
the harassment is ongoing there is clearly more scope for obtainina a 
to stop the behaviour in a delictual action. '-' 
'le there is a resistance on the part of judiciary to issue interdicts in an iý, 
,, 
Ooynient context it would be difficult to find a more worthy cause for 
4ý(ation of this rule. -The question for critics would seem to be ... whether 
ýhoýkr far it would be appropriate within our legal system to introduce 
, ocially ordered 
affirmative action. "" 
statutory regime in equal opportunities, with its emphasis on control- 
the discriminatory activities of employers. is ill-suited to providing 
gainst an employee acting in a discriminatory rnanner. -4ý ,: ýedies 
directly a. 
harasser will often escape any liability, which will undoubtedly leave the 
-M-feeling aggrieved. in circumstances where the consequences of the 
,e 1z, 
L, __ 
sment for them are serious (mental harm, loss of employment, etc. ). 
ý41dle the 
industrial tribunal systern has the undoubted advantage of 
,, 
ýOality, cheapness and easy access to justice, it has drawbacks in that it 
, IaLshes the employer 
for a sin of omission-failing to prevent an act of 
16ssment. It exposes the employer to publicity and opprobrium rather than 
ýharassers. -' Where the victim pursues a delictual remedy they could have 
kchoice of suing the harasser or the employer, or both. This clearly has its 
47 &antagCs. 
"V 
H, Hou-hton-James. Sexual Harassment (1995), at p. 75. 
As was'done in the Khorasandjan ca%e. above. n. 2. 
Above. n. 40 at p. 58. 
; f- See Waters %-. Commissioner (if Police qfthe Metropolis 1199.51 I. R. L. R. 531, where a 
male police constable who was harassed by a male collcaoue out of workin hours was denied 
8 0"O"Uni ty of redress against the employer or the harasser for sex'discrimination or 
iitirrii, ation under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
Above. n. 16 at p. 363. 
While this article has concentrated on the delictual remedies available to victims ofsexual 
ad racial harassment. the same protection could be available to victims of bullying (see Wartrvite v. Stratliclyde Regional Council. unreported. Health and Saferv Bulletin. July 1996). 
ad harassment on the ground of disability (the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 makes it 
gainst disabled employees by harassment). It could be aPd ha in Ulawful to discriminate a. rg ett 
:9 case of disability there is a higher standard of' care owed to the employee than in other 
Ws-particularly where the disability involý es mental impairment. 
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tRy BREATH YOU TAKE... EVERY MOVE YOU 
AKE"-SCOTS LAW, THE PROTECTION FROM 
iRASSMENT ACT 1997 AND THE PROBLEM OF 
STALKING 
RICHARD MAYS, SAM MIDDLEMISS, JENNIFER WATSON* 
zylicle the authors discuss the 
belatedly recognised social phenomenon 
ing. They explain how the Scots common law crime of breach of the 
developed for other socially and legally unacceptable conduct, has 
I ýJqyed to respond to this "new" thy-eat. They posit that the recently 
[protection from Harassment Act 1997, which criminalises harass- 
cluding stalking in England and Wales, but fails to do so in Scotland, 
Wts a missed opportunity for Scots Law to enact a clearly defined 
ýO tackle a growing and increasingly alarming form of obsessive 
has acerbically commented that: 
"Laws ... suffer 
from their incapacity to anticipate the novel or 
ýusual circumstance. They tend to be written in response to events 
Mer than anticipation of them. There is an inevitable time lag between 
recognition of a problem and the law's capacity to control it, so the 
kw always runs after moral problems and, like a man chasing his 
6attails, can never quite catch them" 
jeactionary and responsive should offer the law certain advantages. 
of reflection in respect of social problems should ensure laws 
, red on the anvil of experience and resonant with widespread public 
&ýility. Were it always so, one could sustain the law's tardiness of 
se. In recent years there has been evidence to repudiate Donaldson's 
In response to moral panic and genuine concern, there have been 
V" assimilated laws on such topics as dangerous dogs, joy-riding and gun 
L. The subject matter of this article can also be submitted to contest the 
ýnd more accurately, legislators' inertia in responding to social 
Wor Lecturer in Law. the Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, Senior Lecturer in Law, 
en Gordon University, BA (Hons) Law and Management graduate of the School of 
"nistration and Law, the Robert Gordon University (respectivelX). The writers wish 
wledge the assistance of Linda Strangward, School of Public Administration and Law in 
wation of this article. 
Donaldson, Corporations and Morality (1982) p. 165. 
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problems. However, it is trite to note that haste can result in bad law. 2 
contention in this article is that in the haste to respond to a burgeoning si oc al 
problem, legislators, in promulgating the Protection from Harassment 
1997, have not only failed to grasp an opportunity in Scotland to reconstruct, 
a law specifically suited to the crime but, by continuing to rely on - _e -_ ent th anc, , 
common law crime of breach of the peace, the wrong message is being, '. 
conveyed to both victims and perpetrators of an identified and morally,, 
condemned course of conduct. Moreover, there must be concern that', in", 
practice the newly created delict of harassment and the attendant nOn" harassment order will not offer victims considerably more protection than, 
existing civil law remedies already confer. This article considers the ext'( 
and nature of the problem of stalking, how Scots law currently addresses' 
the problem, and finally, to offer a brief overview and assessment 'of,, 
the new legislative provisions (introduced in June 1997) as they pertain"'t'O 
Scotland. 
Although clearly not entirely a modem phenomenon, 3 it is only in recent 
years that stalking has achieved media notoriety. ' However, it is estimato,, 
that for every case that attracts publicity, 5 there are more than 100 that'ý"' we 
hear nothing about. 6 Many victims live in terror and are in constant fearýo'f, 
their stalker. They have limited means of Protecting themselves. These', 
victims have been frustrated by the perceived failure of the law to proviýý 
adequate legal protection against this unwanted and unsolicited attention.,, A 
Many victims are so sceptical of current legal protection they question hoý, W', 
far stalkers; have to go before the law will intervene. 8 It is they who haý, ýj 
pressed for the changes now being introduced in both England and Wales and 
Scotland. 
The Nature and Extent of the Problem 
Stalking has been described by the Home Office in their Consultation Papýt 
as, "a series of acts which are intended to, or in fact, cause harassment'to 
2 Dyer, "How to stop stalkers", The Guardian, September 26,1996. see the various 
contributions from M. P. s in the House of Commons Debate on the Bill, Hansard H. C. Vol. 287. 'ý-, 
cols. 795,803 and 805. 3 Davis v. Lane 87 Eng. Rep 897 (Q. B. 1704). R v. Dunn 113 Eng. Rep. 939 (Q. B. 1840)-., National Victim Center, Stalking Questions and Answers (http: //www. nvc. orgtddirf info43. htm). 
' Campbell, "New Law to give stalkers five years in Jail", The Guardian, October 19. - 1996. 
, Stalking was originally seen to be the scourge of many Hollywood celebrities-lobi' Lennon was stalked and killed by Mark Chapman, a devoted fan; John Hinckley shot Ronald Reagan in an attempt to impress actress Jodie Foster; Robert Hoskins hounded Madonna for five 
years and threatened to slit her throat if she did not marry him and Klaus Wagner had an ongoiýg 
obsession with the late Diana, Princess of Wales. Alderson and Norton. "Inside the mind of the stalker", The Times, September 1996. 
7 Sohn, "Anti-stalking statutes: Do they actually protect victims? ". 1994 30 Criminal Law Review 203 at p. 206. vl " ' See Guy, "The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws" 1993 46 Vanderbiltuw', Review 991 at p. 996. 
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r. person ... 
9 The essence of stalking has also been described as, 
jonally harassing, threatening and/or intimidating a person by follow- 
,u about, sending them 
letters or articles, telephoning them, waiting 
, rtheir place of abode and the 
like". 10 Stalking involves a range of 
ýur that is often continuous and increasingly severe. This may include 
, atly sending letters, making I 
obscene phone calls, using threatening or 
,, 
language and physical intimidation outside the victim's home or 
a ce. 11 Stalking often involves following, threatening, harassing or 
lance. 12 The impact on victims ranges from inconvenience and 
ace, to alarm, distress and, in extreme cases, severe psychological 
or serious physical injury. The National Victim Center in America has 
suffice it to say, virtually any unwanted conduct between a stalker and 
cdm which directly communicates a threat or places the victim in fear 
ierally be referred to as stalking. "" 
niaJor problem surrounding the current debate is the distinct lack of 
ita concerning the frequency of incidents of stalking. 14 It has been 
t to ascertain the magnitude of the problem while stalking itself was 
)gnised as a specific criminal offence under statute or common law. As 
quence, it does not appear in the criminal statistics's which has perhaps 
:d to the apparent failure of the police to respond appropriately and 
ýetically to complaints in the past. "' Since the launch of their 
pi, NASH. 17 has collected a wealth of information through its 
ne helpline. Between January 1994 and January 1996, a total of 8,097 
. of stalking contacted the crisis line for help, support, comfort and 
t&rne office and Lord Chancellor's Department Consultation Paper, Stalking: the 
&w (Home Office. 1996). http: //www. open. gov. uk/home-offllh 1426a. htm, para 1.2. 
P As noted in Goode, "Stalking: Crime of the Nineties", (1995) 19 Criminal Law Journal 
klmican literature perhaps provides the most comprehensive definition in that: "any person 
I EWly, maliciouslý and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the 
, it of stalking ... or arasses another person and makes a credible threat with the intent to `6a person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, commits the offence of aggravated 
pig" (Florida's anti-stalking law. Florida statute 784.048) as mentioned in the Stalking and 
nt Overview (Survivors of Stalking. http: //www. soshelp. org/Overview. htm). 
ilome Office (1996). Stalking: the Solutions, Para 1.6. 
Guy, above n. 8 at p. 994. 
See n. 3. 
Ugg, --Stopping stalking: a critical examination of anti-stalking statutes" 1993 67 St 
'I L;; Review 347 at p. 349. Allen. Look Who's Stalking: Seeking a Solution to the 
Im of Stalking (Web Journal of Legal Issues, 1996), http: //www. webjcli. ncl. ac. uk/ 
h=4/aIlen4. html p. 2.; Guy. above n. 8 at p. 945. 
AUen. above n. 14 at p. 2. 
95 per cent of victims who had contacted NASH felt that the police did not take them 
ly (Macleod. "Crime of the Nineties". The Wire (Strathclyde Police magazine), p. 22, 
August 1996). Other victims criticised "the casual response of the police and the 
that thel. are sometimes powerless to intervene" (O'Kane, "The Hunted", The 
ikn. April 1996), as well as the temptation of forces to give complaints of this nature 
viority ("Stop the Stalker-. The Times, March 5,1996). 99 per cent of victims felt that 
officers were "cynical. prejudgmental, insensitive and unknowledgeable about their 
(von Heussen. Facts About Stalking (NASH), p. 3). See also Perez, "When does 
Ig become a crime? " (1993) 20 Amer. J. Crim. Law 263. 
liational Anti-Stalking Harassment Support Association-a non Profit making organis- bunded in July 1993 by Evonne von Heussen. 
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advice. " NASH also recorded that, over a two year period (1994-1995), 
victims of stalking in the United Kingdom died as a consequence of attaclý. 
upon them. Families of victims have also been in touch for support. ig It is clear that the stalker's target is not the only one who suffers. The victiiiivý' 
partner or family may also be vulnerable if the stalker believes they,, ý, ý, w 
standing in the way of consummating his/her relationship with the vict6i 
Although most stalkers live alone, where they have families, members of' 
'the 
, 
family may also be affected by the stalker's actions. 2" Overall, there,,, ii 
evidence that the incidence of stalking behaviour is rising-2, The daý 
collected by NASH provides an indication of the extent of the prc)bli 
However, the Association is keen to point out that the data does not present a" 
complete picture of the problem as the work is still in progress. Despite uus, ý it is the only source of data which the Home Office cited in its Consultati 
, Paper. 22 More recent research into the scale of the problem has been- 
conducted by the Assistant Chief Constable of Hampshire. This researc 
conducted on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers (Acpoy, 
found that, out of 44 forces asked about the types of behaviour that would" 
constitute stalking, only four forces could not provide examples. 23 __7 The problem is all the more prevalent in America where a survey estima ted, 
that there are as many as 200,000 stalkers. 24 A number of high profile 
celebrities have become victims. 25 The U. S. has responded rapidly to theý 
problem with 48 out of the 52 states legislating against stalking. 26 
A major priority is the need for information as to the psychological prordel 
of the differing types of people who stalk. 27 Unless this data is established it is 
von Heussen, Facts About Stalking (NASH). p 2. A recent example is the father of a victim w6 contacted NASH to inform them of theii 
vicious murder of his daughter in 1995. Jessie Hurlstone was stalked for two years by a 
labourerwho eventually battered hertodeath. Herkillerwas tried andconvicted inNovember 1 
20 For example, Shameen Wagner (the wife of the late Princess Diana's stalker) says she 
become another victim of her husband's obsession. Social workers have threatened to take herý 
children into care if she remains with him. Alderson and Norton, "Inside the mind of the, 
' 
Stalker", The Times, September 29,1996. "5 
Guy above n. 8 at p. 995. 
Home Office (1996), Stalking: the Solutions. 
2' Tendler, "Call for tighter law as victim tells of stalker's campaign", The Times. 
September 3,1996. 
'4 O'Kane, "Behind you", The Guardian, January 31,1996. It is also estimated that 5 per, 
cent of all American women are likely to become the target of a stalker during their lifetime 
(National Victim Center, Stalking: Questions and Answers, above n. 3); see also Walker. "And 
Stalking legislation: does it protect the victim without violating the rights of the accused? 1993 
71 Denver University Law Review 273 at p. 275. 
1 Whittel, "Madonna hails court win for victims of stalkers". The Times, January 10,1996. 
The Los Angeles Police Department estimate that of the 200 cases they handle each year, at least 
30 per cent of calls are from celebrities seeking help and protection from obsessive fans; see also 
Attinello, "Anti-Stalkint legislation: A comparison of traditional remedies available for victims 
of harassment versus alifomia penal code 646-9", Pacific Law Journal. Vol. 24, pp. 
1945-1980. 
I Trevena, "Stalk talk", The Guardian, April 1.1996. 
27 McAnaney, Curliss and Abeyta-Price, From imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking La*'s 
(1993), p. 819 state that those who stalk include "obsessed fans, divorced or separated spouses, 
ex-lovers, rejected suitors, neighbours, co-workers. classmates. gang members, former emplOY- 
ees, disgruntled defendants, as well as complete strangers. " 
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ýfficult to determine whether the new legislation will be effective. NASH has 
. 
0t conducted research into the psychology of stalkers, although it has 
, iivestigated the relationship of stalkers to their chosen victims. Of the 8,097 
ýctims who contacted their helpline, 85 per cent had experienced "post 
ýlationship stalkincg- (i. e. by ex-husbands or partners), and 10 per cent were 
bown to the victim, but had never been romantically involved with them- 
sual contact stalking". This group may include neighbours, colleagues, 
JDctors, teachers and postmen. Only around 5 per cent of the victims had been 
ýýalked by total strangers. 21 
, ýThe 
investigation conducted by the ACPO involved the analysis of 151 
itcidents of stalking. Of these cases, 40 stalkers had casual relationships with 
jeir victims, 32 were unknown, 30 had some other form of relationship, 25 
jýre "domestic" stalkers (ex-husbands or partners) and 24 knew their victim 
ijough work . 
29 
;,, NASH have identified that stalking is not gender specific, thought the most 'W I fm=on situation is of men stalking women. Despite this, more women tend 
i stalk celebrities. 30 Those who stalk are from all walks of life, as are their 
ýctims. The stalkers and their victim are usually of differeqt sexes. 3 I Stalkers 
jaýe an average age of 35, most are unemployed and 60 per cent have 
le_ceived psychiatric treatment in the past. However, the vast majority are 
better educated than other mentally ill offenders, with at least average 
iiielligence (25 per cent were above average). 32 
t, While the victims may have a resilient character, it does not negate the fact 
ihat they suffer from the traumatic impact of stalking activity. The stress 
idered by victims is such that 70 per cent have shown symptoms of post 
iraumatic stress disorder and 25 per cent have contemplated suicide. 33 
-Though these facts from NASH and the ACPO are informative, there is 
dearly a need for further investigation into this area. 34 It has been suggested 
1hit a significant proportion of stalkers suffer from some form of mental 
6ieSS. 33 The fact these people end up stalking perhaps reflects a lack of 
idequate treatment and of adequate care and support in the community. A 
i6nber of stalkers have attempted to seek help, but have been turned away 
ýcause their disorder and its treatment have only recently been recognised. 
'%n von Heussen, Facts About Stalking (NASH), p. 3. Harrison, "Fear stalks provinces after 
ape, of women 'protected' by Police", The Observer, February 4,1996. 
1" Tendler, "Call for tighter law as victim tells of stalker's campaign", The Times, 
September 3.1996. 
,r 
ýO Macleod, above n. 16. 
Though a survey of 80 victims also noted that 13 women had been stalked by other women 61 and Mihill, "Prison plan for stalkers challenged", The Guardian, July 9,1996). 
Persuade, "In the shadow of the stalker". The Times, February 2,1996. 
31 Laurance, "Ban on stalking urged to help defend victims", The Time$, July 9,1996. 
, ý14 Suggested by Allen, above n. 14 at p. 
2. 
,,, 31 it has been suggested that 
60 per cent of stalkers have had previous psychiatric treatment 
Fersuade, above n. 32). A differing view suggests that whilst a small proportion are mentally ill 
Wfering from psychotic or paranoid illness which can be related to schizophrenia), most 
9dkers are not (Mullen and Pathe, "Stalking and the Pathologies of Love" (1994) 28 
4ustralian and Nex'Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 469). 
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Perhaps if they received the level of care and treatment they needed, they 
not have ended up terrorising their unfortunate ViCtiMS. 16 
may,,, 
But what goes on in the mind of a stalker? Research has shown that the 
motives for stalking, real or imagined, are complex and vary drarnaticalijý! 
from one case to another, making it difficult to arrive at a profile, I Of stereotypical behaviour. Motivating factors may include: "intense infatu ti 1 1, a on 
or love fixation, jealousy, inability to accept a relationship ending, child-J 
custody dispute, revenge, racial/hate crime, disgruntled employee, or simpli, 
an extreme dislike of the Victim., 137 One researcher has concluded that the 
motive is not always sexual . 
31 McAnaney, Curliss and Abeyta-Price have, 
identified four different categories of stalker: 39 erotomania; 40 borderliný, 
; 41 . 42 . 
43 erotomania former intimate stalker, sociopathic stalkers 
According to Lingg: 
"Stalkers as a group, have* been found to manifest a variety of 
psychological disorders including erotomania, schizophrenia and others--, ý There is however no discernible pattern of stalking or of the stalking 
'type'. Stalking also occurs in a wide variety of contexts, from situationi] 
in which the victim and stalker formerly had an intimate, personal, ' 
relationship to cases in which the stalker was a complete stranger to tlý- 
victim. The common thread is that the offenders, in most cases, uSe 
similar techniques to terrorise their prey. Consequently, stalking can be' 
described as a type of anti-social behaviour, occurring in several 
36 Professor Paul Mullen (Professor of Forensic Psychiatry at Monash University, mej: bourne, Australia), I'm Your Number One Fan! (Channel Four Wocumentary). " Survivors of Stalking, Stalking and Harassment Overview (http: //www. soshelp. o Overview. htm). 
Pool and Mihill, above n. 3 1. 39 McAnaney et al., "From Imprudence. to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws" (1993) 68 Notre, Dame Law, Review 8 19. 
40 The erotomaniac is generally delusional and believes that the object of his desire lovei, ' him even though the victim may not be aware of his existence. The most common victims here., 
are celebrities. Male crotomaniacs are more likely to resort to violence when their feelings ue, 
not reciprocated. Erotomania has also been recognised in psychiatric literature as De, Clerambault's syndrome has been classified as "delusions of passion" (Enoch and Trethowan. - Uncommon Psychiatric Syndromes (2nd ed., 199 1)). 41 Mullen and Pathe. above n. 36. This may be equated with "casual contact stalking" when' 
an individual develops intense feelings for someone they know does not reciprocate his1her feelings. Stalking for these individuals is often a disordered solution to common persoW 
problems such as loneliness or fear of intimacy. They are prone to narcissistic or abandonment 
rage when they are inevitably rejected. According to Allen (above n. 14 at p. 2), the LAPD 
estimate that 48 per cent of stalkers suffer from borderline erotornania. 12 The vast majority of these stalkers have previously been involved in abusive relationships. Between 1982 and 1987 in the U. K., 38 per cent-49 per cent of female murder victims, but only 5 per cent-7 per cent of male murder victims, were killed by their partner (Law Commission No. 207 (1992). Family Law: Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home). 43 These may include serial rapists or murderers. They do not stalk to initiate a relationship 
ývith a person, but as a means of selecting someone who fits their victim profile so they ca, 
initiate an attack. A slightly differing typology of stalkers has also been id, -ntified by Dr Richard Badcock who believes that stalkers fall into three main categories: "'erotomanics, ' who suffer the persistent delusion that they are loved by their victim. 'love obsessional' who fantasise aboil 
relationships that do not exist. and 'simple obsession, ' where after a relationship has finished. the offender cannot take rejection" (The Suzy Lamplugh Trust, The Stalking Obsession). 
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, texts and perpetrated 
by individuals with a variety of behavioural 
,s 
featuring some similarities, but not otherwise following a common r C, 
ýrrn-' 944 
, 11o says: 
,, Ost stalkers are males, coming from all ethnicites and acges, and from 
variety of social and family backgrounds. Many are intelligent with a 
itory of inadequate heterosexual relationships. They are often moti- 
tid by fantasies of intimate relationships with their victims. However, 
Inany stalkers, love means possession. Stalkers do not see the object 
their obsession as a real person, but rather, see that person as a thina 
be possessed. "" 
tock meanwhile categorises three variants of stalking: celebrity 
work place stalking; and domestic stalking. ' Whereas, The National 
nter offer a two category paradigm for stalking: the love obsession Cý 
and the simple obsession stalker . 47 The former represents roughly a 
f all stalkers, and are characterised by delusional belief. Invariably, 
r from some form of mental abnormality. The latter predominant 
clude those who have had some former relationship, emotional or 
e, with the victim. 
rs are often driven by obsession and a need to control their victims. 
ctive method of obtaining and maintaining control is for the stalker to 
ain or humiliation. Many stalkers thrive on knowing they can make a 
e to their victim and witnessing the suffering of their victim provides 
er with tangible evidence that their actions have had some effect. 48 In 
deprive the stalker of such a victory, and in the process disincline the 
to persist with their behaviour, experts sometimes encourage victims to 
their stalker, although this has occasionally had an adverse effect. 49 
se of the social and psychological diversity of each individual stalker. 
been suggested that a range of solutions may be a more practical answer 
problem, rather than relying solely on the deterrent effect of legal rules. 
r aps worthy of note that, though it would appear that the demeanour 
id y stalkers reflects or suggests some form of psychiatric disposition, 
stic labelling may be redundant in the majority of cases. The likelihood 
*rnany stalkers may simply be deemed to have personality disorders of 
scription which psychiatric authorities largely view to be unremitting 
above n. 14 at p. 351. 
t, ,. 
ttigngiello, op. cit., n. 25, at pp. 1950-1951. 
ahnestock, "All Stalk and no Action: Pending Missouri Stalking 
I 
:h 
iT law Review 783 at pp. 784-786. 
Legislation" 1993 614 
ta 
I 
0, ee n. 3. 
IL, 
4 
a, "Women at risk in Stalker's fantasy league". The Guardian, January 31.1996. 
71e Suzy Lamplugh Trust, Psychology of stalk-ing. 
gj 
ni 
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and thus untreatable. However, the majority of experts are of the opinion tl . 
legislation should emphasise treatment rather than punishment. 10 
Heightened public consciousness of stalking as a social and legal Wronj 
relatively recent. " In the past, victims have been reluctant to inform, t 
police. They frequently blame themselves for encouraging their stalker, 12t 
allowin- his behaviour to escalate until it reaches danger point before seeki, help. The upsurge in interest and the growing number of civil and crimit 
cases before the courts suggest that victims now look to the legal system 1 
protection and advice and that focus on treatment and non-legal prevelltic 
important as it is, is being marginalised by public expectations, despite th, 
reservations in the law and in particular the criminal law. 
Scots Law's Response to Stalking 
In Scotland there is no specific crime of "stalking" albeit that there at limited statutory provisions potentially applicable to certain featuresý, '( 
stalking-related behaviour; " scottish prosecutors generally rely upon'th 
crime of breach of the peace. Many believe that utilisation of this anciez 
common law crime works well. ' Any conduct or behaviour that "causes, ori 
likely to cause alarm to the public" may be prosecuted as a breach of 
peace. 55 This is one of the most commonly prosecuted crimes and has býý 
loosely defined to encompass a wide range of conduct that is perceived to b 
socially disruptive or offensive. 51 Historically, it was merely intended i 
define a class or category of offences. Hume contends that breach of the peac 
should be dealt with as a class of offences that tend or aim to disturb th 
public peace. 51 Within that class of offences he specifically menti6ý 
mobbing, challenging persons to a duel, the bearing of unlawful weap&L, 
brawling, the sending of threatening letters, and the making of verbal threats! 
The latter two of these offences are of particular relevance to the presir 
discussion. Written threats were, in Hume's view, more serious. " Jones an 
Mullen and Pathe. above n. 36. 
As one article identifies. "Three years ago. stalking was something we didn't talk aboutý 
It happened, but nobody told. The cuttings rile yields just one mention of the subject during the' 
whole of 1993. Now. it's a front-page subject. ' (Evans, "The woman who stalks the stalkers"ýý 
The Observer, December 22,1996). 4 The National Victim Center (Safety Strategiesfor Stalking Victims, http: //www. nvc. oror, 
gdir/svsafety. htm) say that victims must recognise that "victimisation is never their fault" and, 
it is a "crime that can touch anyone, regardless of gender. race. sexual orientation, soci 
economic status, geographical location .. 
53 e. g. Telecommunications Act 1985; Malicious Communications Act 1988. 
'" See Dyer above n. 2; Bonnington, "Stalking and the Scottish courts". N. L. J., SepteniJ 
27,1996 at p. 1394. 
" Bonnington, ibid. 
56 McCall Smith and Sheldon. Scots Criminal Law (1992). p. 19 1. 47 Commentaries of the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes ( 1844) "Offences Against the 
Public Peace" Chap. XVI. XVII p. 416: see Christie, Breach of the Peace (1990) pp. 24, 
9-10. 
Hume. i. 416. 
Hume. i, 135 and 442. see Christie. above n. 58 at p. 6. 
1 
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4, 
gWStie interpret Hume's reasoning as one of viewing verbal threats being 
6sually as transient as hot-air". ' Hume himself said that: "Even the verbal 
tening of personal mischief if violent and pointed is a relevant ground of 
to the individual and the ublic. ' 16 1 However in the leadin- case of p0 
es Miller, Lord Justice Clerk Inglis saw no distinction between verbal and 
en threats . 
62 Jones and Christie endorse this view insisting that the crux of 
Inatter is the impact on the ViCtiM. 63 However, Christie questions how 
tten threats can tend or aim to disturb the public peace when the conduct 
ars to be levelled at the recipient of the letter and not to the general 
[- 
64 
f the threat, whether verbal or written, referred to some "Personal 
; chiejr', then the likelihood would be that the accused would be cautioned 
keep the peace. A threat of personal violence obviously creates an 
Sediate potential for alarm-especially if stalking is involved where the 
ýsibility of violence is all the more real. Merely offensive words will not 
it the requirement-the threat must be violent in nature. 65 However, Hume 
remarked that offensive or slanderous expressions, if mixed with violent 
jýts may suffice if "the words are uttered in his presence, and are attended 
h such circumstances of rage and disturbance, as justly to alarm with the 
r of further mischief; so that it is not a cause of pure slander, but savours of 
dence, and has a tendency towards a real assault". 66 
kithough the courts have been reluctant to define common law offences 
cisely, attempts have been made to broadly define breach of the peace . 
67 In 
6n v. Brown 68 it was said that: "It is well settled that a test which may be 
ýlied in charges of breach of the peace is whether the proved conduct may 
isonably be expected to cause any person to be alarmed, upset or annoyed 
IIo provoke a disturbance of the peace. Positive evidence of actual alarm, 
ýt or annoyance or disturbance created by reprisal is not a prerequisite of 
iviction. " Whereas in Raffaelli v. Heatly, " it was said that breach of the 
ace was a form of disorderly conduct and "where something is done in 
ých of public order or decorum which might reasonably be expected to C, 
ld to the lieges being alarmed or upset or tempted to make reprisals at their 
1 Criminal Law, (1996) p. 235. 
4 Hume, i. 442- 
2 (1862) 4 Irv. 238. 
a, - see also HM. Advocate v. Hayes, 1973 S. L. T. Jones and Christie, above no. 61 at p. 235, 
r Lord Cameron; Edmistin (1866) 5 Irv. 219; Lord Advocate's Reference (No. 2 of 1992), 
. 
C. 43. 
Christie, above n. 58 at p. 6. 
Nevertheless, Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland (2nd ed., 1978). Supplement (1992) 
987 has said that any threat can be regarded as a breach of the peace if it places a person 
state of fear or alarm; Galbraith v. Muirhead (1856) 2 Irv. 520. 
Hamilton, Lady St Foord v. Gordon (1708,1709) Hume, i, 343-344 where a charge was 
jht against Gordon for calling the complainer -a common whore, an adulterous bitch, and 
bearer of an illegitimate child, " as well as threatening her with violence. 
The earliest attempt was in Ferguson v. Cornochan (1889) 26 S. L. R. 624. 
1982 S. C. C. R. 49. 
1949 J. C. 10 1- 
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own hand, the circumstances are such as to amount to breach of the peace"' -14 Montogomery v. MacLeod, " it was said that there is: "no limit to the kirld of conduct which may give rise to a charge of breach of the peace. All tbýj Is required is that there must be some conduct such as to excite the reason4-k 
2- apprehension to which we have drawn attention [viz. that mischief 
ensue], or such as to create disturbance and alarm to the lieges in fact. - 
Few cases involving breach of the peace have raised specifically the issue 
of mens rea as it can only generally be inferred from all the facts surrounding 
the case. 71 . 
91 Proof of the accused's motives or intentions may not be requireCL-1 
In Butcher v. Jessop, 72 the court agreed with Gordon's" view of mens rea thý 'i 
it "is not necessary to show that the accused intended to F, vvuKe,, a disturbance, it is enough that his conduct was such that the court regarded ft , ;j1 
objectively calculated to do Sol '. 14 In Ralston v. H. M. Advocate, 75 the shj4l 
instructed the jury that they could convict even if they believed that'ibil 
accused's explanation for his actions was innocent or blameless. The jury'1 
convicted and the decision was upheld on appeal. This may be relevant-tD' 
stalking cases where the accused contends that his motives were pur I ely 11 1 innocent and of a non-criminal nature. A frequent feature of such cases is t6a .I 
the accused is suffering from some sort of delusion. This deIusio i no JI 
an opinion or judgment, but an absolute, incontrovertible, fixed owl iI 
that their victim is truly in love with him or her. Other motives, albeii, ý I 
delusional, might be that the stalker believes that he is married to the victimý',, 
that the victim is in need of his or her protection, or that it is actually'die: ý 
victim who is deluded . 
76 
Scottish courts rarely take motive into consideration except to the extenti 
77 that it helps define intention. One occasion that they did was inShannonýV. J 
Skeen 78 where the accused (two private detectives) persisted in followinga' 
woman who was collecting cash ftom vending machines. The court said that 
there was no doubt they had caused her obvious distress and alarm (as-iýi 
believed they were about to rob her), though the Scottish Court of Criminal 
Appeal quashed the conviction for breach of the peace on the basis that thil 
detectives did not have the necessary mens rea to commit the crime. 
Breach of the peace need not necessarily be committed in a public place. 7. ' 
70 1977 S. C. C. R. Supp. 164. 
71 See Bonnington, above n. 55. 72 1989 J. C. 55; 1989 S. LT. 593,1989 S. C. C. R. 119. 
71 Gordon, above n. 66 at p. 986. I '17his view has been supported by a number of other decisions. For example, in Pala=0 V., Copeland, 1988 I. C. 52 the court re arded it as truly significant that the conduct was likelY toý 
cause alarm to the public taking af, the circumstances into account-that was all that was 
required for conviction. 75 1989 S. LT. 474; 1988 S. C. C. R. 590. 
Mullen and Pathe, above n. 36. See Gordon, above n. 66 at p. 226. 1977 S. C. C. R. Supp. 180.66.1 
79 See Wightman v. Montgomery (1758) Maclaurin 198, Young v. Heady. 1959 J. C- 9519 S. L. T. 250. 
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iz, Chnstle accepts the view that all that is required is evidence to show that there 
Of been a 
disturbance of the immediate area. 80 Christie" summarises by 
t is 9: 
blý 
The general conclusion then is that the breach of the peace is not a lay 
suitable appellation unless the accused's office can be regarded as a 
We minor one. 
It is therefore, primarily an offence for the summary courts. 
Great faith is, of course, reposed in Scottish prosecutors to exercise 119 fairly and properly the wide discretion that they have ... [flesort to 5d. 
lat breach of the peace 
in [serious] cases illustrates the extraordinary 
flexibility of that crime, as also the lack of anything more suitable either a 
as at common 
law or under statute to deal with the realities of the 
iff z situation. " 
he 
Ty the realities of the situation 
dictate "something more suitable' for 
* g? Certainly, Scottish courts have encountered few problems in to 
inpassinc.; stalking behaviour within breach of the peace. " As early as YI in Mackie v. Macleod" the High Court upheld a conviction for breach of iat 
Ist peace where the accused 
became infatuated with a young woman, 
ge tually waited 
for her outside work and followed her about. 
aturally it goes without saying that, where the stalking graduates to other 
ous forms of conduct, other substantive criminal offences may come into 
le Crimes such as rape, attempted rape, 
indecent assault, aggravated assault 
assault, along with other variants of inchoate crimes and criminal 
at pts, may all 
be pertinent. Treatment of these particular offences are 
nd the scope of this article. " They are nonetheless important. The 
stion as to whether breach of the peace is the best way to tackle stalking 
it 'aviour is discussed more 
fully below. 
in Scotland, civil restraint of stalking-related behaviour has revolved 
nd the common law interdicts against molestation, assault, invasion of 
e acy and, possibly 
defamation or trespass. 85 In addition to this, there are the 
ous matnmonial interdicts contained in the Matrimonial Homes (Family 
?9 ction) (Scotland) Act 19811" applicable to married and cohabiting 
pies. Common law interdicts ad interim are fairly readily obtained in the 
ittish courts. The balance of convenience test applied ensures this, as long 
ý; rits are not too widely framed. " The efficacy of the common law interdict 
11 always been open to question. They do tend to restrain certain forms of 
ROD Chrristie, above n. 58 at p. 35. 
C&hristic, above n. 58 at p. 22. 
a ib Tjo 
Bonnington, above n. 55. 
Cl 
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15'March, 1961 High Court, unreported, Gordon, above n. 66 at p. 988. ar 961 
I 
ttP 
For a full discussion on these offences see Gordon, above n. 66; Ferguson. Offences 
the Person (1990). Jones and Christie, above n. 61. 
C V See Scott Robinson, The Law of Interdict (2nd ed., 1994) at pp. 144-15 1. 
[bid ms 15 ibid.; Thomson. Family Law- in Scotland (3rd ed., 1996) at pp. 92-96. 
Murdoch v. Murdoch. 1973 S. L. T. (Notes) 13. 
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obsessional behaviour and accordingly offer relief to many v1CtjM,,,, ý' 
obsessional behaviour. However, the determined stalker is not going to-ý, 
deterred by a simple prohibitory court order. The absence of the ability. ýto 
attach a power of arrest to common law interdicts is clearly a dis-, -- 
disadvantage. Admittedly, extremely obsessive or psychologically-dis 
individuals would still not be restrained, but some individuals may be deteriid 
by the immediate threat of arrest. The power of arrest is not to be 
underestimated in its psychological impact on some victims who will often 
feel more secure in the knowledge that the power does exist. One of the niajoi 
flaws of the interdict system is that breach of interdict's often exacts a sloý 
and cumbersome response, ill-suited to the needs of victims of obsesslie 
threatening behaviour, where the need for a response might well be 
immediate. 
The interdicts contained in the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protectioýý 
(Scotland) Act 1981 do have the added potency of the* possibility of 
attachment of a power of arrest. 81 This may be attached if requested by tk 
applicant spouse. The power of arrest is sometimes added where a breachof 
the original interdict ad interim has occurred. In practice, they are not difficu'h 
to obtain if the court is convinced that the defender's behaviour does posil 
threat to the pursuer. The power of arrest entitles a constable without warnant 
to arrest a non-applicant spouse if he has reasonable cause to suspect dij 
person of being in breach of the matrimonial interdict. Once arrested, the 
spouse may simply be released by the police if they are convinced he poses no 
further danger. Alternatively he may be detained and prosecuted for's 
substantive crime or, if the procurator fiscal decides not to prosecute, a quasi. 
criminal procedure" may be engaged under which a spouse may be detained 
pending breach of interdict proceedings. " 
All civil remedies suffer from the fact that they must be sought by the 
individual victim. It may be a stressful and bewildering process. Added to 
their experiences which have culminated in the need for legal action, it may 
represent an imposing burden. In the absence of legal aid, it may not be 
financially viable. The simple fact remains that breach of the peace and the 
various civil remedies all existed prior to 1997. Despite this, there was stiu 
pressure for Parliament to act. The legislation for Scotland that did come forth 
was undoubtedly not as extensive as many had hoped for. 
The Protection From Harassment Act 1997 
Buoyed by growing public concern, the pressure group NASH had for some 
time campaigned for the introduction of a specific offence of stalking. It had 
" See Scott Robinson, above n. 86 at p. 17 1. 99 s. 15(l) of the 1981 Act; Scott Robinson, above n. 86 at p. 118-120. Forbes v. Forbes. 1993 S. C. L. R. 348; Cordiner v. H. M. Advocate, 1973 J. C. 16. See Scott Robinson. above n. 86 at p. 120; Clive, Husband and Wife (3rd ed.. 1992) p 313-314. 
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critical of existing legal remedies and the way these were applied and 
jgced. ' As a consequence of the growing concern and the promptings of 
a Private Members Bill was introduced by Janet Anderson, a Labour 
in May 1996, though it failed to reach the stage of a second reading 
lowing a lack of government support. 91 Nonetheless, the Home Office 
ýred further hope of legislation with the publication of their Consultation C, 
ýr. 94 Following the consultation exercise, the Government initially 
iounced an intention to legislate, 91 but later announced that legislation 
Vd be left to a Private Members Bill. Then under pressure from the 
k- ition, in a quick volte face, reinstated the B ill. 96 The Act received the 
ir. 
'I 
Assent on March 21,1997 in the last days of the Conservative 
he original Home Office proposals included the development of the 
bg criminal law with regard to harassment through the elimination Of 
-'difficulties which have led to its ineffectiveness in dealing with the 
I, uct of stalkers". "' The paper recommended a combination of civil and 
unal remedies with the introduction of two new criminal offences for 
land and Wales-harassment and putting people in fear of violence. 91 In 
ýdon, the paper recommended a new statutory tort/delict of harassment, 
ýi would also extend to Scotland. 99 
ýctions 1-7 of the Act specifically relate to England and Wales, sections 
I only apply to Scotland. Section I of the 1997 Act prohibits a course of 
juct by someone which either amounts to harassment of another or which 
nows or ought to know amounts to harassment of another. In determining 
latter issue (i. e. should the stalker have known their behaviour was 
issment), the courts should consider what a reasonable person in 
i, ession of the same information would have thought in the circumstances. 
provision does not necessarily involve consideration of the intention 
nd the stalker's actions. ' The issue of intention has bedevilled attempts by 
English criminal law to tackle stalking. Utilisation of the term "harass- 
it" in the statute rather than stalking is designed to ensure that a broad 
,e of activity is brought under the ambit of the legislation. The Act does 
specify the nature of the unlawful behaviour. Given the complexity and 
I 
2,95 per cent of victims who had contacted NASH claimed they had received inadequate 
zcdon from the police (von Heussen, Facts About Stalking (NASH). January 19,1996, p. 
I See "Help for Stalking legislation refused". The Guardian, May 7.1996. 
'. Horne office (1996). Stalking: the Solutions. 
See "Stalking Curbs will Widen Net-, The Guardian, July 10,1996. 
"Major buckles as Labour Calls bluff', The Guardian, October 24.1996. 
, Home Office 
(1996). Stalking: the Solutions, para. 5.17. 
', Horne office (1996), Stalking: the Solutions, paras. 5.17-5.18. 
1997 Act, S. 8 applies here. 
Liberty (the National Council for Civil Liberties) in their Briefing Paper on the Protection 
mHarassment Bill No. B9/16. December 1996 criticised this provision on the basis that it 
, too vague and general and could 
infringe the rights of persons such as bailiffs and 
zalists, going about their lawful daily business. 
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breadth of staking behaviour, it is perhaps not surprising that the legis, '-, * ý 
r 
aturq, declined to grasp the difficult "nettle" of seeking an appropriate de i--- 
By utilising the generic term "harassment" they have been inclus- IonaN 
rather than exclusionary and allowed the legislation to extend to other f, 6Q 
of harassment such as racial harassment or anti-social behaviour by nei*l 
bours. 3 Moreover, there is a distinct advantage in using the term -haiassý 
ment" in that the courts are familiar with it, having interpreted it ilIA6 
context of other statutes. ' 
4 There are limited defences to the prohibition of harassment, wherebyit 
does not apply to: 
a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows- 
(a) that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting 
crime, 
(b) that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply' 
with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any 
enactment, or 
(c) that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the cours 
conduct was reasonable. " 4e 
pf 
The insertion of the third defence proved contentious when the matter, ýas 
debated in Parliament. It ensures that persons in pursuit of their legitimý6 
occupations will not be charged with harassment. ' The courts will haýj 
discretion to determine whether a defence is sustained, and one imagines 
there may be some difficult and contentious decisions ahead. ' 
A person who infringes the prohibition of harassment contained in secti6i 
I will, according to section 2 of the Act, be guilty of an offence and liable ýU 
summary conviction to imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months or' 
a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both. 
The provisions relating to the English civil tort and remedy for harassment 
are set out in section 3. Providing there is an actual or apprehended breach of, 
section 1, this will entitle the victim to sue their harasser for damages or appiy' 
to the courts for an injunction to stop the unlawful behaviour. ' There is the' 
capacity to attach a warrant to arrest in addition to any injunction where the 
plaintiff considers that the harasser has breached the injunction! A separate 
offence of putting people in fear of violence is set out in section 4, and is, 
See speech by Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Hansard, H. L. January 24.1997. 
e. g. the Public Order Act 1986 as amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994. 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s. 1(3). 
e. g. investigative 'journalists. political canvassers. 
6 Would for example a trade unionist stalking a worker intent on working during a strike be 
able to rely on the defence? Would a member of a religious sect attempting to recruit member; 
of the public be acting reasonably? 
7 s. 3 sets out in some detail the criminal consequences flowing from breach of the terms of 
an injunction. 
. 1997 Act. s. 3(3)(b). 
"EVERY BREATH YOU TAKE ... EVERY MOVE YOU MAKE" 
345 
ýched where, as a result of the stalker's course of conduct (perpetrated on 
ýast two occasions), ' the victim fears that violence will be used against her 
Om. The reasonable person test, set out in section 1, is replicated in this 
4on and offers guidance on the accused's appreciation of his own conduct. 
penalties for the section 4 offence are potentially more severe, with a 
pmum of five years imprisonment or a fine or both. " If the case is 
1secuted on indictment, similar penalties to those contained in section 2 Wn to summary convictions for section 4 offences. Under section 5 the 
Wts are empowered (additional to any other disposal of the case) to issue a 
iraining order, where an offence is committed under sections 2 or 4, to 
dg about cessation of the unlawful activity and thereby protect the victim 
in further harm. Failure to comply with the terms of such an order can 
jit in up to five years imprisonment for offences tried on indictment. " 
'tion 7 clarifies that reference to harassing someone includes alarming 
IM or causing them distress. The term "conduct" includes speech, and 
ýt significantly the term "course of conduct" must involve conduct on at 
it two occasions. 12 
rhe specific provisions in the Act pertaining to Scotland show some 
I agruence with those already outlined for England, with several key material 
ferences. Significantly section 8, whilst asserting the individual's right to 
ftee from harassment, only sets out the parameters for a civil remedy to be 
jwn as an "action of harassment". There is no analogous criminal offence 
ivision. Section 80) states: 
"Every individual has a right to be free from harassment and, 
accordingly, a person must not pursue a course of conduct which 
amounts to harassment of another and 
(a) is intended to amount to harassment of that person; or 
(b) occurs in circumstances where it would appear to a reasonable 
person that it would amount to harassment of that person. " 
on 8 also identifies the appropriate remedies in a civil action, which are 
ages, interdict or interim interdict or a non-harassment order. 13 0 
Damages 
be awarded in actions of harassment for anxiety caused in the harassment 
ell as any financial loss resulting from it. 14 
ction 9 of the statute provides that anyone in breach of a non-harasSment 
r can be punished by way of a fine, or be imprisoned for up to five years 
1997 Act. s. 4(l). 
1997 Act, s. 4(4). 
:4 1997 Act, s. 5(6). 
0 Ile rule requiring two instances of harassment, is not a requirement under the common 
iof Scotland where a charge of breach of the peace can be brought against a stalker following 
ýmgle incident. The Scottish Office. Information Directorate, "Stalkers Facing up to Five 
Ws in Prison", Forsyth, No. 1727/96 (October 18,1996). 
' For the application of the civil action in an employment context see S. Middlemiss, 
! 6rassment: implications of New Statutory Controls", 1997 Emp. L. B. 19-2. 
'4 1997 Act. S. 8(6). 
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on indictment, or six months on summary complaint. The non-harassm""'" ent order can also be granted as part of a sentence in a criminal case where t6 
accused has been convicted of breach of the peace or any other Offence th4 falls within the definition of harassment in the Act. 's Where the stalkei6r 
harasser breaches the terms of a non-harassment order imposed additional 1, to 
conviction, he or she shall be guilty of an offence under section 11(4) of th-i 
Act and be liable to imprisonment for a maximum of five years or to a fine, Of both on indictment or alternatively a maximum of six months imprisonment'O-r 
a fine not exceeding the statutory minimum or both on summary convicti6 
The court has the power to vary or revoke a non-harassment order. 16 Ati 
accused may appeal the imposition or variation of a non-harassment order 
additional to conviction, " whilst the Crown may appeal variation 
revocation. " 
Assessing the New Provisions 
The legislation has generally received a favourable response in England and 
Wales. `In Scotland, the new law's reception has been more muted. On'i 
positive note, the parameters of the behaviour which represents grounds for i 
civil action in Scotland have been set out in section 8(l) of the Act. Moii 
importantly in this context, the same parameters will be used to determine 
whether a non-harassment order should be granted as part of the senten 
imposed on someone found guilty of breach of the peace or some otý I! 
relevant criminal action. The potential efficacy of interdicts or nonL 
harassment orders should not be ignored, given that they can be utilised t6 
bring about cessation of behaviour, which is normally of a continuous nature. 
In respect of the new sentences for breach of a non-harassment order, the moit 
obsessive stalker may be reluctant to continue in the face of a five year prison 
sentence. The experience in other countries with stalking laws, such as 
Australia and America, has shown that legal sanctions have gone a long way 
to help deter stalkers by expressing social disapproval of their behaviour? 
There are, of course, limits on how much the law can hope to achieve. 
Attinello has pessimistically counselled that: 
"It must be remembered that stalking is a crime based on obsessions. 
Because an obsession often transcends respect for the law, there is little 
that any law can do to adequately deter a person from stalking another 
15 1997 Act, II which inserts a new s. 234 into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 
1995. 
16 1997 Act. 2.11(6). 
17 1997 Act, s. 11(3). 
1997 Act. s. 11(5). 
Evonne von Heussen, founder of NASH. has commented that: "the measures bet VUL .., 4 
comprehensive and impressive and will go along way to deter the stalking of innocent people, 
and give the courtq the power they need to punish those who bring such misery to their victia" 
(Ford. "Stalkers will risk five years in jail under new laws", The Times, July 10,1996). 
Mullen & Pathe. above n. 36. 
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0, person. The threat of a civil tort action ... will no more deter a stalker 
than will waving an injunction in front of the stalker. Moreover, criminal 
remedies have proven to be similarly inadequate for deterring harass- 
k ment. "' 
ýe scope of the delict is somewhat imprecise. Will its use be restricted to 
ang with the excessive behaviour of stalkers and harassers? Or could it be 
, sed to curtail 
the activities of, inter alia nosy investigative reporters, 
pid fans of celebrities (intent only on meeting them or obtaining their 
)graph), religious activists or over-ardent suitors? While the defence that 
r behaviour was, in the particular circumstances, reasonable, can be 
[0yed, 22 the courts will have to interpret and define "reasonableness". 
, broader criticism of the Act 
is that, whilst it provides some degree of 
ection for the victims of stalking, and may act as a deterrent to stalkers, it 2 
., to take account of the psychological aspects of stalking. I The stalker will 
n act from an obsessional or delusional perspective and will clearly be 
ering from psychological problems. In these circumstances, the courts 
ýdd be empowered to order that the stalker be remanded for psychiatric 
ýssment and, where appropriate, make a restriction order. An attempt was 
le at the Committee stage of the Bill to introduce counselling for those 
j were the subject of non-harassment orders, but this was rejected. 24 
tainly the experience of America is that law is only part of the solution and 
II greater emphasis needs 
to be placed on the treatment of offenders. 25 
here must also be a number of questions regarding the scheme as 
lemented in Scotland. One of the major concerns is that even if a non- 
, issment order is in place, the victim will have to face further fear of harm 
wassment jbefore the state will intervene to prosecute for breach of a non- 
26 issment order. The fact that the victim will be able to rely on the 
; ecuting authorities to thereafter pursue the offender and impose severe 
ilties whilst prima facie a distinct advantage may, in certain circum- 
Lces, be of little comfort- It will certainly be interesting to see how willing 
iorities are to prosecute. Indeed, for some, reliance on state prosecution 
(be seen as a drawback as opposed to a positive benefit. Victims are often 
forgotten parties in the criminal justice equation. 27 
lie ability to seek a non-harassment order, whilst on the face of things a 
itive benefit, looks on further examination to offer little more protection 
i the existing interdict system. The provisions in section 9 are probably 
Attinello, OP. cit.. p. 334. n. 25. at p. 1980. 
1997 Act. S. 8(4)(c). 
See McAneney. et al., above n. 27. 
Hansard. H. L. January 24.1997. 
See Lingg. above n. 14 al pp. 356-360, Sohn, above n. 7 at p. 222; see also Goode, above 
at p. 31. 
See Sohn above n. 14 at p. 208. 
See Moody and Mackay. "Victims and Scottish Criminal Justice". HoWard Journal of 
'nal jusiice. 1996,35. pp. 299-313. 
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more welcome than seeking contempt proceedings for breach of interdi6tý, A 
However, unlike the interdicts available by virtue of the Matrimonial Horn ` ý, es j (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981, there are no provisions f6jj 
attachment of power of arrest. There remains an ongoing need for spee ' It dy I 
police intervention to preclude serious violence being perpetrated against the, 
victim at a time when a culmination in violence ought to be anticipated. 28 
Much of the international literature notes that victims distrust Police activity 
and attitudes" and it is to be hoped that, as well as reactive policing, there Will 
continue to be preventive policing. 10 There is, however, evidence to suggest: 
that policing in Scotland in this type of matter has dramatically improved in 
the past decade. 
Damages for a victim of harassment represent a post hoc compensation and 
not an inherently deterrent remedy or a remedy of relief. This is not to 
understate that restitution can have deterrent effects. " Damages were, 
available previously in delictual actions in addition to common law interdicti, 
and as such this "additional power" does not represent anything new. Matters' 
will be easier for victims of harassment in that there will be a coherence and-, 
congruence between their action for a harassment order and a claim for 
damages. 
The sentencing provisions set out in section 9 for breach of a non-' 
harassment order also look appealing. Clearly the legislature hoped that the 
thought of five years in prison on indictment would represent a substantial 
deterrent to those engaged in stalking behaviour. When compared with breach 
of the peace, where there is a capacity to impose life imprisonment, it begins 
to look more restrictive. The fear is that five years will become the ceiling of 
punishment for all forms of harassment no matter how bad. 
A further concern for victims is that the imposition of a non-harassment 
order following conviction may provoke retaliation. " It is difficult to respond 
to such a criticism; there must be realistic assessment as to what the law can 
achieve. Certainly the fear of retaliation cannot be used in argument against 
not having such orders. 
The creation of the new statutory delict of harassment, limited as it is, does 
offer some symbolism to victims and perpetrators. Utilisation of civil 
remedies is almost as controversial as deployment of the criminal law. " Lord 
Mackay offered support for civil remedies during the House of Lords Debate 
on the Protection from Harassment Bill. He said: 
"Criminal proceedings cannot always protect a victim from anticipated 
29 See Sohn. above n. 14 at p. 206; Perez, above n. 16 at p. 265. '0 See for example Sohn, above n. 14 at p. 209; Strikis, "Stopping Stalking" (1993) 18 Georgetown Law Review 2771 at pp. 2774-2775. 30 See Goode, above n. 10 at p. 31. 
-11 See Zedner, "Reparation and Retribution: are they reconcilable" 1994 57 M. L. R. 229. 32 See Sohn, above n. 7 at p. 218. 33 See Strikis. above a. 30 at pp. 2774-2775. Lingg. above n. 14 at pp. 360-361. 
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harm. The criminal law cannot provide protection for someone who 
might reasonably expect that they might be subject to harassment in the 
future. Nor does it provide protection where the case cannot be proved 
beyond reasonable doubt. In civil proceedings the court, if it is satisfied 
on the balance of probabilities that the defendant harassed the victims, 
should be able to order the defendant to compensate the victim for the 
distress and disturbance caused by the harassment. The civil court 
should also be able to grant an injunction preventing the carrying out of 
any specified activity which would amount to harassment. I believe it is 
an advantage of civil proceedings that the precise order can be tailored C, 
to the circumstances of the case. "-' 
Jisadvantag, e of a civil remedy in this context is the expense for the 
er in raising a civil action. In the absence of an effective civil legal aid 
-n in Scotland, the pursuer will, in most cases, have to meet the costs 
; elves, which may deter some from pursuing civil remedies. Professor 
r argues that the Act does not add to existing remedies already available 
OtS LaW. 35 He further contends that the promise of change through the 
ces of the Act will lull people into a false sense of security as its 
sions would not be used by practitioners, who would continue to seek 
licts. 
i reforms introduced in this area in England should effectively deal with 
roblern and replace the somewhat piecemeal legislation and confusing 
decisions that currently exist in that jurisdiction. Legislative measures 
exist that allow prosecution to take account of the entire course of 
ict and not just particular aspects of the problem. In Scotland it will 
n to be seen how this Act will be applied alongside existing common 
rimes and other legislative measures. 
ier methods of achieving a solution to the problem should not be 
-d. An increased role for social workers, probation officers and those in 
ental health profession should be considered, as they are the profession- 
, ho can recognise and treat such problem behaviour. Moreover, the 
sive demeanour of some stalkers may mean that they are unwilling to 
their behaviour regardless of the sentence imposed. 
Utility of Existing of Criminal Measures 
ington puts forward the view that, because breach of the peace is a 
)le offence, this has allowed Scottish criminal law to freely adapt to the 
Ong modes of conduct demonstrated by today's criminalS. 36 As such, it 
, ord Mackay of 
Clashfem's comments in the Lords, Hansard. January 24,1997. 
Asiting professor at the University of Strathclyde and Chair of the Scottish Council for 
ýiberties. 3onnington, above n. 55. 
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ability to intervene early, ensuring that the "stature" of stalking is elevated in -ý 
the criminal law hierarchy, that by defining the crime greater deterrence 
be achieved, and confirming the victim's faith in the legal system to 4ý the point 
where more victims will come forward. 41 Arraigned against this are 1-ý the 
arguments of sufficiency of current laws, "' that by having specific laws'ýý, ý' 
consciousness of stalking will not be raised" and finally that statutes 
stalkin- will not deter. 51 
Undoubtedly, one of the major arguments in favour of specific statutory'ý! 
provisions is the one which posits that such laws will elevate the pro ile f e', ' fi 0 th 
crime thus ensuring deterrence. Strikis argues: "by defining a type of 
unacceptable behaviour, anti-stalking statutes may discourage such behaviour 
through public scom and condemnation. ' 952 She goes on to say: "perception 
of the necessity for protecting stalking victims is increasing. Through the 
enactment of specific statutes, stalki 
, 
ng conduct can be branded as unaccept-, ' 
able. The existence of statutes will deter some would be stalkers and will', 
impede those persons for whom the threat of sanction will have no deterreiit'ý 
effect. Equally as important is the societal effect of the recognition of stalking 
as a crime. Victims will be empowered, and the entire legal system-from 
police to judiciary-will evolve a little farther in its understanding of the 
reality of crimes traditionally wrought against women. ' 953 Strikis also believes 
that the profile of the criminal conduct will also be important in how it is 
received by the judiciary and the profession. "' 
Interestingly, whilst Scotland adheres to breach of the peace as the best way 
of tackling stalking "in the area of peace law, the historical movement in the 
Anglo-American tradition reflects a recognition that harm to an individual's 
mental and emotional health can be serious and deserves more protection from 
the state". 15 Part of the problem is the way in which breach of the peace is 
viewed. One commentator dismissivcly describes breach of the peace as a law 
"typically used to prosecute people who play music too loud". " Another has 
said that: "the common law with its emphasis on individual liberty and 
autonomy, provides no useful paradigm for deciding the contours of the crime 
[staIking]. "5" 
One potential benefit of the reliance on breach of the peace may be the !I 
ability to respond to solitary incidents of stalking conduct. In contrast, many 
of the stalking statutes, including the new provisions for England and Wales 
in the 1997 Act require a "course of conduct" or in any event repetitim 
Fahnestock, above n. 47 at pp. 790-791. 
491 Fahnestock. above n. 47 at pp. 798-799; Bonnington, above n. 55. 
Fahnestock. above n. 47 at pp. 799-800. 
Fahnestock. above n. 47 at pp. 800-801. 
Strikis, above n. 36 at pp. 2780-278 1. 
Strikis, above n. 36 at p. 28 12. 
Strikis. above n. 36 at p. 2778. 
McAnaney, Curfiss and Abeyta-Price. above n. 27 at pp. 874-875. 
Fahnestock, above n. 47 at 1.. 787. 
Lingg. above n. 14 at p. 35 
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yever, a further question arises as to whether the Scottish lay and non-lay 
ciary will be prepared to impose a non-harassment order on top of a 
tary breach of the peace conviction which they may perceive as minor. 
y may see the one incident conduct as isolated and not tantamount to 
Lssment, being devoid of any continuity and therefore not deserving of the 
osition of a non-harassment order. One feature canvassed in Parliament 
:h may help the judiciary in respect of repeat offenders is for breach of the 
:e convictions to be recorded with the word "harassment" in brackets 
it, where the occasion so warrants. " How the judiciary, especially the lay 
; iary, will view mental anallish will also be important. There is a fear that 0 
es do not tend to see this sort of harm as particularly egregious and, 
ed, there is a feeling that much obsessive behaviour is often viewed as 
cuous. Will continuance of the practice to prosecute stalking as a breach 0 
, ie peace not reinforce the view of the relative unimportance of the 
luct? Guy has suggested that a "lack of understanding in the legal 
munity about the nature of obsessive behaviour has contributed further to 
nadequacy of the legal intervention. It is the judges who will have to 
ify 'stalking' and they are going to be confronted with several- difficult 
tions". " It has already been noted that stalking often occurs following a 
. onship 
between the accused and the victim. There may well be a 
mate fear that "where stalking occurs in a personal relationship there 
be a tendency to downplay the situation especially because of the fear 
he victim may in turn be victimising the accused". 60 
assessing the case for legislation one must bear in mind that "the worth 
lue of legislation must be measured by the degree it improves on existing 
lies. The second measure of value ... questions the practical benefits of 
atutes regardless of other remedies". 61 On balance, the writers, whilst 
nising the strong case for retention of breach of the peace as the major 
nal law weapon against stalkers, are of the view that an opportunity was 
adopt a specific crime of harassment in Scotland. The symbolism that 
w approach would have presented, in our view, is a compelling enough 
i. In the process we do not denigrate Alastair Bonnington's assertion 
'in the case of stalking there may be reason to believe that the old ways 
. Stt 1.62 It remains a valid viewpoint but not one we agree with. 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 represents limited but worth- 
modifications to the law of Scotland. They will modestly improve 
to tackle the burgeoning problem of stalking (and harassment 
illy). Reliance continues to be placed on breach of the peace and the 
is' own efforts at civil restraint. The newly recognised delict of 0 
osacanna Cunningham, M. P. gained an assurance that this would be looked into by the 
Jvocate. 
uy, above n. 8 at P. 999. 
x Strikis, above n. 36 at p. 2806. 
An. above n. 7 at p. 214. 
3nnington. above n. 55 at p. 1394. 
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harassment will assist in a limited way. With the exception of the nork. 
harassment orders and the punishment for breach of these new orders, itvery- 
much looks like "old wine in a new bottle". Applying old solutions to new 
problem might in many circumstances be justifiable and prudent. Doubtles " C, s 
the flexibility of the crime of breach of the peace and the ingenuity Of its 
broadenin 0 application 
is admirable to some. However, in the view Of the 
writers, the modem phenomenon of stalking requires an attempt at a Modern 
solution. There is evidence of growing concern coupled with a demand for 
explicit recognition of stalking as a crime in its own right. Deterrence is not 
confined to prosecution and sanction; it begins with delineation of prohibited 
conduct. The failure to enact a specific statutory offence, discernible and 
recognisable by the populace, ensures that an opportunity has been missed to 
send an unequivocal message to those who engage in such alarming and 
unwarranted conduct that it will not be tolerated in modern Scottish society. 
Encapsulation of limited provisions pertaining to Scotland in a statute Which 
creates a statutory definition and prohibition for England and Wales, serves t6' 
highlight that the provisions of the Protection From Harassment Act 1997 a's 
they pertain to Scotland, though welcome, do not go nearly far enough. The' 
old ways as good as they are, can often be improved upon. 
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SUBSTANTIAL RELIEF FORVICTIMS OFABUSE? 
poh Choo v Camden and Islington Area Health 
AurhoritY [1979] 2 All ER 910: "Knowledge of 
the future being denied to mankind ... 
[t]here is 
really only one certainty: the future will prove the 
award to be either too high or too low'ý Tlis 
remains as true as ever in the case of awards for 
loss of pension. When it is recognised that some 
"contingencies" are truly "imponderables" it 
must follow that they cannot submit to any 
precise quantification. Perhaps the whole head 
of claim should more honestly be thought of as 
"loss of pensionability'ý 
[In his further article, to be published shortly, Mr Scllar 
considers the continuing need for RCtU2rial evidence in 
relation to the various types of pension scheme. ] 
Parliament prior to the introduction of the 
Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Bill centred. 
on extending the power of arrest attached to 
matrimonial interdicts issued under the Matri- 
monial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) 
Act 1981. The limitations in the application of 
these provisions are detailed below. 
Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) 
(Scotland) Act 1981 
The court had the power under ss 2,3 and 14 of 
this Act to issue an exclusion order, interdict and 
power of arrest to prevent a spouses occupancy 
in the marital home or perpetration of domestic 
violence against his marriage, partner or child 
(Millar v Millar, 1991 SCLR 649). 
0 
Substantial Relief for 
Victims of Abuse? 
The Protection from Abuse 
(Scotland) Act 2001 
Sam Middlemiss, 
Senior Lecturer in Law, 
The Robert Gordon University, 
Aberdeen. 
Mr Middlemiss considers the impact of the 
Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Act 2001 and 
the extent to which it has overcome the deficiencies 
in existing legislation, providing more effective 
protectionjor victims ofabuse. 
The Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Act 2001 
is the first committee Bill to be enacted by the 
Scottish Parliament, the committee responsible 
for the legislation being the justice and Home 
Affairs Committee. More importantly it 
provides the police with the power of arrest 
where the subject of an interdict is likely to 
abuse his victim contrary to the terms of the 
order. The impact of this legislation could be far 
reaching, offering the prospect of arrest in a 
variety of situations for abusers, harassers oi 
stalkers thereby bringing about cessation of 
their unlawful activities. Thus separated or 
divorced spouses, ex-partners living together or 
apart, homosexual and lesbian partners (parti- 
cularly victims of harassment, intimidation or 
violence from current or ex-partners), and 
victims of stalking or of abusive neighbours 
may benefit from the legislation ("Victory for 
Abuse Campaigners", The Scotsman, Friday 5 
October 2001, p 6). 
Discussions at initial meetings of the justice 
and Home Affairs Committee of the Scottish 
Automatic application of these rules was 
restricted under s 14 (2) to spouses and children 
of the family, although cohabitees could benefit 
where their rights were declared to exist by the 
courts following an application by the cohabitee 
in line with the provisions in s 18. 
More significantly, interim exclusion orders 
which were designed to get an unreasonable or 
violent spouse away from the marital horne 
were not granted where spouses were living 
separately, although case law (most notably 
Brown v Brown, 1985 SLT 376) decided that 
intervention through an exclusion order may be 
warranted where a spouse wished to return to the 
marital home (Scott Robinson, The Law of Interdict (2nd ed), Butterworths, 1994, pp 114- 
116). 
Matrimonial interdicts (including interirn 
interdicts) as defined by s 14 (2) could be 
granted in circumstances where they were 
necessary to (a) restrain or prohibit any conduct 
of the spouse towards the other spouse or a child 
of the family, or (b) prohibit a spouse frorn 
entering or remaining in a matrimonial horne 
or a specified area in the vicinity of the matrirrio- 
nial home. 
"By section 15 (1) the court is required to 
attach a power of arrest to any matrimonial 
interdict which is made ancillary to an 
exclusion order ... The courts also have discretion to attach a power of arrest where a 
matrimonial interdict is not ancillary to an 
exclusion order" (Edwards and Griffiths, 
Family Law, W Green, 1997, p 312ý This Power 
can also be attached to an interim exclusion 
order. 
The most limiting aspect of the legislatiOn'was 
that the matrimonial interdict or exclusion order 
would cease to have effect on the termination of 
324 SCOTS LAW TIMES: ISSUE 39: 7-12-2001 
SUBSTANTIAL RELIEF FORVICTIMS OFABUSE? 
the marriage, which is often the point where 
protection is most needed. 
The complexity of these rules, their limited 
application and the restricted constituency they 
covered led to calls for this aspect of the legisla- 
tion to be improved. The Scottish Law 
Commission in their Report on Family Law 
(1992) recommended that the availability and 
scope of matrimonial interdicts should be 
clarified. The Scottish Office issued a consulta- 
tion paper in 1999 with the title "Improving 
Scottish Family Law'ý A report was issued in 
November 2000 with the title "Proposal For a 
Protection From Abuse Bill" and in September 
2000 the Scottish Executive issued a white 
paper. The Scottish Parliament charged the 
justice and Home Affairs Committee with the 
task of reforming the matrimonial interdict leg- 
islation in Scotland. They ended up looking at 
ways to provide a right of arrest of the subject of 
an interdict where the power to do so is attached 
to interdicts, domestic violence is involved and a 
re-occurrence is likely. 
The justice and Home Affairs Committee 
This committee through their discussions and 
hearing evidence from interested parties, 
discovered that the legislation was lacking in 
many respects. Not only does the protection 
stop on divorce (a time when an ousted spouse's 
resentment and violent feelings towards his 
partner might be strongest), but also cohabitees, 
rights are limited: for example, s 18 of the Matri- 
monial Homes Act gives cohabitees the right to 
an interdict for an initial six months with the 
right to apply for an extension after that, and a 
woman having a relationship with a violent 
man but not living with him would not be 
protected. Identification of these issues was 
derived from review of the minutes of the 
justice and Home Affairs Committee meetings 
prior to introduction of the Protection of Abuse 
Bill (see Scottish Parliament web site at 
www. scottish. parliament. uk). 
There is other legislation which could apply in 
these situations, such as the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997; however its application to 
the criminal law of Scotland is extremely limited. 
The power granted to the courts to issue non- 
harassment orders under this Act (with a 
maximum of five years' imprisonment for non- 
compliance) has been underutilised by the 
Scottish judiciary. Their preference is to utilise 
orders they are familiar with, namely a common 
law interdict. There are also common law crimes 
which could apply to cases of domestic violence 
etc, such as breach of the peace and assault 
(Kelly v Docherry, 1991 SIT 419). 
However prosecution in the past required a 
willingness on the part of the victim to bring 
charges against their abuser and the police to 
initiate a criminal investigation of domestic 
abuse (Mackay, "Domestic Violence -A Uniform Response? " (1987) 128 SCOLAG 76). 
Consideration was given to widening the 
scope of interdict beyond the home to the place 
of work, social events, school etc. This would 
have impacted most on vengeful estranged 
partners, stalkers or harassers whose obsessive 
behaviour could affect all aspects of their 
victirifs daily life. 
The appropriateness of using an interdict, 
that is a civil order, albeit with the power of 
arrest attached, as opposed to a criminal 
measure, to deal with domestic violence was 
also considered. Practical difficulties with the 
enforcement of interdicts such as the require- 
ment for corroboration of an alleged breach and 
tangible evidence of the alleged behaviour 
proved problematic for the police in enforcing 
the terms of the order, although corroboration 
is not considered necessary to establish the 
necessary reasonable cause in terms of s 15 (3) for suspecting a breach (Lord Advocate's 
"Guidelines to Chief Constables on the Matri- 
monial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) 
Act 1981", (1986) 122 SCOLAG 171). 
It was thought that the protection from abuse 
aspect of the 1981 Act should be removed from 
what is essentially a conveyancing statute with 
protective measures attached and placed in an 
amended form in a stand alone Bill which could include protection for a variety of victims of 
violence and abuse. The emphasis in the legisla- 
tion should be on protection of the vulnerable 
rather than protecting only those persons that 
are cohabitees or married. 
These are just some of the issues discussed by 
the committee and their recommendations and 
conclusions. The Bill arose from a proposal in a 
report published on 23 November 2000 by the Justice and Home Affairs Committee. These 
proposals are also rcflected in the content of the Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Act 2001. 
The Protection from Abuse (Scotland) Act 
2001 
This is a short Act of eight sections and its stated 
purpose is "to enable a power of arrest to be 
attached to interdicts granted to protect indivi- duals from abuse, to regulate the consequences 
of such attachment, and for connected 
purposes'ý 
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To what extent does the Act overcome the defi- 
ciencies in existing legislation identified by the 
Scottish Parliament and provide effective 
protection for victims of abuse? 
By s1 (1) "A person applying for, or who has 
obtained, an interdict for the purpose of 
protection against abuse may apply to the court 
for the power of arrest to be attached to the 
interdict under this Act: ' Abuse is widely 
defined ins 7 as"violence, harassment, threaten- 
ing conduct, and any other conduct giving rise, 
or likely to give rise, to physical or mental 
injury, fear, alarm or distress". So anyone that is 
a victim of abuse and entitled to an interdict 
under the civil or criminal law will be eligible to 
apply for a power of arrest to be attached. It is not 
necessary to show that the abuser is in some sort 
of relationship with the victim. However before 
granting an interdict the judiciary will certainly 
need to be convinced that there is a continuous 
mode of abusive behaviour which is likely to 
continue. Where the behaviour consists of 
harassment, domestic violence or stalking, this 
requirement will be easily met. 
"'Me effect of attaching a power of arrest to an 
interdict would be that in the event of the inter- 
dicted person being suspected of breaching the 
interdict, a constable would be entitled to arrest 
the interdicted person, and take them away from 
the scene" (explanatory notes on the Protection 
from Abuse (Scotland) Bill, p 3). 
The campaigners against physical and mental 
abuse will no doubt be pleased with the broad 
coverage of the Act in terms of the types of per- 
petrators of abuse and behaviour involved. 
However before this power of arrest can be 
attached to an interdict at the original applica- 
tion or to an existing interdict, the person 
seeking protection will have to convince a judge 
that it is needed to protect them from a risk of 
abuse. Under s1 (2) the court must satisfy itself 
that the interdicted person has had a chance to 
be heard by or represented before the court and. 
that they are not already subject to a matrimonial 
interdict under the Matrimonial Homes (Family 
Protection) (Scotland) Act 19 8 1. They also need 
to be satisfied that the power of arrest without 
warrant is necessary for the applicant's 
protection. 
These requirements may be difficult to 
establish to the judge's satisfaction when there 
are no witnesses to or corroboration of the appli- 
canfs claim of abuse. There must be a causal link 
between the interdict and risk of abuse. There 
are detailed rules in the statute regarding the 
duration (a maximum period of three years 
after the power is attached is normal but this 
period can be extended or recalled), extension 
and recall of the power of arrest (s 2), rules 
regarding notification to the police (s 3), and the 
powers and duties of the police where a breach 
has occurred (s 4). While these rules will not be 
given detailed consideration here (see explana- 
tory notes on the Protection from Abuse 
(Scotland) Bill), there is a need to mention s4 
(1), which sets out the grounds for an arrest by 
the police (reasonable cause for suspicion of 
breach and risk of abuse or further abuse). 
Reasonable cause will be established for the 
police, eg when the person is near or within the 
area prohibited by the interdict or acting in a way 
likely to cause damage to a person7s property. 
Section 4 (3) sets out the rights of the detainee 
(right to be informed of his rights and the right 
to consult a solicitor). There are minor 
amendments to the Matrimonial Homes 
(Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981 brought 
in by s6 to accommodate this additional route 
for victims of abuse to obtain interdicts with the 
power of arrest attached. Otherwise application 
of the measures covering matrimonial 
interdicts continues as before. 
Conclusion 
One commentator writing some time ago 
painted a rather bleak picture for victims of 
abuse relying on the assistance of the police for 
protection from their ordeal: "The Police 
response to domestic violence is inadequate and 
ineffective; it puts women at risk, and condones a 
man's violence to his partner; with a few notable 
exceptions it is at best misguided and ineffectual, 
at worst illegal and lethal" (Mackay, "Domestic 
Violence -A Uniform Response? " (1987) 128 
SCOLAG 76). 
There are undoubtedly situations where this 
prognosis still holds true. In a number of high 
profile stalking cases victims who have 
contacted the police and utilised existing legal 
remedies such as interdicts have still been killed 
by their stalker. 
Generally we now have a more enlightened 
and supportive police force and judiciary (Lord 
Advocate's "Guidelines to Chief Constables on 
the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) 
(Scotland) Act 1981" (1986) 122 SCOLAG 171), 
and now the legislative measures are in place to 
protect victims of domestic violence or abuse. 
They can bring about the cessation of the 
unlawful acts perpetrated against them through 
interim relief. They can achieve peace of mind 
from the knowledge that repetition can lead to 
the arrest of their spouse, cohabitee or partner. 
With regard to other types of abuse such as 
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stalking, attack by neighbours or harassment, 
victims may also be able to benefit from the 
protection of this Act, although ultimately the 
effectiveness of the legislation will depend on 
the judiciary's willingness to grant these 
measures. An evaluation of the use and effective- 
ness of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
(Home Office Research study no 203) found that 
judges in England and Wales were only willing to 
grant restraining orders (non-harassment orders 
in Scotland) under summary procedure. It will 
also depend on the ability of the police to 
enforce them. It is estimated that there will be 
between 2,000 and 5,000 new powers of arrest 
attached to abuse interdicts, and between 300 
and 750 arrests per year for breach of these 
orders (explanatory notes on the Protection 
from Abuse (Scotland) Bill, pp 14 -15). 
NEWS 
Appointments number of persons prosecuted in Scottish 
courts, to 137,000. 
New Court of Session judge 
The Queen, on the recommendation of the First 
Minister, who considered the report of a 
selection board, has approved the appointment 
of Mrs Anne Mather Smith, QC as a Senator of 
the College of justice, in succession to Lord Gill 
who has been elevated to the office of Lord 
justice Clerk. 
New Solicitor General 
The Scottish Parliament, on the recommenda- 
tion of the First Minister, has approved the 
appointment of Mrs Elish Angiolini to the post 
of Solicitor General for Scotland following the 
resignation of Mr Neil Davidson, QC. Mrs 
Angiolini, regional procurator fiscal in 
Grampian, Highlands and Islands since 27 July 
2000, is the first woman to hold the post. 
Chairman of judicial Studies 
The hon Lord . Wheatley 
has been appointed 
Chairman of judicial Studies in Scotland with 
effect from I January 2002, in succession to the 
rt hon Lord Ross, who is retiring at the end of 
the year. 
Advocates depute 
Edward GM Targowski, QC, Dorothy R Bain, 
advocate, and Geoffrey D Mitchell, advocate, 
have recently been appointed by the Lord 
Advocate as advocates depute. 
-0- 
General 
Criminal proceedings and homicides 
statistics 
Statistics issued by the Scottish Executive show a 
7 per cent decrease in 2000 over 1999 in the 
Eighty six per cent of persons proceeded 
against in court in 2000 were convicted. The 
number of custodial sentences imposed in 2000 
was down 5 per cent from 1999 to 15,300 and 82 
per cent of custodial sentences were for six 
months or less. The number of convictions 
resulting in a community sentence was down I 
per cent from 1999, at 12,400: in 7,400 of these a 
probation order was made, which was a slight 
increase from 1999, and 4,700 resulted in a 
community service order, a decrease of 4 per 
cent. Sixty six per cent of all convictions 
resulted in a fine or compensation order as the 
main penalty, compared with 78 per cent in 
1990. The peak age of conviction in 2000 
remained at 18. 
For the first time statistics have been collected 
concerning drink or drug related homicides. Of 
the 88 people accused of homicide in 2000 where 
drink/drug status was known, 52 per cent were 
drunk, 13 per cent were on drugs and 9 per cent 
were both drunk and on drugs. 
Recorded motor vehicle offences show an 
overall decrease of 2 per cent to 345,800. The 
findings are, contained in three statistical 
bulletins avaliable price C2 each from The 
Stationery Office bookshop. 
Community legal service: working group 
report 
A working group established by the Scottish 
Executive in October 2000 (2000 SLT (News) 
286) to examine how a community legal service 
might be developed in Scotland has published a 
report containing initial findings and recom- 
mendations. 
The project built on the research of Professors Glenn and Paterson which resulted in the recent 
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Human Rights Consultancy-Ilam- 
bie@btinternet. com; web-site: 
www. humanrightslawyers. com) 
Internet Filing of 
Self-Assessment Tax 
Returns 
Legislation in the 1999 Finance 
Act enabled Customs and Inland 
Revenue to develop new electron- 
ic services as an alternative to tra- 
ditionaI paper-based communica- 
tion. 
The Conunissioners of Inland 
Revenue laid before Parliament in 
April this year regulations - The 
Income Tax (Electronic Com- 
munications) Regulations 2000 (SI 
2000 No 945) - to support the first Internet-based service provided 
by the Inland Revenue, for the fil- 
ing of income tax self-assessment 
returns. 
The Regulations are available 
on the Inland Revenue web-site: 
http: //www. inlandrevenue. gov. 
uk 
Simpler Reporting 
Arrangements Extended 
to More Estates 
Following new regulations laid 
before the House of Commons in 
April this year, the simplified 
reporting rules now apply to 
qualifying smaller estates where 
the gross value does not exco L210,000 (previously E200,0( 
They apply to estates of pem dying on or after 6 April 2000. 
The new regulations are: 
The Inheritance Tax (Deliv 
of Accounts) Regulations 2000 
2000 No 967); 
The Inheritance Tax (Deliv, 
of Accounts) (Scotland) Rej 
lations 2000 (SI 2000 No 966); a The Inheritance Tax (Deliv, 
of Accounts) (Northern Irelai 
Regulations (SI 2000 No 965). 
Copies are on the InIa 
Revenue's home page 
www. inlandrevenue-gov. uk 
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MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION, THE CONTRACTUAL IMPERATIVE ID 
EMPLOYMENT LAW? 
by Sam Nfiddlemiss, Senior Lecturer in Law at the Robert Gordon University 
INTRODUCTION 
This article involves an analysis 
of recent judicial decisions which 
are concerned with the process of 
identifying and attributing differ- 
ing contractual status to work 
arrangements under employment 
law. The possible difficulties aris- 
ing from these judgments is fully 
analysed, particularly the right of 
workers to be treated as having 
employee status being compro- 
mised. 
The process utilised by the 
courts to determine the important 
issue of whether working 
arrangements can be classified as 
a contract of service (contract of 
employment) or as a contract for 
services (contract to engage ser- 
vices of an independent contrac- 
tor) has always been problematic. 
This is due to a number of factors, 
not least, that certain working 
arrangements have aspects of 
both type of contract in their 
make-up. Problems also stem 
from the uncertainty and vague- 
ness introduced into certain 
employment arrangements by the 
contracting parties themselves 
(particularly the employer). 
The difficulty was characterised 
by leading commentators on 
employment law as follows: 'it 
must be true, that each relation- 
ship has a number of characteris- 
tics the prominence of which is as 
variable as the working environ- 
ment. " 
Add to Us the complexity that 
has been introduced by the judi- 
ciary into the process of determin- 
ing which contract applies (in ful- 
filling their role as guardians of 
the integrity of employment con- 
tracts) and you have a recipe for 
confusion. 
THE LEGAL TESTS FOR 
DETERMINING THE NATURE 
OF THE CONTRACT 
The higher courts have devised 
for themselves (and by definition 
the lower courts and employment 
tribunals) complex legal ques- 
tions to answer in the context of 
their deliberations. 'The courts 
and tribunals have been greatly 
taxed by the problem of devising 
criteria to distinguish a contract of 
employment from a contract for 
services. " 
The criteria that they have 
developed take the form of tests, 
which are applied, to the circum- 
stances of the case to determine 
the type of contract underpinning 
the relationship of the emplo. 
and the person carrying out W1, 
on their behalf. 
The tests are used as a ben 
mark or legal standard 3 agai 
wl-dch an employment tribunal 
court can evaluate a particu 
claim and determine the contr 
tual basis of the arrangement 
control test, entrepreneurial ti 
organisational test). 
This mechanism for resolvi 
this legal dilemma has suffe, from a lack of consistency in I decisions of the courts Concerni 
the correct test to apply at ap ticular time. ' Traditionally t 
courts have used single faci 
tests such as the control test (a 
sidering which of the parties cc trols the way the work is don 
and the organisational test (exa: 
ining how integral the job is to t 
organisation)l to determine d 
issue. The more control exercis by the employer over the many 
of doing the job or the mc important the task in relation 
the activities of the organisati, 
the more likely it will be aa tract of service. In recent tirr 
the courts have opted for the mi tiple test, where no single factor 
relied on but all the factors will I 
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Dnsidered before a decision is 
.7 . ached 
)EFINING BASIS FOR 
ýMTLEMENT TO 
IMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 
Another difficulty for the courts 
aresolving this issue is that there 
Te no universally accepted char- 
cteristics of an employee and 
; enerally statutes which have 
ftempted to define the term fail 
D identify the essential nature of 
'a employee or employment sta- 
U0 Statutes are increasingly 
Idopting varied criteria for deter- 
tiýing entitlement to different 
tatutory rights. ' 'The economic 
ran refuses to be placed in neat 
igeon-holes. "' It 
can lead to the anomaly 
ýat a worker may have the right 
b specific statutory protection (eg 
, 4fitlement to the minimum 
Vage) but fail to qualify for 
'Zployment protection gener- 
ýjy. n This inconsistency of treat- 
ýent leads to confusion, the 
liployer being left unsure of 
'that rights different categories of 
qorkers are entitled to, and the 
'Zployee in the dark about his 
'ýritractuaI or statutory entitle- 
)ent to legal protection. 
While the parties may elect to 
se a particular label to cover 
r relationship this will not be 
ing on the employment tri- 
Is or the courts. They are the 
ýal arbiters of what label should 
I attached. '2 As this issue is a 
lestion of fact rather than law it 
,, 
difficult for the Employment 
`Ppeal Tribunal or the courts to 
*fere with a tribunal's deci- 
`A, They can only overturn the 
$unalls decision where the 
loyment tribunal has misap- 
the law in reaching its deci- 
Wlere the contractual nature of 
,ý arrangement is uncertain it 
,a 
be the responsibility of the 
, ýrts to deterrnine the correct 
'sition. This will then allow 
I 
s, - ncarprtain the parties' ,V 
and obligations urýder 
the 
)n law aiýd statute 
, ever recent judicial 
deci- 
may have resulted 
in 
ýers being able to effective- 
it the njýmber of persons 
working for them who will be 
afforded the status of employee 
which could result in temporary, 
casual and atypical workers in an 
organisation being denied such 
status (including workers carry- 
ing out integral tasks). 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
MUTUALITY OF 
OBLIGATION TEST 
Given that this article is largely 
concerned with the emerging 
pron-drience of the mutuality of 
obligation test in these types of 
cases it is important to trace the 
development of this legal stan- 
dard through examining relevant 
cases. 
In the case of O'Kelly v Trust 
House Forte [19841 QB 90, CA the 
Court of Appeal emphasised the 
inapplicability of a single factor 
test being used to determine this 
question and concluded that the 
multiple test was the appropriate 
test to be applied. Thds requires 
the employment tribunal to con- 
sider all the factors in the case 
before reaching a conclusion 
about the nature of the contractu- 
al relationship. However they 
also highlighted the importance 
of establishing the existence of 
mutuality of obligation between 
the parties. It was decided on the 
basis that there was no obligation 
to provide work or accept it 
where it was offered that a con- 
tract of employment did not exist. 
Lord Justice Dillon in Nethermere 
(St Neots) Ltd v Taverna and 
Gardiner [19841 IRLR 240, CA 
expressed a similar view to the 
Court of Appeal in the Express 
case infra in determining the con- 
tractual basis of homeworkers. 
'For my part I would accept that 
an arrangement under which 
there was never any obligation on 
the outworkers to do work or on 
the company to provide work 
could not be a contract of service. ' 
In McLeod v Hellyer Brothers Ltd, 
Wilson v Boston Deep Sea Fisheries 
[1987] IRLR 232, five trawlermen 
working out of the port of Hull 
were treated as working under a 
contract for services owing to a 
lack of mutual obligations (which 
in this case arose from the fact 
that they could and did work for 
other employers between sail- 
ings). 
Recently the Court of Appeal in 
Lane v Shire Roofing Co Ltd [19951 
IRLR 493, CA, affirmed the use of 
the multiple test as the correct 
mechanism for resolving these 
disputes. While the indications 
are that employment tribunals 
and the courts will continue to 
utilise the multiple test ostensibly, 
in practical terms it is more likely 
that a single factor test will domi- 
nate their proceedings, as illus- 
trated by these cases. They will 
require evidence of personal ser- 
vice, namely the existence or non- 
existence of a mutuality of obliga- 
tion, before attaching the label of 
contract of employment to the 
arrangement. Any doubts that 
this approach has become the def- 
inite one, were removed by the 
case of Express and Echo Publi- 
cations [1999] IRLR 367. 
MUTUALITY OF 
OBLIGATION, THE 
DEFINITIVE TEST? 
In Express and Echo Publications 
v Tanton [19991 IRLR 367 the 
Court of Appeal arrived at the 
conclusion that the existence of an 
employment contract is depen- 
dent on an element of mutuality 
of obligation and personal ser- 
vice. In this case Mr Tanton along 
with his employer agreed he 
would be employed as a driver on 
a self-employed basis. The con- 
tract contained a clause, which 
allowed for another person to 
undertake the work on his behalf 
(and at his expense) where he was 
unable or unwilling to undertake 
the work personally. This is com- 
monly known as a substitution 
clause. 
He had relied on this clause 
from time to time and brought a 
replacement worker in to under- 
take his work. On the basis of 
these facts the courts were satis- 
fied that Mr Tanton was working 
under a contract for services. 
They were unwilling to look fur- 
ther at the practicalities of the sit- 
uation to determine if a mutuality 
of obligation did exist in the 
workplace. 13 They summarised 
their position thus: 'where ... a 
person who works for another is 
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not required to perform his ser- 
vices personally, then as a matter 
of law the relationship between 
the worker and the person from 
whom he works is not that of 
employee and employer. ""' The 
implication of this decision is that 
mutuality of obligation and per- 
sonal service have become thresh- 
old devices to determine entitle- 
ment to employee status. Proving 
the applicability of this threshold 
standard in a particular case can 
be frustrated by the existence of 
an agreement between the 
employer and his worker that the 
relationship is covered by a con- 
tract for services and the intro- 
duction of a substitution clause 
into the contract (allowing for 
someone else to undertake the 
contractual task occasionally in 
the worker's place). 
What follows is criticism of the 
use of these factors as barriers to 
employee status. 
INEQUALITY IN THE 
CONTRACTUAL POSITION 
OF THE PARTIES 
In reality it may not be difficult 
for an employer (with superior 
economic wealth and social sta- 
tus) to someone undertaking 
work for them to obtain their con- 
currence that they should be treat- 
ed as working under a contract 
for services. The appeal court in 
the Express case seems to have 
neglected to consider this self-evi- 
dent truth although they are cer- 
tainly not alone. This lack of con- 
cern for equality in the contractu- 
al positions of the parties is wide- 
spread in legal circles and part of 
what one commentator describes 
as the market order in contract 
theory which is characterised in 
part in the following terms. 'The 
belief seems to be that, provided 
that a person has freely consented 
to the terms of the contract, then 
there could be no danger that the 
contract established unjustifiable 
positions of power. " It is, as if 
positions of unjustifiable powers 
over others simply cannot arise 
within the framework of freely 
chosen agreements. Part of the 
justification for this view is that 
the parties freely enter into a con- 
tract on mutually agreed terms 
and the parties will both benefit 
from the transaction and the par- 
ties are therefore both equally 
placed. 
In employment contracts the 
reality is different from this, an 
employer often being in a superi- 
or position to a prospective 
employee both economically and 
socially. As a result they can often 
dictate the terms and conditions 
of the employment contract or 
more importantly in this context 
the nature of the contract which 
applies to the transaction. The 
other element in a case, which can 
create a presumption of self- 
employment, is a substitution 
clause and what follows is a dis-. 
cussion of the legal principle of 
delegation and substitution in this 
context. 
THE SUBSTITUTION CLAUSE 
AS A BARRIER TO 
EMPLOYEE STATUS 
The High Court in Ready Mixed 
Concrete (South East) Ltd v 
Macdonald and Evans [196812 QB 
497 were willing to accept that 
contractual arrangements could 
allow for delegation of the con- 
tractual obligation to do work 
under its terms and still be treated 
as a contract of service. " Mr 
Justice McKenna was of the opin- 
ion that some right to delegate 
arising under the contract was not 
inconsistent with employment. 
The converse is also true, a con- 
tractual arrangement which does 
not provide the right to delegate 
work is not necessarily excluded 
from being treated as a contract 
for services. 'Common experience 
suggests that an absence of the 
right to delegate is not inconsis- 
tent with self-employment,, but 
the contract will rarely make 
express provision as to delega- 
tion. "' 
The judgment of the Court of 
Appeal in the Express case is at 
odds with the view reached by the 
court in Ready Mixed Concrete and 
could represent a retrograde step 
in the development of the law in 
this area. Unscrupulous employ- 
ers may try to benefit from this 
legal ruling by utilising substitu- 
tion clauses in their contracts 
along with other means to ensure 
that their contractual relationst 
with workers is lacking any e 
ment of personal service & therefore is treated as a contr, for services. 
While it may be important I 
the employer to have the flexibi 
ty to substitute one employee I 
another in some situatior 
express provision should be ma for it in the contract. Howe, % there may be other situatio 
where substitution would r be appropriate. -. or desirable, P ticularly where there is a stro: 
element of delectus personae in t hiring decision. 
When an employer enters int( 
contractual arrangement with 
worker on the basis that he is sc 
employed they can introdu 
safeguards into the contract as 'the performance of the servJ 
and the quality of the work 
undertakes. Such assurances %s be difficult to obtain in the sit, tion where a person is undertz ing work on behalf of the contn 
tor under a substitution clau Their identity will often 
unspecified and thereft 
unknown, there will be no cc tractual obligation between t 
worker and the employer and t 
nature of their abilities and th honesty and reliability will 
unknown to the employer. 
terms of health and safety t 
employer could be held vicario- ly liable to a third party Onclu 
ing their own employees) for ai delictual wrong perpetrated I 
the substitute in the context 
their work which causes thi: 
parties to suffer harm. Liabili 
could also be extended on t] basis that the employer is respo 
sible for engaging the services ol competent contractor and failu 
to do so makes thern legal 
responsible for the cOnsequenc 
of their actions. " It is unlikely th 
such considerations will persuac 
employers that it is against the interests to employ their worke 
on a self-employed, basis ar many of these problems- could I 
overcome by careful drafting 
exclusion clauses in the contra for services. 
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ENTITLEMENT TO 
STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT 
PJGHTS FOR WORKERS 
It is important to bear in mind 
that, in detern-dning entitlement 
to some statutory rights, it is no 
longer necessary to establish that 
the person entitled to the right is 
working under a contract of ser- 
vice or its equivalent. A good case 
in point involved a sub post-n-ds- 
tress Ms Bain who ran a small sub 
post office in a village near 
Inverness. " She complained to an 
employment tribunal that her 
employer had failed to provide 
her with the n-drtimum wage as 
provided for by the National 
Minimum Wage Act 1998" and 
this claim was upheld. 12Despite 
the lowly status of this legal deci- 
ýion it serves as a useful illustra- 
tion of the consequences of the 
ýdiciary adopting -a broad inter- 
pretation of the definition of a 
worker to bring an individual or 
group of workers within the 
statutory context of an employ- 
ment relationship for certain pur- 
poses. 23This development may be 
heartening to atypical workers, 
affording them limited entitle- 
frient to specific statutory employ- 
raent rights. This process of 
induding the self-employed and 
other forms of atypical worker 
within the realms of statutory 
protection began with equality 
, legislation and health and safety 
provisions. 'Self-employment is 
not altogether excluded from the 
scope of labour law and, more- 
Over, - statutory 
intervention can 
be used to overcome some of the 
lirrdtations, of the common law 
Concept of the employee. " 
CONCLUSION 
Employers determined to place 
$eir workers on the footing of 
self-employed, will no doubt (fol- 
6ing the decision in the Express 
ýase) make every effort to ensure 4 absence of any element of per- 
sonal service in their contractual 
Irrangernents. in The Court of Appeal 
C4rmichael v National Power plC 
b981 IRLR 301 were unwilling to 
iccept an employer's assertion at ýce value that there was no 
r4utuality of obligation and 
decided that the correct response 
would be to anaIyse whether in 
practice work was offered by the 
employer, and if so, whether the 
offer was accepted by the employ- 
ee. The workers in this case were 
employed on a 'casual and as 
required' basis which was inter- 
preted as meaning that the 
employer would provide a rea- 
sonable share of the work as it 
became available and subject to 
the qualification of reasonable- 
ness, the applicants would accept 
the work. On applying this inter- 
pretation to the facts the casual 
workers were deemed to be 
employees. 
On appeal the House of Lords 
were unwilling to uphold the 
eminently sensible decision of the 
Court of Appeal and ruled 
instead that a prima facie absence 
of mutuality of obligation in con- 
tractual arrangements would 
inevitably lead the courts to con- 
clude that there was no contract 
of employment . 2' The Lord Chancellor surnmarised their 
position in the following manner: 
'The parties incurred no obliga- 
tion to provide or accept work but 
at best assumed moral obligations 
of loyalty in a context where both 
recognised that the best interests 
lay in being accommodating to 
each other. ' He later stated 'flexi- 
bility suited both sides. The 
arrangement turned on mutual 
convenience and goodwill and 
worked well in practice over the 
years. ' 
The House of Lords decision in 
Cannichael supports the approach 
the Court of Appeal in the Express 
case by restricting the right of 
employment tribunals or courts 
to interfere with contractual 
arrangements between the parties 
where an agreement exists which 
is characterised by a lack of mutu- 
al obligation and evidence is led 
which shows the arrangement is 
of some benefit to both the par- 
ties. 
The combined effect of these 
legal decisions is to place the 
emphasis firmly on employment 
tribunals to apply a single factor 
test in determining this issue and for the first time provide the 
employer with a clear indication 
of what is needed to satisfy the 
requirements of this test. 
There may be certain develop- 
ments in this area which may 
counteract the negative impact of 
these legal decisions. There is a 
commitment on the part of the 
Government to give basic 
employment rights to everyone 
except the genuinely self- 
employed. " It is apparent that it is 
sometimes difficult to determine 
to define what type of worker 
falls within this heading although 
the case law may result in many 
more workers being classified as 
such. The European Union has 
expanded the category of person 
who is entitled to statutory 
employment rights (from employ- 
ee to worker) in their legislative 
measures. This has resulted in 
United Kingdom legislation hav- 
ing to reflect this change and 
statutory employment rights 
applying to a much wider con- 
stituency whose entitlement is not 
dependent on employee status. " 
This trend looks set to continue. 
Workers on the borderline 
between a contract of service and 
a contract for services such as 
employment trainees, agency 
workers, casual workers and peo- 
ple working under umbrella or 
global contracts are now much 
less likely to be extended employ- 
ee status. Although the employ- 
ment tribunals and courts will 
continue to deliberate over the 
contractual nature of these bor- 
derline occupations they may, as a 
result of the judicial develop- 
ments discussed, have to contend 
with and increased number of 
claims where the employment 
status of applicants (and corre- 
spondingly their entitlement to 
fundamental employment rights) 
is uncertain. 
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CULPABLE HOMICIDE BY PRIZEFIGHTING 
by Robert S Shiels 
The contemporary interest in 
sport and the law justifies a recon- 
sideration of past events where 
sport had, for whatever reason, 
legal implications. Boxing has 
already been prol-dbited in some 
countries and it may yet be in the 
United Kingdom. A consideration 
of, for example, prizefighting 
which preceded boxing may pro- 
vide some insight into the dynam- 
ics of one aspect of sport and the 
law. 
The history of leisure may now 
properly be considered to be part 
of social history. ' That in itself, 
however, does not negate the 
interest of others: prizefighting 
is of relevance to the history of 
criminal law and public order. 
The watershed in pugilism was 
1867 when the rules of boxing 
were written by John Chalmers 
and given an aristocratic gloss 
by their association with Lord 
Queensberry. It was about tl-ds 
time that prizefighting began to 
decline and boxing started to 
develop. 2 One must be careful 
about identifying the time of 
change for it has been argued that: 
'the general decline of prizefight- 
ing must not, in any case, be 
exaggerated or ante-dated for it 
remained enormously popular 
with working men'. ' Contem- 
porary prosecutions may reveal 
some of the reasons for the 
decline in the acceptability of 
prizefighting, as well as provid- 
ing an insight to judicial views 
and prosecutorial discretion. 
PRIZEFIGHTING 
There seem to be tW6 distinct 
aspects to prizefighting, although 
in discussion both are often run 
together: the mode of fighting is a 
separate matter from the context 
of the fight. Prizefighting had 
written rules from the 1740s and 
those allowed wrestling holds 
and falls, although these did not 
allow hitting a man who was 
down, or punching below the 
belt. The technique of prizefight- 
ing borrowed movement of the 
feet from swordfighting. 
When giving ground became 
acceptable to spectators and con- 
testants, a bloodier but slower 
variety of what is now boxing 
became recognisable. During a 
prize fight either or both contes- 
tants could be knocked uncon- 
scious more than once because 
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mistress wins landmark Ruling, ' Scotl 
on Sunday, 26 September 1999, p4 Although it was claimed by the' flcý Office that she was employed by tW. 
as an agent with no personal resporýr bility to be in attendance and only dle 
need to ensure the service was co 'she was treated as someone 
personally provided a service or 
as per the definition 'of worker in 
Act. 
This ruling is not binding on otDe'l 
courts and tribunals and is likely to 
the subject of an appeal given that 
could affect 17,500 sub post-mas 
across the UK. 
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I 
of war in Article 20) of the Young Wor 
Directive 94/33/EC which is also to define the scope of the Working -r- Regulations SL 
I 
their attendants were allowed ý 
or 40 seconds in which to be 
them round! The bare-knucUi 
contests and the rather lax contv 
of the prize fight probaf, 
enhanced the dangerous nature, the event and hence the excit 
ment that drew the crowd. 11 
extent of physical injury to par6 ipants in prize fights should rs be underestimated. 
As for the context, Profesgi 
George Trevelyn has referred I 
the 'more variegated social strol tures and rougher manners' W 
could be seen in the patronage i 
the ring in earlier times. 3 ý 
explained that 'when the date ar place of a prize fight had bee 
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EDITORIAL 
May we begin the 2000 volume by wishing all 
our readers successful fulfilment of all the hopes 
and good intentions which must be especially 
prominent in this of all years. 
This year is a highly significant one for the 
Scots Law Times, though it is more by accident 
than design that changes we have been planning 
for a few years now are finally coming to fruition 
as we reach the millennium. 
Since its inception the Scots Law Times has 
relied, with a few exceptions, on practising 
counsel to prepare its law reports. At one time, 
indeed, a report would not have been accepted 
in court if prepared in any other way. This 
was regarded as a necessary authentication of 
the accuracy of the report as a record of the 
proceedings. 
Times change. judicial decisions are widely 
available to the profession and the public, parti- 
cularly since the launch of the Scottish Courts 
web site. That does not take away the need for 
selected and properly sumniarised and edited 
law reports, but it does demonstrate that the 
authentication aspect of the report is now redun- 
dant, as it probably has been for some time. 
It also has to be recognised that, while many 
able counsel have given generously of their time 
and ability over the years, it is not always easy to 
meet desired deadlines when professional duties 
take precedence. In addition the necessary in- 
house editorial checks for every report, and the 
time to proof and re-read prior to going to press, 
make it difficult to publish, using this system, 
with the speed required by today's profession. 
The solution we have adopted is to bring the 
law reporting in house, to be undertaken by the 
same qualified team who are already preparing 
Greens Weekly Digest copy much more quickly 
than we could manage when it was done free- 
lance. The same editorial control and scrutiny 
will operate, and counsel will continue to advise 
on which cases should be reported; thus we 
hope to ensure the same quality that readers 
have come to expect. Indeed the appearance may 
have been noted of several reports towards the 
end of 1999 without the traditional counsel's 
initials at the end. These are the first fruits of the 
new system and are offered as evidence of our 
ability to deliver to these standards. 
A number of reports initially prepared by 
counsel are still in hand for publication in 2000: 
these will be acknowledged by the use of 
counsel's initials as before. In addition, we hope 
shortly to introduce, as an appendix to the News 
section, a Case Comment section which will 
provide an opportunity for counsel (and other 
suitably qualified individuals) to offer a brief 
exposition of the more significant decisions and 
their implications. (Me reason for adding it to 
the News section is so as not to delay publication 
of the reports. Other changes in prospect will, we 
hope, quite shortly make the News as well as the 
reports available in digital format. ) 
Technological change is set to play its part in 
speeding the production process, and in making 
the Scots Law Times available more quickly in 
electronic form. Greens have already publicised 
the fact that the reports on CD-rorn will be 
updated monthly rather than annually, begin- 
ning in a few weeks' time. The functionality of 
the CD will not change meantime; but we shall 
be working this year to introduce a more sophis- 
ticated way ofpreparing the data which will at the 
same time permit us to move to a better search 
engine for the user. 
"Exciting" is not an adjective traditionally 
associated with law publishing, but it is quite a 
good description of the feeling associated with 
being part of developments which we hope will 
bring benefits to Scots Law Times subscribers 
which could not have been imagined even a 
decade ago. 
ARTICLES 
Aiding the DiscrinlMiatory 
Act of the Employer 
CaseNote: AMv WC[1999] IRLR410 
Sam NUddlemiss, 
Senior Lecturer in Law, 
Tle Robert Gordon University, 
Aberdeen. 
Mr Middlemiss considers the potentialfor increased 
use of s 42 of the Sex Discrimination Act, allowing 
tribunal applicants to call individuals as respondents 
in addition to the employer in sex discrimination 
cases, in light of the recent EAT decision AM v WC 
[1999] IRLR 410. He believes this would be a 
welcome development, placing the spotlight on the 
individualperpetrators of discrimination. 
Under s 42 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
("SDA") an action can be pursued against an 
SCOTS LAW TIMES: ISSUE 1: 1-1-00 
AIDING THE DISCRIMINATORY ACT OF THE EMPLOYER 
employee for behaviour that is deemed to aid an 
employer in the perpetration of a discriminatory 
act (as defined by s6 of the SDA) and for which 
the employer is actually or potentially liable 
(under s 41 ofthe SDA). Sections 57,4 and 58 of 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
("DDA") and ss 33,4 and 32 of the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (ýRRA") are parallel pro- 
visions. 
"Complaint maybe made ofdiscrimination by 
an employer as a company but it is important to 
note that such complaint can be made against 
any person. Any person who knowingly aids 
another person to do an unlawful act shall 
himselfbe treated as having done an unlawful act 
of like description and the act of an employee or 
agent for whose act an employer or principal is 
liable shall be deemed to aid the Act of the 
employer or principal" (R W Rideout and 
j Dyson, Rideout's Principks of Labour Law (4th 
ed, 1983), p 343). 
In practice it is through the discriminatory act 
of the employee that the employer is often liable 
in the first place, and having established that 
such action is capable of incurring vicarious 
liability for the employer, to succeed in an action 
under s 42 it will then be necessary to prove that 
the same employee assisted in the perpetration of 
the discriminatory act. If this legal process 
appears confusing it is largely the fault of con- 
voluted legislative rules which apply in this area. 
This case note will represent a summary of the 
present law through a historical review of the law 
in this area and analysis of the current law (parti- 
cularly the recent decision of the employment 
appeal tribunal inAM v WC [19991 IRLR 4 10). 
Put at its simplest, an applicant bringing a 
discrimination case against their employer can 
co-join an employee or other party in the pro- 
ceedings where that person has played a signi- 
ficant role in discriminating against the victim. 
'niis facility has not been widely utilised in the 
past because discrimination law is framed in 
such a way that primary liability for breach of its 
provisions lies with the employer. "Employers 
may be liable either personally or vicariously" 
(S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law 
(Butterworths, 1995), p 53 1). 
Employer's primary liability 
Ixgislators responsible for drafting the equality 
laws proceeded on the assumption that although 
it wiU invariably be the discriminatory acts of 
employees which lead to a discrimination action 
being brought before a tribunal, these acts in 
most cases will be undertaken on behalf of the 
employer (eg discrimination in recruitment, 
access to promotion, dismissal). Hence most 
cases should be pursued on the basis that the 
employer is vicariously liable. 
"By adopting an essentially tortious approach 
to non-discrimination, the court seems to base 
the legitimacy of discrimination law on the 
'harm principle': an employer cannot discrimi- 
nate because, in doing so he/she harms others" 
(N Bemard, "What are the purposes of EC 
Discrimination Law? ", chap 7, p 87, in J Dine 
and B Watt (eds), Discrimination Law. - Concepts, 
Limitations andjustifications (Addison, Welseley 
& Ungman, 199 6)). 
It will ultimately be up to the applicant to 
prove that the employer is responsible for the 
harm suffered in line with the evidential require- 
ment imposed by s 41 of the SDA (RRA, s 32; DDA, s 58), by proving that the behaviour was 
carried out within the scope of the discrimina- 
tor's employment, and was "done by the 
employer as well as by him, whether or not it was done with the employer's knowledge or 
approval" (s 41 (1)). Section 41 (2) states: "Anything done by a person as agent for another 
person with the authority (whether express or implied and whether precedent or subsequent) 
of that other person shall be treated for the pur- 
poses of this Act as done by that other person as 
well as by him" 
Since the decision of Jones v Tower Boot Co [1997] IRLR 168, CA, it is no longer difficult to 
prove that most discriminatory behaviour is 
related to the discriminator's employment (even 
where the behaviour is perpetrated by a col- league of the victim). In Burton v De Vere Hotels [1996] IRLR 596, EAT, it was held that an 
employer can be liable for discriminatory acts 
perpetrated against his employee by a third party 
where the employer is in a position to control 
such behaviour. Given that it is unnecessary to 
establish that the employer knew of the discrimi- 
natory act then liability under s 41 (1) of the SDA (and corresponding provisions in other Acts) is 
not usually difficult to prove. 
Ile defence available to the employer under 
s 41 (3), is that "he took such steps as were 
reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from doing that act, or from doing in the course 
of their employment acts of that description". The employer in establishing this defence may introduce evidence that, inter alia, they intro- duced policies to outlaw discrimination in its 
various forms, provided equality training, informed employees fully of equality measures 
and had in place procedures to deal with internal 
complaints about discrimination. A combina- 
tion of all these measures would probably be 
sufficient to satisfy the employment tribunal that 
the employer had taken reasonable steps to avoid 
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discrimination taldng place (Equal Oppor- 
tunities Commission, Code of Practice, Equal 
Gpporrunities Polices, Procedures and Practices in 
EmpLvment (HMSO, London, 1985), p6 and 
commission for Racial Equality, Code 
of practice for the Elimination of Racial Dis- 
crimination and the Promotion of Equality OJ 
opportunity in Employment (Commission for 
Racial Equality, London, 1994), p 6). 
Analysis of an employer's liability in the 
context of discrimination cases is necessary to 
understand ftilly the circumstances in which a 
victim of discrimination would sue their 
employer and a fellow employee. 
Joint discrunmation actions 
In Read v 7-sverton District Council [1977] IRLR 
203 a female council worker was refused pro- 
motion to the post of chief land charges clerk. 
Ms Read named Mr Bull, the solicitor to the 
council, as the respondent to her application and 
described him as her employer. Once it became 
clear he had been involved in refusing her pro- 
motion the tribunal decided it was appropriate to 
treat him as a separate but additional respondent 
to the council. This decision was arrived at 
through the application of a combination of ss 41 
(1), 41 (2) and 42 (1). Both the council and Mr 
Bull were found liable for discrimination. In his 
obiter comments, the tribunal chairman was 
drawn into discussing the burden on the appli- 
cant in proving an agency relationship between 
an employee accused of discrimination and their 
employer (see s 42 (2)). This is unlikely to be 
an issue in most cases as proving the vicarious 
liability of the employer or the employee's 
involvement in aiding the employer does not 
require reference to agency principles. The 
chairman stated that "in any normal case we 
would expect an employer to be ready to accept 
responsibility for the acts of his employees. In 
these cases the addition of a second respondent 
would in practice, we think, prove largely 
nominal" (p 204). 
In EnterPrise Glass Co 
, 
Ltd v Glass [1990] ICR 
787 a harasser (and supervisor) was ordered to 
pay jC750 to his victim of sexual harassment (his 
subordinate) and the employer was ordered to 
pay L1,000, to compensate her for their failure 
to take action in response to her complaint of 
sexual harassment. 
In these cases the employment tribunals 
experienced little difficulty in accepting that 
both respondents, the discriminator and the 
employer, were liable through application of 
the legal principles in ss 41 and 42 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
In AM v WC [1999] IRLR 410, a woman 
police constable brought a sexual harassment 
case against her employer and the alleged 
harasser, her sergeant. An interesting twist was 
introduced into the proceedings when it was 
successfully argued before an employment 
tribunal that as the co-joined respondent was the 
perpetrator of the discriminatory act he could 
not aid and abet his own act as per s 42 (1) of the 
SDA and therefore could not be liable. On this 
reasoning liability could only arise against an 
individual under the Act where it was the 
employer himself that had committed the dis- 
criminatory act and the employee merely 
assisted them in the process. The EAT recog- 
nised that such an interpretation would severely 
limit the coverage of equality legislation and 
defeat the purpose of the legislation, and held 
that it was an incorrect application of the law. 
'Me correct approach is to determine whether 
the employer is vicariously liable for the dis- 
criminatory act under s 41 (1) and, if he is, 
whether the defence under s 41 (3) applies and 
exonerates him. However even if the employer 
proves he has a defence, provided vicarious 
liability has been established the perpetrator of 
the discriminatory act may be liable under s 42 
(1) on the basis that they assisted the employer in 
committing an unlawful act. "The result of this 
decision is to make clear that wherever the 
employer is presumptively liable for an act ofdis- 
crimination, the individual employee who corn- 
n*ted the act of discrimination is also liable. 
Individual liability is not entirely freestanding: 
the act of discrimination must be such as would 
render the employer liable (though it may be 
possible to establish this without bringing pro- 
ceedings against the employer). Conversely, 
individual liability is not entirely contingent on 
an employer's liability, to the extent that it 
remains even where the employer has established 
a reasonably practical steps defence for itself" 
([1999] IRLR, p 394). 
It is clear that it is possible to pursue an action 
against an employee together with the employer 
under any of the Acts established to provide pro- 
tection against discrimination. Continued 
success in pursuing actions against the perpetra- 
tors of discriminatory behaviour may have the 
long term effect of deterring prospective dis- 
criminators. "Ibe wider the range of situations 
which are seen to be caught by the legislation, of 
the narrower the range of justifications in the lin- 
guistic sense, the more likely the law is to have a 
'chilling' effect - to the extent that it is ever able 
to have such an effect - on sexually or racially 
discriminatory social conduct" (see Dine and 
Watt, supra, chap 5, N Barnforth, "Setting the 
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Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law: Some Legal 
and Social Concepts", p5 6). 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to anticipate the type of discrimina- 
tion case in which an employee will want to 
pursue a joint action, but it seems logical that it 
will happen in cases where the personal affront to 
the victim caused by the perpetrator's action is 
greatest, and these are cases involving harass- 
ment or bullying. This is bome out by the type of 
cases which have been pursued in the past. Given 
that vicarious liability of the employer in these 
areas has expanded dramatically to encompass 
acts by colleagues and third parties it is reason- 
able to assume that there are likely to be more of 
these cases being brought before employment 
tribunals. While this change will generally be of 
benefit to applicants in discrimination cases the 
employment tribunal will need to be on its guard 
that it is not used as a device by the applicant to 
settle personal grudges against other employees. 
Where individuals are directly involved (as co- 
respondents) in the proceedings they will be 
informed before the hearing ofthe precise nature 
and detail of the case against them, and they are 
entitled to be present during the fall hearing and 
to hear the entirety of the evidence presented. 
'Mey will be in a better position to prepare their 
evidence and themselves for the tribunal pro- 
ceedings than if they were merely witnesses. 
It is difficult to anticipate the reaction of 
employers to this development. While it may suit 
some employers to share the blame for the dis- 
crimination (with their employee or a third 
party) and the consequences of the tribunal 
ruling, others may be disadvantaged by the 
inclusion of one or more of their employees in 
the proceedings. The complications involved in 
defending such a case are likely to persuade the 
employer that legal assistance is necessary. On a 
practical level employers may feel inclined to pay 
for the legal representation costs of the co-joined 
employee, and indemnify them for any compen- 
sation they are ordered to pay, where they are 
satisfied the employee was acting in the scope of 
their employment. 
Where they are attempting to reach a settle- 
ment prior to an employment tribunal hearing 
informally, or through the auspices of ACAS 
conciliation or compromise agreements (see 
s 203 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 as 
amended by s9 of the Employment Rights 
(Dispute Resolution) Act 1998), their efforts 
may be thwarted where a co-respondent feels 
unable to agree to settle because of feelings of 
personal resentment at the accusations levelled 
at them. 
The possibility of additional financial costs 
involved for the employer and the uncertainties 
surrounding the testimony of the co-respondent 
(particularly in relation to the context of the dis- 
criminatory act) may combine to increase 
anxiety for them. As far as the co-respondent is 
concerned they will become more of a focus for 
the attention of the court which will increase the 
pressures involved in a tribunal hearing. Where 
they are not helped financially by the employer 
they will face the prospect of paying their own 
legal costs plus any damages awarded against 
them. The employer may also decide to institute 
disciplinary action against them in respect of 
their discriminatory behaviour. 
As a result of the AM v WC case there is an 
increased likelihood that employees that are sub- 
jected to discriminatory behaviour by other 
employees will pursue an action against them, as 
well as their employer. To conclude, it is a 
welcome development (at least for the applicant 
in discrimination cases) which will ensure that 
the behaviour of the party responsible for dis- 
crimination will be placed in the spotlight in legal 
proceedings, and may in the long term have a 
deterrent effect on potential discriminators. 
NEWS 
Appointments 
Ncwsheriffs 
On the recommendation of the First Minister 
the Queen has appointed the following all 
Scotland floating sheriffs: Craig Caldwell, 
advocate; Samuel Cathcart, advocate; Professor 
Douglas j Cusine, solicitor, Peter Gillam, soli- 
citor; Isobel G McColl, advocate; Neil j 
Mackinnon, advocate; Derek CW Pyle, soli- 
citor; Linda M Ruxton, procurator fiscal; Rajni 
SwanneY, solicitor; William J Totten, advocate; 
Alfred D Vannet, regional procurator fiscal; 
Thomas Welsh, QC. 
Ministers have also approved the transfers of 
Sheriff Kenneth Ross, currently a floating sheriff 
based at Linlithgow, to a permanent post at 
Dumfries, and Sheriff James Friel, currently a 
floating sheriff, to a permanent post in Glasgow 
in succession to Sheriff Gerald Gordon, QC, 
who retired in November. 
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Scheme A to be applied (clause 4) 
unless provision was made 
(under clause 5) for use of Scheme 
B. Specifically the roof of the tene- 
ment would fall to be regulated as 
part of 'Scheme property' (rule 
1.2(iv) of Scheme A and rule 
16.1(iv) of Scheme B). Clause 120) 
of the Bill provides that: 'The 
owner of any part of a tenement 
building being a part which pro- 
vides, or is intended to provide, 
support or shelter to any other 
part shall maintain the support- 
ing or sheltering part so as to 
ensure that it provides support or 
shelter'. Only insofar as it was not 
reasonable to do so, having 
regard to all the circumstances 
(and including, in particular, the 
age of the tenement building, its 
condition and the likely cost of 
maintenance) would such obliga- 
tions cease to be applicable 
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(clause 12(2)). Assuming the roof 
were owned in common such 
obligations would bind all the pro 
indiviso owners of the tenement. 
These duties would be enforce- 
able by any owner of a part of the 
tenement who is or would be 
direc tly affected by any breach of 
those duties. But, presumably to 
reconcile this provision with 
those introducing the manage- 
ment schemes, it is provided 
(clause 14) that if work is carried 
out under section 12 the owner 
meeting the cost of that work 
shall be entitled to recover from 
any other owner the share of the 
cost to which he would have been 
liable under the management 
scheme involved. But (coming 
almost full circle! ) rule 5 of 
Scheme A- dealing with appor- 
tionment of liability for arising 
costs - requires continuing refer- 
ence to the titles involved; if they 
provide that the full amount of 
any costs is to be met by one 
or more of the owners of the 
tenement those provisions must 
govern (rule 5.2); if those title 
provisions do not entirely govern liability for the full costs they 
must be followed insofar as they 
apportion the costs (rule 5.3); and, 
otherwise, proportionate alloca- 
tion is to be made (rules 5.5-5.8). 
CONCLUSION 
Agents will, therefore, have to 
continue to have proper regard to 
what the governing titles may 
provide; both upon enactment of 
such provisions and, more impor- 
tantly for current purposes, in the 
meantime, proper exan-dnation of titles must remain part of the 
essential duties incumbent upon the prudent conveyanceL 
TOWER BOOT RE-VISITED: THE IMPACT CONTINUES 
by Sam Middlemiss, Senior Lecturer in Law, Robert Gordon University 
In Jones v Tower Boot Co. Ltd 
(1997) IRLR 168 the Court of 
Appeal took the opportunity to 
re-interpret the meaning of the 
statutory definition of vicarious 
liability (set out in section 32 of 
the Race Relations Act 1976, sec- 
tion 41 of the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975) ensuring that employ- 
ers could be held accountable for 
the discriminatory acts of their 
employees, even where such acts 
are not carried out directly 'in the 
course of their employment'. 
While this change applied to all 
types of sex or race discrimination 
cases, it has impacted most signif- 
icantly on cases of harassment, 
where the harasser is a supervisor 
or co-worker of the victim. 
The issue of what acts are, and 
are not, perpetrated within the 
course of someone's employment 
is not always clear, and will be 
dependent on a number of factors 
which will be considered by tri- 
bunals. Such factors are, the rela- 
tionship between the two parties, 
the nature of the employment of 
the perpetrator, any relevant poli- 
cies and instructions given to 
employees, the locality and time 
of the incident and the degree of 
control exercised by the employer 
over the party's actings. Q Waite 
in Jones summarised the position 
thus: 
'The application of the phrase 
will be a question of fact for each 
industrial tribunal io resolve, in 
the light of the circumstances pre- 
sented to it, with a mind uncloud- 
ed by any parallels sought to be 
drawn from the law of vicarious 
liability in tort. ' Although he 
makes it clear that it should be 
interpreted in the sense of every- 
day speech, little guidance is 
given beyond this as to the para- 
meters of employer's liability in 
this context. 
In the racial harassment case, 
Burton v De Vere Hotels (1996) 
IRLR 596, the EAT had to deter- 
mine whether an employer could 
be vicariously liable for the dis- 
criminatory acts perpetrated 
against his own employees by 
third parties, not in his employ- 
ment. The crucial factor for the 
EAT was the extent to which the 
employer could have controlled 
the behaviour of the third party. The rationale behind their cleciý 
sion of the EAT is convincingly 
presented in the judgrnent of justice Smith, who argued that: 
'The tribunal should ask them- 
selves whether the event in ques- tion was something sufficiently 
under the control of the ernployer 
that he could, by the application 
of good employment practice, have prevented the harassrnent or reduced the extent of it. If such is their finding, then the ernployer has subjected the employee to the harassment. ' Although the issue 
of control in Burton related to the 
actions of third parties, it is also relevant to consider whether an employer can be deemed to be in 
control of the actions of his own employees who are undertaking 
discriminatory acts against co. workers, and the extent to which this is relevant in these cases. Where the harassment is carried out within the workplace and during the normal working day, 
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the employer can readily be 
expected to be in control of the 
employee's actings, although the 
situation can be more difficult 
where the perpetrator is working 
outside the workplace. It might 
reasonably be assumed that dis- 
criminatory acts perpetrated out- 
side working hours, cannot be 
attributable to an employer in this 
context. In Waters v Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner (1997) IRLR 
589 a female police officer was 
raped by a colleague in off-duty 
hours at her place of residence. 
This act was clearly outwith the 
control of the employer and out- 
side the scope of the perpetrator's 
ýnployment. In other cases the 
issue may be less clear. In Stubbs v 
Chief Constable Lincolnshire Police 
4nd others, 9 September 1997 Case 
No. 38395/86, a chief constable 
was held liable for acts of sexual 
harassment by a male officer per- 
petrated against a female officer 
in a public house. The employer 
was not in control of the person's 
actions (and under the common 
law this would be treated as an 
independent act of the employee); 
however the harassment was still 
held to be within the scope of the 
harasser's contract of employ- 
ment, as the incident would not 
have happened, but for the appli- 
cant's work. In Waters the Court 
of Appeal took a contrary view: 
'The man was a visitor to the 
appellant's room at a time and in 
circumstances which placed them 
in no different position from that 
which would have applied if they 
had been social acquaintances 
only. ' 
The tribunal in Stubbs was 
clearly influenced by events 
occurring previously to the pub 
incidents in question, although 
they were satisfied that the inci- 
dents 'were connected to the work 
and the workplace'. Although this 
ýA REVOLUTION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
I (Contributed) 
INTRODUCTION 
Significant changes in neigh- 
bouring legal systems cannot in 
the modem era be ignored, partic- 
ularly with comparable economic 
- 
foTces at work. The publication 
in June 1998 of the paper by the 
Lord Chancellor's department 
the Rights of Audience and Rights to 
Conduct Litiqation in England and 
Kales (The Way Ahead) is impor- 
ýnt in several respects for Scots 
4wyers. 
First, if legislation changes the 
ýghts of audience for lawyers in ! igland and Wales then it is like- ý, in the context of a United 
iýngdom, that similar legislation 
Oould follow for Scotland. 
ýCondly, and alternatively, if 
luch changes for England and Wales are not implemented in ýOtland, in the context of a 
I 
Nited Kingdom, there would be 
I Nior differences as between the 
'tpective jurisdictions. 
NE pAPER 
The Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Irvine of Lairg QC, commented in 
a foreword to his departmental 
paper that the Government is 
committed to a modern, efficient 
and fair system of justice, which 
operates in the public interest 
(emphasis added). Having regard 
to other similar changes, the 
Government was not satisfied 
that the present state of affairs is 
in the public interest: 'We accept 
that entry to the legal profession 
needs to be controlled, in order to 
ensure the maintenance of high 
standards which protect the 
public. But the right to maintain 
properly high entry standards to 
a profession must not be misused 
to impose restrictive practices for 
the benefit of those already estab- lished in the profession! 
The Government believed that 
'unnecessary and unjustified 
obstacles' prevented solicitors 
and employed barristers from 
obtaining and exercising rights of 
audience in the higher courts. The 
view of the Government was that 'all qualified barristers and quali- 
181 
decision, emanates from an indus- 
trial tribunal and is therefore not 
binding on other tribunals, it can 
offer an insight into the direction 
of future decisions in this area. 
While the element of control has 
never been a decisive factor 
in these cases, it should be a con- 
sideration, to ensure that the 
reasonable bounds of employer 
accountability in tl-ds area are not 
exceeded. Even where the control 
element is not considered in 
determining whether a discrimi- 
natory act is carried out in the 
course of someone's employment, 
the degree of control exercised 
over the situation or the employ- 
er's inability to control the 
harasser's actions could be intro- 
duced by an employer as part of 
their defence under section 41(3), 
that they took such steps as were 
reasonably practicable to prevent 
the employee from doing the act. 
fied solicitors should in principle 
have the right to appear in any 
court. It is proposed that all solic- 
itors and all barristers should 
have full rights of audience before 
all courts wl-dch they will be able 
to exercise subject to meeting any 
additional training requirements 
imposed by their professional 
bodies. 
The new rules put forward by 
the professional bodies will cover 
the additional training criteria, 
and rules of conduct will be sub- 
ject to approval by the Lord 
Chancellor. 
The legislation will also pro- 
vide for designated judges who 
will be consulted on any change, 
but the veto (existing in the pre- 
sent but more limited legislation) 
is to be abolished. Further, the 
Advisory Committee on Legal 
Education and Conduct will also 
be abolished and replaced with a 
Legal Services Consultative Panel 
designed to give advice to the 
Lord Chancellor in response to 
requests. 
CrRCZV5 CiZirno^iAL- i-AL, %j aLiLL-r-Tjoi 
EDrTOML 
As the year draws to a close it is time to reflect on 
some of the matters we have covered in the last twelve 
months: the cases completed and those which won't 
go away; the legislation passed and yet to take effect; 
and the wider developments in the field of Scottish 
criminal law and procedure. * 
1998 was a year redolent with major case law: it 
started with Fox (corroboration) and approached its 
end with Salmon andMoore (misuse of drugs). In the 
Spring there was Campbell and Steele (fresh evidence), 
a case which the Secretary of State has just refused to 
refer back to the appeal court. This is one which 
may well end up before the new Review 
Commission, the members of which have just been 
appointed and which starts its work in April next 
year. 
* 
Two major pieces of legislation have received the 
Royal Assent but have not yet been commenced: the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the Scodand Act 1998. The 
impact of the former on criminal practice is hard to 
overestimate; and while the Scottish Parliament will 
have legislative competence to deal with most matters 
of criminal law and procedure, its measures (and 
the acts of Scottish Ministers) must be in conformity 
with Convention rights even before the general 
commencement of the Human Rights Act. 
What else faces the criminal lawyer? The way 
cases are prepared and presented may well change 
in 1999 when the new legal aid fee structure starts to 
bite. One can only hope this does not result in the 
lessening of standards of practice. With so much 
new over the horizon, there remains the need for 
highly professional legal services. It has to be 
doubted whether a strike of criminal legal aid lawyers 
will enhance the profession's reputation. 
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PROTECTIONFRom 
HARAssmENT 
The Harsh Reality in Scotland 
SamMiddlemiss 
Senior Lecturer in Law, 
Robert Gordon University 
Introduction 
In England and Wales the police and the Crown 
Prosecution Service, in furtherance of their role of 
protecting the rights of victims of stalking and 
similar aberrant behaviour, were recently given 
extended powers which can be utilised against 
stalkers or harassers, either to pur-dsh them, or more 
importantly, force them to cease their criminal 
activities (ss. 1,2,4 and 5 of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997). The offences created were 
criminal harassment (s. 2, which is a summary 
offence) and putting people in fear of violence 
(s. 4, which is an indictable offence). In Scotland, 
these criminal offences were not introduced, on 
the basis that stalkers could already be prosecuted 
for common law crimes, such breach of the peace, 
which would achieve the same purpose (for a 
contrary opinion to this see Mays, Middlemiss & 
Watson, "'Every Breath YouTake... Every MoveYou 
Make'-Scots Law, The Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 and the Problem of Stalking", 
1997JR, Pt 6, pp. 331-334). This article identifies 
the problems associated with enforcing criminal 
sanctions against stalkers in Scotland, through 
analysis of a recent case. 
Criminal provisions in the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 
What was provided under section 8 (5) of the 1997 
Act was the right of the court in Scotland to grant 
a non-harassment order "requiring the defender 
to refrain from such conduct in relation to the 
pursuer as may be specified in the order for such 
period (which includes an indeterminate period) 
as maybe so specified. " 
This will only be granted where someone has 
been found guilty of a criminal offence, involving 
a course of conduct which falls within the 
definition of harassment in section 8 of the 1997 
Act (the definition will be given detailed 
consideration when civil remedies are examined 
later in the article). Under section 9, where 
someone breaches a non-harassment order they 
will be guilty of a criminal offence and liable to a 
maximum sentence of five years imprisonment 
and/orafine. The courts thus have a legal device 
at their disposal, which can be utilised to combat 
stalking and other associated behaviour, provided 
the authorities responsible for administering and 
enforcing the criminal law decide to prosecute the 
stalker for a common law crime. "Albeit that breach 
of the peace is a flexible enough crime to embrace 
the activities involved in stalking, nonetheless it 
is perceived as relating to less egregious conduct; 
it fails to convey thegravity of thenatureand horror 
of much stalking activity. Prosecutable discretion 
and court sentencing flexibility may be viewed as 
a means of reflecting the variants of stalking 
behaviour, but such an approach offers imprecision 
and uncertainty" (Mays, Middlemiss and Watson, 
p. 350). The truth of this statement is clearly 
demonstrated in an unreported case of harassment 
to be found under the headline of "Case against 
harassment puts Scots law on trial". TheScotsman, 
November 14,1998 at p. 5. 
It is suggested that the particular sheriff court 
missed an ideal opportunity to demonstrate that 
the common law offence of breach of the peace 
could be utilised effectively by the courts to protect 
victims of stalking. The court should arguably 
have issued a non-harassment order against the 
convicted stalker, who (over a period of 21 months) 
made the life of his victim a misery. It was 
established that the accused followed and harassed 
his victim, entered her workplace and issued 
verbal threats (which was captured on video) and 
made threatening gestures toward her. The victim 
had been forced to leave two jobs because of the 
stalker's actions and suffered from clinical 
depression. The stalker had already been 
convicted on two separate occasions for harassing 
this victim. The sheriff merely re-imposed the bail 
conditions which had banned him from 
approaching his victim for six months, and his 
sentence was deferred for good behaviour for six 
months. In the newspaper article, David 
McKenna, depute director of Victim Support 
Scotland, was quoted as saying: "This just doesn't 
go anywhere towards reassuring the public that 
the intimidation of vulnerable victims is taken 
seriously by the courts. " 
Civil remedies under the Protection from 
liarassmentActl997 
The Act provides for a civil delictual action for 
harassment, which is generally available toa %ictirn 
of stalking. Not only can such a person be awarded 
damages, but he/she can also obtain an interdict 
or interim interdict against the tormentor to 
restrain him from stalking (s. 8). 
The onus of proof in a civil case, is that, on the 
balanceof probabilities the stalker pursued a course 
of conduct which amounted to harassment, in that 
it (a) was intended to amount to harassment; or (b) 
occurred in circumstances where it would appear 
to a reasonable person that it would amount to 
harassment of her. The'conduct'referred to in the 
1997 Act can include speech, and causing the victim 
alarm and distress, although the termcontinuous 
conduct' requires stalking on two or more 
occasions. In England and Wales under section 3 
of the 1997 Act it is possible to obtain a warrant for 
the arrest of the stalker when he does anything 
which is prohibited by an injunction, but there is 
no corresponding provision in the Scottish section 
of the Act, although breach of interdict is under 
Scots Law punishable by fine or imprisonment. 
Breach of interdict constitutes a challenge to 
the authority and supremacy of the court and is 
punishable by admonition, censure, fine or 
imprisonment. " (Robinson, The Law of Interdict, 
Butterworths, (2nd ed., 1994) p. 168). V4-dle the civil 
remedy can to a limited extent recognise the degree 
of harm suffered by the victim and provide 
remedies to offset it, stalkers will be unlikely to be 
deterred from continuing to stalk their victims, or 
where they are restrained from doing so, switching 
their unwanted attentions to someone else. 
Conclusion 
The case referred to does not represent a binding 
legal authority, and it could be argued that it is not 
worthy of serious attention. 
However it is indicative of an apparent 
unwillingness on the part of the judiciary and 
prosecuting authorities to treat this matter 
seriously. The introduction of statutory offences 
(the same or similar to those in England) would 
not only underline the importance of 
criminalising this form of behaviour to the 
enforcement authorities and the judiciary, but also 
send a message to stalkers that they will face serious 
crim ina I pena Ities when they are found guilty of 
acting outwith the confines of socially acceptable 
behaviour. There will always be stalkers who will 
be undeterred by such a threat, although the 
consolation for their victims would be that the law 
can provide them with genuine protection. 
MISUSE oFDRUGS 
Scope of Statutory Defences 
The recent opinion of the Appeal Court in the two 
cases of Salmon and Moore v. H. M. Advocate 
(November 13,1998, as yet unreported) should be 
essential reading for any practitioner dealing with 
a case brought under either section 4(3)(b) or 
section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, where it 
is sought to run a statutory defence under section 
28. For the first time in Scotland, the court has 
embarked on a detailed analysis of both these 
elements together: what does the Crown require 
to prove in such cases and how may the accused 
avoid conviction by invoking section 28(2) or (3)? 
Of these subsections of section 28, little has 
previously been heard of the former, but the court 
makes it clear that its scope differs from the latter. 
The two appeals before the Court each 
concerned the adequacy of directions given by 
trial judges and provided an opportunity for re- 
visiting this area of drugs law. But how each appeal 
was finally decided is of rather less interest for 
present purposes than the extensive exercise of 
statutory interpretation which was carried out, 
under reference to a number of examples of how 
in practice the various points might arise and how, 
in such eventualities, a trial judge or sheriff should 
direct the jury. On the questions of onus of proof, 
the court's view was extremely clear. 
Taking section 5 first, whether it is a case of 
simple possession or possession with intent to 
supply, the Crown must prove knowledge and 
control of the substance, which is in fact a 
controlled drug. More particularly, in a 
"container" case, the Crown must prove not just 
knowledge and control of the container, but also: 
(a) knowledge that there was something in the 
container; and (b) that it was in fact a controlled 
drug. However, it is not necessary for the Crown 
to prove that the accused knew that the container 
contained drugs. If the accused claims that he 
thought the container over which he had control 
contained something not a "substance or 
product", but that he neither knew, suspected nor 
had reason to suspect that it was a controlled drug, 
then under section 28(2) he is entitled to be 
acquitted. 
Where however, he accepts that he knew the 
container had in it a "substance or product" (for 
example, tablets of some sort), but that he neither 
believed, nor suspected, nor had reason to suspect 
that the "substance or product" was a controlled 
drug, then his acquittal will follow under section 
28(3)(b)(i). Thus, the two statutory defences are 
designed to deal with different situations, 
something which had not previously been 
properly appreciated. 
Turning to section 4(3)(b), again it is enough 
for the Crown to prove that the accused knew he 
was concerned in the supply of something and 
that it was in fact a controlled drug. But he can 
avail himself of the defence in section 28(2) if there 
is evidence that he did not know nor suspect nor have reason to suspect it was a controlled drug; 
and likewise of the defence under section 
28(3)(b)(i) if he claims that he did not believe, nor 
suspect nor have reason to suspect that the 
"substance or product" in which he was concerned in the supply was a controlled drug under the 
1971 Act. 
EDrrORLAL 
As a rule, employment lawyers and their clients 
are equally bewildered by the absence of legal aid 
in industrial tribunals. 
Employment rights continue to increase in 
number and complexity, not least because of the 
arrival of a Labour government. Cameron Fyfe 
deals with this issue in a short article on p. 6, 
stressing a point of which we are all too well aware 
- that financial constraints tend to dictate that 
many applicants are left unrepresented at 
tribunals. In the majority of cases the assistance of 
a legal representative will greatly enhance the 
parties' prospects of success. 
It is a basic truth that tribunals operate in a 
procedurally flexible way. But the current policy 
of denying legal aid ignores the complexity of the 
substantive law in the field. We await the outcome 
of this test case witý interest. 
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NEw LEGISLATION 
Harassment: Implications of New 
Statutory Controls 
Sam Middlemis5 
Senior Lecturer in Law, Robert Gordon University 
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (c. 40) 
received the Royal Assent on March 21, and 
certain provisions are due to come into force on 
June 16 by order (cf. S. I. 1997 No. 1418, just 
published at the time of going to 
' 
press). See also 
June issue of Cri? n. L. B. 27-2 
The Act was primarily intended to deal with 
the problem of stalkers; and similar obsessives, 
by imposing criminal liability on them, and by 
providing civil remedies for their victims. It 
follows hard on the heels of section 4A of the 
Public Order Act 1986 (as inserted by s. 154 of 
the Criminal Justice and Public OrderAct 1994), 
which makes it a criminal offence in England 
and Wales to intentionally harass, alarm or 
distress someone, whether during the course of 
employment or elsewhere. Unlike the Public 
Order Act 1986, however, the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 does have application in 
Scotland (ss. 8-11). 
From an employment law perspective, the 
Act provides civil remedies for victims of 
harassment of any kind (including sexual or 
racial harassment, bullying, or harassment on 
the grounds of disability), and it is these 
remedies (damages and interim interdict) which 
will make the new provisions attractive to 
victims of this type of behaviour. 
Nature and scope of the civil offence 
It is unlawful for a person to pursue a course of 
conduct which amounts to harassment of 
another and "is intended to amount to 
harassment of that person" (s. 8(l)(a)); or, 
"occurs in circumstances where it would appear 
to a reasonable person that it would amount to 
harassment of that person" (s. 8(l)(b)). 
Under the Act, the victim must prove that the 
harassment or bullying was intentional or, 
alternatively, that a reasonable person would view 
the behaviouras harassment. It cannot be clear what 
the "reasonable person" test entails in this context 
until the issue has been judicially considered. 
Fortunately, there is no requirement to prove 
that the behaviour involves inequality of 
treatment on the basis of sex, race or disability 
(a fundamental issue in statutory discrimination 
claims; cf. Stewart v. Cleveland Guest (Engineering) 
Ltd [19941 IRL. R. 440, EAT). 
The phrase, "course of conduct" (s. 8(3)), 
involves the requirement that the behaviour 
must take place on at least two occasions, thus 
clearly excluding cases like Bracebridge 
Engineering v. Darby [19901 T. R. L. It 3, EAT, Insitu 
Cleaning Co. Ltd v. Heads [19951 I. R. LR. 4, EAT, 
and De Souza v. Autoniobile Association [19861 
I. R. L. R. 103, CA, involving singular incidents of 
harassment. 
The term "conduct" includes "speech" and by 
definition encompasses verbal harassment The 
term "harassment" includes behaviour that 
"causes the person alarm or distress" (s. 8(3)). 
Most forms of harassment or bullying which 
involve a continuous mode of behaviour wiR faU 
within the definitions of the Act ([ones v. Touvr 
Boot Co. Ltd [19971 I. R. L. R. 168, (1997) 147 N. Lj. 
Rep. 60; Dobbin v. Denholm Ship Management, 
Case No. S/5309/1094). 
The Civil action 
It may not bedifficult fora victim of harassment 
to establish a case against their harasser 
under the 1997 Act, unlike under the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 or the Race Relations 
Act 1976 according to which a case can be 
pursued only where it can first be established 
that the employer is vicariously liable for the 
employee-harasser's actions. 
Defences 
Although defences are available to the harasser 
under section 8, they apply in limited 
circumstances only. The best defence in most cases 
is likely to be that the course of conduct "was, in 
the particular circumstances, reasonable" (s. 8(s)) 
- although this may be difficult to establish in 
cases of harassment in the course of employment. 
Interim Interdict 
The advantage to a victim in pursuing Us civil 
action, as opposed to any other civil actions 
available under statute or the conunon law, is that 
the 1997 Act specifically provides (s. 8) that the 
remedy of an interdict, or more importantly in 
this context, an interim interdict, may be granted. 
The latter judicial decree can be utilised 
quickly and effectively to restrain the actions of 
the harasser and is generally unavailable as a 
remedy in other civil actions in this area: 
being provided by no other relevant statute 
(neither the Employment Rights Act 1996, 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975, Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995, nor Race Relations Act 
1976), and tending to be unavailable in common 
law actions, particularly contractual claints, or, 
the basis that the employment relationship is a 
personal relationship which cannot be enforced 
by a decree of the court, except where the breach 
of contract by either party has not affected the 
position of trust and confidence between therru 
c. f. Irani v. Southampton and Southuvst Hampshire 
Health Authority 11985] 1. C. 1; L 590, [1985] 1. R. L. FL 
203, Ch. D. 
Non-harassment orders 
Where the harasser or bully is convicted of a 
criminal offence under the Act, the prosecutor 
may apply to the court for a non-harassment 
order. Where granted, it will have the effect of 
restraining the unlawful behaviour of the 
offender. It will be granted only where it is 
necessary to protect the victim from further 
harassment: see section 234A of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, as inserted by 
section 11 of the 1997 Act. 
Wider Application? 
While the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
is intended to protect individuals from the 
unwelcome attentions of stalkers or other 
persons infringing their right to privacy of 
person, it may have a wider application. 
Where it is accepted that victims of 
harassment or bullying in the workplace are 
entitled to pursue the civil remedies provided 
by the legislation, they will have an effective 
means of directly pursuing a civil action against 
their harasser, and, for the first time, will be 
empowered to bring about the cessation of the 
behaviour (essentially what most victims want), 
where the courts are willing to grant an interim 
interdict to restrain the behaviour of the bully 
or harasser. 
Victims of continuous harassment will no 
longer have to resign from their job to free 
themselves from oppressive behaviour - clearly 
a welcome development. 
Dignity at Work Bill 1997 
The Dignity at Work Bill, which aims specifically 
to render bullying at work unlawful, failed to 
be enacted prior to the dissolution of Parliament, 
but may now re-emerge (it has been passed by 
the Lords and had its first reading in the 
Commons on February 12). 
UPDATE 
G. Ian McPherson 
Head of Legal Services, Strathclyde Police 
Scottish Appeals to the House of 
Lords 
Appeals to the House of Lords have been 
presented in - 
(1) City of Glasgow Council v. Za/ar, 1997 S. L. T. 
281, and 
(2) West Dunbartonshire Council v. Wallace, 
1997 S. L. T. 315. 
Notwithstanding the case citations in the Scots 
Law Times, regular readers of this column will 
recognise the appeals as those- 
(1) against the Second Division's opinion of 
July 12,1996 in Zajar (sub nom, Strathclyde 
Regional Council v. Zafar in E. O. R., 31, and sub 
nom Glasgow City Council v. Zafar at [1997] 
I. R. L. R. 229; 1996 G. W. D. 30. - 1823; E. O. R. 72, 
March/April 1997 at 45-46; and IDS Brief 587, 
p. 10 (April 1997)). And, 
(2) against the Second Division's opinion of 
July 31,1996 in Wallace (sub nom Strathclyde 
Regional Council v. Wallace, [1996] I. R. L. R. 670 and 
1996 G. W. D. 31- 1877). 
Glasgow City Council v. Za/ar 
Interestingly, I. R. L. R. editor, Michael 
Rubenstein, commented in his April 1997 
"highlights" at 1997 I. R. L. R. 198-199, in the 
following terms: 
"It is understood the case is to go to the 
House of Lords. This is regrettable. The 
appellant appears singularly unmeritorious, 
having been found to have committed acts of 
sexual harassment 'of the most distasteful and 
unacceptable kind', and the legal arguments are 
far from compelling. Experience suggests that 
such circumstances heighten the risk that the 
appeal will produce general principles giving a 
restrictive interpretation to discrimination law".. 
Equal Pay cases against the former 
Strathclyde Regional Council 
Fowler v. Strathclyde Regional Council 
On January 13 and 14, the Glasgow Industrial 
Tribunal (Chairman: Mr A. McArthur) heard 
submissions from counsel for the respondent 
employers in Fowler, the equal value case (joint 
cases) in which depute principals of outdoor 
centres are seeking equal pay for work of equal 
value, citing assistant head teachers of 
residential schools as comparators. 
After four days, the tribunal adjourned 
submissions (on both subss. 1(6) and 1(3) of the 
Equal Pay Act 1970) to April 17 and 18. 
Submissions concluded on April 18. The 
industrial tribunal's decision has yet to be 
promulgated, but will be reported in due course. 
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COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY CONCEPTS OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Reid was not concerned with the procedure to be 
followed by the police, the writer cannot see that 
this is so. The decision in Reid, it is submitted, 
was that the police have nothing at all to do with 
any explanation given by the accused. 
It is the writer's respectful suggestion that the 
reasoning in the Reid case is a better interpreta- 
tion of the requirements of the statute than in 
Docherry. 717he crucial difference between the two 
decisions is that Reid recognises that the police 
cannot determine whether an explanation is 
satisfactory unless it is capable of "instant verifi- 
cation". Surely it does not matter what the police 
think of any explanation. 7lie correct person to 
determine whether or not the explanation is 
satisfactory must be the magistrate or sheriff 
trying the case. 
This does not mean, however, that the police 
are not entitled to take a practical approach to 
charges under s 58 (1), and are obliged to arrest 
every person they find with a screwdriver in their 
pocket. If a person is patently telling the truth, or 
there is verification of his explanation available, 
then no doubt the police would not charge him 
with any offence. But this is no different from 
any investigation into suspicious circumstances 
which the police may undertake - if someone is 
doing something which looks suspicious, but has 
a good explanation, then he will be allowcd to go 
on his way. But, strictly speaking, it seems to the 
writer that in terms of the Act if the police find a 
known thief in possession of a housebreaking 
implement, they should be entitled to arrest and 
charge him without fiather ado. If he protests, 
they should then be able to utter the time 
honoured words: "Give your explanation to the 
judgeý" 
One other interesting point arose in Docherry, 
and this was that it was argued by the accused 
that it was unfair for him to have been cautioned 
that he need not say anything before any cxplana- 
tion was asked of him. The court held that there 
was no unfairness 2S even if the caution put him 
offgiving an explanation there and then, he could 
still give his explanation at the trial. This reason- 
ingmay not be seen as altogether convincing, but 
the court then went on to say that in some cases 
"the caution may be a necessary protection for 
the accused, because anything he might say 
could lead him into further difficulty". The ques- 
tion of whether a caution ought to be given was 
said therefore to be for the discretion of the police 
officer. 
This to the writer's mind perhaps creates more 
problems than it solves. It gives police officers 
on the street a difficult decision to make as to 
whether a caution is necessary, with only %raguc 
guidelines to help them, although ithas tobc said 
that this also applies in many other situations 
which the police have to deal with. Would it not 
be better, however, to take the view that in s 58 
(1) cases no caution is necessary? Although this 
might be something of an exception to the 
general rules regarding Cautions, there would be 
nothing wrong in having a special statutory pro- 
cedure for a special statutory charge. This would 
give the police a fixed procedure to be followed, 
and would remove the scope for complicated 
arguments at any trial that a caution should have 
been given, which would revolve around the 
nebulous concept of fairness. 
It must be unlikely that Docherry will be recon- 
sidered. It would require a bench of seven judges 
to do so. The provisions relating to such charges 
seem to have become more obscure over the 
years. Perhaps the solution is to redmft the 
provisions of s 58 (1) so that the intention of 
Parliament is made somewhat clearer. 
The Common Law and 
Statutory Concepts of 
Vicarious Liability 
The Parting of the Ways 
Sam Middlemiss and RichardMays, 
7be Robert Gordon University, 
Aberdeen. 
Mr MiddZerniss and Afr Mays analyst recent case 
law deaYng with vicarious liability in dikrimination 
cases andexamine the kgalandpracricaleffecu ofthe 
courts'dramaric change of direction in this area of 
employmentlaw, 
Currently the most dynamic area of discrimina- 
tion law is undoubtedly the development of the 
courts' interpretation of the nature and scope of 
the statutory concept of vicarious liability. 7be 
decisions of the employment appeal tnbunal in 
Burton v De tire Houls [ 1996] IRLR 596 and the 
English Court of Appeal in Jones v Torzw Boor 
Co Ltd, 774 Times, 16 December 1996, have 
reversed the tide of judicial opinion that common 
law principles should be relied upon in deter- 
mining issues of vicarious liability in discrimina- 
tion cases. Tle effect of this approach had been 
severely to restrict the circumstances in which an 
employer could be held vicariously liable in 
discrimination cases. 
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Both cases have redefined the circumstances 
under which an employer will be held liable for 
their employee's discriminatory acts, by applying 
a cornmonsense approach to the meaning of s 32 
(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976, which states 
that "anything done by a person in the course of 
his emplo)rment shall be treated for the purposes 
of the Act as done by the employer as well as by 
him, whether or not it was done with the 
employer's knowledge or approval". Section 41 
(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 contains 
an analogous provision. Given that these statu- 
tory provisions undoubtedly emanate from the 
common law (delicrual and tortious concepts of 
vicarious liability), it is hardly surprising that, to 
date, industrial tribunals and courts have tended 
to resort to common law cases to define their 
parameters. In particular the term "in the course 
of employment" has been interpreted strictly in 
line with the common law notion of "course of 
employment" (see, eg WiNams v HemphiU, 1966 
SC (HL) 3 1; 1966 SLT 259; for a definition see 
Salmond and Heuston on Torts (20th ed, 1992), 
atp457). 
Ile detrimental effect that such an inter- 
pretation has had on the legal rights of employees 
(particularly those harassed at work) is illus- 
trated to full effect in the EAT decision in Touxr 
Boor Co Ltd v_7ones [1995] MR 529. Here, the 
EAT (following the earlier decision of Irving v 
Post Cffxe [ 19871 IRLR 289) declined to accept 
that the employer was vicariously liable for a 
particularly %icious campaign of racial harass- 
ment, perpetrated against a 16 ycar old black 
employee by his co-workers (for a critique of the 
earlier decision see Jenifer Ross, "Case and 
Comment", 1996 JR 284). Ile facts were that 
the employee's arm %%-as burned with a hot screw- 
driver, he had metal bolts thrown at him, and was 
subjected to racial insults. This behaviour was 
carried out over a five week period. The basis for 
the EArs decision (overturning the industrial 
tribunal) was that the test of "course of employ- 
ment" was whether the wrongful act was so con 
nccted with what the employee had to do as to 1ýe 
the mode of doing it. They viewed such incidents 
as being beyond the scope of the harassers, 
employment as they were incapable ofbeing seen 
as an improper mode of performing authorised 
ta sks (se e Con=y v George Wtimpey & Co [ 19 51] 
2 KB 266; JýJunkman on EmpkDwls Liability 
(1995), P 80). 
In reversing the EAT decision, the Court of 
Appeal is clearly taking a more purposive 
approach to interpretation of the statutory pro- 
visions. ne judgment of 
Waite Q is especially 
enlightening, where 
he contends that "it would 
be particularly wrong to allow racial harassment 
on the scale that was suffered by the complainant 
in this case at the hands of workmates - treat- 
ment that was wounding both emotionally and 
physically - to slip through the net of employer 
responsibility, by applying it to a common law 
principle evolved in another area of law to deal 
with vicarious responsibility for wrongdoing of a 
wholly different kind. To do so would seriously 
undermine the statutory scheme of the Dis- 
crimination Acts and flout the purposes which 
they were passed to achieve". He went on to say 
that tribunals should interpret "in the course of 
their employment" in a way that a layman would. 
They should act as an "industrial jury" and 
assess the situation on the basis of the facts, and 
apply their minds "unclouded by any parallels 
sought to be drawn from the law of vicarious 
liability in tort". 
These judicial misgivings were represented in 
the obiter comments of the EAT in the earlier 
case of Burton v De Vere Hotels ( 1996] IRLR 596, 
where the tribunal contended that "it is undesir- 
able that concepts ofthe law ofnegligence should 
be imported into the statutory torts of racial 
and sexual discrimination". (nese comments 
appear to have influenced the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Yones v Tower Boot Co. ) The 
Burton case is also of major significance in that it 
further widens the scope of the vicarious liability 
of employers in discrimination cases. 
The facts in the Burton case are relatively 
straightforward. The applicants were both black, 
and were employed as casual waitresses at an 
hotel owned by the respondents in Derby. One 
evening, at the hotel, the Round Table employed 
the services ofMr Bernard Manning as a speaker. 
In the course of his presentation he made sexist 
and racist jokes and used offensive racist terms, 
and on spotting the applicants clearing the tables 
made specific sexist and racist comments 
directed at them. Following the completion of 
Mr Manning's performance, customers, follow- 
ing his lead, made lewd and racist comments to 
both the applicants, and one customer attempted 
to manhandle Miss Burton. After complaints to 
the management by the women, apologies were 
offered; nevertheless the victims of the harass- 
ment decided to exercise their right to bring a 
case for race discrimination. Before the tribunal 
they argued that if the employer had vetted Mr 
Manning's material the incidents would not have 
occurred. The tribunal accepted that the appli- 
cants had suffered a detriment but did not accept 
that their employers were responsible for it, on 
the basis that the nature of the incident could not have been foreseen by management. 
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The EAT overturned the tribunal decision, 
contending that "an employer subjects an 
employee to the detriment ofracial harassment if 
he causes or permits harassment serious enough 
to amount to a detriment to occur in circum- 
stances in which he can control whether it 
happens or not". Iley further concluded that 
foresight of the events, or lack of it, is not deter- 
minative of whether the events were under the 
employer's control. 
The practical effect of this decision is that 
employers can be held vicariously liable for the 
action of an individual who is not their servant 
or agent, where that individual harasses their 
employee, in circumstances where the employer 
is in a position to exercise control over these 
events. The implication is that employers may be 
vicariously liable for the unlawful behaviour of 
customers, clients or other persons visiting their 
premises, when it can be shown that they have 
sufficient control over the situation to prevent it 
happening or minimise the risk of it happening. 
Ile EAT took the view that "the question of 
whether an employer has subjected his employee 
to racial harassment, where a third party is 
primarily responsible for the harassment, should 
be decided by the tribunal in its capacity as an 
industrial jury. The tribunal should ask them- 
selves whether the event in question was some- 
thing which was sufficiently under the control of 
the employer that he could have prevented the 
harassment or reduced the extent of it". 
The EAT were not inclined to accept the view 
put forward by the respondents, that resort 
should be made to common law rules to deter- 
mine whether vicarious liability applied. In fact, 
as intimated earlier, their opinion %%ras that this 
practice, which had been followed in earlier cases 
(i e Irving v The hst Office and Tower Boor Co Ltd 
vyonts (EKr)) was unsound. 
It is ironic that the offensive and racist 
comments of a well known personality should 
indirectly lead to the expansion of the concept of 
vicarious liability of employers to encompass the 
actions of third parties whose behaviour is 
subject to their control. Whilst Burton v De tin 
Hotels may adversely affect the future employ- 
ment of Mr Manning, of much greater signi- 
ficance (particularly in the light of the Court of 
Appeal's latest pronouncements in TotwrBoot) is 
its impact on both parties to the employment 
relationship. 77he employer will have to ensure 
that their policies and procedures (which might 
include aspects such as equal opportunities 
training and ensuring adequate supervision of 
staff and third parties in the workplace) are suffi- 
ciently clear and comprehensive to satisfy a 
tribunal that they "represent such steps as were 
reasonably practicable to prevent the employee 
from doing that [discriminatory) act" (the 
defence set out in s 32 (3) of the Race Relations 
Act and s 41 (3) of the Sex Discrimination Act). 
Attention will undoubtedly re-focus on this 
defence, which will represent the last bastion of 
hope for an employer facing a discrimination 
claim based on vicarious liability. 
NEWS 
Appointments 
Newsheriff 
The Queen, on the recommendation of the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, has appointed 
Mrs Pamela MM Bowman, solicitor, Forfar, to 
be a floating sheriff for all shcriffdoms, nominally 
based in the Sheriffdorn of Tayside, Central and 
Fife at Perth. The appointment will be taken up 
on a date to be determined. 
0 
Scottish Law Corntnission 
The Lord Advocate has appointed Patrick S 
Hodge, QC, as a part time member of the 
Scottish Law Commission for a period of three 
years from 21 April 1997 in succession to Lord 
NimzWo Smith who recently demitted office on 
his elevation to the bench. 
Queen's Counsel 
The Queen, on the recommendation of the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, to whom the 
names were submitted by the Lord justice 
General, has approved the rank and dignity of 
Queen's Counsel in Scotland being conferred on 
'Momas Welsh, advocate, Joseph Ra)mond 
Doherty, advocate, and James Robert Campbell, 
advocate. 
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ARTICLES 
Remedies for Victims of 
Sexual Harassment: the 
Contractual Dimension 
Sam Middlemiss, 
Senior Lecturer in Law, 
'Me Robert Gordon University, 
Aberdeen. 
Afr Mid&emiss questions the utility of victims of 
sexual harassment at work pursuing itatutory 
remedies in light of recent driviopments in case 1=4 
and suggests that actions based on breach of implied 
contractual terms m4y prom more beneficial in 
certain cases. 
Where an employee is experiencing, or has 
experienced, sexual harassment they will nor- 
mally pursue statutory remedies that com- 
pensate them for the harm they have suffered. 
The normal avenue of redress for victims of 
sexual harassment is to bring an action for sex 
discrimination under ss I and 6 of the Sex Dis- 
crimination Act 1975. This may appear to be an 
attractive option to a victim of sexual harass- 
ment and will certainly be the course of action 
recommended by most legal advisers. 
T'he reality is that it is not necessarily the 
best option, given that in a significant number of 
cases the applicant will have to prove they have 
suffered a substantial detriment as a con- 
sequence of unequal treatment at the hands of 
the employer or the harasser (197 5 Act, s6 (2) 
(b): see DeSouza vAutomobdrAssociation [1986] 
IRLR 103). Only where these evidential require- 
ments are fulfilled will the tribunal afford a 
remedy which uill normally be an award of 
compensation. 
The applicant %%ill normally try to establish the 
vicarious liability of the employer (2$ per s 41 of 
the Sex Discrimination Act 197 5). This process 
has been made considerably easier as a result of 
the Court of Appeal's decision in Jones v Tower 
Boot Co Ltd, II December 1996, unreported. 
Where they are not vicariously liable it is 
questionable whether an action will lie against 
the harassers themselves (see Waters v Com- 
mWioner of ftlice of the Metropolis [ 199 5]I RLR 
531). 
The recent removal of the upper limit of com- 
pensation that can be awarded under the Sex 
Discrimination Act by the Sex Discrimination 
and Equal Pay (Remedies) Regulations 1993 
(SI 1993/2798) has meant there is scope for 
substantial Compensation to be awarded in 
favour of successful applicants, although despite 
a subsequent increase in the level of monetary 
awards, the majority of awards in sex and race 
discrimination cases are still below the previous 
limit of jC1 1,000. (For detailed St2tiStiCS con- 
cerning the level of recent awards see the Equal 
Opportunities Review, no 67, May/June 1996, 
pp 13-24. ) Whether compensation, even of a 
substantial nature, represents sufficient consola- 
tion and redress for the emotional, physical and 
economic consequences suffered by victims, is 
uncertain. 
There are difficulties for applicants in pro%ing 
their Case under the 1975 Act, which might not 
pertain to other types of civil action brought 
under the law of contract or dclict. This has been 
recognised by other writers: "The authors 
contend that the discrimination foundation for 
such claims may not be the most appropriate 
base because sexual harassment, even of a severe 
nature, does not necessarily involve disparate 
treatment of the sexes. Rather it concerns 
inappropriate use of sexuality, regardless of the 
gender of the victim" (I Dine, B Wart, "Sexual 
Harassment: Moving Away From Discrimina- 
tion" (1995) 58 MLR 343). 
Bringing an action for breach of contract may 
prove it suitable alternative, given that a range of 
contractual actions may be viable, and there may 
be instances where although there am no 
grounds for bringing a deli=al action, a con- 
tractual claim may lie. "Where ... the delictual 
claim is for pure economic loss .-- if the parties have direct privity of contract there appears to be 
no room for delictual liability as there is no 
obligation - apart from the contract itself - to 
prevent economic loss arising as a result of a 
failure to take reasonable care to perform a con- 
tract" (J Thomson, "Delictual liability Between 
Parties to a Contract", 1994 SIT (News) 29 at 
p 34). In the case of Wright v Dunlop Rubber Co 
Ltd (1972) 13 KIR 255 it was stated that 
although in employer had no duty under the law 
of tort to rescue an employee from a harmful 
situation Caused by a third party, he did have a 
contractual duty of care which would extend to 
dangers caused by his own failure to act. Wh= a 
claim arises from personal injury resulting from 
a breach of in employer's duty of care, itwM 
be advisable to pursue both a contractual and 
dclictu2l action: "It is important always to con- 
sider whether there is potential delictual liability 
for personal injury.. . as there may be important 
practical advantages in being able to sue in delict 
in addition, or as an alternative, to an action for 
breach of contract" (Thomson, ibid). 
SCOTS LAW TIMES: ISSUE 9: 7-2-97 37 
REMEDIES FOR VIC-MiS OF SEXUAL HARASSME14T 
Types ofcontractual claim 
While normally an action against an employer 
under the law of contract must be raised in a 
court of law, where the breach of contract has 
arisen from, or is outstanding at, the termination 
of employment an action for breach of contract 
can be brought before an industrial tribunal 
(Industrial Tribunals Extension of jurisdiction 
(England and Wales) Order 1994 (SI 1994/ 
1623) and Industrial Tribunals Extension of 
jurisdiction (Scotland) Order 1994 (SI 1994/ 
1624)). In such a case there is a maximum 
financial award of r25,000. The industrial 
t 'bunal is, in most cases, the preferable forum n 
for resolving contractual disputes. It is less 
formal than a court (in terms of procedure and 
evidential requirements), it is cheaper for the 
applicant (particularly if they can represent 
themselves), and the process of adjudication of 
the case is quicker. Unfortunately the jurisdic- 
tion of industrial tribunals in breach of contract 
cases is much narrower than the jurisdiction of 
the courts. 
Where someone has been subjected to sexual 
harassment in the context oftheir emplo) ment, it 
will be unlikely that they can base a claim on a 
breach of the express terms of an employment 
contract. This is bemuse most contracts will not 
include rights and duties in respect of sexual 
harassment, unless spedfic policies and pro- 
cedures for sexual harassment have been intro- 
duced and become incorporated into the 
contract. Despite the stated objective of most 
trade unions to combat sexual harassment in the 
workplace, the collective agreements drawn up 
between trade unions and employers will rarely 
contain references to sexual harassment. Even 
where sexual harassment is referred to, in most 
instances collective agreements uill not form 
part of a contract of employment. 'Me most 
likely basis for a contractual claim in this context 
is the implied duties placed on employers by the 
courts. 
lie effect ofa breach ofcontract on 
statutory rights 
Before considering the nature of contraý. tual 
claims (underp=*cd by implied duties) which 
might apply to sexual harassment cases, 
it is 
important to recogaise that a breach of contract 
can form the basis for in action 
for constructive 
dismissal. In the case of Mtern Excavarion v 
Sharp (1978) QB 76 1, the Court ofAppeal con- 
firmed that the success of in action for con- 
structive dismissal under what 
is now s. 95 (1) (c) 
of the Employment Rights 
Act 1996, is depen- 
dent on the applicant establishing that the 
employer's unreasonable behaviour represented 
a breach of contract, entitling them to resign their 
job. In illustrating the type of behaviour that 
would represent sufficient breach of contract to 
justify an employee's claim, Lawton Q speci- 
fically identified "Persistent and unwanted 
arriorous advances by an employer to a female 
member of his staff". 
In Bracebridge Engineering v Darby [1990] 
IRLR 3, another case of constructive dismissal, it 
was held by the employment appeal tribunal that 
an employer's failure to investigate a complaint 
of sexual harassment breached the implied 
contractual obligation "not to undermine the 
confidence of the female stag". 
Duty to maintain trust and confidence 
It is certain that such behaviour represents a 
breach of the implied duty to maintain 
employees' trust and confidence. The following 
statement explains the nature of this implied 
term: "Destruction of trust and confidence is 
really no more than a technical sounding name 
for intolerable behaviour, the existence of which 
destroys the ability to work together" Rideout's 
Pýincipks ofLabour Law (4th ed, 1983), Sweet & 
Maxwell, at p 70). 
In the case of Afuehring v Emap and Ibbett, 29 
July 1988, COM 10824/88, Ms Muehring was 
employed as an advertising director. She was 
forced to leave her job after six months as she was 
being sexually harassed. Ms Muehring claimed 
she had been constructively dismissed. She also 
brought a court action against her employer for 
breach of contract (on the basis of a breach ofthe 
implied duty io maintain trust and confidence), 
and in tort for assault and battery. Her employer 
eventually agreed to an out of court settlement of 
425,000. There is no doubt that employers that 
perpetrate sexual harassment themselves or fail 
to respond to employees' complaints of sexual 
harassment will breach this implied duty. Where 
an employer maintains an organisational culture 
that condones sexual harassment, this may also 
represent a breach. 
Duty zo take reasonable carejor the safety of 
employees 
There is an implied duty that the employer will 
exercise a reasonable standard of care in provid- ing for the safety of his employees: "The duty of 
care is generally thought of as lying within the law 
of tort, and so far as it concerns the employer's duty towards his employee, is always treated as 
such. There is no doubt, however, that a com- 
parable almost identical contractual duty does 
mist" (Rideour, supra, at p 96). 
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Employers must take reasonable care for the 
safety of their employees and in the process must 
provide and maintain a We system of work, safe 
and competent fcUow employees, and safe plant 
and machinery. The first two of these specific 
duties could apply to sexual harassment cases, 
where the consequence for the victim is their 
health being adversely affected. 
(a) Duty to protide a safe system of twrk. In 
Walker v Northumberland County Council (1995] 
IRLR 35, it was judiciafly recognised that an 
employer's failure to provide an employee with a 
safý system of work by overworking him caused 
him psychiatric damage, and represented a 
breach of their duty to take reasonable Me: 
"Although the law on the extent of the duty on in 
employer to provide an employee with a safe 
system of work and to take reasonable steps to 
protect him from risks which are reasonably 
foreseeable has developed almost exclusively in 
cases involving physical injury to the employee 
there is no logical reason why risk of injury to an 
employee's mental health should be excluded 
from the scope of the employees duty. * 
Where sexual harassment creates in oppres- 
sive environment and causes the employee to 
suffer stress or other mental harm, the victim 
may have 2 right of action for breach of the duty 
to provide a safe system of work. The physical 
layout of the workplace may be a contributing 
factor to sexual harassment (e g secluded places, 
congested workspaces). Other relevant factors 
are insufficient supervision, unclear instructions 
and lack of adequate procedures. Where an 
employer receives a sexual harassment com- 
plaint and fails to take action, it could be argued 
he has fOed to provide a safe system of work. "It 
may be the case that the employer has tried to 
prohibit bad working practices amongst his staff 
but has failed in his attempt to do to, and accord- 
ingly the continued use of bad practices may, 
depending on the circumstances, have developed 
into what is rcaDy a defective system of work, for 
which the employer will clearly be answerable" 
(I P Miller, Industrial Law in Scodand (1970), 
W Green, p 183). 
All of these factors could be relevant in a 
contractual or delictual action for breach ofduty. 
Where they an proven to be the substantial cause 
of the harassment or a material factor in the 
incident, the liability of the employer could be 
established. 
(h) Duty to provide safe and competent felloto 
emplo, yeeL An employer is placed under a duty to 
provide safe and competent fellow employees. 
Employers, in the process of recruiting and 
selecting new staff, may Merience difficulty in 
determining whether in employee's future 
behaviour will be safe and competent. However 
where a pattern of behaviour of in employee has 
developed which indicates they are unsafe or 
incompetent, there is an expectation of the 
courts that the employer will dismiss such a 
person from their employment or take other 
action to limit their effect on other employee& 
VIcre someone is known by the employer to be a 
perpetrator of sexual harassment and there is a 
causal connection between the behaviour and 
the victim experiencing health problems, the 
employer may breach the implied contractual 
duty (and a similar delictual obligation) to 
provide safe and competent fellow employees. 
In the cast of Hudson v Ri4e Manufacturing 
1957) 2 QB 348, an employer was held to be in 
breach of his duty for failing to have disciplined a 
known practical joker whose irresponsible antics 
led to a fellow employee being injured. 
Dury to render employees reasonable support 
Micre may be a separate implied duty for the 
employer to "provide the support necessary for 
an employee to do their job". In the case of Wi-gan 
Borough Councd v Davies [1979] ICR 411, a 
junior manager at an old folk's home failed to 
take the side of care assistants in a dispute with 
the warden. In order to avoid the resulting per- 
sonality conflicts between the manager and other 
staff the employers tried to arrange a transfer for 
the manager but were unsuccessful, and she 
agreed to continue working. She was subject to 
harassment by other members of staff who 
refused to co-operate with her. In the light of this 
and the failure of her employers to support her in 
her actions she resigned. It was held in an action 
of unfair dismissal that the employers had failed 
in their implied duty to render her reasonable 
support: "As the employers were in breach of 
contract by failing to attempt to correct a sima- 
tion which was intolerable to the cmplo)ec ... there had been a fundamental breach of contract 
or a breach of the fundamental terms". 
It Seem$ reasonable to contend that the 
employer's implied duty to pro%ide reasonable 
support to employees could be extended to cases 
of sexual harassment. Employers may breach this 
duty where they fail to take complaints of sexual 
harassment seriously or fad to take action to 
alleviate the suffering of a victim of hmssmenL 
Conclusion 
7bere is clearly scope for contractual claims to be 
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pursued against employers for sexual harass- 
ment. Victims of sexual harassment in employ- 
ment and their representatives should reappraise 
the utility ofpursuing statutory claims in the light 
of corrunon law alternatives, such as contractual 
actions, when the issues are relatively clear 
(compared with those in a statutory claim, which 
are becoming increasingly complex and less 
user friendly) and the remedies are often as 
favourable. A contractual action should parti- 
cularly be considered where it can be brought 
before an industrial tribunal, uith consequent 
reduction in costs. 
Aspects of Appeals from the 
Sheriff Court 
William Holligan, 
Brodies, WS, 
Edinburgh. 
Afr HoNgan survos Me authorities on rights of 
appealftom, andjudkial review of, the sheriff, and 
suggests that there are a number ofpoints thx require 
clarifiration. 
-rbe purpose of this article is to examine the fol- 
lowing two issues: (a) appeals from sheriffs in 
summary applications; and (b) judicial review of 
sheriffs'decisions. 
Before doing so, it is worth looking briefly at 
the history of the appeal process in the sheriff 
court. 
The procedure of appeals from one profes- 
sional judge to another does seem anomalous. its 
roots he in the historical development of the 
sheriff coum 
7be Heritable jurisdictions (Scotland) Act 
1746 abolished the heritable nature of the office 
of sheriff. The office remained although no 
appointments appear to have been made. 'Me 
office of sheriff depute %%-As provided 
for, with the 
right to appoint substitutes 
for whom the depute 
was answerable. The sheriff 
depute was an 
advocate who did not sit within 
his jurisdiction 
throughout the )ear. It has been said 
untroduction to Scottish Ljg& Hi=7, Stair 
Society, Vol 20, chap xxvi) that the practice 
developed for the sheriffs substitute to refer 
matters of difficulty to the sheriff 
depute. In the 
course of his note in 
Archer's Th v Akxander & 
Sons (1911) 27 Sh Ct Rep 11, Sheriff Ferguson 
stated that there always was an unlimited right to 
seek review of the sheriff substitute's decision, a 
right which was regularly employed. From 18 39 
onwards, the right of appeal from the sheriff sub- 
stitute to the sheriff depute was gradually 
restricted, culminating in the present position set 
out in s 27 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 
1907 ("the 1907 Act"). 
The Court of Session Act 1868 abolished the 
process of advocation as a method of review by 
the Court of Session and established the system 
of appeals which is now to be found in s 28 of the 
1907 Act. 
The process of appeal by way of summary 
application to the sheriff has a long history 
extending well before the 1907 Act. Throughout 
the 19th century more and more statutes gave 
rights of appeal to citizens dissatisfied with the 
actions of ever encroaching local and central 
government. The most obvious candidate to 
resolve matters was the local sheriff. As Sheriff 
Dove Wilson pointed out in 1883 (INacrice of the 
Sheriff Courts (3rd ed), p 374), although appeals 
were permitted to the sheriff, no procedure was 
laid down as to the form they might take, or 
what the sheriff was supposed to do on hearing 
the appeal. 
It is against that background that the 1907 Act 
was enacted. It was intended to provide a pro- 
cedure to deal with summary applications, and 
also to establish the duty of the sheriff. 
Sunnnary applications 
A summary application is defined in s3 (p) as 
including a common law application (very rare) 
and all applications, by appeal or otherwise, 
broughtbywayof statute andto be disposed of in 
a summary manner, although the statute does 
not specify the form the appeal should take. 
Section 50 of the 1907 Act provides that the 
sheriff shall appoint a hearing to dispose of the 
application and shall issue a judgment in writing. 
Any uncertainty as to the form of the summary 
application (see, eg National Bank v Williamson 
(1886) 23 SLR 612) is now dispelled by the 
Summary Application Rules 1993 which provide 
that all such applications are to be initial writs in 
the form annexed to the rules. 'Me rules provide 
that, unless there is an enactment to the contrary, 
there is a 21 day time limit for the commence- 
ment of proceedings (rule 6). Once the pleadings 
are under way, further procedure is a matter for 
the discretion of the sheriff (ODonnell v Wilson, 19 10 SC 799; 1910 2 SLT 3; Park v Coltness Iron 
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EDrroRiAL 
When the President of the Industrial Tribunals in 
Scotland addressed the Industrial Law Group 
conference last Christmas she was invited to ask 
Santa to grant her an employment law Christmas 
wish; she asked, not surprisingly, for "Some 
Certainty in an Uncertain World" but events since 
then have indicated that Mrs Littlejohn appears 
(and this is more surprising! ) to have little 
influence with Santa or his helpers. 
The end of the year is nigh and we stW do not 
know who qualifies for the right to claim unfair 
dismissal. Readers will recollect that in R v. 
Secretary of State for Employment, ex p. Seymour 
Smith and Perez [1995) I. R. L. R. 464 the Court of 
Appeal decided that the two-year service 
qualification for the right to claim unfair dismissal 
was indirectly discriminatory (in breach of the 
Equal Treatment Directive) as at 1991 when the 
appellants were dismissed, since the proportion 
of women was considerably smaller than the 
proportion of men who qualified for the right in 
that year (90-5 women per 100 men). 
This decision was appealed to the House of 
Lords and we could reasonably have been 
expected to have their Lordships'decision by now. 
However, illness appears to have slowed the 
progress of the case and the decision is still 
awaited. What we do have in the interim is a 
decision of the divisional court in R v. Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry, ex p. UNISON [19961 
I. R. L. R. 438, which also examined, among other 
things, the potentially disparate impact of the two- 
year qualification period. However, in this case the 
position was analysed as at Autumn 1994. The 
court noted that the gap between the proportion 
of female and male employees who could comply 
with the two-year service qualification was just 
over 4 per cent at that point. In considering 
whether this was a "considerable difference" the 
court indicated that on the evidence currently 
available it was inclined to the view that a4 per 
cent disparity would fall within the de minimis 
exception. 
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scheduled dates. As a result, submissions from 
the Tespondents'counsel have been re-scheduled 
for January 13 and 14,1997. 
5) E. I. S. v. Robert Gordon University 
The Inner House did not, in the event, hear a 
reclaiming motion on September 26,1996 against 
Lord Milligan's interlocutor of May 29,1996 
(1996 GAV. D. 26-1511). The Lord Ordinary's 
opinion is now digested in IDS Brief 573, 
September 1996, at pp. 4 and 5, where it is 
incorrectly cited (in the English style) as R v. The 
Robert Gordon University, ex parte the Educational 
Institute of Scotland! I am obliged to Sandy Kemp 
(see article, below) for intimating to me that 
settlement terms were agreed and, as a result, 
the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor was recalled, and the 
petition for judicial review disý. 
(6) Blair v. Highland Council 
The Industrial Tribunal's written decision, with 
reaso , ns, was promulgated on 
October 8,1996. 
(Chairman: Mr George Livie - S/2020/95). 
Following a 24-day hearing over various dates 
between September 21,1995 and June 24,1996, 
the unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that 
Highland Council (statutory successors of 
Lochaber District Council) unfairly dismissed 
Mr Blair, that the respondents should re-engage 
him as a solicitor at a set salary; that the 
respondents should pay Mr Blair monetary 
compensation amounting to a fixed sum; that 
there should be restored to Mr Blair any rights 
and privileges, including seniority and pension 
rights which he would have benefited from had 
he not been dismissed; and the Council should 
re-engage him not later than November 11,1996. 
In an 87-page written decision, which is mainly 
concerned with the question of the fairness of 
Mr Blair's dismissal, and the employers' failure 
to provide a proper and fair procedure, the 
Industrial Tribunal does, however, give 
consideration to an interesting issue as regards 
the remedy awarded. In addressing the question 
of remedy, the Tribunal's written reasons record 
(at page 85C/F) that: 
"Had the applicant not been dismissed we 
are satisfied that he would have continued to 
discharge his duties until the date of 
reorganisation. Thereafter he would have 
enjoyed the benefit of the Detriment Regulations 
assuming that he was unsuccessful in securing 
an equivalent or higher position either with 
Highland Council or elsewhere. " 
1rhe Tribunal fully accepted Mr Williamson's 
submission in regard to the Transfer of 
Undertaking Regulations. The applicant was not 
an employee at the date of reorganisation and 
could not benefit from either the Regulations or 
the Acquired lRights) Directive. However, 
Highland Council as a consequence of the Local 
Government Scotland Act 1994, had taken over, 
albeit in a reorganised form, all of the 
administrative functions and employees of 
Lochaber District Council. Those employees 
whose jobs disappeared with reorganisation 
have either been matched to other employment 
or are in the process of being matched. None so 
far have been made redundant. Section 1150) 
of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides for 
re-engagement by a successor of the employer 
or by an associated employer. In the 
circumstances the Tribunal are of the opinion 
that a re-engagement order is competent. We do 
not think it could have been the intention of 
Parliament to deprive an employee of the right 
to a reinstatement or re-engagement order, if 
appropriate, in circumstances where the 
employee has been held to be unfairly dismissed 
at a date prior to implementation of the Local 
Government (Scotland) Act 1994. " 
It does not appear from the Tribunal's written 
decision, with reasons, that the Tribunal was 
referred to the provisions of section 181 of the 
Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994. That 
is the statutory provision which made the 
consequential and supplementary provisions 
arising from local government reorganisation on 
April 1,1996. In particular, section 181(4)(g) 
deals with any proceedings instituted by or 
against any local authority prior to April 1,1996. 
Gender-neutral Conduct can 
amount to Sexual Harassment 
Richard Mays and Sam Middlemass 
The Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen 
The recent decision of an industrial tribunal 
sitting in Glasgow, Dobbin v. Denholm Ship 
Management (UK) Ltd and McNiven G. T. S/5310/ 
94), represents an interesting development in the 
evolution of sexual harassment law, expanding 
the scope of the behaviour which will be treated 
as unlawful sexual discrimination (Strathclyde 
Regional Council v. Porcelli (19861 I. R. I-R. 134 
(C. S. ); Braccbridge Engineering Ltd v. Darby [19901 
I. R. L. R. 3; Insitu Cleaning Co. Ltd v. Heads [1995] 
I. R. L. R. 4, EAT). It was decided that employers 
can be liable for failing to prevent sexual 
harassment of an employee by a colleague, even 
where the harassment is evidenced by gender- 
neutral conduct. 
In Dobbin the applicant claimed that she had 
been subjected to sexual harassment on numerous 
occasions by a male colleague who was 
previously her super%isor. Specifically, she first 
complained to employer (a merchant shipping 
company) of the supervisor's behaviour in 199Z 
alleging that he picked on her and purposely 
ignored her. The applicant said that the 
supervisor had acted towards other employees, 
both male and female, in the same way. The 
response of the company to this original 
complaint was-that it was "trivial" and matters 
were dealt with by a meeting. The applicant 
subsequently moved sections within her 
workplace. 
Despite this, complaints to management 
became more serious. The applicant claimed the 
male colleague had started to personalise the 
victimisation. When she went for a drink he made 
slurping noises, as she walked across the room 
he would stamp his feet in time, and when she 
ate he would say "munch, munck munch-. It was 
also alleged that he called her names such as 
back-stabbing bitch" and called her 'Mrs 
BlobW. The apphcant made a written complaint 
to the manager stating that her health was being 
affected by the harassment. In response to this 
latest complaint the employer made the 
respondent employee aware of its "concern". 
There was also evidence of a subsequent 
incident where the respondent employee had 
brushed against the applicant in a deliberate 
manner but that this was not sexually motivated. 
There emerged evidence of a succession of 
complaints from female employees of the 
respondent employee's past conduct. As a 
consequence, the company instructed an 
investigation through its solicitors. The company 
concluded that the respondent employee's 
conduct did not amount to sexual harassment 
as he had acted in a similar fashion to male 
colleagues. It also became clear that the 
respondent employee was suffering 
from a 
stressýrelated illness. Their response was to offer 
the male colleague counselling, although latterly 
he did receive a warning. 
The applicant had in the interim contacted the 
]Equal opportunities Commission to seek support 
for her tribunal claim which she subsequently 
pursued. In finding for the applicant the 
tribunal 
said that the -repetition of trivial wrongs can 
become the essence of harassment with heavy 
cumulative consequences. 
" The respondent 
ernployee's treatment of the applicant was 
unwanted conduct which affected 
her dignity 
at work and so amounted to 
harassment" and that 
this conduct wwas to her 
detriment and amounted 
to less favourable treatment" 
(see Sex 
Discrimina tion Act 1975 sections I (1)(a), 
6(2)(b); 
Strathclyde Regional Council v- Porcelli 
[19S61 
I. R. L. R. 134 (C. S. ); De Souza r. 
Automobile 
Association [19861 I. R. L. R. 103 (C. A. ); Insitu 
Cleaning Co. Ltd v. Heads [19951 I. R. L. R. 4, E. A. T. 
The tribunal went on to say that "while a sexual 
consideration may not have been the sole reason, 
the tribunal was satisfied that the sex or gender 
of (the applicant] was the important critical factor 
and was the activating, effective and operating 
cause, prevailing over mere dislike or [the 
respondent employee's] style of supervision. " 
This particular case expands the scope of the 
behaviour which will constitute unlawful sexual 
harassment. While it has previously been 
accepted that sexual harassment could represent 
discrimination based on gender, it had not 
hitherto been recognised that gender-neutral 
conduct could amount to sexual harassment 
(Steuvrt v. Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd [19941 
I. RLF- 440, E. A. T. ). The tribunal were able to see 
similarities in this particular case with Porcelli 
(above), where some of the acts complained of 
were not primarily of a sexual nature. 
In an earlier Scottish case, Rarity v. larvie Plant 
Hire (S/4788/91) a female employee was 
subjected to a tirade of verbal abuse by her 
supervisor. There was clearer evidence in this 
case of sex discrimination. A male employee 
guilty of the same misconduct as the applicant 
was not subjected to the same verbal 
harassment. There was also a "feminine 
connotation" in the language used. 
In Dobbin almost all of the conduct of the 
respondent employee was considered not 
sexually motivated. Despite this, the tribunal 
had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that 
the applicant had been subjected to materially 
different treatment from that which would have 
been inflicted on a male colleague. In failing to 
properly address the complaints from the 
applicant, the respondent employer, in the 
opinion of the tribunal: "had liability in more than 
just the formal sense". The company had no 
formal policy on sexual discrimination/ 
harassment or equal opportunities. Indeed the 
company did not contest its vicarious liability for 
the sexual discrimination. Nor did the company 
seek to suggest that it had a defence because it 
had taken all reasonable preventative steps (see 
section 410) of the 1975 Act). The company had 
sexually discriminated against the applicant 
contrary to sections 10)(a) and 6(2)(b) by failing 
to take prompt and effective action to stop the 
applicant being harassed, despite her complaints 
of the respondent employee's conduct. In 
recognition of the failure of the company to 
protect the applicant the tribunal ordered the 
company to pay her; E3000 compensation. 
This decision represents an interesting 
departure from the recent trend in harassment 
cases (Irving v. The Post Office [19871 I. R. L. R. 289, 
C. A.; Tower Boot Ltd v. Jones [19951 I. R. L. R. 529, 
E. A. T. - see also article by Vic Craig, above), 
whereby harassment perpetrated by a colleague 
against the victim is treated as behaviour outside 
the scope of their employment, and therefore 
incapable of attaching vicarious liability to the 
employer as per the statutory definition. It also 
sends a message to employers to not only take 
positive measures to outlaw sexual harassment 
from the workplace, but also to include in their 
coverage protection against intimidating or 
bullying behaviour. 
Taxation of Payments on the 
Termination of Employment 
Sandra Eden 
University of Edinburgh 
Payments on the termination of employment 
take a variety of guises: payments in lieu of 
notice; redundancy payments; lump sums in 
respect of death or disability, and golden 
handshakes are just some of the more common 
termination payments. It is critical from the point 
of view of both the employer and the employee 
to ascertain how such payments should be 
treated for the purposes of tax and national 
insurance contributions. The employer needs to 
be aware of when to deduct PAYE and national 
insurance contributions from the payments 
because failure to do so will render him liable in 
the first instance for these sums. From the 
employee's point of view, where he or she is in 
a position to negotiate over the amount of any 
payment, it is vital that he or she knows whether 
he will receive the sum net or gross before he 
can properly decide on the acceptability of any 
offer. The considerable degree of uncertainty in 
this area has been mitigated by the publication 
this year of a statement of practice (S. P. 3/96) 
and a summary of the Inland Revenue's view in 
the Tax Bulletin (August 1996, p. 325). This article 
briefly outlines the Inland Revenue's current 
practice in this area in relation to various 
different types of termination payments, 
focusing in particular on the recent Revenue 
statement on payments in lieu of notice. 
There are four main provisions under which 
termination payments may fall to be taxed: 
1. They may be taxed on general principles 
under section 19 of the Taxes Act 1988, which 
charges to tax "emoluments" from an office or 
employment, where "emoluments" include "all 
salaries, fees, wages, perquisites and profits 
whatsoever" G. A. 1988, ss. 19 and 1310)). If so 
it is taxed in full; 
2. If not caught under general principles, they 
may be taxed under section 148, which charges 
payments on termination of an employment to 
the extent they exceed: C3O, OOO, unless otherwise 
exempted from a section 148 charge by section 
188. Section 188 exempts inter alia the following 
payments from a section 148 charge(the first 
00,000 of a termination payment; payments on 
termination of employment as a result of death 
or disability; lump sums from tax approved 
pension arrangements; certain payments on 
termination of foreign service); 
3. If it is a payment on retirement, other than 
a lump sum payment under Inland Revenue 
approved arrangements which are tax free, it 
will be taxed in full under section 596A; 
4. The other possibility which remains to be 
considered is whether the payment is in return 
for entering into a restrictive covenant, in which 
case it will be taxable in full under section 313. 
The main difficulty in practice has been in 
distinguishing between emoluments, and 
section 14 receipts. 
Redundancy Payments 
Statutory redundancy payments are exempt 
from tax under T. A. 1988, section 580(3). This 
treatment is extended to "genuine" non- 
statutory redundancy payments (Mairs v. 
Haughy [199411 A. C. 303; (199313 W. L. R. 393; 
[19931 3 All E. R. 801 (H. L. ). A redundancy 
payment is genuine, broadly, if is paid to 
compensate or relieve an employee from the 
unfortunate consequences of being unemployed 
and is to be distinguished from payments on 
retirement, damages for unlawful termination 
and deferred payment of wages. The Inland 
Revenue will provide advance clearance for 
particular schemes if they are provided with the 
scheme details (S. P. 1/94). 
Restrictive Covenants 
These are taxed in full under T. A. 1988, section 
313. The term 'restrictive covenant' is not used 
in the legislation, which refers to undertakings 
"the tenor or effect of which is to restrict him as 
to his conduct or activities". It became apparent 
that at least some tax offices wýre seeking to tax 
compromise agreements under section 313, but 
the position has been clarified by S. P. 3/96. This 
confirms that no tax charge will arise where the 
only "restriction- which the employee is 
suffering is an agreement not to claim further 
damages in respect of the dismissal, or where 
the agreement merely reaffirms undertakings 
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CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
by Sam Middlen-dss, Senior Lecturer in Law, The Robert Gordon University 
The perpetrators of sexual 
harassment rarely need to con- 
cern themselves with the prospect 
of facing criminal charges as a 
consequence of their behaviour, 
although serious forms of sexual 
harassment could represent a 
criminal offence in Scotland. In 
the light of recent developments 
in England and Wales, whereby 
certain forms of sexual harass- 
ment have become a criminal 
offence under the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994, it 
seems an opportune time to 
review the existing forms of crim- 
inal liability which apply to per- 
petrators of sexual harassment at 
work and consider whether there 
is a need for legislative measures 
in Scotland which clarify the 
extent of their criminal liability 
and represent a suitable deterrent 
to prospective harassers. 
Up until now victims of sexual 
harassment have primarily relied 
on statutory civil remedies (under 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) 
as redress for the harm suffered as 
a consequence of this behaviour, 
although realistically the only 
remedy available to them under 
statute is an award of compensa- 
tion. There are other civil reme- 
dies which might be available 
under the law of contract, delict 
and other statutory provisions (eg 
claiming constructive dismissal 
under the unfair dismissal rules) 
although these are seldom pur- 
sued by victims of harassment 
and are also often restricted to 
offering financial recompense. 
Where the victim has suffered 
physical abuse, psychological 
harm and econon-dc loss (possibly 
through having to give up his 
employment) it is questionable if 
the payment of compensation 
represents adequate redress, par- 
ticularly where the perpetrator of 
the harassment goes unpunished 
and is free to continue his 
employment and his lascivious 
practices. 
Victims of the more serious 
forms of sexual harassment Ge 
involving physical assaults) have 
proved unwilling or reluctant to 
make a complaint which poten- 
tially results in criminal proceed- 
ings being undertaken against 
their harasser, even although this 
is clearly an option. The problem 
may be that, given this behaviour 
is carried out in an employment 
context, it may not be apparent 
that criminal remedies are appro- 
priate. Even where they are 
cognisant of this fact it is likely 
they will be discouraged from 
making a complaint through fear 
of further harassment by their 
harasser Or victimisation by their 
employer. The formality of court 
proceedings and the possibility of 
unwelcome publicity from press 
coverage of the trial may also act 
as a deterrent. At present in 
Scotland several common law 
crimes might be committed in the 
context of sexual harassment and 
these will be considered. As 
referred to earlier, under the 
Criminal justice and Public Order 
Act 1994, certain forms of sexual 
harassment will be treated as a 
criminal offence in England and 
Wales. In the interest of providing 
an effective deterrent against this 
behaviour it may prove expedient 
for similar measures to be intro- 
duced north of the border. 
Against this background it 
seems appropriate to consider the 
headings of criminal liability 
which might apply in cases of sex- 
ual harassment. 
ASSAULT 
Where an employee is the vic- 
tim of physical manhandling by 
the harasser, this could constitute 
the basis of an action for assault. 
'Any attack upon the person of 
another is an assault'. ' 
TI-ds need not involve physical 
violence, but will usually involve 
some physical contact, although 
the contact may be of a trivial 
nature such as tapping on the 
shoulder or slapping on the back. 
'Injury to the victim is unneces. 
sary, it is an offence to kiss a gif 
without her consent. In practic( 
prosecutions are not broughi 
where the assault does noý involve any significant violenc( 
or injury unless the circurnstance, 
are special'! 
It is unclear whether sexua harassment would represen 
special circumstances, althougi 
minor physical contact of a non 
sexual nature (eg brushing agains, 
or leaning over someone) is un likely to attract criminal liability. 
Where the harassment involve, 
interference with someone's per 
son of a sexual manner (eg grop ing), then a prosecution fo, 
assault would be upheld. Th, 
F enalty for assault is not fixed b] 
aw and ranges from a srnall fini 
to life imprisonment, dependiq 
on the gravity of the offence 
'The seriousness of the assaul depends on its own general cir 
cumstances'. ' 
'There are certain circum 
stances which are regarded a! 
specific aggravations of assault,. Where the court is satisfied tha 
the behaviour represents a, aggravated assault, the penalt, 
attached will be more severe thaý for straightforward assault. Tht 
main area where aggravatec 
assault may be proved in sexua harassment cases, is where it cal be shown that the assault wa, ý committed with the intention oi 
perpetrating a more seriouc 
crime. The crime in questior 
might be intent to ravish, where ii 
can be established that it was thý harasser's intention to rape thE 
victim but his action fell short ol this (eg where someone is pinned 
against a wall or pushed across a desk with the purpose of carrying 
out sexual acts). Another form 01 aggravated assault which may 
apply is indecent assault, which is 
not a specific crime, but merely ar, assault accompanied by some degree of indecency. 
'Where there has been actual 
1-" 
I 
lewdness comn-dtted against the 
will of another party the lewd acts 
are specified in the charge and 
aggravate the assault'. ' Lewdness 
has been defined as: obscene, 
lustful, indecent, lascivious and 
obscene, and the term imports 
a lascivious intent. ' There are 
dearly instances where sexual 
harassment represents a criminal 
assault and in more extreme cases 
an aggravated assault. 
There are evidential difficulties 
in proving that an assault (or 
other criminal act) has taken place 
in the workplace. Often the 
harassment is perpetrated behind 
dosed doors or in circumstances 
where witnesses are not available 
to corroborate the evidence of the 
victim. There may however be 
physical evidence of an assault 
which could be brought forward. 
In the event that evidence 
is unavailable, a conviction will 
be dependant on the victim's abil- 
ity to convince the court of the 
veracity of the claims. The testi- 
inony will be severely tested 
under cross-examination by the 
accused's legal representative. 
The defence of consent may be 
lodged whereby the perpetrator 
of the harassment will attempt to 
convince the court that the victim 
Was a willing recipient of the sex- 
ual advances and consented to 
them. If this is proved to the sa tis- 
faction of the court the accused 
will be discharged! 
RAPE 
it is very unusual for sexual 
harassment to culminate in rape 
although where it does, and it can 
be proved, the perpetrator will 
ýace a severe penalty. The prose- 
Cution would need to satisfy the 
court that penetration of a female 
einployee's sexual organ had 
taken place, and that such action 
Was committed forcibly and 
against her will. The niens rea for 
jape has been defined as the crim- 
111al intent to force intercourse on 
I woman against her will! 
The prosecution would need to 
Prove that the victim was subject- 
ed to violence, threats of violence, 
*er types of threat or drugging, 
kfficient to overcome her will. In 
I 
this context it is unclear whether a 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
threat to someone's promotion 
prospects or continued livelihood 
is sufficient. ' Resistance is not nec- 
essary although it is important 
that no degree of consent is 
present. The victim must be 
unwilling throughout the assault. 
The penalties for rape can be 
severe and the High Court has a 
wide discretion as to the term of 
imprisonment which can be 
imposed (although guidance is 
provided for judges in Scotland). 
The maximum penalty for rape is 
life imprisonment. 
INDECENT EXPOSURE 
As the name suggests, indecent 
exposure is where one person 
exposes such bodily parts as are 
usually concealed to another. 
'Where the exposure is made to 
a particular person or persons in 
such a way as to indicate an 
improper motive on the part of 
the accused, and is something 
from which the exposer derives 
gratification, something which for 
him is a sexual act, then it is a 
criminal act. ... It is not clear 
whether exposure in a private 
place to a particular female is a 
crime where the female is above 
the age of puberty, even where the 
woman is not a consenting party, 
but it probably is, the crime con- 
sisting in an outrage to her sense 
of decency'. " 
This definition of indecent 
exposure clearly envisages that 
where the exposure is perpetrated 
in the context of sexual harass- 
ment in the workplace it will be 
treated as a criminal act. In the 
unfair dismissal case, Mellors v 
Courtaulds Northern Spinning Ltd, 
COIT 904/82 1537/242, it was 
shown in evidence that the appli- 
cant had exposed his private parts 
to woman employees, and it was 
held by the tribunal that such 
action not only constituted suffi- 
cient reason for dismissal, but also 
represented a criminal act. 
SHAMELESS INDECENCY 
There seems to be a degree of 
uncertainty concerning the type 
of behaviour which would consti- 
tute the crime of shameless inde- 
cency, although one writer states 
that 'all shamelessly indecent con- 
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duct is criminal'. " 
The High Court in the case of 
McLauchlan v Boyd 1934 JC 19 held 
that acts which could be cate- 
gorised as sexual harassment did 
represent shameless indecency. 
The accused was a publican who 
behaved indecently towards peo- 
ple working in his bar, by carry- 
ing out acts of a homosexual 
nature Ue placing his hands on 
their private parts and their hands 
on his). 
The case of Watt v Annan 1978 
JC 84 extended ihe scope of the 
crime of shameless indecency to 
include an indecent display of 
pornographic material (in this 
case showing a pornographic 
film) in a private place, on the basis 
that such a display represented an 
affront to public morals and was 
likely to deprave and corrupt its 
viewers. Whether the criminal 
courts would accept that certain 
forms of sexual harassment 
would represent shameless in- 
decency is uncertain given the 
ill-defined nature of this crime. 
BREACH OF THE PEACE 
It is perhaps surprising that a 
crime, often associated with noisy, 
drunken, disruptive or violent 
behaviour, will have application 
to sexual harassment at work. 
There are however two situations 
where it could apply. Firstly, with 
respect to threats: 'any threat may 
be prosecuted as a breach of the 
peace if it can be said to place the 
threatened person in a state of 
fear or alarm' . 13 Where physical acts of a sexual 
nature are represented in the form 
of a threat to the victim this may 
easily place them in a position of 
fear or alarm concerning their 
physical well-being. The second 
situation is less straightforward 
because the crime of breach of the 
peace is one which is normally 
perpetrated in a public place and 
sexual harassment is normally 
carried out in a private work- 
place. If, however, the behaviour 
takes place in private, but has the 
effect of breaching the public peace, 
then it is actionable. In this con- 
nection the public need not be the 
public at large, but merely some 
other person. An actual breach is 
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unnecessary, as it need only be 
shown that the conduct is calcu- 
lated to result in public distur- 
bance. 
In the case of Young v Heatly 
1959 JC 66, a master in a technical 
school was charged on four 
counts of breach of the peace. All 
were committed on the same day, 
when he had indecent conversa- 
tions with male pupils of the 
school, all aged around 16, in his 
study. In this case there was no 
evidence that anyone was 
annoyed or alarmed or that any- 
one other than the victims had 
knowledge of what occurred. 
Despite this fact the schoolmaster 
was convicted. There are clear 
parallels between this case and 
the typical case of sexual harass- 
ment where offensive or insulting 
sexual remarks are directed at the 
victim. In the case of Sinclair v 
Annan, 1980 SLT (Notes) 55 a 
charge of breach of the peace was 
upheld on the basis of remarks 
addressed to a woman and over- 
heard by an 18-year-oId girl 
which were deemed by the court 
to be embarrassing and particu- 
larly offensive to her. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Given the dearth of legal deci- 
sions in criminal law relating to 
sexual harassment cases it is diffi- 
cult to predict the likely success of 
a common law criminal action at 
the present time, although devel- 
opments highlighted in the fore- 
going discussion and scope for 
future expansion of criminal lia- 
bility in these areas suggest an 
increasing likelihood that the 
courts will be willing to uphold 
such an action. 
A victim who brings charges 
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against the harasser will not 
normally obtain any personal 
benefit from a criminal action, 
other than the satisfaction of 
knowing that the harasser has 
experienced some form of penalty 
for his illegal acts. 
An indirect benefit of a success- 
ful prosecution, is that where the 
victim pursues a civil action 
against the harasser, the fact that 
guilt has been established in a 
criminal action will be persuasive 
in establisl-dng civil liability under 
the law of delict. There is also the 
possibility that an action could be 
pursued against an employer on 
the basis of his vicarious liability 
for the delictual wrongs of the 
harasser. 
As mentioned earlier, the 
Criminal justice and Public Order 
Act 1994 makes it a criminal 
offence in England and Wales to 
intentionally cause harassment, 
alarm or distress to someone, and 
specifically identifies the type of 
behaviour which would represent 
a breach of the Act. This includes 
the use of threatening, abusive 
or insulting words or behaviour, 
disorderly behaviour, display of 
writing, sign or other visible rep- 
resentation which is threatening, 
abusive or insulting, and causing 
someone harassment, alarm or 
distress. " 
It is perhaps a suitable juncture 
for a legislative measure to be 
introduced in Scotland which cre- 
ates a specific statutory offence 
for sexual harassment, which pro- 
vides similar protection to victims 
of sexual harassment and which 
more importantly represents a 
serious and effective deterrent to 
perpretators of sexual harass- 
ment. In the absence of such a 
measure, it will be necessarvo'" 
resort to common law crii; ý 
which clearly has its disadvO 
tages. While the following 
sage identifies the inappropri, 51t 
ness of common law rules bei 
utilised to control verbal sextI 
harassment, there are similar fi 
ficulties in applying these ruleg 
other forms of sexual harassme 
'Used with restraint there ig 
place for the criminal law in co 
bating verbal sexual harassme 
Again, however, it must be ul 
tioned whether it is appropri" 
for the courts to distort the arr, 
of existing offences to achieve 
end'. " 
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LINTRODUCTION 
This article will consider an aspect of employment law which has been given little 
attention by commentators on employment law but which the writer believes is an 
important issue for certain employees. The topic is sexual favouritism, %vhich has been 
defined as follows: 
Sexual favouritism exists where a person who is in a position of authority rewards 
only those who respond to his/her sexual advances, whilst other deserving employees 
who do not submit themselves to any sexual advances are denied promotion, merit 
rating or salary increases. 
1 
This article is concerned with analysing the legal position of employees who refuse to 
enter into sexual relations with the person in authority, or are not given the option, 
and correspondingly are denied employment benefits, e. g. promotion, enhanced salary 
that are given to employees who have given into his sexual advances (his sexual 
paramours). Sexual favouritism. is relevant to discrimination on the ground of sex, 
sexual harassment and can also impact on other areas of employment law. 
www. workinfo. co sexual 
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2. LEGAL POSITION OF PARTIES INVOLVED IN A SEXUAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
It could be argued that given the power imbalance between a manager and the 
employees who report to him there could never be a fully consensual arrangement 
between them in terms of a sexual relationship. It is likely however that this is not 
unlawful behaviour on the part of the perpetrator unless it is contrary to a company 
policy and is deemed to form part of his contract. It could be established that it 
constitutes a breach of an implied contractual term such as the implied duty to 
maintain his employees' trust and confidence, particularly where the relationship goes 
wrong or the implied duty to provide a safe working environment 2 although there is 
no precedent for this type of claim in the context of sexual favouritism. 
In respect of the legal rights of the parties involved in the relationship it is not likely 
to be treated as sex discrimination because the employee involved in the relationship 
is not likely to suffer a detriment. 3 
On the contrary they may receive tangible benefits from their involvement. It is not 
likely to be treated as sexual harassment because sexual harassment must involve 
unwanted conduct of a sexual nature and does not include behaviour that is welcome 
and mutual. It should be recognised however that it may be difficult for a victim to 
indicate to the perpetrator that the conduct is unwelcome because of the awkwardness 
of the situation, a fear of victimisation or because of power imbalances in the 
workplace. In the University of Ottawa's guidelines on romantic and sexual 
relationships the following abstract offers some food for thought. 
2 Walton & Morse v Dorrington (1997) IRLR 488 
3 Section 1(2)(a) &1(2)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
2 
The university Tecognises the potential for abuse in sexual relationships where an 
imbalance of power exists between the parties, such as in the relationship between 
faculty members and students Or between supervisors and employees. Given the 
power imbalance in these relationships the students or employee's freedom of choice 
almost vanishes if sexual favours are intermingled with what would otherwise be 
legitimate demands on the part of professors or supervisors. As a result professors or 
supervisors would have great trouble in proving there was consent if they were 
accused of sexual harassment. 
4 
At the end of day however it is a mutual relationship between two consenting adults 
of full legal capacity and unless doubt can be cast on this then employment tribunals 
and courts are unlikely to intervene. 
3. LEGAL POSITION OF EMPLOYEES DISADVANTAGED 
BECAUSE OF SEXUAL FAVOURITISM 
It is argued that employees who lose out in comparison with employees that enter into 
sexual relations with the boss and are consequently rewarded are victims of sexual 
favouritism. 
Unlike the position in the United States there are no reported cases on sexual 
favouritism, in the UK although it seems likely that if the matter did come before an 
employment tribunal they would follow the approach of the US courts which is 
discussed below. 
The following extract from a policy on personal relationships covering staff at the 
University of Aberystwyth in Wales highlights a suitable approach or dealing with 
this issue. 
i, www. uottowaxa 
3 
Where sexual/romantic relationships occur between members of staff each member of 
staff must ens, --. re that they are not involved in any way in the assessment of that other 
(e. g. appointment promotion or discipline). This is primarily to protect impartiality 
but also to protect both members of staff from the possibility of accusations of 
favouritism or from the danger of the assessment being negative to emphasise the 
intention not to show favour. 5 
Enforcement of this type of policy will be difficult where the parties involved decide 
to keep their relationship secret, which will often be the case. 
On a strict application of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 women who are 
disadvantaged by this behaviour and suffer a detriment will not have a right of action. 
This is because where the person in authority is a heterosexual male then the 
comparator, his paramour, will be a female and it cannot be claimed that the victim 
and the comparator have been treated differently on the ground of sex. 
What is the position of males who are disadvantaged because they cannot for the same 
reason obtain the employment benefits that a female paramour gets? 
Where the person in authority is a heterosexual male he is only likely to have a 
relationship with a female employee and as males cannot have a relationship with him 
they are not eligible for the benefit arising from that kind of relationship. On the face 
of it this is direct discrimination against male employees on the basis that 'but for 
their sex' they would not have been disadvantaged. Of course the employer will argue 
in his defence that not all female employees benefit from his sexual attentions and 
accordingly as both men and women suffer the same fate it is a detriment that is 
gender neutral (the US courts position). It may be more practical for males affected by 
sexual favouritism, to claim indirect discrimination on the ground of sex on the basis 
that considerably less men than women can have consensual sexual relations with 
5 From the academic handbook at www. aber. ac. uk 
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their superior and qualify for the resultant employment benefits, and it is to their 
detriment. 
What about these poor females who are similarly situated to the men? Even if males 
were able to claim sex discrimination, as discussed, their female counterparts cannot 
because there is no right to claim same sex discrimination in the UK. 
A woman may now have the option of pursuing an action under the Employment 
Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations SI 2003/1661. The Regulations cover cases 
involving discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation directed at persons of the 
same sex and/or the opposite sex? "A sexual orientation towards persons of the same 
sex, persons of the opposite sex or persons of the same sex and the opposite sex. " 6 
It could be argued that a woman suffers a detriment because they are the same sex as 
the comparator and disadvantaged by not being eligible to receive the same 
employment benefits. Alternatively an action might lie where they can show that they 
are the same sex and similarly heterosexual to the recipient of the benefits and they 
are disadvantaged because they would have a right of action against the employer if 
they were a lesbian (because they could never be a paramour of the boss and rewarded 
because of it). 
Of course any discussion along these lines is academic until this matter comes before 
an employment tribunal or court. 
What about bringing an action for harassment under equality law? Under clause 12 of 
the Equality Bill 7 which is in the process of being passed to implement the Equal 
Treatment Amendment Directive 2002/73/EC a new statutory tort of harassment has 
been introduced and defined as follows: 
6 Regulation 2 
7 www. hmso. gov. uk 
5 
It is unlawful Jor a person (P) to subject another person (B) to harassment for a 
e_1 
reason related to one or more of the prohibited grounds. (2) P harasses B where he 
subjects him to unwanted conduct that has the purpose or effect of-. (a) violating B's 
dignity or (b) creating an intimidating, hostile degrading or offensive environment for 
B. Under (4) ... regard is to be 
had to all the circumstances including in particular B's 
perception of the conduct in question. 
Under this definition an applicant could show that their working enviromnent 
including sexual favouritism impacted strongly on them by creating an intimidating 
hostile, degrading environment. There is also the possibility of bringing a harassment 
case under similarly constructed legislation that provides protection against 
harassment on the ground of race, disability, sexual orientation and religion or belief. 
4. LEGAL TREATMENT OF SEXUAL FAVOURITISM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Sexual harassment in the workplace raises sensitive and complex concerns. For courts 
these copcems are often competing. On the one hand we should not be in the business 
of throwing a wet blanket over activities that can lead to consensual amour. On the 
other hand a major purpose of Title VII is to immunize the workplace from sexual 
intimidation and repression! 
As pointed out earlier, sexual favouritism arises where a person in a position of 
authority enters into a consensual romantic relationship with one of his staff and as a 
consequence that member of staff obtains certain employment benefits that other 
members of staff do not receive. Those staff that are disadvantaged, whether a woman 
8 Henessy v Penril Datacomm Networks Inc. 69 F 3d 1344 (1995) p 1353 
6 
or a man, will not have any recourse to the law on the basis that this situation is 
gender-neutral, discriminating against both sexes equally. 
In DeCintio v Westchester County Medical Center 9 seven male respiratory therapists 
sued their emplo. yer maintaining that a woman was selected for a promotion because 
she was involved in a romantic relationship with the head of the department. The 
United States Court of Appeals stated there was no right of action under 
discrimination law because the men were in exactly the same position as other women 
who might have applied for advancement in rank. They were disfavoured not because 
of their sex but because of the decision-maker's preference for his paramour. 
This flawed logic has been applied to various similar cases since 10 and is supported 
by the EEOC. They have stated that "not all types of sexual favouritism, violate Title 
Vil ... Title 
VII does not prohibit preferential treatment based upon consensual 
romantic relationships ... it does not discriminate against women or men in violation 
of Title V 11. since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their gender. " 
11 
it could be argued that it is sex discrimination contrary to tile VII Ahe. -e a person in 
authority is a heterosexual male because he is only likely to have a relationship with a 
female employee and as males cannot have a relationship with him they cannot be 
eligible for the benefits arising from that kind of relationship. This approach appears 
to overcome the gender neutral obstacle to a successful claim of sexual favouritism on 
the ground o'A' sex altiough claims based on the ground that this behaviour represents 
sex discrimination have to date been unsuccessful. 
12 As is the case in the United 
9 807, F 2d 304 (2 nd Cir . 
JqS6) 
10 in thejudgement of Womack v Runyon 147 F. 3d 1298 the US Court of Appeals provide a 
useful summary of the law see King v Palmer 778 F 2d. 878 (D. C. Cir 1985) 
11 EEOC Policy Guidance on Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism EEOC 
kj .1 . N'otice 
No 915-049 ' anuar, 12 1999) 
12 Womack v RuTrr, 147 F. 3d Mg, Becerra v Dalton 94 F. 3d 145 (4h Cir 1996) 
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Kingdom it could also be indirect discrimination which is classified as disparate 
impact discrimination. 
This applies where a plaintiff challenges a neutral employment practice which has a 
discriminatory effect on a protected group. 
Proof of disparate treatment requires a showing that the employer treated some 
people less favorably than others ... discriminatory motive or intent need not be shown 
under a disparate impact theory, which challenges facially neutral employment 
practices Vnich have a discriminatory impact; under the latter theory, the plaintiff 
must actually prove the discriminatory impact at issue, rather than merely an 
inference of discriminatory impact. 13 
'Me plaintiff would have to produce statistical evidence that supports his assertion that 
the employer allows a practice to be followed whereby a heterosexual manager can 
enter into sexual relations with a female employee and reward them with employment 
benefits and this is an option that is not available to male employees and is to their 
detriment. 14 This burden of proof may dissuade a prospective plaintiff and could 
account for the fact tbat, to date, no claims have been brought on this basis. 
The employer has the defence, which is probably inapplicable here, that this 
discriminatory practice was applied as a business necessity. 
What about female etnployees who are not involved in a romantic relationship with 
the boss and are therefore similarly situated to the men? They are also victims of 
discriminatory behaviour and may have a right of action under Title VII the Civil 
Rights Act 1964. This will. apply where they can show that the behaviour represents 
same sex harassment creating a hostile working environment. Unfortunately this 
could fail because there is no inequality of treatment on the basis of gender. 15 
13 Rose v Wells Fargo & Co.. 902 F-2d 1417 C. A. 9. Cal., 1990 
14 Where the manager is bi-sexual this is not a valid option. 
is Pa-qua v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 101 F 3d 514 (76Cir 1996) 
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In Hentosh v Herman M Finch University ofHealth Sciences / The Chicago Medical 
School 16 the plaintiff brought an action for sexual harassment alleging that Dr Jacob 
during his tenure as chairman of the department engaged in a pattem and practice of 
sexual favoritism in the workplace. To this end he made unwelcome advances to four 
women in the department not including the plaintiff. The plaintiff also alleged he 
entered into a sexual relationship with a female assistant professor who received more 
favourable terms and conditions as a result of the relationship. She claimed that Dr 
Jacob's behaviour created a hostile work environment and that the university failed to 
take action to combat his conduct despite their knowledge of it. The District Court 
were of the opinion that the allegations did not rise to the level of an abusive, hostile 
working environment because Hentosh was not personally subjected to sexual 
harassment and she did not witness any of the alleged incidents of sexual harassment 
by Jacob. It was found that she only become aware of them after Dr Jacob has 
resigned as chairman. 
In view of these facts they dismissed her action against the University. Although this 
ruling was made after the important and relevant decision of the Supreme Court in 
orcales v Sundowner Offshore Services 
17 the court did not take account of it and if 
they had their decision might have been different. 18 In Orcales the Supreme Court 
decided that same-sex harassment did constitute a violation of Title V1 I of the Civil 
Rights Act 1964 which prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin. 
The court clarified that hostile work environment cases are not about the gender of the 
alleged harasser, but rather are about the behaviour - because of sex - that is so 
16 167 3 F. 3d 1171 (3)'4Cir 1999) 
17 No 96-568 
is Although the plaintiff s arguments for a finding of unlawful discrimination in the Hentosh case 
were weak. 
9 
severe or pervasive that it would alter the conditions not only of the alleged victim's 
employment, but also a reasonable person's envirorunent. 19 Where does this leave 
women or men who are victims of sexual favouritism? In theory they have a right of 
action where they can show that the effect on them of the practice of sexual 
favouritism in the workplace is so severe or pervasive that it alters their conditions of 
employment. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The lack of relevant case law and statutory rules dealing with sexual favouritism in 
the United Kingdom makes it difficult to accurately define the legal position of 
victims of this behaviour. 
Where a sexual relationship between a boss and an employee reporting him goes 
wrong and the emrloyer uses his position to exact his revenge on the employee 
through victimisatien of some kind, then an action would lie for sex discrimination 
and/or harassment aad constructive dismissal based on a breach of the implied term of 
trust and confidence. 
Despite this where the victim is indirectly disadvantaged by not being eligible for 
benefits given to a sexual paramour however, there is a distinct possibility none of 
these actions could be successfully pursued by them. In discrimination cases 
involving sexual favouritism, maIes are the most directly affected by the action, and 
they are less likely to bring an action for sex discrimination or harassment than 
19 Supreme Court Rules that Same Sex Harassment Claims are actionable under Utle VII 
www. feedsmit! - comAibrary/publication 
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women. 20 Also. given that -women can also be affected, it means the argument that the tp 
impact of the behaviour is gender neutral is regarded as applicable and this will serve 
to undermine the validity of a discrimination claim. It is accepted by the courts in 
both jurisdictions that this behaviour is morally wrong, however, it is not treated as 
unlawful and the judiciary seem content with this conclusion. 
Whether other groups and Andividuals within society will be equally complacent 
remains to be seen. The General Secretariat of Organisation of American States in the 
United States 21 includes sexual favouritism. within their definition of sexual 
harassment which is: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 
conduct Pf a sexual nature, when it interferes with work, is made a condition of 
employment or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. It 
is particularly serious when engaged in by an official who is in a position to influence 
career or employment conditions ... of the recipient of such behaviour. 
As already point,. -d out some organisations have attempted to outlaw this type of 
behaviour in their policy documents. 
Disappointingly the EEOC in the United States appear willing to accept the gender 
neutral argument put forward by the courts and endorse it in their own policy 
documents despitt: its inherent flaws. 
It is difficult to know what im petus will be required for the courts in both jurisdictions 
to apply the current law in a more constructive manner to ensure that victims of the 
effects of sexual favo-Luitism are provided with a legal remedy. 
20 In Leonard AM Judging Inequaiity, Cobden Press = .0 
1987, the findings of survey of applicants 
involved in sex discr; mination and equal pay claims over a two year period showed that of the 
234 claims ir. England and Wales 187 were brought by women and only 47 by men 
21 Administrative Mer. -, orandum No 75 - Implementation Of Part-Time Employment www. ilo. org 
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Additionally what strength of argument will be needed to convince the UK and US 
Goverrunents that this is an outdated mode of behaviour that should properl-, ce, 
protected by statutory rules. 
There may be strong policy reasons for the courts or the le islature refusing to 4") 9 
intervene in this area although surely these are outweighed by the iniquity of an 
institutionalised reward system, eligibility for which is compliance with sexual 
demands. 
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Beauty's Only Skin Deep? Legal Liability of Employers for 
Discrimination on the Ground of Physical Appearance? A 
Comparative Analysis 
SAM MIDDLEMISS 
ABSTRACT 
'Mis article analyses the nature and effect of discrimination against employees by 
employers on the ground of their physical appearance or lookism as it has become 
known. While the research into this phenomenon is limited it all points to the fact that 
the economic and social consequences for victims of lookism are significant. 
A comparison of the legal protection for discrimination based on physical looks and 
employers' standards of appearance and grooming in the United Kingdom and the 
United States is undertaken. Proposals are made for reform of the legal system in the 
UK drawn in part from examples of relevant statutory rules and judicial decisions in 
both jurisdictions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"Why don't the champion of civil rights line up against lookism as they have against 
sexism and racism? The rhetoric of civil rights law denounces, in general and 
unqualified terms, discrimination based on stereotyping ... which is to say judging the 
worth of human beings on superficial char acteristics like skin color. You can't judge a 
book by its cover, or so we say when we talk about race and gender. Does not the 
same principle make us say that beauty is only skin deep. " 
1 
Although this quote refers to the law in the United States the same challenge could be 
made to the champions of civil rights in the United Kingdom. 
In the United Kingdom employees that are chosen for employment or other workplace 
benefits because of their physical qualities are known as aesthetic laboUr 2 and those 
Extract from Robert Post's, Brennan Centre Symposium Lecture 1998-99, Grey TC 
Cover Blindness, California Law Review, January 2000, Vol. 88 pp 65 - 73 at p 65 
2 This terrn has been used by the Industrial Society and researchers commissioned to analyse this 
persons not chosen because they do not meet an employer's standard of looks or 
appearance are discriminated against. 
Where an employee in the United States iý subjected to discriminatory action because 
of their physical appearance, the term coined to cover this is lookism. 3 
This is a genuine area of discrimination within employment although as the opening 
quote suggests it is not generally recognised as such and as will become apparent 
there is often no legal remedy for a victim of this type of discrimination. This article 
will highlight the nature and extent of this problem, identify possible legal solutions, 
and undertake a comparison with the legal treatment of this issue in the United States. 
It will primary involve consideration of the current legal protection available to 
employees suffering discrimination because of their physical appearance in both 
jurisdictions (excluding for reasons of relevance and brevity, common law remedies) 
and analysis of the steps that employers, the Government and the legislature should 
take to eradicate this type of discrimination. 
2. EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF PHYSICAL 
APPEARANCE 
In a recent study undertaken by a researcher at Guildhall University a sample of 
11,000, thirty three year old employees were chosen and it was found unattractive 
men were paid 15% less than others and unattractive women 10% less. 4 
issue in the UK (see note 6 below) 
3 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language Fourth Edition, 2000 Houghton Miflin 
Coy. defines lookism. as discrimination or prejudice against people based on their appearance 
overweight women received 5% less pay than average. 
2 
"We find that attractive people earn more than unattractive people; looks affect men 
as much as they do women; tall men, but not tall women, earn substantially more than 
their colleagues; those who are short earn less... " 5 
It is not just discrimination in terms of pay. It often extends to discrimination in 
recruitment and selection, availability of. employment rights such as promotion and 
the basis for dismissal. 
A recent report commissioned by the Industrial Society found that there is a danger of 
social exclusion because employers are increasingly choosing to employ people who 
, look and sound the part'. "Society is becoming more and more style-obsessed and 
this is reflected by a growing trend among UK companies to opt for staff who reflect 
the company image. ,6 
The following finding highlighted in this report provides an indication of the severity 
of the problem in certain professions. 
"A survey of skills needs in hotels, restaurant, pubs and bars, indicated that 85% of 
employers ranked personal presentation and appearance in third place - above 
initiative, communication skills or even ability to follow instructions. " 
There is undoubtedly a variation in the level of discrimination between occupations 
and this conclusion is affirmed by the findings of the Guildhall University study 
mentioned earlier. 
7 
An employer's requirements concerning physical appearance of his staff may be 
determined through fulfilment of the expectations of his clients and/or the general 
public. This could extend beyond 
his or her physical looks to what they wear. 
Full details of this research appears in Harper, B. 'Beauty, Statute and the Labour Market: 
A British Cohort Study', oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62, December 2000, 
pp 773-802. 
6 Chris Warhurst and Dennis Nickson of Strathclyde University compiled the report entitled Looking 
g good, sounding right: style counselling in the new economy 
http: //www. hrm(.,, uide. co. uk/general/looking_good. htm 
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"Consumer preference is important here making the effects of appearance greater in 
jobs involving face to face contact or those that involve selling. " 8 
The evidence of discrimination on the basis of physical appearance in the United 
States is fairly limited although similar in nature. In a study undertaken by Dr Daniel 
Hamermesh, an economics professor at the University of Texas, and Jeff Biddle of 
Michigan State 9 involving three surveys of more than 7,000 respondents it was found 
that over a lifetime good looking people in the United States earn about 12% more 
than less attractive people. According to the researchers the wage differentials are 
simply a result of employer bias and raw physical beauty bestows a major 
employment edge on both men and women. The interviewers rated the respondent's 
attractiveness and they were categorised as strikingly beautiful or handsome, above 
average for age, average for age, below average for age and homely. 
The research methodology utilised in these studies and underpinning these findings 
has not been subject to detailed scrutiny because at best the research to date illustrates 
that the behaviour has negative ramifications that the law should take account of. 
There is clearly a need for more widespread and rigorous research in terms of 
reliability and validity in both jurisdictions. 
3. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 
ON THE BASIS OF PHYSICAL APPEARANCE 
What is perhaps surprising is that there is still little legal protection against 
discrimination based on physical appearance in the United Kingdom. There may be 
some protection against discriminatory dress or appearance codes under existing 
' The penalty for unattractive women in clerical/secretarial occupations is 15% less pay 
4 
equality law where it is reinforced by human rights legislation such as the right to 
privacy and family life (Article 8) and freedom of expression (Article 10) although 
application of these human rights to this type of case is, to date, untested. There is 
however little or no statutory protection against discrimination based on physical 
looks. although under paragraph 3(l) of Schedule I of the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 there is protection for persons suffering discrimination because of severe 
physical disfigurement 10 The law dealing with discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation may have some application " as might the legislation to be introduced in 
the United Kingdom in October 2006 dealing with ageism. 
In the United States the position is similar as there are no federal laws that directly 
treat lookism as discriminatory and few States have legislated against it. In the city of 
Santa Cruz however, they introduced an ordinance in 1992 that prohibited 
discrimination based on personal appearance and in San Francisco it is now unlawful 
to discriminate on the grounds of height or weight. In the District of Columbia under 
State law it is unlawful to discriminate on the ground of physical appearance and this 
measure is given detailed consideration below. 
it is often left to the plaintiffs to prove that discrimination is due to factors covered by 
existing legislation but not readily apparent as such. 
12 
There is some legal protection against dress or appearance codes 13 in the United 
States and this aspect of discrimination law which is pertinent to discrimination 
against persons based on physical appearance will be considered later in this article. 
z Supra 2 
9 Results published in the Austin Business Journal, July 2001 
10 in Gill and other v Tulip international (UK) Cooked Meats Division Ltd EAT/I 14/00 this 
protection was narrowly defined. 
11 Equality of opportunity (Sexual Orientation) Regulation 2003 
12 In a recent case McDonald's Restaurants were sued for breach of the American with Disabilities 
Act and the Connecticut Fair Employment Ptictices Act for refusincr to 0 employee someone 
because they were overweight reported by Catherine Valenti in item Appearance v Reality, 
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A. The nature of discrimination on the ground of physicaI appearance 
"There is no doubt that the power to control appearance is widely, though subtly, used 
in the workplace ... from refusing to employ people whose facial features depart very 
substantially from the accepted norm of good looks, through to the informal request to 
wear a shirt instead of a T-shirt" 14 
There are two aspects to this, cases that can be summarised as discrimination on the 
ground of physical looks (including weightism, heightism, discrimination because of 
physical disfigurement and ageism) and cases that include discrimination on grounds 
of physical appearance, excluding physical looks (discrimination through dress or 
grooming codes) and a term (borrowed from the United States which is increasingly 
being utilised in the UK) that covers the combined behaviour is lookism. 15 It is 
difficult to distinguish between these types of discrimination as illustrated by the fact 
that restrictions imposed by employers on hair length or facial hair might reasonably 
be assumed to relate to discrimination of Physical looks but is dealt with here under 
grooming codes. Nevertheless an attempt is made in this article to deal with these 
areas of discrimination separately in both the UK and the US. 
Alleged Victims of Lookism Face Uphill Battle May 13 ABC News 2002 CP 13 Hay, 0., Middlemiss, S. Fashion Victims, Dress to Conform to the Norm, or Else? Comparative 
Analysis of Legal Protection against Employers Appearance Codes in the United Kingdom 
and the United States, International Journal of Discrimination and Law, 2003 Vol 6, pp 69-102 
14 G Clayton, G Pitt 'Dress Codes and Freedom and Expression' [ 1997] 1(54) European Human 
Rights Law Review 55 
is As defined in note I 
6 
B. Discrimination on the ground of physical looks 
There is a well recognised failing in management decision-making in activities related 
to human resource management (e. g. recruitment and selection, performance 
appraisal) where managers allow themselves to be unduly affected by the halo or 
horns effect in assessing the qualities of a prospective or actual member of staff. 
This is where one or more of the individual's characteristics closely mirror that of the 
organisation 16 or more significantly the interests or lifestyle of the manager assessing 
the individual and a decision is unduly influenced by this factor (halo effect) 
The less close the individual complies with the model requirements of the 
organisation or the manager then the less likely they will be appointed to a job or be 
successful in their career and one dissimilar factor could influence the decision (horns 
effect). These unduly favourable or harsh judgements of the individual being 
evaluated will often be triggered by their physical appearance. 
The following quote outlines the pitfalls of such subjective judgements in employee 
appraisal 
-, in some cases appraisers may allow the rating they give to one characteristic to 
excessively influence their ratings on all subsequent factors. The appraiser who 
decides that the employee is good in one important aspect and gives him or her 
s *larly high markings for all other aspects is demonstrating the 'h o' effect. HM al 
Alternatively one serious fault can sometimes lead to an appraiser to reduce markings 
in other areas (the homs effect)" v 
I'his problem can be resolved if the appraiser judges all employees on a single factor 
or trait before going on to the next 
factor. In this waY it is possible to consider all 
16 See note 2 Aesthetic labOur 
7 
1ý 
employees relative to a standard or to each other on each factor. 
In the results of the survey carried out by Guildhall University mentioned above one 
of its authors state that "ugly people are penalised far more than good-looking people 
are rewarded. " It is also recommended by the researchers that the Government should 
change the equality laws to ensure that discrimination on the ground of physical 
appearance is covered. 18 
In a book entitled Appearance is Everything, 19 written by an individual who is 
currently seeking revision of the Civil Rights Act 1964 in the United States to include 
laws against appearance discrimination, much of the research findings in this area in 
the United States are included. The author concludes that unattractive people are 
amongst other things two to six times more likely to be laid off and are extremely 
likely to be passed over for promotion. 
A new Directive is being proposed by the European Commission which if 
implemented will lead to a reduction in discrimination in interview processes. The 
proposer, Commissioner Olaf Porli, summarised the current position as follows: 
"Employers are struggling to recruit objpctively, with white, middle-aged men still 
dominating the workplace. Race, gender, hair style, teeth and even facial tics continue 
to influence the process, making it discriminatory. " 20 
17 ACAS Guidelines on Employee Appraisal - http: //www. acas. co. uk/publications/b07. html#top is Supra 3 
19 Jeffes, SM Appearance is Everything 1998, Sterling House 
20 Personnel Today April 12003, News p3 www. personneltoday-com 
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4. LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUND 
OF PHYSICAL APPEARANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
There are a number of aspects of someone's physical looks that may lead to them 
being discriminated against or dismissed from their employment. They could amongst 
other things be overweight, 21 unattractive, small, bald, have facial hair, piercings, 
tattoos or a severe disfigurement. Although as stated earlier there are no specific laws 
that protect against this type of behaviour it could form part of a legal action for 
discrimination or harassment under equality laws. 
A. Action for Discrimination or Harassment under Equality Laws 
if for example a woman sued her employer for sex discrimination where she was 
refused promotion and substantiated her claim by reference to sexist comments made 
about her physical appearance to her at the time by her manager she could be 
successful. The use of discrimination laws to deal with verbal comments about 
appearance is better illustrated in sexual harassment cases where such comments are 
II. by themselves 22 or as part of a continuous mode of behaviour 
23 deemed to be sexual 
harassment and unlawful under section 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 . 
24 This 
type of action for harassment based on verbal comments (or other harassing 
behaviour) could be taken under legislation dealing with race, sexual orientation, 
religion or belief or disability. 
21 According to the Western Mail and Echo November 30,2002, News p7 "More than half the 
Welsh population is overweight or obese. " 
22 Insitu cleaning Co. Lid v Heads (1995) IRLR 4 
23 porcelli v Strathclyde Regional Council (19 8 6) IRLR 134 
24 Equal Treatment Amendment Directive 2002/73/EC due for implementation in UK October 2005 
will provide a separate ground and statutory 
definition of sexual harassment for the first time 
9 
LÀ 
Where discriminatory decisions are made by management on the basis of someone's 
physical appearance then this may or may not be unlawful. When they select someone 
for employment on the basis of their appearance, or ensure that the successful 
candidate for a promotion complies with appearance norms or expectations of the 
organisation then this should be treated as discriminatory but there is little evidence 
that it is. 
Even if they can satisfy an employment tribunal of this, they have in addition to 
establish the decision is made on a discriminatory ground that is unlawful under 
equality law in the United Kingdom, namely sex, race, sexual orientation 25 religion or 
belief 26 or disability. This represents a high onus of proof which will dissuade most 
applicants from pursuing a case. They will find it easier where there is a pattern of 
discriminatory behaviour against unattractive men or women or against homosexuals 
(because of their style of dress) that can be referred to in the evidence. 
In cases brought on the ground of sexual orientation the Regulations define the 
persons covered widely under Regulation 2 and sexual orientation means sexual 
orientation towards persons of the same sex, persons of the opposite sex or persons of 
the same sex and the opposite sex. 27 Protection is also extended against 
discriminatory behaviour because of assumptions (right or wrong) about their sexual 
orientation. "Perhaps more than any other form of discrimination sexual orientation 
discrimination and harassment is often based on stereotypical assumptions about a 
person's sexuality drawn from the way** that a person is perceived as projecting 
25 Under the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Re, -, Ulations 2003/1661 that came into force 
in December 2003 direct and indirect discrimination and discrimination by way of victimisation 
and harassment against employees on the ground of sexual orientation is covered. With respect to 
comparators it is enough to show that someone of a different sexual orientation would not have 
been discriminated against 
26 The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003/1661 introduced equivalent 
measures (to the regulations dealing with sexual orientation) to deal with discrimination on these 
grounds 
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hini/herself whether through clothing, speech or other characteristics. " 28 It is not 
necessary for someone to reveal their sexual orientation to make a valid claim under 
the Regulations. 
As intimated earlier the only exception to the relatively high burden of proof in 
discrimination cases is where the person has been discriminated against because of a 
severe disfigurement as defined by paragraph 3(l) of Schedule I of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 29 and regulation 5 of the Disability Discrimination 
(Meaning of Disability) Regulations 1 996/1455. The Regulations provide that 
,6 disfigurement which consists of a tattoo that has not been removed is not to be treated 
as a severe disfigurement nor is piercing of the body for decorative purposes 
including anything attached through piercing. 
in a guidance note that accompanies the legislation examples given of disfigurements 
are scars, birthmarks, postural deformation or diseases of the skin, however assessing 
its severity will mainly be a matter of the degree of the disfigurement and it may be 
necessary to take account of where on the body the disfigurement is. 30 
Where an employee has a severe disfigurement they do not have the evidential burden 
normally faced by applicants in cases of disability discrimination of showing their 
situation complies with the definition of disability in section I of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995.31 They do not necessarily have to find a comparator 
32 
and 
-. c)nly have to show they 
have suffered a detriment because of their disability. 33 
27 Homosexuals, heterosexuals and bisexuals 
-, 2s Oliver, H Sexual Orientation Discrimination: Perceptions, Definitions and Genuine Occupational 
Requirements, Industrial Law Journal Vol. 33 No. 12004, pp 1-21 at p4 
29 An impairment which consists of a severe disfigurement is to be treated as having a substantial 
adverse effect on the ability of the person concerned to carry out normal day to day activities 
30 paragraph A 17, Part 11, Guidance on Matters to be taken into account in determining questions 
relating to the meaning of disability, issued July 1996 under the DDA 1995 
31 As amended by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 2003/1673 
32 Clark v NovacoldLtd (1999) IRLR 318, CA and modified s 3A(5) of the DDA 1995 in force 
from October 2004 
33 This could take the form of direct discrimination by the employer or a failure on the Part of the 
11 
There are obviously difficulties in proving that a management decision that is 
detrimental to the victim of discrimination is founded on an unfavourable opinion of 
their appearance. 
If we continue with the example of derogatory verbal comments mentioned earlier it 
will be difficult to show these have been directed at an individual unless they have 
been overhead by another person in the workplace and that person is willing to 
substantiate the victim's claim before a hearing implementing the statutory dispute 
procedure and/or an employment tribunal. Where there are no witnesses it will be the 
applicant's word against his employer. 
B. Action for Redundancy Rights or Unfair Dismissal 
In extreme cases the person maybe selected for redundancy or for dismissal because of his or 
her physical appearance. It would be up to the person adversely affected by these decisions to 
show that unfavourable aspects of their physical appearance (because they are unattractive, 
disfigured or inappropriately dressed or groomed) is the reason or one of the main reasons for 
a detrimental decision. The difficulties in proving that the actions of the employer in unfairly 
or constructively dismissing an employee or making them redundant is based on their 
physical appearance is illustrated by a very old redundancy case Vaux & Associated Brewers 
Ltd v Ward. 34 In the absence of more recent relevant decision, this will serve to outline the 
inadequacies in the law. The applicant Ms Ward had worked as a barmaid for the same 
employers for eighteen years. The brewers decided to modemise the bar where she worked 
and converted part of it into a disco. In keeping with the bar's glamourised image they 
employed two barmaids to dress as bunny-girls. Ms Ward was fifty-seven years of age and 
did not fit into the new image of the bar and was dismissed. She claimed redundancy pay but 
employer to make reasonable adjustments (s 6) 
34 (1969) 7 KIR 30S, DC 
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it was held that she had not been made redundant because the need for the work she had done 
had not diminished. It was just that she was considered no longer suitable for the job. 
Although she is clearly the victim of ageism and lookism there was at the time, and still is C. 
now, no remedy for these types of discrimination. She was unable to claim unfair dismissal as 
35 
no such remedy existed at the time. It is not certain, in the absence of a suitable precedent, 
whether she would be successful with a claim for redundancy pay or unfair dismissal at the 
present time. In an unfair dismissal case an employer could argue that she was dismissed for a 
fair reason 
36 of some other substantial reason. "Although an employer cannot claim that a 
reason for dismissal is substantial if it is a whimsical or capricious reason which no person of 
ordinary sense would entertain if he can show that he had a fair reason in his mind at the time 
when he decided on dismissal and that he genuinely believed it to be fair, this would bring the 
,, 37 case within some other substantial reason. In a case where dismissal is based on the 
unsuitableness of the appearance of the emplQyee as in Vaux the fair reason could be that she 
was no longer suitable for her employment 
38 or that she was dismissed as a result of a 
reorganisation of the business. 
39 
"Where there is a genuine reorganisation which has dislodged an employee who 
cannot be fitted into the reorganisation, it must be open to the employer to dismiss 
him and in such circumstances the dismissal will be for some other substantial 
reason. -)940 
35 introduced for the first time under the Industrial Relations Act 1971 
36 Section 98(l)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, 
37 Harper v National Coal Board (1980) IRLR 260 
38 Saunders v Scottish National Camps Association Lid (1980) IRLR 174, cited with approval by the 
EAT in the Harper case above. 
39 Lesney Products v Nolan (1977) IRLR 77 
40 Robinson v British IslandA irways 0 977) IRLR 477 EAT 
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Where an employer is pressurised. by a third party such as his customers to dismiss a 
member of staff because he or she does not meet their standards of looks or dress then 
it may also be a fair dismissal. 41 
Provided the employer followed a proper procedure then it will probably be decided 
that he acted reasonably in dismissing her. 42 
"Once it has been established that the reason for the dismissal was that it was 
impracticable for employment to continue and that this was a substantial reason for 
dismissal within the meaning of s 98(l)(b) it is extremely difficult to conclude that it 
was unreasonable in terms of s98(4) for the employer to dismiss on this account. q-) 43 
A better option for an employee in this position is to show that they have been 
contractively dismissed. Thus they have been forced to leave their job because the 
employer's behaviour is so intolerable that it represents repudiation by him of the 
contract and constitutes a fundamental breach of their contract. 44 Where it can be 
shown that the employer is subjecting an employee to unfavourable treatment because 
of their physical appearance then this may represent a breach of the implied term of 
trust and confidence and underpin a claim for constructive dismissal. 
In the case of Malik v BCCI 45 defined the obligation on the employer in terms of 
maintaining trust and confidence as "... not without reasonable and proper cause to 
conduct oneself in a manner likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of 
trust and confidence between employer and employee. 946 
In the absence of relevant case authority it is difficult to know what evidential 
difficulties may face someone in this position although it is likely that where it can be 
41 Scott Packaging and Warehousing Co Lid v Paterson (1978) IRLR 166, EAT 
42 Section 98 (4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
43 Kelman v GJ Oram (1983) IRLR 432 EAT 
Section 95(l)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
45 (1997) IRLR 462, HL 
46 Ibid at p 471, para 70 
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established that a pattern of behaviour or a single detrimental act 47iS motivated by a 
dislike of someone's physical appearance, then this will treated as a breach of this 
implied term and represent a suitable basis for a constructive dismissal claim. 
In terms of cases such as Vaux the light at the end of the tunnel might be the 
legislation dealing with age discrimination that will be introduced in the UK in 2006 
although for persons dismissed on the ground of physical appearance, without an 
element of age discrimination, there will be no salvation. 
With respect to ageism this is clearly an.. aspect of discrimination based on physical 
looks because as illustrated in Vaux the mere fact that an employee is of advanced 
years, and looks it, may make them unsuitable from an employers perspective for 
appointment to a job, training, promotion etc. Legislation on Age Discrimination in 
the UK will not be introduced until October 2006 to allow time for consultation and 
for employers to put in place suitable employment practices. It is uncertain what form 
the legislation will take although the Government has intimated that where possible 
they will introduce measures that are similar to other areas of equality law. It is 
important to note that this protection.. will not extend beyond the sphere of 
employment. Having said this, the Government may have to reconsider the use of 
niinimum or maximum age limits in employment law as they may be subject to 
challenge under the legislation e. g. upper age limit of 65 for entitlement to the right to 
claim redundancy rights and unfair dismissal 
47 isle of Wight Tourist Board v Coombes (1976) IRLR 413, EAT 
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5. FEDERAL AND STATE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES PROHIBITING 
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON PHYSICAL LOOKS 
The legal rules dealing with this type of discrimination are unsatisfactory given that 
there are no federal laws directly protecting employees although certain employees 
(as illustrated below in the case of weightism and ageism) can gain protection under 
federal laws where they can bring their situation under definitions in the legislation 
(e. g. disability discrimination). 
Where state law does deal with lookism, it tends only to deal with one or two aspects 
of the problem. The exception to this is the District of Columbia which prohibits 
discrimination based on "personal appearance, " which refers to "bodily condition or 
characteristics. " The D. C. Human Rights Act of 1977, D. C. Code Ann. § 1-2501 
(1981) states its intent and defines "personal appearance" as follows: "it is the intent 
of the Council of the District of Columbia, in enacting this act, to secure an end in the 
District of Columbia, to discrimination for any reason other than that of individual 
merit, including, but not limited to discrimination by reason of race, color, religion, 
national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, 
family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, physical handicap, source of 
income, and place of residence or business. (§ 1-2501). " 
Personal appearance is broadly defined as "the outward appearance of any person, 
irrespective of sex, with regard to bodily condition or characteristics, manner or style 
of dress, and manner or style of personal grooming, including, but not limited, to hair 
style and beards. "(§ 1-2502) This legislation covers both kinds of discrimination 
identified in this article although with respect to appearance or grooming codes it is 
16 
not clear whether the restrictions will be upheld by the courts or not although the 
reference to hair style and beards suggest they will be protected rights of employees. 
A. Federal Law Dealing with Weightism 
"Overweight people are at a high risk of discrimination due to disempowerment 
because of their weight or more specifically because of their weight combined with 
race, gender, and socioeconomic factors which operate synergistically to disadvantage 
them further. " 48 
Under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U. S. C. § 20OOe-2) it declares that 
all Americans have a right to employment free from discrimination based on race, 
color, sex, religion, and national origin. While weightism is not included in the list of 
protected classifications, employers violate Title VII when they apply weight 
requirements in a discriminatory manner. SuccessM actions have been brought under 
Title VII by flight attendants for discriminatory application of weight requirements by 
airline companies. 
Generally, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. ) protects the rights 
of persons %%rith disabilities in programs, facilities, or employment that receive federal 
funds. The Americans %%ith Disabilities Act (42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. ) extends those 
protections to the private sector. In the employment area, both statutes prohibit 
discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual with a disability solely on the 
basis of their disability. The statutes define "persons with disabilities" as including 
4S Tberan, Free to be Arbitrary and ... Capricious: Weight -Based Discrimination and the Logic of CP American Antidiscrimination Law, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. II Fall 2001 
pp 113-1 go at pp 124-125 
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those who are regarded or perceived as having a disability which could include 
employees that are obese or that have a severe physical disfigurement. 
In an important decision, obesity caused by metabolic dysfunction was found to be a 
disability under the Rehabilitation Act. In Cook v Rhode Island 49 a "morbidly obese" 
plaintiff was denied reemployment at a state home for the retarded because the state 
claimed her obesity compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of 
emergency. The state also claimed she was at a greater risk of developing ailments 
that would increase the likelihood of workýrs' compensation claims and absenteeism. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals found that concern over absenteeism and increased 
costs is not a valid basis for denying employment. The court upheld a jury finding that 
the state denied Ms. Cook employment solely on the basis of her obesity, rather than 
on her ability to do the job, and it upheld a damages award of $ 100,000. 
B. State Law Dealing with Weightism 
Through legislative enactments or court decisions, several states have moved to 
outlaw discrimination based on size or weight. Michigan appears to be the only state 
with a statute specifically including "weight" as a protected classification in the same 
way sex, religion, race, and national origin are protected. In the Elliott Larsen Civil 
Rights Act of 1976 , Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2101 (West 1994) the law states 
that the opportunity to obtain employment, housing and other real estate, and the full 
and equal utilization of public accommodations, public service, and educational 
facilities without discrimination because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, 
49 10 F. 3 d 17 (1 st Cir. 1993) 
is 
sex, height, weight, or marital status as prohibited by this act, is recognized and 
declared to be a civil right. 
In various cases state law has been widely interpreted to include discrimination on the 
ground of weight or obesity in the absence of specific protection under state 
legislation. In New York, in the case of State Division ofHuman Rights v Xerox Corp. 
46 
IA 
50 and in New Jersey, in the case of Gimello v Agency Rent-a-Car Systems, Inc 51 the 
courts found that obesity falls N%ithin the definition of disability or handicap under the 
state human rights laws. 
The state Supreme Court of California found that obesity could be the basis of a 
violation of the state's fair employment law where there is a physiological systemic 
basis for the condition. 52 
Obesity may be regarded as a handicap under the state of Oregon's Fair Employment 
Practices Act, if the obesity substantially limits one or more of the person, s major life 
53 
activities, such as caring for oneself, working, walking, etc. These classifications being 
much more general are very different from the closely defined day to day activities looked for 
under UK discrimination law to underpin an action. 
C. Prohibition of age discrimination 
Where discrimination on the ground of physical appearance in underpinned by ageism 
then there may be a right of action under federal law in the United States. The Age 
30 480 N. E2d 695 (NY 1985) 
31 594 A. 2d 264 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1991) 
-42 Cassista v Community Foods. 
Ina, 856 P2d 1143 (Cal. 1993) 
33 Oregon Correctional Institution v Bureau ofLabor andIndustries, 780 P. 2d 743 
(Or. App. 1989). 
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Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 (ADEA), protects individuals who are 40 
years of age or older; 
It states that under SEC. 623 [Section 4] (a) It shall be unlawful for an employer- 
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual's age; or (3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee 
because of his age. 
In the federal courts, some significant developments in equal opportunity law caine 
about in 2000. One of the most important was Reeves v Sanderson Plumbing 
Products 54 in which the Supreme Court held that a jury may infer that an employer 
has violated the ADEA even if the plaintiff presents no direct evidence of age 
discrimination. 
In the Reeves case, the employee gave the jury substantial evidence from which it 
could conclude that his employees explanation for firing him was false. The Court 
held that this was enough for a finding of age discrimination. 
Also, in Kimel v Florida Board of Regents" the Supreme Court held that state 
employees are not protected by the ADEA because states have not consented to being 
sued under this statute. Thus, only private' employers may be sued for breach of the 
ADEA. 
54 (530 US 133 (2000) 
55 (520 US 62 (2000) 
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While there is limited protection under federal legislation for this type of 
discrimination in the US there are state laws which offer some protection against 
discrimination based on physical looks. 
6. DISCRIMINATION UNDER DRESS CODES AND GROOMING POLICIES IN 
THE UNITED EINGDOM 
An employer will often introduce codes -or standards of appearance to apply in the 
workplace and as a consequence employees may have to sublimate or modify their 
normal mode of dress to comply with these organisational requirements. The impact 
of this on most employees is minimal although it can be important where appearance 
codes compromise an employee's sexual identity, religious belief or sexual 
orientation. The courts generally accept that employers have a managerial prerogative 
to specify and enforce rules that impose appearance standards on their employees that 
control the way their employees are dressed (e. g. clothing) or groomed (hair, body 
piercing, jewellery etc. ) 
These dress or appearance codes are not normally included within a contract of 
employment and are often the unilateral company rules of the employer. 
56 
Nevertheless judges tend to accept that employers have the right to introduce and 
enforce such codes irrespective of whether they have a contractual status or not. 
56 Unless, in the unlikely event, they have been arrived at through negotiation with trade unions or 
through agreement with individual employees prior to the contracotual terms being settled. 
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A. Sex Discrimination 
Inequality of treatment can arise where an appearance code imposes standards which 
impact differently on both sexes. The consequent dissatisfaction of employees 
affected by such discriminatory requirem ents could be substantial and lead to them 
pursuing a legal action against their employer. The chance of their success in an 
action under equality legislation has to date been limited. 
The case that determined the judicial approach to discrimination cases brought 
because of inequality of treatment in dress codes is Schmidt vA usticks Boobhops Ltd. 
57 In this case female employees who came into contact with the public were not 
allowed to wear trousers and instead were required to wear skirts and overalls. The 
applicant Ms Schmidt was dismissed because she refused to wear a skirt. Her clairn 
that this dress requirement represented direct discrimination on the ground of her sex 
was unsuccessful. 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal took the view that there was no inequality of 
treatment as required by s. 1 (1) (a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, because there 
was no comparable restriction that could be applied to men equivalent to a ban on 
wearing trousers. The evidence showed that men were not allowed to wear t-shirts and 
it seemed likely that men would not have been allowed to wear any unconventional 
clothing. It was felt that there was insufficient evidence to show that choice of 
clothing at work was not restricted for both sexes. The EAT in Schmidt appear to 
approve of a 'swings and roundabouts' approach to assessing whether appearance 
rules are acceptable, typified by the following quote. "There were in force rules 
restricting wearing apparel and governing appearance which applied to men and also 
57 [ 1977] IRLR 3 60; [ 1978) ICR 85 
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applied to women although obviously, women and men being different, the rules in 
the two cases are not the same" 58 
Where women are forbidden to wear trousers as in the Schmidt case there are two 
arguments put forward for women having a valid discrimination claim (because this 
requirement means the treatment of women and men is unequal). 
Women are subjected to different requirements, which result in them suffering a 
detriment, and only women are denied the opportunity to wear something that is 
socially acceptable. If the dress code restricted men from wearing skirts, the effect 
would be far less burdensome because it is unlikely that many men would want to 
wear them. The restrictive interpretation of the equality aspect of dress codes in 
Schmidt has been followed by Employment Tribunals and Courts in the United 
Kingdom and has not been confined to clothing requirements, but extended to cover 
hair length, j ewellery, body piercing and facial hair. 59 
In the case of Burrett .v West Birminghqm Health Authority 
60 a female nurse was 
required to wear a cap as part of her uniform but male nurses were not. The applicant 
claimed she had been subjected to a discriminatory requirement and brought a claim 
for sex discrimination. The Employment Appeal Tribunal followed Schmidt and held 
that, as the requirement to wear a uniform applied to both male and female nurses, the 
fact that the uniforms differed and the applicant objected to only one part of the 
uniform, this did not amount to less favourable treatment under s. 1 (1)(a) of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975. 
59 [1977] IRLR 360,361 
59 in India in a district in Madhya Pradesh state policemen are encouraged by the authorities to 
grow moustaches through payment of a bonus because they believe that persons with 
moustaches are more respected by the public 
Indian police given moustache pay BBC News 14.01.2004 http: //news. bbc. co. uk 
60 (1994) IRLR 7 
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The decision in Schmidt has also been upheld as correct by the Court of Appeal in 
Smith v SafewaypjC. 61 
The applicant, Smith, was a male delicatessen assistant, who was dismissed when his 
ponytail grew too long to be hidden under his hat. It contravened the rule for males in 
his position which specified "tidy hair not below shirt collar length. No 
unconventional hairstyles or colouring. " Safeway required all their food handlers to 
wear hats and both sexes were prohibited from having unconventional hairstyles or 
colouring. However women were allowed to clip back shoulder-length hair. Ile basis 
for his complaint of sex discrimination was that a female employee would not have 
been dismissed for having long hair. The Court of Appeal held that Smith had not 
been discriminated against and Lord Justice Gibson stated that an employer would not 
be acting unlawfully by adopting a code that applies conventional standards to both 
sexes. 62 Moreover, it was felt that it could not be accepted that changes in society 
rendered the above reasoning unsound in law. 
In Wilson v Royal Bank of Scotland PIC 63 the bank introduced a policy that men 
must wear suits instead of a uniform. Wilson refused to comply because his suit was 
not suitable for summer wear and he was unable to afford a new one. He claimed 
sex discrimination on the ground that women could wear anything as long as it was 
smart. Wilson's claim failed because the tribunal felt that he had not suffered a 
detriment and both sexes were subject to a requirement, in that they had to dress 
smartly. 
In the case of Department of Work and Pensions v Matthew Thompson 64 the 
applicant worked for Jobcentre Plus but his work did not bring him into contact with 
61 (1996) IRLR 456 
62 lbid p 459 
63 S/0590/89 
64 EAT/0254/03/MAA 
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the public. He was required to wear a shirt and tic at work and he objected arguing 
that this -A-as discriminatory against men. The dress code operated by his employer 
required all staff to dress in a "Professional and business like way". Men were 
required to wear a collar and tie though in hot weather ties could be removed with 
the permission of management. Women were required "to dress appropriately and to 
a similar standard. Although the employer strictly upheld the dress code for men and 
gave a warning to the applicant when he refused to comply, the applicant produced 
photographic evidence that suggested it was not strictly upheld in the case of 
women. The Employment Tribunal upheld his claim and this led to around 6,950 
similar cases being lodged with the employment tribunal. The decision of the 
Employment Tribunal %%2s set aside on appeal by the EAT. 
They found that the tribunal misdirected itself in law by amongst other things failing 
to establish that the facts in the case could be distinguished from the facts in the 
cases cited above. They decided it was for the employment tribunal to decide if 
requiring men to wear a collar and tie.. was necessary to achieve the level of 
smartness required of both sexes and this matter was referred to a differently 
constituted tribunal for a decision. Both parties were given leave to appeal. 
A. Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, religious belief, race and 
disability 
Legislation has been introduced to implement the Council Framework Directive 
2OOOn81EC into UK law. The rules relating to discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation 65 and religious belief 
66 were implemented in December 2003 and 
65 Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations SI 2003/1661 
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legislation on the grounds of disability discrimination by October 1,2004. The legal 
rules dealing with age discrin-dnation will be implemented by October 2006. 
There is now as a result of the legislation dealing with sexual orientation and religious 
belief additional grounds for a discrimination action in the UK that will offer 
increased protection to persons suffering a detriment because of dress or grooming 
codes. 
The Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations offers new protection for 
employees who are unfairly treated as a result of their sexual orientation. It has been 
realised that sexual orientation rarely affects a worker's suitability or capacity to 
perform their duties. Although 'sexual orientation' is not defined, Regulation 2 
provides protection against discrimination to heterosexual, homosexual and bisexual 
persons. 
If the behaviour can be challenged under the heading of harassment set out in 
Regulation 5(l) & (2) below then the additional scope for legal action is considerable. 
(1) ... "Where on grounds of sexual orientation 
A engages in unwanted conduct which 
has the purpose or effect of (a) violating B's dignity; or (b) creating an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment to B. (2) Conduct shall be 
regarded as having the effect specified in'the paragraphs above only if having regard 
to all the circumstances including in particular the perception of B, it should 
reasonably be considered as having that effect. " If for example a homosexual man is 
subjected to verbal insults by his colleagues because of his clothing then an action for 
harassment based on sexual orientation could be taken against the employer. 
Alternatively the employer could be liable for harassing an employee who refuses to 
comply with the employer's dress or grooming code. 
66 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations ST 20003/1660 
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The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations prohibits direct and 
indirect discrimination based on 'religion or belief. The UK Government chose not to 
define 'religion' but clearly states that 'belief only covers religious beliefs and 
profound philosophical convictions that deserve society's respect. Where the 
behaviour consists of harassment because an employee on religious grounds wears 
religious dress or jewellery or alters their physical appearance then the employer will 
be liable under Regulation 5. There are specific practical concerns for employers 
laying do, %m rules on dress and uniform in their appearance codes as they could be 
could be discriminatory directly or indirectly against persons religious or other beliefs 
which are protected by the Regulations. 
Rights under Article 9(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights an 
individual's right to the freedom of religious belief may be restricted by a public 
health exception that it is "necessary in a democratic society". Thus a prohibition on 
beards while representing a violation of religious observance in certain religions will 
because of this exception not necessarily amount to a breach. There are various 
possibilities for legal actions being brought under the Human Rights Act although the 
case law to date does not suggest this is the most viable option. There are Genuine 
occupational Requirements which apply under the Regulations dealing with sexual 
orientation and religion (provided by Regulation 7 of both) but these have no direct 
bearing on lookism or dress codes so they are not considered here. However it is 
important to point out that under Regulation 26 of the Employment Equality (Religion 
or Belief) Regulations, Sikhs can now wear turbans 
instead of safety helmets on 
r, onstruction sites in the UK- 
The law dealing %%ith racial discrimination in the UK has undergone considerable 
amendment as a result of changes 
brought in under the Framework Directive. There 
27 
I 
amendments were introduced into UK law by the Race Relations Act 1976 
(Amendment) Regulations Sl 2003/1626 which includes a statutory definition of 
racial harassment, changes introduced to the burden of proof and a new definition of 
indirect discrimination. These Regulations could have a bearing on the protection of 
victims of discrimination based on physical appearance. 
Definitions of direct and indirect discrimination have been altered to comply more 
closely with the Burden of Proof Directive 97/80 EC. With respect to indirect 
discrimination the wording used in defining indirect discrimination as it applies to 
certain sections in the Act has changed to provision, criterion or practice instead of a 
requirement or condition. It is likely that because most dress or grooming codes are 
expressed in clear and emphatic terms this change in the burden of proof will have 
little impact (the more stringent test being satisfied) but it will be a significant change 
where for example the code is informal or established through custom and practice. 
Also for the first time racial harassment is defined under statute and treated as 
directly unlawful. 
Racial or ethnic harassment is defined by Article 2(3) as unwanted conduct related to 
racial or ethnic origin ... with the purpose or effect of violating the 
dignity of a person 
or of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment" It is no longer necessary to prove that the treatment was less favourable 
than the treatment afforded to a comparator (real or hypothetical). This means that 
where restrictions are imposed that adversely impact upon the dress or appearance 
required of employees by their membership of racial groups they will have a right of 
action. 
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B. Transsexuals and Tranvestites 
Discriminatory action against transsexuals and transvestites by an employer could fall 
under both kinds of discriminntion, on the ground of their physical looks and on the 
ground of their appearance representing a breach of dress or grooming codes. 
Unfortunately it is difficult to see that the physical appearance of a transsexual or 
transvestite -Aill meet the expectations of most employers, particularly where they 
employ aesthetic labour as part of their human resources policy. 
Transsexualism is concerned uith sexual identity and transsexuals are anatomically of 
one sex but believe they belong to the other sex. and accordingly they tend to dress up 
as the opposite sex. This often generates a 'ýpanicked defence" from management 
resulting in harsh decisions being made against the employee. 67 Transsexuals are now 
protected against the discriminatory acts of the employer by section 2A of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975.68 
A transvestite on the other hand is a person who obtains gratification from wearing 
the clothes of the opposite sex. 
. 
*Ibey are as a class unprotected by the law at present although they may be able to 
Xnake a claim under the Emplo), ment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations Sl 
2,00311661 where they can establish that the discrimination is based on their sexual 
orientation. Grooming codes are important here since a transvestite may wish to wear 
r-iothcs to work- that are deemed inappropriate by society or by an employer under his 
dress or grooming code. The Court of Appeal's decision in Smith v Safeway ple in 
respect of dress codes was followed in Kara v London Borough OfHaCkney. 
69 
67 L FI)TA 'Gender equAity l3w and employees dress codes' (1995) 24 Industrial Law Journal 
272 see pvS and Cornwall CC (1996) ECR 1-2143 ECJ 
6S Inserted by the Sex Discrimin3tion (Gender Reassignment) Reg-plations 1999 sj 1999,1102 
6* EAT 325/95 
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The EAT held that Kara, a male transvestite, was not discriminated against when his 
employers banned him from wearing women's clothes at work. It was concluded that 
the employers were lawful in requiring Kara to dress as a man whilst at work. The 
claim was dismissed on the grounds that the council reasonably and genuinely 
believed Kara's clothes were in breach of their clothing policy. 
Kara went on to complain to the European Commission that his rights under Article 
8(l) and 10(l) of the European Convention had been breached. In the earlier case it 
became clear that under UK law an employer would not be liable for sex 
discrimination if they dismissed a male employee for attending work dressed as a 
woman. The applicant brought an appeal against this decision to the European 
Commission of Human Rights complaining that he been prevented from expressing 
himself through his dress and accordingly there had been a violation of Article 8 and 
Article 14 of the ECHR. The Commission however dismissed the complaint by a 
majority. 70 They agreed that under Article 8(l) constraints imposed on a person's 
mode of dress amounted to an interference with their private life. Nevertheless, they 
felt that in the circumstances the restriction was "in accordance with the law" since it 
was based on a lawful internal policy. The interference was held to pursue the 
legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others and thought to be "necessary in a 
democratic society, " since employees who come into contact with the public may 
have to conform to reasonable dress codes. They also decided that such a requirement 
could be regarded as "enhancing the employer's public iniage., ' 71 The Commission 
in Kara were not satisfied that the applicant had established that he had been 
prevented by his employer from expressing a particular opinion or idea by means of 
his clothing. The employer was not acting in breach of Article 10(2) of the ECHR, 
70 (1999) EHRLR 232 
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despite the fact that the employee was a bisexual male transvestite and there was 
plenty of evidence to show that by wearing dresses he was indeed trying to express 
his own identity and opinions. 
Finally the Commission acknowledged that although there might have been a wider 
range of dress available to females than to males, a complaint of discrimination under 
Article 14 was rejected since there was no evidence that the applicant was subjected 
to a different rule purely because he was a male and not a female. 
71 lbid p 233 
7. DISCRIMINATION UNDER APPEARANCE CODES AND GROONHNG 
POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
While no explicit reference is made to workplace appearance or grooming policies in US 
equality laws, they are often treated by the judiciary as included in the terms and 
conditions of employment and therefore fall within the types of discrimination prohibited 
by Title VII 42 as amended by USCA Section 20OOe-2(a). 72 The only exception is where 
race, colour, religion, sex or national origin and associated appearance standards are a 
bona fide occupational qualification 73 which is necessary for the operation of the 
employer's business. 74 
The courts in the United States adopt a similar approach to the courts in the UK, namely 
that introducing and applying dress or grooming codes is a managerial prerogative that 
they are reluctant to interfere with. 
This approach is underlined in the case of Fagan v National Cash Register Company 75 
where the Federal Court of Appeals states that: "perhaps no face of business life is more 
important than a company's place in the public estimation. That the image created by its 
employees dealing with the public when on company assignment affects its relations is so 
well kno%%m that we take judicial notice of an employer's proper desire to achieve 
favourable acceptance. " 
72 Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, makes It unlawful employment practice for an employer "(I) to 
fail or reftme to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individualwith 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individuals 
race, colour, religion, sex or national origin; or (2) limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, 
colour, religion, sex or national origin" 
73 42 USCA Section 2000t-. 2(aXI) 
74 Ibid. at 2(e) 1 
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In this case the judges were categorical that maintenance of an employer's public image 
in a favourable light was paramount and measures introduced to protect that image, such 
as dress codes, would be justifiable. 
A. Sex discrimination 
As might be expected workplace appearance standards will only amount to unlawful 
discrimination if as a result of their application a person of one sex is treated less 
favourably treated than a person of the other sex. 
In Laffey v Northwest Airlines JnC. 76 impositions of different grooming standards for 
women amounted to sex discrimination. Here female cabin attendants (unlike male 
attendants) could not wear spectacles and were subjected to a maximum weight 
requirement. 
In the case Carroll V Yalman Federal Savings and Loan Association of Chicago 77 the 
Federal Court of Appeals held that Title VII had been breached: 
"... Disparate treatment is demeaning to women. While there is nothing offensive about 
uniforms per se, when some employees are uniformed and others are not there is a natural 
tendency to assume that the uniformed women have a lesser professional status than their 
male colleagues attired in normal business clothes" 
78 
75 [1973] 481 F 2d 1115 
76 [1973) 366 F Supp 763, L19741 374 F Supp 1382 (US District Court) 
77 [1979] 604 F 2d 1028 (7 Cir) 
78 Jbid, at 1032-3 
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In Michigan Department of Civil Rights ex rel. Cornell v EdwardA. Sparrow Hospital 
Association 79 it was held that an employer's dress code was based on sexual stereotyping 
and amounted to sex discrimination. Despite these favourable decisions most challenges 
to grooming policies have been unsuccessful. 
In Willingham v Macon Telegraph Publishing Company 80 which is probably the US 
equivalent of Schmidt Mr Willingham filed a complaint asserting sex discrimination by 
his employer Macon in its hiring policy. He was refused employment because they were 
unhappy with the length of his hair. 81 Under their grooming policy all employees who 
were in contact with the public were required to be neatly dressed and groomed in 
accordance with community standards. Mr Willingham claimed that if he were a female 
with identical hair length and similar qualifications he would have been hired. The court 
held that his claim was outwith the scope of the 1964 Act. 82 on the dubious ground that 
the employer's grooming policy constituted discrimination on grounds of grooming 
standards and not on the grounds of sex. 
They decided that if an employee objects to the grooming code they have the right to 
reject it by looking elsewhere for work or alternatively they could compromise their 
preference by accepting the code that comes with the job. 83 While the court's decision 
was in line with previous authority 84 it was not without its critics. 
79 [ 19821326 N. W. 2d 519 (Mich. App. ) 
:0 [1975] 507 F 2d 1084, there was an 11-4 majority ruling 
1 In its defence the management at Macon argued that the business community on which it depended 
issociated longhaired males with the "counter-culture types" who gained extensive unfavourable national 
and local exposure during the 'International Pop Festival' in Georgia during 1970. 
82 Section 703(a) as amended by Title 42 U. S. C. A s. 20OOe-2(a) 
83 In addition it was stated that only immutable characteristics could frustrate employment opportunities. 
immutable characteristics include, race, national origin and gender, thus hair length enjoys no 
constitutional protection since it is changeable. 
" In Fagan v National Cash Register Co. [1973] 157 US App. D. C. 15,481 F 2d 1115, an employee was 
discharged and sued under s. 703 (a). His suit was dismissed because hair length is not constitutionally 
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The four dissenting judges in Willingham 85 argued that anti-discrimination law: "extends 
to all differences in the treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes ... (the 
law) does not permit one standard for men and another for women, 
where both are similarly situated " 86 
In the case of Dodge v Giant Food Inq. 87 it was decided that hair policies: "are 
classifications by sex ... which do not represent any attempt by the employer to prevent 
the employment of a particular sex, and which do not pose distinct employment 
disadvantages for one sex. Neither sex is elevated by these regulations to an appreciably 
higher occupational level than the other" 88 
In Page Airways of Albany, Inc. v New York State Division of Human Rights 89 it was 
held that company regulations which required men to cut their hair, did not discriminate 
or classify within the meaning of Human Rights Law. 90 
While the various justifications put forward by the judiciary in these early cases for 
excluding grooming codes from coverage of the Civil Rights Act 1964 were interesting in 
most cases the arguments they put forward were fairly unconvincing. 
Most cases point to the fact that courts in the United States believe that 'no-beard' 
policies do not amount to sex discrimination. 
91 In the case of Rafford v Randle Eastern 
protected and the grooming policy was designed to further the company's business interest and not for sex 
discrimination 
85 Wisdom, Tuttle, Goldberg and Godbold (all Circuit Judges) 
86 In Earwoodv Continental South-eastern Lines Inc [1976] 539 F 2f 1349, Circuit Judge Winter refused 
to follow the Court of Appeals' decision and dissented (p. 1352) on the ground that the Willingham test: 
-imports constitutional notions of immutability and fundamentally into the process of statutory 
interpretation" 
87 [1973] 488 F 2d 1333 
:8 [1973] 488 F 2d 1333 at 1337 
9 (1975) 376 N. Y. S. 2d 32N. YJLD. 3 Dept 
91 in Knott v Missouri Pacific Railroad Company [1975] 527 F 2d 1249 the Court of Appeal decided 
that a grooming policy requiring men to have short hair did not violate Title VII of the Civil Fights 
Act because it was never intended that this legislation would interfere with the "promulgation" or 
"enforcement" of personal appearance regulations by private employers. at ppl251-1252 
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Ambulance Service 92 the principal reason for termination of the plaintiffs employment 
was the fact he had a beard and moustache. It was decided that this behaviour did not 
violate the 1964 Act. I as they had not been discriminated against of the ground of their 
sex because only men could be discharged because of an unwanted beard. ' There is more 
chance of success where a desire to wear a beard is part of the employee's religious 
beliefs (considered below). Federal Express have, following legal actions against them by 
certain of their Rastafarian and Muslim employees, agreed to amend their personal 
appearance policy to allow employees with sincerely held religious beliefs to wear a 
beard. 
Employers in the United States may sometimes impose a sexually provocative dress 
requirement on their staff and this could in itself represent a discriminatory requirement 
and particularly where it leads to the person subject to this requirement being sexually 
harassed. 
Deakin & Morris 95 state that the reciprocal duty of co-operation means that an employer 
will violate Title VII by implementing a policy that clearly oppresses an individual's 
dignity. 
In the case of Marenteite v Michigan Host Inc. 96 the court recognised that requiring an 
employee to wear sexually provocative clothing which leads to them experiencing sexual 
harassment could violate the spirit of Title VII. 
91 Thomas v Firestone Tfre& Rubber Company [1975] 392 FSupp, 373; BertuMvFfrstNational Stores 
IncIl 979] 2 FEP Cases 1527 
92 1 
ýi 
1972ý148 F Supp, 316 
93 Civil ghts Act 1964 s. 703(a)(1) as amended by Title 42 U. S. C. A. s. 20OOe-2(a)(1) 
94 Likewise in Indiana Civil Rights Commission v Sutherland Lumber [ 1979] 394 NE 2d 949 Ind. App. 3 
Dist. two male employees were discharged for failing to comply with the company's 'clean-shaven' rule. 
The policy did not amount to sex-based discrimination since it was enacted for business purposes. 
Moreover, the policy did not affect equal employment opportunities because it was uniformly enforced on 
all employees. e 
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The most cited case in this area is EEOC v Sage Realty Corporation 97 where a female 
lobby attendant was sexually harassed as a result of customers' reaction to her uniform. 
The US District Court found there had been sex discrimination because it was 
unreasonable for her to tolerate such treatment and the employer's knew that the 
revealing nature of her 'Bicentennial Uniform' would expose her to sexual harassment 
The employee raised two important issues in support of her claim. Firstly that the 
uniform was entirely inappropriate and incompatible with the nature of herjob because 
she was responsible for security, safety, maintenance and information functions in an 
office building. Secondly, the uniform misrepresented her duties by presenting her as a 
sex object. In Sage it was decided that Title VII was: "intended to strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotyping". 98 
Male employees would not have been required to wear such a uniform and 
correspondingly there was no question that the plaintiff was only required to wear the 
uniform because of her sex. The uniform was made a term and condition of employment 
and by firing her for refusing to wear it her employers violated Section 703(a) of the 1964 
Act. 99 - 
B. Sexual Orientation 
Unlike the UK where sexual orientation is now a prohibited ground of discrimination 
under national law there is no federal law in the United States directly dealing with 
93 Deakin, S Morris GS Labour Law P ed. (200 1) Butterworths p 60 
96 [1980] 506 F Supp 909 (US District Court) 
97 [1981]507 F Supp 599 
98 [1971] 444 F 2d 1194 at 1198 
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sexual orientation. A same-sex hostile environment sexual harassment claim under title 
VI I could apply where a homosexual male or female employer discriminates against an 
employee of the same sex or allows such discrimination to take place against an 
employee by homosexual employees of the. -same sex. Sexual harassment by a supervisor 
of an employee of same sex could be actionable especially where this behaviour is taken 
because of the employee's physical appearance or because he breached an appearance 
code. Where male co-workers harass another male employee because they perceive him 
to be a homosexual (or female co-workers perceive a female employee to be a lesbian) it 
is not actionable because it is not harassment on the ground of sex. Unfortunately 
unfavourable comments or other harassment undertaken by colleagues against someone 
because of their sexual orientation will not be actionable. There are seven states where 
sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited in public employment 100 and eleven states 
where it is prohibited in the public and private sector. 101 There are various cities and 
counties that prohibit discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in the workplace. 
102 The effect of all these legal measures combined is that only around 40% of the 
population have protection against discrimination. 103 It is questionable whether this 
legislation will protect homosexuals and lesbians against the restrictive effects of 
appearance or grooming codes. Although the restrictions introduced by these codes may 
impact strongly on these groups they will find it difficult to show requirements that apply 
to all employees are discriminatory against them. 
" as amended by Title 42 U. S. C. A. s. 20OOe-2(a) see also Mathews v City offew York [2000] 704 N. Y. S. 
2d 49 N. Y. A. D. I Dept. 
100 Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania and Washington 
101 California Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin 
'c2 124 in total 
103 Biedzynski et al Job Discrimination, American Jurisprudence Second Edition May 2003 
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C. Transsexuals and Transvestites 
The relevant case la%v indicates that transsexuals in the US (unlike their UK equivalents) 
have little protection from discrimination under Title VII and are unlikely to be 
successful in iny claim. In Grossman v Bernards Township Board of Education 104 the 
US District Court conformed this by stating it: "has no desire, to engage in the resolution 
of a dispute as to the plaintiff s present sex. Rather we assume ... the plaintiff is a member 
of the female gender ... she was discharged by the defendant school board not because of 
her status as a female, but rather because of her change in sex" '01 
The employee's claim under Title VII failed because the court was of the opinion that 
there was no evidence of any congressional intent to include transsexuals within the 
ambit of equality legislation. 
Three US Court of Appeal decisions are 
, 
often cited in this area and they follow the 
reasoning adopted n Grossman. 
106 In Holloway v Arthur Anderson & Company 107 there 
was no unlawful discrimination when an employee was dismissed for commencing sex- 
change treatment because Congress only had the 'traditional notions of sex' in mind 
when enacting Title VIL Despite this restrictive interpretation of Title VII in respect of 
transsexuals the US Court of Appeal in Holloway did concede the legislation could offer 
limited protection: where "consistent with the determination of this court, transsexuals 
104 [1975] 11 FEP Cases 1196 
105 Ibid, at 1198 
106 Sommers vBudgetMarketinglnc. [1982] 667F2d748 ; Wane v Eastern Airlines 35 [1984) FEP Cases 
1348 
107 [1977] 566 F 2d 659 
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claiming discrimination because of their sex, would clearly state a cause of action under 
Title VIP 108 
On this reasoning transsexuals could have a valid claim of sex discrimination where they 
can prove they have been less favourably treated as a result of their sex and not their 
transsexualism. In such a case they will be afforded the same protection under equality 
law as any other person of the same sex that is a victim of discriminatory treatment (see 
Enriquez case below) 
What is the position of persons who are dismissed for displaying characteristics that are 
associated with the opposite sex? In these circumstances, a man could argue that if he 
belonged to the opposite sex he would not have been dismissed since it would have been 
socially acceptable to adopt the social role he is being penalised for adopting. 
The employer in most cases would find it difficult to establish that dressing like a 
woman or having feminine tendencies affect's a male employee's ability to perform his 
contractual duties. Despite this, in the case of Smith v Liberty Mutual Assurance 
Company 109 the Court of Appeals in a rather draconian judgement held that Title VII had 
not been violated when a homosexual employee was dismissed for being 'effeminate'. It 
was stated that the 1964 Act does not forbid discrimination based on sexual preference. It 
was also contended that Smith was not discriminated against because he was male but 
because his characteristics were associated with females. 
There were clearly flaws in the reasoning of the judges in these early decisions. It could 
be argued that just because discrimination in terms of dress or grooming codes is not 
mentioned in the legislation it should not mean that these cases cannot not be brought 
'08 lbid, at 664 
109 [1978] 569 F 2d 325 
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within its ambit-110 Furthennore the legislators, had they thought of it, would have 
included this behaviour within the ambit of equality legislation and therefore it should be 
interpreted as if they had included it. 
In the case of Price Waterhouse v Hopkins 111 the plaintiff was denied appointment as a 
partner because her manner, speech, dress and physical appearance etc. were not 
feminine enough. The Supreme Court ruled that Title V11 protects employees against 
discrimination for failing to comply with gender role expectations. It could be argued that 
a reasonable extrapolation of this decision is that employers cannot discriminate against 
employees that maintain an outward appearance that is inconsistent with their anatomical 
sex. Unfortunately the courts have not chosen to utilise the decision in Price Waterhouse 
as the basis for affording protection to transsexuals. 
As can be seen in the case of the law dealing with discrimination on the ground of 
physical looks State Governments are generally more generous in affording protection to 
employees than Federal Authorities. Although some State laws extend similar protection 
to employees against classic forms of discrimination to that provided under the Federal 
Acts other statutes provide protection to groups not covered by the Federal Acts e. g. 
Californian statute to prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation, Californian 
labour code 1102.1. Many States now provide protection against discrimination because 
of an employee's sexual orientation (Califbmia, New Jersey, Connecticut, Hawaii, and 
Massachusetts. Minnesota, Wisconsin, New York and the District of Columbia) and 
110 'Ibis was the successful argument put forward in the early sexual harassment cases. This behaviour is 
similarly 
left out of the detail of the Act 
11 [ 1989] 490 US 228,109 S. Ct 1775,104 L. Ed. 2d 268 
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individual States provide protection against discrimination on the ground of bein., a 
transsexual or cross-dressing (Rhode Island, Connecticut, Minnesota and in California) 
In California transsexuals and transvestites are now protected against sex and gender 
discrimination and harassment. The changes in State law to allow this was effective from 
January 1,2004, and California's prohibitions against such discrimination and harassment 
will be expanded to cover not only an employee's actual gender, but also the employees 
perception of an employee's gender identity, appearance, or behaviour, "whether or not 
that identity, appearance, or behaviour is different from that traditionally associated with 
the employee's sex at birth. " This means that employers now cannot discriminate against 
a worker because he or she is a transsexual or a transvestite. 
While this expansion of state law protection specifies that an employer may still "require 
an employee to adhere to reasonable workplace appearance, grooming, and dress 
standards, " that employer must "allow an employee to appear or dress consistently with 
the employee's gender identity. " Thus, while a company with office workers can specify 
that employees wear presentable office attire, that company is prohibited from barring a 
transsexual and cross-drcsser from wearing the presentable attire of the gender with 
which that person identifies. 
In the case of Enriquez v Mest Jersey Health Systems 1 12 a Doctor was dismissed when he 
underwent treatment for gender reassignment and his appearance gradually changed to 
that of a woman. When he refused a request by the West Jersey Health Systems to change 
his appearance back he was dismissed. 
112 Decided July 3 2001, find at http: //Iawlibrary. rutgers. edu/courts/appellate. html 
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A New Jersey Court accepted his argument that forcing men to act like men and 
women to act like women constituted gender discrimination. They also held that 
discrimination against transsexuals could constitute illegal disability discrimination 0 
under New Jersey aw. 
113 
In the absence of Federal laws protecting against discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation and transsexual behaviour it will be left to the courts to broadly interpret 
relevant State legislation (where it exists) ýo ensure employment rights are available to 
those category of employees. Obviously as long as dress or grooming codes are being 
upheld by the courts as non-discriminatory on the basis that they are gender neutral or 
required in the interests of business necessity, it will be difficult for transvestites and 
transsexuals to obtain any protection against discrimination because they tend to wear 
clothes etc. that present an outward appearance that is inconsistent with their 
anatomical sex and are contrary to organisational norms. 114 
D. Race, religion and grooming codes .. 
Grooming codes can have a discriminatory impact on individuals that have specific 
appearance requirements as a consequence of their race or religion. An employee 
suffering a detriment because they are obliged to flout their racial or religious rules 
could bring a case against their employer under Title VII and claim their rights have 
beenbreached underthe Federal Constitution! 15 
113 in Nichols v Azteca Restaurant Enterprises the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Price 
Waterhouse ruling in deciding that a heterosexual *aiter that was subjected to homosexual taunts 
because of his effeminate manner was deemed to be the victim of sexual harassment Decision 16/7/01, 
http: //caselaw. jp. fmdlaw. conVdata2/circs/9'h/9935579p. pdf 
11" Changes in the California state law outlined above are a step in the right direction 
115 [ 1976] 27 ALR Fed 274 2000 Supplemený Part 2(b) 
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With respect to hair requirements in grooming codes these can have a discriminatory 
effect on the ground of race and be contrary to Title VII. In EEOC Decisions No. 71- 
1985 the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that an employer's hair policy 
violated Title 42 U. S. C. A. Section 20OOe-2(a), since it banned hair that uras 'cut 
bushy' and the court felt African-Americans were being measured against a grooming 
standard that assumed Caucasian hair characteristics. Furthermore, it was found that 
the employer was not applying his policy uniformly. 
in relation to facial hair, the majority of cases are decided in favour of the employers, 
especially if their business requires a high standard of hygiene and safety. 
If policies are introduced that prohibit beards for safety reasons do not usually violate 
Title VII as long as they are not used as an excuse to reject black applicants. 116 
There are cases however, where Black employees have won their case, like in 
Johnson v Memphis Police Department 117 where a grooming policy requiring all 
officers to be clean-shaven violated Title VII because employers made no effort to 
accommodate a black officer who suffered from folliculitis which prevented him from 
shaving. 118 
A Jewish employee won his case when it was held that the employer failed to show 
neutral or valid reasons (health or safety) for the 'no-beard' policy other than the 
excuse that it was 'tradition. 119 
The US District Court in Atlanta ruled that a no-beard rule for employees in contact 
with customers violated an employee's religious beliefs. Khaleed Abdul Azeez had 
asked for an exemption from the rule because of his Islamic beliefs and Federal 
116 Fitzpatrick v City ofAtIanta 11993) 2F 3d 1112 Employer's defence was accepted on safety 
fill ounds since protective face masks would not fit unless employees were clean shaven 
1: 
7 [1989] 713 F Supp 244 
2 see also Richardson v Quick Trip Corporation [ 1984] 591 F Supp 115 
119 Carter v Bruce Oakley, Ina [1993] 349 F Supp 673,64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 967 
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Express Corp was found to have violated Title V 11.120 A rule set down by the military 
that originally required and later strongly recommended female personnel serving in 
Saudi Arabia when off duty to wear local dress in the form of an 'abaya' was 
prohibited by the US Legislature. This move followed a legal action by America's 
highest-ranking female pilot Colonel Martha McSally claiming the requirement 
violated her Christian sensitivities and her constitutional rights as a woman. 121 
In cases involving claims of religious discrimination under State law, the courts have 
dealt with various terms and conditions of employment giving rise'to discrimination 
claims. For example, employers that have appearance codes governing the way their 
employees dress have been subject to the claim that the codes violate the requirements 
of an employee's religion, and the court concluded in Phoebe v State Division of 
Human Rights 122 that enforcement of the code constituted illegal discrimination and 
in another case Engstrom v Kinney System Inc. 123 that it did not. Enforcement of an 
employer's grooming code was held id the case of Eastern Greyhound Line Div. of 
Greyhound Lines Inc. v New York State Division ofHuman Rights 124 not to constitute 
illegal discrimination. 
In the United States the courts have supported the legitimacy of employer's 
appearance codes in all but the most extreme of cases. With respect to arguments of 
inequality on grounds of sex, race etc. it will only be treated as discrimination where 
the restrictions are unjustified and there 'are no similar restrictions on the relevant 
comparator. Where there are restrictions that apply to both the plaintiff and his 
120 June 20 200 1, find at www. gospelcom. net/apologeticsindex/news I/anO 10621-12. html 
121 House unanimously passes Saudi dress-code bill May 15 2002, 
http: //cnn. allpolitics-printthis. clickability. com 
122 (1979) 418 N. Y. S. 2d 55 
123 (1997) 241 A. D. 2d 420 
124 (1970) 27 NY 2d 279 
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comparator in sex discrimination cases then no matter how different the dress codes 
this will be treated as a gender neutral requirement and therefore not contrary to Title 
V 11. The employer can readily establish the necessity of the code to maintain the 
company's image. 
The areas where dress or grooming codes are treated as unlawful under Federal law is 
where they lead to the employee being sexually harassed, where they have an adverse 
impact on transsexual employees who are; discriminated against because of their sex 
(and not because they are a transsexual) and under State law where appropriate 
employees have a claim for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or being 
a transsexual. Increasingly where a code interferes with employees' racial or religious 
beliefs the courts are willing to treat this as a breach of Title V 11. 
It would be reasonable to expect that because of today's diverse social conditions, any 
difference of treatment based on sex, sexual orientation, race or religion would not be 
tolerated. As can be seen however, there is a need for further reform either through 
statutory intervention or as a result of judicial creativity before an envirorunent of 
equality of treatment can be created in the United States. 
8. COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF 
LOOKISM 
With respect to discrimination on grounds of physical appearance the law in both 
jurisdictions is not dramatically different. There is no federal law in the US or Act of 
Parliament in the UK that directly provides protection against the various types of this 
behaviour. 
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Although there maybe limited scope for pursuing an action under legislation in the 
UK where it provides explicitly (severe disfigurement). or implicitly (harassment on 
the ground of sexual orientation) some degree of protection. The victims of this type 
of behaviour often face a difficult struggle in proving their case under statute. In a 
discrimination case they have to show that their physical appearance is the reason for 
the unfavourable decision and this represents a form of discrimination protected by 
the law. While in cases of discrimination on sexual orientation, religion and ageism 
(yet to be legislated on) the prospects are better than conventional areas of 
discrimination there is still evidential difficulties to face. With respect to other 
statutory rights such as unfair dismissal or protection against effects of redundancy 
the law is uncertain. How does someone prove that an employer's adverse view of 
their physical appearance lies behind unfavourable choices he makes in respect of 
them? 
The law tends to be more protective in the United States 125 because there are federal 
laws dealing with ageism and disability discrimination which have been applied 
successfully through favourable judicial interpretation to victims in these kinds of 
cases. Also legislators in certain States have provided specific protection against 
certain forms of discrimination (weightism) or a general protection against 
discrimination on ground of personal appearance. 
What about the law dealing with discrimination under appearance or grooming codes? 
Unfortunately because of the "swings and roundabouts" approach and gender neutral 
arguments applied to this issue there is often difficulty in showing that there is 
inequality of treatment. In Smith v Safeway Stores, the Court of Appeal stated that 
where there is a package of restrictions that relate to standards of dress or grooming of 
125 With the exception of its treatment of transvestites and transsexuals. 
47 
all employees then it will not be discriminatory where one of these restrictions is 
different for both sexes. In Rv Birmingham CC, ex p. EOC 126 it Was stated that less 
favourable treatment can include denial of an option which is valued by the employee 
(e. g. dressing casually, having long hair, wearing jewellery) 
The legal approach of the Employment Appeal Tribunal at an earlier stage of the 
Smith case was probably the correct one. 
Firstly it was asked whether Smith had been treated differently "but foe' his sex? He 
was because if he were a woman he would have been allowed to tie his hair back. 
Secondly, it was asked whether this amounts to less favourable treatment for the 
purposes of the Act? It did amount to less favourable treatment in Smith because he 
was dismissed when he refused to cut his hair. Thirdly, it must be determined whether 
he was less favourably treated on the grouhds of his sex? The majority of the EAT felt 
that he was because women could pin up their hair rather than have it cut, which was 
the only option for men It is submitted that this is the correct approach for deciding on 
the unlawfulness or legality of appearance or grooming codes in discrimination cases. 
The UK and US courts use a "comparative model" when dealing with discrimination 
cases which on the face of it is fair and objective but in reality in some cases produces 
biased and unfair results from an employee's perspective. 127 The comparative model 
centres on: "less favourable treatment as "opposed to purely unfavourable treatment" 
128 The imposition of dress or grooming codes or discrimination based on their 
physical appearance of employees are good examples of this. 
126 [19891 IRLR 173 (HL) 
127 S. Middlerniss, "Shall I Compare Thee"? The Legal Dilemma, Choice of Comparators in 
Discrimination Cases"(2000) 4/09 International Journal of Discrimination and Law, 293- 
317 
122 N, Lacey., "Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a Feminist Perspective" 
(1987) 14 Journal ofLaw & Society 411 
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In respect of appearance or grooming codes the main difference between the UK and 
US is the lengths the courts will go to test the validity of the business necessity 
defence. This defence is more developed in the US because once discrimination has 
been established under Title VII it is open to the employer to establish the defence. 
Unlike the courts in the UK, the US courts investigate such claims of business 
necessity rather than simply accepting th. pm. 
129 Accordingly, the US courts give an 
impression of being more open and unbiased because they accept contrary evidence 
and give equal attention to the arguments of both employee and employer. In effect 
they treat the discriminatory effect as seriously as the business need for it. 
In Diaz v Pan American World Airways Inc. 130 it was held that the: "primary function 
of an airline is to transport passengers safely from one point to anothee -) 13 1 and 
accordingly, this function did not require a pleasant environment, enhanced by the 
obvious cosmetic effect that female stewardesses provide. This was particularly 
significant because it helped reduce discriminatory dress policies for women in the 
airline industry. The limitation of the application of the business necessity defence in 
Diaz to purposes that are related to the primary function of the organisation is a 
development that could usefully be emulated in lookism cases by Employment 
Tribunals and courts in the UK. It seems unlikely but not impossible that the 
argument that aesthetic labour is needed to assist the primary function of an 
organisation would be accepted by the courts. 
In relation to health and safety, the courts in US and the UK will normally accept the 
relevance of the business necessity defence in this context because for example to 
129 Smith vSafewayplc [1996] IRLR456; BoychukvH. JSymons Holdings Ltd [19771 IRLR395 
130 [1971] 442 F 2d 385 (5b Cir) cert. denied, 404 US 950 
131 [1971] 442 F 2d 385 at 388 
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allow beards or loose hair in certain workplaces is a safety hazard and should not be 
tolerated. 
132 
In a sex discrimination case in the UK Grieg v Community Industry 133 it was held by 
the EAT that employers could not justify their discriminatory behaviour on the basis 
that it was done in the interests of business or with a good motive. 134 Similar 
reasoning has been adopted in a later case James v Eastleigh Borough Council [ 1990] 
IRLR 298 HL. 135 In cases involving dress or grooming code in the UK employers 
have been successfully using this type of defence. 136 
9. CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to know what the solution is to this kind of workplace problem. 
A culture of encouraging the employment and advancement of aesthetic labour and of 
using dress or grooming codes to create a company's image or maintain its reputation 
will tend to emanate from the senior management of an organisation. 
Convincing them of the unacceptability of such practices may be difficult where their 
managerial prerogatives in these respects have to date largely gone unchallenged. 
The impact of a favourable judicial decision in this area should not be underestimated 
as shown by the public response to the employment tribunal decision in the 
Department of Work and Pensions v Matthew Thompson. Here a male applicant won 
132Dripp5V UnitedParcel Service, Inc [1974] 381 FSupp421 (DCPa) held that an employer's rule 
forbidding welders to have beards was a sound BFOQ based on reasonable safety concerns 
33 [ 1979] IRLR 159, (EAT) 
34 Ibid, at 159 
135 James v Fastleigh Borough Council [ 1990) IRLR 298 IlL 
136 SM i1h V SafeWay ple 
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his case of sex discrimination because he was required to wear a shirt and tie and this 
led to around 6,950 similar cases in the UK being lodged with employment tribunals. 
A warranted fear of the floodgates being opened may account for judicial reluctance 
to recognise and provide a remedy for the discriminatory effect of lookism in all its 
forms in both jurisdictions. 
What is probably the only realistic solution is introduction of legislation specifically 
to deal with the problem. 
Providing suitable and reasonable definitions and standards of behaviour in a statute 
dealing with discrimination based on physical looks and appearance or grooming 
codes is problematic but not an insurmountable problem. 
Under Article 14 of the District of Columbia Code the following human rights are 
covered 137 (a) "It shall be an unlawfW discriminatory practice to do any of the 
following acts, wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon the actual 
or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal 
appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, disability, matriculation, or 
political affiliation of any individual. " 
They offer the following deffidtion of personal appearance as a ground of 
discrimination under state law. "Personal appearance" means the outward appearance 
of any person, irrespective of sex, with regard to bodily condition or characteristics, 
manner or style of dress, and manner or style of personal grooming, including, but not 
limited to, hair style and beards. It shall not relate, however, to the requirement of 
cleanliness, uniforms, or prescribed standards, when uniformly applied for admittance 
to a public accommodation, or when uniformly applied to a class of employees for a 
reasonable business purpose; or when such bodily conditions or characteristics, style 
137 2-1402.11. Prohibitions [Formerly § 1-2512]. 
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or manner of dress or personal grooming presents a danger to the health, welfare or 
safety of any individual. 138 Tle aspects of personal appearance in the definition seem 
wide enough to cover the full spectrLun of the behaviour although further definition 
would be useful in some cases. 
As outlined above there are various situations where discrimination on the basis of 
personal appearance is allowable and requirements of cleanliness, uniform or 
prescribed conditions will not be unlawful. The most worrying is where such 
requirements are uniformly applied to a class of employees and are applied for a 
reasonable business purpose. It would be much better to apply the primary purpose 
test, set out in Diaz, to any argument about business necessity. The test should be is 
the requirement necessary for fulfilment of the primary purpose of the business? 
Lessons can be learnt from the legal treatment of this issue in both jurisdictions 
however the inevitable conclusion is that neither system have got it right, in terms of 
dealing with this form of discrimination, and reforms need to be made. The following 
quote neatly sununarises the issue "Thus all forms of anti-discrimination law straddle 
this barrier between unfettered managerial discretion and the protection of civil rights. 
The solution to the conflict between these two forms of discourse seems to be 
,, 139 pragmatic adjustment of the scope of the protection and the extent of justification. 
13: § 2-1401.02. Definitions 
13 Ed. Dine J Watt B Discrimination Law Concepts, Limitations and Justifications, Chapter 4, 
Bourn C Equal Treatment and Managerial Prerogatives, pp 37 - 48 p 48 (1996) Longman 
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Le( gal Rights of Atypical Workers D to 
Introduction 
This article will analyse the legal rights of atypical labour to determine what 
categories of workers are included in the generic term and how each of them 
compares with full-time workers in terms of their status and entitlement to contractual 
and statutory employment rights. 
As the following quote illustrates the traditional contractual arrangement whereby 
work was undertaken on behalf of an employer involved a contract of service which 
was full-time and open-ended and persons working under this contract were entitled 
to economic rewards and some element ofjob security. 
`rbe jobs were typically full-time of indefinite duration and were expected to last 
until retirement at which point most employees ... would benefit from the employer's 
pension scheme. "' 
There were of course exceptions to this model and persons not falling within its 
parameters were referred to as marginal workers. " This term included, homeworkers, 
part-time workers, fixed-term workers and agency workers 
Traditionally persons engaged on an atypical basis to carry out work on behalf of an 
employer were denied the same employment rights as persons working under a 
contract of service. 
The Restructuring of the Individual Employment Relationship i1i 
The nature of employment changed from the traditional model to one that reflected 
the flexible working methods introduced as part of the approach of employers to the 
market and enterprise economy encouraged by the Government during what has 
commonly been referred to as the "Thatcher years". It is not this writer's intention to 
outline the economic and social changes that led to the vast increase in atypical 
labour. " From the beginning of the nineteen eighties onwards employers were 
concerned with obtaining greater flexibility in the employment of labour and part of 
this process was to vary the arrangements under which work was undertaken. 
Although a core of persons would normally be employed under a full-time contract 
increasingly other workers were employed to undertake work of a peripheral nature. 
They would often be employed, on short-term or intermittent contracts, work outside 
the workplace usually in their own home, be allocated work through the services of an 
intermediary e. g. agency worker or undertake the work as an independent contractor. " 
The workers would often have limited legal status and legal rights arising from their 
working relationship with the employer. " There has been an impetus for improving 
the legal rights of atypical workers in recent years primarily through the social policy 
of the European Union. The protection of atypical workers has been achieved through 
the introduction of measures spccifically protecting certain groups e. g. Fixed-Term 
Work Directive. "" Also through the introduction of the concept of worker in EU 
Legislation which has provided this category of person (see dcrinition below) with 
specific legal protection. This EU legislation has been implemented into the law of 
the United Kingdom through domestic legislation e. g. National Minimum Wage Act 
1998, Working Time Regulations. ""' 
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These developments are given general consideration below and are also discussed in 
the context of each separate classification of worker that is protected 
Classifications of Atypical Workers 
It will be readily seen from the following breakdown of the number and types of 
atypical workers that although individually they are still a minority within 
employment they cumulatively represent a substantial part of the workforce in the 
United Kingdom. "' 
In the 1997/98 Labour Force Survey there were 1.7 million temporary workers (6.5% 
of all workers) ' 868,000 fixed term workers (3.3% of all workers) 324,000 persons 
working in casual employment (1.2) 222,000 agency supplied temporary workers 
(0.9) 180,000 zero hours workers (0.7) 621,000 horneworkers (2.4) and 3.2. million 
self-employed (12.4). 
" 
There are various classifications used to describe atypical workers although the 
following are the most common: casual workers, trainees, temporary workers, agency 
workers, fixed term and part-time workers. 'ii 
Each of these will be considered in terms of their current legal status and their legal 
rights although the difficulties in classifying these types of arrangement are identified 
in the following quote 
'The complex form of modem industrial and commercial organisation enables people 
to work under a variety of legal arrangements which may be entirely satisfactory to all 
concerned, but which are difficult to rationalise into well-defined categories necessary 
for the purpose of legal analysis. " "" 
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Employees and Workers 
Employees and contracts of employment are defined by the statutes which provide 
individual statutory rights. 
The definition of employee as per section 230(l) of the Employment Rights Act 1996: 
is "an individual who has entered into or works under (or where the employment has 
ceased, worked under) a contract of employment. " (s230 (2)) and a contract of 
employment means "a contract of service or apprenticeship whether express or 
implied (and if express) whether oral or in writing. " 
These definitions, however, are not helpful in identifying the essential characteristics 
of an employee. 
A broader concept than the term, 'employee, is the term 'worker'; that has been 
introduced as a consequence of legal developments in the European Union. 
Accordingly the use of the term worker (and its introduction as a threshold 
requirement for employment rights) in UK employment law statutes has gained 
momentum. 
A worker has been defined in the Employment Rights Act (1996) as "an individual 
who has entered into or works under a contract of employment s230(3)(a) or any other 
contract whether express or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, 
whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services 
for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of that contract client or 
customer of any Profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual 
"(Q30(3)(b)) 
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Again, the definition is somewhat vague and incapable of identifying the full 
characteristics of a worker. 
Despite this a possible means of increasing the number of persons covered by 
employment law is to use the broader definition of worker in preference to employee. 
This would cover individuals who do not have a contract of employment but who 
nevertheless contract to supply their services to the employer and to some degree are 
economically dependent on the employer's business. 
The courts have developed tests which have been used to distinguish contracts of 
service from contract for services (between an employer and an independent 
contractor) but it is outwith the scope of this article to give this matter detailed 
consideration. Aspects of these tests however, will be considered below in the context 
of casual and temporary workers because they are the categories of atypical workers 
most likely to be treated as independent contractors. x'v 
Casual and Temporary Workers 
Employment law does not recognise such categorisations as casual and temporary 
workers. The crucial issue is whether or not an individual is an employee or not. 
Most statutory employment rights only extend to employees (e. g. unfair dismissal, 
redundancy) although some rights have been extended to workers and accordingly to 
casual and temporary workers e. g. rights under equality laws, the right to a national 
minimum wage, protection under health and safety legislation " and maximum 
working hours. "' 
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Casual Workers 
In many instances casual workers have been deemed to be independent contractors 
because their arrangements with the employer tend to lack the mutuality of obligation 
necessary for a contract of service. "" In such circumstances they may not be entitled 
to the rights extended to workers under recent legislation e. g. Working Time 
Regulations 1998. 
The powers given to the Secretary of State under section 23 of the Employment 
Relations Act 1999 to extend coverage of employment rights beyond employees or 
workers is to date unused. ""' 
The typical situation in casual employment is where there are breaks in employment 
where no work is undertaken and the requirement for work to be done is irregular or 
informal in its nature. Where individuals are employed on an ad-hoc basis, only where 
the need arises as the workers in the O'Kelly case "x or based on seasonal demands 
then they are referred to as zero-hours workers. 
Whether casual workers will be treated as workers will be dependent on them 
providing services under a contract to another person and that other person not 
contracting in the capacity as a client or customer of a profession or business carried 
out by the individual in question. 
Where there is substitution clause in the contract allowing the worker to provide a 
substitute to carry out the task then this will strongly suggest they are not a worker. 
Where casual employment consists of bouts of broken employment, regularly 
undertaken over a considerable period of time then the person can be deemed to be an 
employee working under a global or umbrella contract. What is necessary here is that 
during the breaks in employment the employer is under an obligation to provide work 
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and the employee is obliged to undertake it. In the majority of cases it is deemed that 
global contracts do not apply to casual workers. " Even where the person undertaking 
the work can work for other employers during breaks in his employment does not 
point conclusively to it not being a contract of service. 
In McMeechan v Secretary of State for Employment "' it was held that a contractual 
arrangement no matter for how long can be a contract of service for the duration of 
the work. Clearly this type of arrangement will involve breaks in the continuity of 
employment which will mean certain employment rights contingent on continuity of 
employment will be unavailable to the temporary worker e. g. unfair dismissal 
protection). 
Temporary Workers 
The Labour Force Survey carried out in June -August 2000 found that around 7% of 
the workforce was employed under a temporary contract and these contracts are used 
widely in certain professions or industries e. g. nursing, teaching, fishing, hotels and 
catering. They are often used to meet fluctuations in workload arising from shortages 
due to a variety of causes e. g. seasonal demands. It is because of the irregular 
employment of many temporary workers that the arrangements they work under are 
regarded by the courts as lacking sufficient mutuality of obligation to be treated as a 
contract of service. A lack of mutuality of obligation was a key element in denying 
casual temporary workers employee status in the case of O'Kelly v Trust House Forte 
pic "" which dealt with zero hour workers. Home workers, agency workers, zero- 
hours contract workers and workers in a casualised trade or occupation have in the 
past been held not to be employees due to lack of mutuality of obligation 
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In Clark v Oxfordshire Health Authority "iii a bank nurse had no fixed or regular 
contact hours and was only offere., vork when the need for temporary work arose. 
The relevant conditions of service stipulated they were not regular employees no right 
to guaranteed or continuous work (zero-hours worker). The Court of appeal found she 
was not working under contract of service because of lack of mutual obligation in 
periods when person not working for employer 
"Even if an individual can show that he or she was employed as an employee for the 
purposes of a particular task or job, or for a particular period of time, they may be 
unable to show they have a global or umbrella contract which spans the gaps between 
periods of work. 
Agency Workers b. 
There is little law that covers this category of worker and existing definitions should 
apply, however inappropriate. "' 
The proposal for an Agency Workers Directive, put forward by the European 
Parliament and the Council on working conditions for temporary workers "" may be 
of assistance in providing clear definitions and legal rules applying to this category of 
worker. 
Until this comes to pass it is instructive to examine recent case law to try and 
determine agency workers current legal position. 
In McMeechan v Secretary of State for Employment (considered above) ""' a worker 
employed by an employer on a temporary basis through an agency claimed that he 
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was entitled to be treated as an employee for a particular transaction for which he was 
owed money. 
The Court of Appeal needed to make a decision on the employment status of 
temporary or casual workers. It held that under the general rules of engagement 
temporary workers can have the stereotype of an employee for particular assignments, 
even if generally they do not have employee status 
In Motorola Ltd v Davidson "viii Mr Davidson was placed by an agency to repair 
mobile phones for Motorola and he worked for them for two years but then was 
suspended and had his contract terminated over a disciplinary issue. He claimed 
unfair dismissal citing Motorola as his employer. As there was a high degree of 
control exercised over Mr Davidson's work and he was subject to Motorola's 
disciplinary procedures the Employment Tribunal upheld his claim for unfair 
dismissal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected Motorola's appeal. It would 
seem that this is a precedent for the fact that where an agency worker works 
exclusively for a client of an agency for a considerable amount of time (at least a year 
but probably longer) they become an employee of the client and are entitled to claim 
statutory employment rights from them. 
The Court of Appeal in Montgomery v Johnson Underwood Ltd x"x made similar 
findings to the EAT in Motorola. 
In Dacas v Brook Street Bureau Ltd. xxx Dacas was registered with Brook Street 
Bureau for six years and during'that time worked for a single client. The contract 
stipulated that this was not to be treated as an employment relationship. The 
Employment Tribunal held he was not an employee of either employer but on appeal 
to the EAT they decided he was an employee of BSB. This decision was overturned 
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on appeal on the basis that there was no mutuality of obligation between the agency 
and the worker. ""' 
In Franks v Reuters CA (2003) IRLR 423 Mr Franks was supplied as a driver through 
an agency to Reuters for six years. Employment Tribunal held was not an employee 
of Reuters. The Court of Appeal decided he could be an employee of Reuters and 
remitted case back to the Employment Tribunal. 
In this case the possibility of an implied contract of employment between Franks and 
Reuters was considered and documentation or lack of documentation in place as in 
this case was only one factor to be considered. The background circumstances to the 
relationship and how parties operate important and the period of service with the 
client was a relevant factor. 
In most situations where there is an implied contract with client employer this is not 
necessarily not affected by anything stated to the contrary in the documentation 
governing the relationship. As a result of the decisions in Motorola and Franks the 
commercial advantage of using agency workers in now questionable, except for short- 
term hiring. 
Dependent Self-Employed 
Dependent self-employed or dependent entrepreneurs ""' are terms which are 
increasingly used to describe self-employed contractors who as result of the economic 
realities of their situation are dependent on an employer for their livelihood. They 
could be freelance workers sole traders, home workers and casual workers of various 
kinds who will certainly be protected under health and safety legislation """ and 
to 
could fall within the statutory definition of worker for the purposes of various pieces 
of legislation. ""' 
Fixed Term Workers 
The Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) 
Regulations""' were introduced to implement the Council Directive on Fixed Term 
WorkqqnO/EC and ensure that the position of fixed term workers were not abused 
for example by the use of successive fixed-terms employment contracts. 
These Regulations came into force in July 2002 although prior to this there was no 
statutory regulation of this type of contract. The Regulations apply to "an employee 
who is employed under a fixed-term contract. " ""' What is fixed term contract? It is 
one that provides a specified term of employment and terminates automatically at the 
end of that term. There are limited remedies provided by the Regulations for unfair 
treatment in respect of contractual terms where the fixed term worker receives less 
favourable terms than a permanent employee's terms of his or her contract. """ 
Also under Regulation 3(l) it is unlawful to subject a fixed term employee to less 
favourable treatment than a permanent employee in respect of being subjected to any 
other detriment by any act or failure to act by his employer. 
The right not to be treated less favourably than others is not absolute but employers 
must justify different treatment on objective grounds. Under Regulation 4(l) 
treatment may be justified "if the terms of a fixed term employee's contract of 
employment, taken as a whole, are at least as favourable as the terms of the 
comparable permanent employee's contract of employment. " 
II 
The DTI guide that accompanies the legislation ... iii states that less favourable 
treatment is justified where it is necessary to achieve a legitimate objective and it is 
necessary to achieve that objective and it is an appropriate way to achieve it. 
The relevant comparator must be employed by the same employer and engaged in 
same or broadly similar work at the same establishment. 
Under s 95 (1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 it states that an employee is 
dismissed if the fixed term expires without being renewed. The employee may be able 
to claim unfair dismissal where it is reasonable to continue the contract and the 
employer fails to do so. XXXiX 
An employee whose fixed term contract expires without being renewed can also claim 
redundancy rights provided they have sufficient continuous service. x' The right to 
include a redundancy waiver in a contract of employment has been abolished under 
the Regulations. "' Redundancy may be a fair reason for dismissal however, and not 
renewing the contract at the end of the fixed term maybe a fair reason for dismissal 
under the heading of some other substantial reason. 
It can still be fixed term even if a term of the contract allows the parties to terminate 
by giving notice before the term expires. "" If the contract contains no right to prior 
ten-nination where an employer terminates the contract summarily the employee has 
the right to claim damages for breach of contract. 
It is automatically unfair dismissal if the principal reason for dismissal is one of those 
set out in Regulation 6(3). This provides wide ranging protection against victimisation. 
and includes dismissal of fixed term employee because inter alia: he has, brought 
proceedings under the regulations, or requested a written statement of reasons or 
given evidence or information in connection with proceedings, refused or proposed to 
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refuse to forego a right under the regulations or has alleged that the employer has 
infringed the regulations. x'... 
Under Regulation 8 the use of successive fixed term contracts beyond four years is 
unlawful unless it can be objectively justified or a workplace or collective agreement 
has agreed otherwise. If a fixed term contract is renewed in breach of the limitation, 
the term of the contract limiting it to a fixed term will be invalid and the contract will 
be regarded as permanent. 
There are clearly going to be difficulties in enforcing this legislation in particular the 
provisions calling for comparison with the position of a permanent worker. A suitable 
comparator may not be available within the same workforce and even if there is the 
employer can justify inequality of treatment on the basis that the package of rights 
available to both types of employee are equivalent or there is a genuine business need 
for the difference in treatment. On the other hand there are some positive measures 
that should ensure that fixed term employees benefit from equivalent terms and 
conditions to permanent employees e. g. automatic change in contract after four years, 
protection against victimisation for pursuing rights and abolition of redundancy 
waivers. 
Part Time Workers or Employees 
The Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 
x"v introduced new rights for part-time workers. 
The measures reinforce the Government's policy of putting in place decent minimum 
standards whilst promoting a flexible and competitive workforce and more 
significantly they implement the Part Time Work Directive "' 
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What is the likely impact of the new Regulations? Under a contract of employment 
part-time workers have pro rata contractual rights with full-time workers. 
The Regulations are meant to ensure that Britain's part-timers are not treated less 
favourably than comparable full-timers in their terms and conditions, unless it is 
objectively justified. 
This means part-timers are entitled to: the same hourly rate of pay, the same access to 
company pension schemes, the same entitlements to annual leave and 
maternity/parental leave on a pro rata basis, the same entitlement to contractual sick 
pay, no less favourable treatment in access to training and the same access to 
promotion and redundancy rights 
From the I" of October 2002, under the Part-Time Workers Regulations individual 
part-timers were allowed to compare themselves to a full-time colleague irrespective 
of whether either party's contract was pen-nanent or fixed-term. 
As the Part-Time Workers Regulations (unlike the Fixed Term Employees 
(Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations) apply to both employees and 
non-employee workers, the possibilities of comparison under the Part-Time 
Regulations are available to both categories of individual. 
Under Regulation 2(4) however, any claim by a part time worker that they are 
receiving less favourable treatment than a full-time worker, will need to be 
substantiated by reference to a full-time equivalent in terms of the type of contract, 
the type of work type of qualification, skills and experience, same place of 
employment and employer. It is important to note that of the six million part-timers 
in the United Kingdom only one million have a full time equivalent working under the 
same type of contract. "" 
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The defences available to an employer are in certain respects similar to those that 
apply under the Fixed Term Work Directive (e. g. difference in treatment necessary to 
fulfil genuine business objective). 
With respect to enforcement of the Regulations an employer or agent of the employer 
will be liable for anything done by an employee in the course of their employment. 
There is a defence of having taken all reasonable steps to prevent the worker doing 
the act in the course of his employment 
There is a right not to be dismissed or suffer a detriment as a result of exercising any 
rights under the legislation and a right to receive written reasons from the employer 
for less favourable treatment. 
A tribunal can award damages, although not for injury to feelings and can make 
recommendations for action by the employer to correct the fault. 
There are clearly deficiencies in these regulations which may be subject to legal 
challenge for non-compliance with EU standards (e. g. narrow basis for comparison) 
and they may fail to adequately protect this type of atypical worker as identifies by 
the following quote. 
"The PtWRs 2000 do nothing to challenge the major part of the disadvantage 
associated with part-time work. They do not require that jobs are opened up to part- 
time working not even ... that women be entitled to return to their jobs after maternity 
leave. Further they do not appear to protect against a dismissal connected with a 
refusal to transfer between part-time and full-time work. " ""' 
Homeworkers 
is 
Although horneworkers are not a particularly modem phenomena in the current 
situation where increased flexibility of working patterns suits both parties in the 
employment relationship people are choosing to work at home wholly or as part of 
their working week. It is estimated that horneworkers now account for around ten 
percent of the working population. """ What is the legal status of these workers? 
In Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd v Gardiner "" the applicant had worked for several 
years for the respondents although not every week. There were no fixed hours of 
work, payment was related to the individual amount of clothing they produced and the 
applicants were not obliged to accept any work offered. When they were dismissed 
they claimed unfair dismissal and the employment tribunal decided that despite the 
flexibility in the work arrangement they were employees for the purpose of 
entitlement to protection against unfair dismissal and this decision was upheld by the 
Court of Appeal. 1 Although this decision is not a precedent for the fact that 
horneworkers will be treated as employees and the matter will be determined in each 
individual case, there is likelihood that they will be regarded as employees or workers 
for the purpose of deten-nining entitlement to statutory employment rights. Where 
however enforcement of these rights is dependent on inspection and enforcement of 
these rights in the workplace by regulatory bodies then there will be practical 
difficulties in them carrying out this role in the case of homeworkers. 
Trainees 
Persons working for en employer in the context of a trainee have traditionally been 
denied any employment rights as they have been deemed to be working under a 
training contract. This is fair enough when the arrangement consists of someone 
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obtaining training to do a particular job or obtain a particular qualification and there 
are no tangible benefits to the employer. " What is the current legal status of trainees? 
Increasingly trainees are expected to undertake work for the employer equivalent to 
that undertaken by his employees but are denied the same rate of remuneration, 
contractual status and employment rights. Where they are 'relevant trainees' in other 
words trainees working under a government sponsored or government supported 
training scheme e. g. New Deal, they will be treated as workers for the purposes of 
certain legislation e. g. minimum wage, working time regulations, equality legislation, 
although they will not entitled to other employment rights. "' 
Other types of trainee e. g. students on a course undertaking a work placement 
(sandwich course) are not covered by any legislation and have no employment rights 
as they will be deemed to be working under a contract of training. 1 ... All trainees 
however, have some protection under health and safety legislation e. g. section 3 of 
HASAWA 1974. 
There is a need for all trainees that undertake work on behalf of an employer to have 
their status enhanced to that of working under a contract of service or failing that to be 
treated as a worker. Otherwise they will continue be regarded and treated as second 
class, cheap labour by employers. "' 
Conclusions 
The complexity of the situation created by the expansion of atypical work. and the 
introduction of new flexible forms of working relationship has meant that there are a 
variety of legal arrangements applying each with its own legal status and level of 
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statutory protection. It is hardly surprising that many of the people working under 
these arrangements are unclear about their employment rights. 
"While some degree of uncertainty in the operation of the law in this area is probably 
inevitable a situation in which a substantial proportion of the workforce is unsure of 
its legal position would give rise to concem. " ly 
Employers may avoid their obligations by a number of means including exploiting 
their workers lack of awareness about their entitlement. 
In terms of health and safety all classes of atypical workers have some statutory 
protection in the form of criminal duties placed on employers in respect of their safety 
and welfare under section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and risk 
assessment requirements under the Management of the Health and Safety at Work 
Regulations 1999. "' There is now the possibility of a civil action against employers 
for breach of statutory duty where they fail to consider atypical workers in the health 
and safety arrangements implementing these Regulations. 
Despite arguments about mutuality of obligation and dependency or otherwise of self- 
employed persons it is important to recognise the economic reality that agency 
workers and zero-hours workers rarely exercise their legal right to turn down work 
and increasingly genuinely self employed and freelance workers may also have to 
accept work due to economic dependence on a particular employer. "More generally 
evidence of the individual's experience of non-standard work suggests that the legal 
division between employment and self-employment does not correspond to 
perceptions of a clear divide between these different forms of work. 
In the context of non-standard work there is considerable ambiguity in the notions of 
control, autonomy and mutuality of obligation used as guidelines by the courts in 
assessment of employment status. " 1" 
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There is undoubtedly a need for parity in the employment status, contractual rights 
and obligations and individual statutory rights extended to different types of atypical 
workers. 
There is a need to modernise and simplify UK employment law and at the same time 
to extend employment rights to vulnerable unprotected groups, to prevent contracting 
out of employment rights (substitution clause) and tackle the problems created by the 
perception of a second class workforce 
The reasons for this problem are neatly summarised in the following quote. 
"... Employers may choose between different forms of contract for acquiring labour, if 
they are efficient substitutes, on the basis of which contractual arrangement avoids 
legal incidents of employment law. One of the least satisfactory aspects of many 
employment law systems is the way in which the allocation of the risk of economic 
insecurity on to the worker also tends to exclude the worker from protection of 
employment rights. " Iviii 
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The Right to Dignity at Work? Protection from Harassment and Bullying under 45, b, Employment Law in the United Kingdom 
Introduction 
There is no legal definition of the term dignity at work although most parties involved 
in the employment relationship have some understanding of what it involves. 
The terminology was originally derived from the European Union and in particular 
the European Commission Recommendation on the protection of the dignity of men 
and women at work. 1 This was supported by a Code of Practice on Sexual 
Harassment which defined sexual harassment as an affront to the dignity of men and 
women. "Sexual Harassment means unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or other 
conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of men and women at work. This can 
include unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct. " 
The term dignity at work is also utilised in the Race Directive 2 and the amendment to 
the Equal Treatment Directive 3 both of which are considered below 
Most of the behaviour of an employer that represents an affront to his employees' 
dignity at work can be categorised under the terms harassment or bullying. 4 
The law in this area is complicated by the fact that in the case of harassment there has 
been a piecemeal development of statutory rules, now found in a variety of legal 
measures which collectively offer legal protection whereas in the case of bullying 
91/13 1 /EEC, OJ L49/1,1991 
2000/43/EC 
3 2002n3/EC Article 2 (2) 
4 The only legislation dealing with bullying and harassment to make any headway in Parliament 
was the Dignity at Work Bill in 1997. Its progress stopped at the election and it was never 
re-introduced. 
there is limited statutory protection and legal redress for victims of bullying is largely 
5 dependent on the application of a set of ill-defined and ill-suited common law rules. 
While the legal protection against both types of activity will be analysed in the 
context of this article the main focus will be on the former activity which has recently 
undergone considerable expansion as a result of legislative change. 6 
It is important to recognise that there is significant overlap in the types of legal action 
that can be utilised to protect against both types of behaviour 7 particularly under the 
common law (actions for breach of contract, tort and criminal liability). 
The law of harassment in employment law is now largely governed by statute and as 
this is the most likely avenue for legal redress by employees the article will restrict its 
attention to the statutory rules. 
In the absence of specific statutory protection against bullying 8 employees rely 
heavily on various common law actions to deal with this behaviour and these will be 
considered later in the article 
The Law of Harassment 
There are now various types of harassment that are specifically recognised 
and protected against by statute. 9 The most established and well-defined legal 
rules dealing with harassment apply to sexual harassment and because of 
Middlemiss, S Hay, 0 Bullying in the Workplace, the Case for Legal Redress? Parts 1, 
2&3 Irish Law Times Volume 21 Number IS December 2003 pp 287 - 292, Volume 21 
Number 17 November 2003 pp 266 - 27 1, Volume 21 Number 16 October 2003 pp 250 - 255 
E. g. Section 5 of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 
provides protection against harassment on the ground of someone's sexual orientation 
Equality Laws and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
ibid. The legislation could provide some form of legal redress, depending on the nature of (e. g. 
continuous conduct) and basis for (e. g. sex, race) the bullying. 
Race, Disability, Sexual Orientation, Religion or Belief 
their importance and influence on other areas of harassment law it seems 
appropriate to consider these at the outset. 
Sexual Harassment 
The following quote summarises the nature of sexual harassment law in the United 
Kingdom which applied until very recently. ' 0 "As neither sexual nor racial harassment 
is specifically mentioned in the anti-discrimination legislation, the process by which it 
has been held to be unlawful and the boundaries of that unlawfulness are entirely 
judge made. " 11 
A good example of this was the landmark case of Strathclyde Regional Council v 
Porcelli (1986) ICR 134 CS where Mrs Porcelli was employed as one of three 
technicians in a school in Glasgow. 
The other two technicians were male and they undertook a campaign of sexual 
harassment against her including physical touching, sexual innuendo and sexist 
comments all with a view to getting her to leave her job. In the face of such action she 
applied to her employer for a transfer which was granted. 
She claimed that the sexual harassment she had experienced represented a form of sex 
discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
The Industrial Tribunal accepted the employer's argument that there was no 
discrimination as the harassers would have bullied a man they disliked in a similar 
manner. This was overturned by the Court of Session who was satisfied that given the 
sexist nature of the action it would not have perpetrated against her but for her sex. 
10 Amendments to the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 including introduction for the first time 
of a statutory definition of sexual harassment will be introduced in the UK and apply from October 2005 
11 Townshend - Smith, RJ Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials (1998) Cavendish, 
They held that the act of harassment itself without any accompanying threat to terms 
of employment could be discrimination under section 6(2) (b) of the Act, provided it 
represented a sufficient detriment. 12 Where the consequence of the harassment is 
sexual blackmail 13 by the employer (give in to my sexual demands or else) then this 
would almost always represent sufficient detriment. Since Porcelli there have been 
numerous cases involving sexual harassment and often the issue is, are the 
consequences of the employer's behaviour sufficiently detrimental to the victim to 
represent a breach of the Act? 
In De Souza v Automobile Association 14 a racial harassment case, Mrs De Souza 
overheard a racist comment made about her in a conversation between two managers. 
It was held that this was not sufficiently detrimental to her to constitute an unlawful 
act. While this was undoubtedly an overtly restrictive interpretation of the term 
detriment used in the Acts, 15 on the positive side, the Court of Appeal made it clear 
that even when the only consequence for the victim of the harassment is a hostile 
working environment this could represent a contravention of the Acts. 
The difficulty in establishing sufficient detriment to represent a breach of the Act was 
illustrated in the case of Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd 16 where a 
woman in the course of her employment had to walk through a working environment 
tainted by pornographic images. The impact of such a working environment was held 
to be gender-neutral as a man would be equally offended by such images. 
The outcome of this case was clearly wrongly decided by the Employment Tribunal in 
this case. They failed to take account of the effect on the applicant of the 
p 236 
12 These are referred to as working environment cases. 
0 Quid pro quo cases 
1.9 [1986] ICR 514 CA 
is Section 6 (2)(b)(c) of the SDA 1975 and Section 4(2)(c) of the RRA 1976 
16 [ 1994] 1 RLR 440, EAT 
objectification of women as sex objects in the workplace The case does emphasise 
the need for applicants in sexual harassment cases to differentiate their treatment at 
the hands of the employer from that likely to be or actually, experienced by a man. 
Similarly in the case of British Telecommunications v Williams 17 the female 
applicant was unable to show that she had experienced sufficient detriment. The facts 
were that a performance review interview of a female employee undertaken by a male 
manager was carried out in a very confined space. She claimed she was forced into 
close physical proximity with the manager and this represented sexual harassment. 
This was not treated as sex discrimination on the basis that there was no evidence that 
the manager was sexually aroused and that a male employee in the same situation 
would have been similarly discomforted. 
While it was originally believed that harassment must involve a continuous mode of 
conduct this view was challenged in two cases. In Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v 
Darby 18 a single incident of harassment was capable of constituting a sufficient 
detriment (a serious sexual assault by her supervisor and another). In the case of 
Insitu Cleaning Co Ltd v Heads 19a single verbal comment of a sexist nature made to 
a female manager by a male colleague at a management meeting was sufficient 
detriment. 
The problem with bringing any kind of claim for harassment or bullying is that the 
consequences of the behaviour will often be dependant on the particular sensitivities 
of the victim and the Tribunal will need to be satisfied that sufficient harm has 
occurred to the particular applicant. 20 This subjective aspect of sexual harassment 
17 [ 1997] IRLR 668 EAT 
Is ( 1990] IRLR 3 EAT 
19 [ 1995] IRLR 4 EAT 
20 All the new legislation dealing with harassment identifies that the sensitivities of the victim 
should be a key consideration in any claim 
was identified by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in the case of Reed and Bull v 
Stedman 21 
"The essential characteristics of sexual harassment are that it is words or conduct 
which are unwelcome to the recipient and it is for the recipient themselves to decide 
what it acceptable to them and what they regard as offensive. " 22 
In this case a secretary was bullied and subjected to sexual comments and innuendoes 
by her boss the marketing manager. She brought a claim for sex discrimination based 
on her constructive dismissal by her employer. "The tribunal had not erred in finding 
that a course of unwanted and bullying behaviour by the applicant's manager, which 
amounted to sexual harassment was a breach of the duty of trust and confidence. " 
This amounted to constructive dismissal and accordingly was an act of discrimination 
within the meaning of s 6(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act. 
"A characteristic of sexual harassment is that it undermines the victim's dignity at 
work. It creates an offensive or hostile environment for the victim and an arbitrary 
barrier to sexual equality in the workplace. " 23 
In the case of Waters v Commissioner for Police of the Metropolis 24 a female police 
officer was sexually assaulted by a colleague outside working hours in her home. 
She reported the incident to her employer but after an internal enquiry no action was 
taken against the harasser. Ms Waters then experienced victimisation by her employer 
and made a claim under Section 4 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
It was held that as no legal action could be taken against the employer under the Act 
for the assault (not vicarious liable as per section 41 as the harasser was acting outside 
21 [ 1999] IRLR 299 
22 lbid p 300 
23 lbid p 300 
24 [1995] IRLR 531 
the scope of their employment) and correspondingly there was no right to bring a 
claim for victimisation which was dependant on the action complained of following a 
complaint under Section 41 of the SDA 1975. 
This case was eventually taken on appeal to the House of Lords and they upheld Ms 
Waters claim that the employer's failure to offer her support and to permit harassment 
and victimisation against her amounted to breach of their duty of care under the law 
of contract and tort. 25 
"If an employer knows that acts being done by employees during their employment 
may cause physical or mental harm to a particular fellow employee and he does 
nothing to supervise or prevent such acts, where it is in his power to do so, it is clearly 
arguable that he may be in breach of his duty to that employee. It seems to me that he 
may also be in breach of that duty if he can foresee such acts may happen, and if they 
do, that physical or mental harm may be caused. 4c 26 
The employer should have anticipated Ms Waters persistent complaint about the 
assault by a fellow officer would lead to retaliatory action. 
"I consider the person employed under an ordinary contract of employment can have 
a valid cause of action in negligence against her employer if the employer fails to 
protect her against victimisation and harassment which cause physical or mental 
injury. This duty arises both under the contract of employment and under the common 
law principles of negligence. " 27 
This decision and the Reed case mentioned earlier will have more significance for 
victims of bullying rather than victims of harassment because the former are often 
25 Waters v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2000] IRLR 720 
26 Lord Slynn 
27 Lord Hutton 
dependent on common law remedies whereas the latter are now heavily protected by 
statute law. 
Influence of the European Union on Sexual Harassment Law 
There was, until recently, no legally binding measures emanating from the European 
Union dealing with sexual harassment or any other kind of workplace harassment. 
The European Commission Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment however was 
influential on courts and tribunals in the United Kingdom. The Code of Practice sets 
out a definition of sexual harassment which has been adopted by domestic tribunals 
and courts as the appropriate legal standard against which cases are judged. 
"Sexual Harassment means unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or other conduct 
based on sex affecting the dignity of men and women at work. This can include 
unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct. " 
This definition highlights the importance of considering the impact of the behaviour 
on the individual victim and underlies the diverse nature of harassment at work. 
An improved version of this definition has been provided by a recent Directive 28 
which amended the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EC and is considered below. 
There are plans in the United Kingdom to implement the terms of this Directive by 
October 2005 although the precise nature and content of the legislation is as yet 
unclear. 
The Directive includes a clear definition of sexual harassment that is more 
comprehensive than definitions used in the other Directives providing protection 
against harassment. 29 
28 Equal Treatment Amendment Directive 2002/73/EC 
29 Race Directive 2000/43/EC, Equal Treatment at Work Directive 2000/78/EC 
Harassment is defined as "where an unwanted conduct related to the sex of a person 
occurs with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, and of creating 
an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. 
Sexual harassment is similarly defined as "Any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature occurs with the purpose or effect of violating 
the dignity of a person in particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, 
humiliating or offensive environment. " 
The definitions used in the Directive cover a wide range of harassing behaviour 
including sexual harassment, harassment based on sex but without any sexual element 
and intimidatory behaviour such as bullying and physical or verbal abuse. 
The behaviour complained of does not need to be directed at a woman. It is enough 
that the harassment is linked to the fact she is a woman. 
The Equal Treatment Amendment Directive 30 also changes the definition of indirect 
discrimination and this development will be considered below. 
Racial Harassment 
The law dealing with racial harassment is virtually the same as the law dealing with 
sexual harassment except for the grounds of action. As any legal precedent relating to 
racial or sexual harassment applies to both areas it is unnecessary to run through the 
rules already mentioned. It will be useful however, to consider any relevant case law 
and statutes that apply to racial harassment. 
The first case to recognise that racial harassment was a type of racial discrimination 
under the Race Relations Act 1976 was De Souza v Automobile Association. 31 
30 2002/73/EC 
It is useful to reiterate that Mrs De Souza was unsuccessful in her claim because the 
Court of Appeal, wrongly decided, in this writer's opinion, that the behaviour 
complained of was not sufficiently detrimental to her to constitute an unlawful act. 32 
The Court of Appeal held that racial harassment was unlawful discrimination and that 
when the only consequence for the victim of the harassment is a hostile working 
environment this could represent a breach of the Act. 
In what must be the most extreme case of racial harassment to be brought before an 
Employment Tribunal, Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd, the complaint was considered by 
33 
the Court of Appeal. The case involved a sixteen-year-old male employee of mixed 
ethnic Parentage who was physically and verbally abused and bullied by fellow 
employees because of his race. This consisted of burning his arms with a hot 
screwdriver, throwing metal bolts at his head, whipping his legs with a rubber welt 
and calling him racially insulting names. 
He brought a complaint of racial discrimination against his employer on the basis of 
their vicarious liability for these actions under section 32 of the Race Relations Act 
1976. 
The Court of Appeal overturned the EAT decision, which relied heavily on the 
common law rules dealing with vicarious liability, and went on to consider the 
interpretation that should be given to the phrase 'in the course of employment' in 
discrimination cases. They concluded that, "tribunals are free and are indeed bound, 
31 [ 19861 ICR 514 CA 
32 Doubts were cast by the EAT on the appropriateness of the ruling of LJ May in De Souza to 
current racial harassment cases in the case of Thomas and Comsoft Ltd. v Robinson [2003] IRLR 
7, EAT 
33 ( 1997] ICR 254 
to interpret the ordinarily, and readily understandable, words, 'in the course of his 
employment' in the sense in which every layman would understand them. " 34 
The Race Discrimination Directive 35 has been implemented into UK law by the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations SI 2003/1626 
The Regulations insert after section 3 of the 1976 Act, Section 3 A, which for the 
first time sets out a statutory definition of racial harassment. 
3A. - (1) A person subjects another to harassment in any circumstances relevant for 
the purposes of any provision referred to in section I (I B) where, on grounds of race 
or ethnic or national origins, he engages in unwanted conduct which has the purpose 
or effect of - (a) violating that other person's dignity, or 
(b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment 
for him. 
(2) Conduct shall be regarded as having the effect specified in paragraph (a) or (b) of 
subsection (1) only if, having regard to all the circumstances, including in particular 
the perception of that other person, it should reasonably be considered as having that 
effect. 
The Regulations are drafted more narrowly than the Race Relations Act 1976 because 
of restricted grounds of action applying. They only apply to discrimination based on 
race or ethnic or national origins rather than the racial grounds which apply under the 
Act which include colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national originS. 36 
34 Supra 29 p 265 
35 2000143/EU 
36 Scction 3 
These Regulations are significant because they closely define the nature of racial 
harassment although the definition used closely emulates the nature and scope of 
unlawful racial harassment that has been developed through judicial precedent. 
One aspect of the Regulations that is different and worthy of a mention is that persons 
pursuing a harassment case under them, need not find a comparator in the workplace. 
"Harassment, the third form of prohibited discrimination, does not require a 
comparator. " 37 
Harassment on the Ground of Sexual Orientation 
Until recently victims of harassment or any form of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation were denied any protection under discrimination law. Homosexual or 
lesbian employees facing harassment or discrimination within employment had no 
form of legal redress under the equality laws of the United Kingdom or the European 
Union. 38 
The reason they were denied protection in the United Kingdom was summarised by 
the Court of Appeal in the case of Smith v Gardner Merchant 39 when they stated that 
"discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is not discrimination on the ground 
of sex within the meaning of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. A person's sexual 
orientation is not an aspect of his or her sex. 99 40 
A similar but rather more reluctant interpretation of Community Law was provided by 
37 Guild E The EC Directive on Race Discrimination: Surprises, Possibilities and Limitations, 
Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 29 No. 4 December 2000 pp 416423 p 420 3S Sexual orientation was not included within the ambit of Section I of the SDA 1975, Article 141 
of the EC Treaty or Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive EEC 76/207 39 [1998] IRLR510 
40 It was the judiciary's view that homosexuality derived from someone's sexual proclivity rather 
than their gender and only gender-based discrimination was acceptable for comparison in sex 
discrimination cases. 
the ECJ in Grant v South West Trains 41 
Despite the fact that the European Convention of Human Rights became part of 
United Kingdom law with the passing of the Human Fights Act 1998 (HRA) 42 
attempts to broaden the impact of domestic legislation though the application of 
human rights to provide protection to victims of discrimination or harassment on 
ground of sexual orientation have been largely unsuccessful. 43 
In the case of Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield School 44 the applicant was a 
lesbian teacher who regularly experienced homophobic verbal taunts by pupils at the 
school where she taught. When she complained she was provided with very little 
support by the school management and she was eventually obliged to take early 
retirement to escape the harassment. She brought a complaint of sex discrimination 
but the House of Lords dismissed her appeal. They compared the treatment that Ms 
Pearce received with that which would have been directed at a hypothetical 
homosexual male and decided they would have both suffered a similar fate. On this 
reasoning there was no inequality of treatment. 
The need for the EU to legislate in this area was apparent and in December 1999 the 
European Commission introduced the European Employment Directive (Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC) which amongst other things proposed that discrimination on 
the ground of sexual orientation should be treated as unlawful. The United Kingdom 
Government have now introduced the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
41 1998] IRLR 206 at p218, this reasoning was followed in Rv Secretary ofStatefor Defence ex 
parte, Perkins (NO2) (1998] IRLR 508 
42 Ewing, K The Human Rights Act and Labour Law, Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 27, 
No 4, December 1998 pp 276 
43 Secretary of State for Defence v McDonald [2001 ] IRLR 431 
[20031 UKHL 34 
Regulations 45 to fully implement the Directive into UK domestic law. This has had a 
direct impact on the rights of victims of sexual orientation discrimination. It makes it 
unlawful to discriminate by way of harassment or other discriminatory treatment on 
the ground of sexual orientation. 
Sexual orientation is widely defined under Regulation 2 of the Regulations to mean 
orientation towards persons of the same sex (homosexuals) of the opposite sex 
(heterosexuals) and persons of the same sex and the opposite sex (bisexuals). This 
means that homosexuals' heterosexuals and bisexuals are protected under the 
legislation. 46 The Regulations provide protection against direct and indirect 
discrimination and victimisation. 
The definition of harassment in regulation 5 is similar to that found in other new 
legislation making it unlawful for A to engage in unwanted conduct on the ground of 
sexual orientation which has the purpose or effect of violating B's dignity or creating 
an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. 
Under Section 6(3) "it unlawful for an employer ... to subject to 
harassment a person 
whom he employs or who has applied to him for employment. " 
These regulations will provide much needed protection to employees in this position 
47 and the broad definition of harassment and category of comparator should ensure 
that it suitably comprehensive in its coverage. It will be interesting to see if these 
43 Sl 2003/1661 
46 "They cover discrimination on grounds of perceived as well as actual sexual orientation O. e. 
assuming - correctly or incorrectly - that someone is lesbian, gay, heterosexual or bisexual) 
The Regulations also cover association, i. e. being discriminated against on grounds of the 
sexual orientation of those with whom you associate (for example, friends and/or family). 
DTI Website 
47 Regulation 6 sets out the types of activities that will be treated as unlawful under the regulations 
which are largely identical those under section 4 of the RRA and section 6 of the SDA. 
Dismissal of a person includes expiry of a fixed term contract or constructive dismissal. 
Regulations can overcome some of the practical obstacles faced by employees in this 
position (e. g. homosexual employees' reluctance to admit to their sexual orientation). 
Harassment on the Ground of Disability 
Where an employee suffered harassment because of their disability and it could be 
established it was to their detriment then this was contrary to section 4 (2) (d) of the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995. The disabled employee would need to show that 
their disability fell within the meaning of the definition of disability in Section I of 
the Act. 4s As there is no opportunity to bring a claim for indirect discrimination under 
the Act the disabled employee being harassed would need to show that they were the 
victim of direct discrimination or that the employer had failed to make a reasonable 
adjustment, under section 6 of the Act, to allow them to carry out their job. The most 
obvious and effective adjustment would be to change the nature or place of the job to 
avoid the harassment or transfer or dismiss the harasser having followed the 
appropriate disciplinary procedure. The question is would the employer have treated 
someone else to whom the material reason (physical or mental impairment) does not 
apply in the same way. There are certain significant differences between this 
legislation and the other equality statutes. 
48 Further definition is provided in various guidance notes 
This is not true of the law dealing with harassment on the ground of disability 
following the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 
2003/1673 which largely follows the model used in other legislation and states that: 
(1) For the purposes of this Part, a person subjects a disabled person to harassment 
where, for a reason which relates to the disabled person's disability, he engages in 
unwanted conduct which has the purpose or effect of - 
(a) violating the disabled person's dignity, or 
(b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment 
for him. 
(2) Conduct shall be regarded as having the effect referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) 
of subsection (1) only if, having regard to all the circumstances, including in 
particular the perception of the disabled person, it should reasonably be considered as 
having that effect. 
While the introduction of a specific statutory tort to deal with harassment should 
make it easier to establish a case the Regulations makes it clear that the reason for the 
harassment must relate to the person's disability otherwise it is not unlawful. If there a 
number of reasons for the harassment, with disability only being one of them, it might 
be difficult to show that there has been a breach. 
Harassment on the Ground of Religion or Belief 
There was very little protection available to victims of harassment or discrimination 
on the ground of religion or belief prior to Employment Equality Religion or Belief 
Regulations 2003.49 What protection there was arose under the Race Relations Act 
1976 where certain categories of religious groups persuaded courts and tribunals to 
widely interpret the terminology used in the statute to cover their interests. In Mandla 
v Lee 50 the House of Lords defined in some detail what characteristics apply to an 
ethnic group (including a common language and religion) as defined in the RRA and 
decided that Sikhs fell within this term and were protected by the statute. 51 
There were various religious groups that weren't as fortunate such as Rastafarians, 
Muslims and Jehovah's Witnesses. 
As a result of the recent legislation all religious groups are potentially covered as well 
as groups or individuals that hold a strong deeply held belief about something. 
In common with other new pieces of equality legislation specific provision is made 
for a tort of harassment. 
The definition of the tenns religion or belief are set out in Regulation 2, the 
interpretation section, as follows: 
(1) In these Regulations, "religion or belief' means any religion, religious 
belief, or similar philosophical belief 
With respect to the tort of harassment this is defined in a similar way as in the 
other statutes. 52 
49 SI 2003/1660 
50 (1983) ICR 3 85 
51 Gypsies were given similar protection in CRE v Dutton (1989] IRLR 8 and Jews in the case of 
Scide v Gillete Industries Ltd. ( 1980) IRLR 427 
52 Regulation 5. - (1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person ("A") subjects another 
person ("B") to harassment where, on grounds of religion or belief, A engages in unwanted conduct 
which has the purpose or effect of - 
(a) violating B'S dignity; or 
(b) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. 
(2) Conduct shall be regarded as having the effect specified in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) only if, having 
regard to all the circumstances, including in particular the perception of B, it should reasonably be 
considered as having that effect. 
The most contentious aspect of the Regulations relates to genuine occupational 
requirements. 
Under Regulation 7 the genuine occupational requirement is stated in broad terms and 
allows employers to refuse employment to those people that do not conforin to their 
expectations regarding religion or belief. The categories of person that could be 
denied employment because of this requirement are homosexuals or lesbians. Their 
lifestyle and beliefs are likely to be regarded by some religious groups as the 
antithesis of their own religious ethos. 
Regulation 7 (1) states that "in relation to discrimination falling within regulation 3 
(discrimination on grounds of religion or belief) - (2) This paragraph applies where, 
having regard to the nature of the employment or the context in which it is carried 
out - 
(a) being of a particular religion or belief is a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement; 
(b) it is proportionate to apply that requirement in the particular case; and 
(c) either - 
(i) the person to whom that requirement is applied does not meet it, or 
(ii) the employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable for him 
not to be satisfied, that that person meets it, and this paragraph applies whether or not 
the employer has an ethos based on religion or belief. 53 
33 (3) This paragraph applies where an employer has an ethos based on religion or belief and, 
having regard to that ethos and to the nature of the employment or the context in which it is carried 
out - 
The onus is on the employer to show that the GOR applies and that it is proportionate 
because of the nature of a particular job. 54 
Harassment on the Ground of Age 
There is no legislation in place at the moment to deal with this type of harassment 
because the legislation implementing the Directive does not need to be in place until 
2006. The indications are that it will follow the model used in other areas of 
discrimination law and harassment on this ground will be prohibited by statute. 
Unlike age legislation in the United States which only applies to workers over forty 55 
these regulations will apply to workers of all ages. 
Vicarious Liability 
Under the equality laws of the United Kingdom employers can be vicariously liable 
for the discriminatory acts of supervisors, colleagues, and even third parties. 
Importantly, they can be vicariously liable for acts of harassment by employees 
perpetrated against other employees inside and outside of the workplace. 56 
(a) being of a particular religion or belief is a genuine occupational requirement for the job; 
(b) it is proportionate to apply that requirement in the particular case; and 
(c) either - 
(i) the person to whom that requirement is applied does not meet it, or 
(ii) the employer is not satisfied, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable for him not to be satisfied, 
that that person meets it. 
54 A chaplain in a hospital or a prison could be an example. 
55 Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 
56 The rules relating to vicarious liability of employers can be found in s. 41 of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975, s. 32 of the Race Relations Act 1976, section 58 of the Disability 
"anything done by a person in the course of his employment shall be treated for the 
purposes of this act as done by his employer as well as by him, whether or not it was 
done with the employer's knowledge or approval. " 
The judicial interpretation of the words in the equality statutes 'anything done in the 
course of his employment' (e. g. section 32 (1) of the RRA) changed following the 
landmark decision of Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd 57 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the interpretation that should be given to the 
phrase 'in the course of employment' in discrimination cases should be decided by 
tribunals applying a commonsense and everyday meaning of the term. 
"Tribunals are free and are indeed bound, to interpret the ordinarily, and readily 
understandable, words, 'in the course of his employment' in the sense in which every 
layman would understand them. " 58 
LJ Waite usefully gave examples of the kind of factors to be considered when 
deciding whether an employee was acting in the course of their employment. 
Such as whether or not the employee is within or outside the workplace, in or out 
of uniform and in or out of rest-breaks when the incident occurred. 59 
In all of the relevant provisions of the equality legislation mentioned above 60 a 
defence is provided for employers. "In proceedings brought under this Act against 
Discrimination Act 1995, Regulation 22 of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations and Regulation 22 of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003. 
57 ( 1997] ICR 254 
58 lbid P 265 
59 [bid p 272 
any person in respect of an act alleged to have been done by an employee of his it 
shall be a defence for that person to prove that he took such steps as were reasonably 
practicable to prevent the employee from doing that act, or from doing in the course 
of his employment acts of that description. " 
In the case of harassment once it has been shown that an employee has been the 
victim of harassment and that it was perpetrated by the harasser in the course of their 
employment, then it is up to the employer to show they have taken steps to prevent 
the discriminatory behaviour. 
"The burden of proof is on the employer to show that he has taken such steps. " 61 
The EC Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment recommended that for the 
defence to be established, not only should there be a policy, but it should be 
communicated effectively to all employees and there should be provision for 
training of managers and supervisors. 62 These steps are also recommended by 
the Codes of Practice of the Equal Opportunities Commission and the 
Commission for Racial Equality. With respect to harassment employers will 
be expected to have taken positive steps to avoid the situation which could 
include having a harassment (or dignity at work) policy, informing and 
training employees, providing counselling for victims of harassment and 
disciplining the harassers. 
60 Supra 56 
Hemming J, Discrimination in the Workplace: A Practical Guide, John Wiley & Sons, 
Chichester, 1997, p 170 
62 European Commission, Code of Practice on the Protection of the Dignity of Women and 
Men at Work (92/13 I/EEQ, OJ (1992) L49/5,5(A) (ii) 
Vicarious Liability for Harassment Perpetrated Outside the Workplace 
In the case of Stubbs v The Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police and others a 
policewoman was sexually harassed on a number of occasions by a male officer in a 
public house after work. The Employment Tribunal held that the incidents were in the 
course of employment, and the Chief Constable was held vicariously liable 
They took the view that; "the pub incidents were connected to the work and the 
workplace. They would not have happened but for the applicant's work. Work related 
social functions are an extension of employment and they could see no reason to 
restrict the course of employment to purely what goes on in the workplace. " 
This conclusion was affirmed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal who stated that the 
initial tribunal, "were in the best possible position to judge whether, despite the fact 
that the first incident occurred 'in a pub' it was nonetheless to be regarded as part of 
the employment relationship. " 63 
Employer Liability for Harassment by a Third Party 
An employer not only has a duty to protect an employee from the discriminatory acts 
of supervisors and fellow employees but also has a duty to protect an employee from 
harassment by third parties. 
"This duty clearly arises in the employment context whether the harasser is a 
customer, a member of the public, or anyone else who comes into contact with the 
employee while she is at work. " 64 
63 Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Stubbs ( 1999] IRLR 8 1, EAT 
64 Townshcnd-Smith R J, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Cavendish Publishing 
Ltd, London, 1998, p 250 
A good example is the case of Burton and Rhule v De Vere Hotels Ltd 65 where two 
waitresses of Afro-Caribbean origin were made the object of racially and sexually 
offensive remarks by the comedian, Mr Bernard Manning, and other guests at an 
after-dinner speech in the hotel in which they worked. The waitresses brought a 
complaint of racial harassment against her employer under s. 4 (2) (c) of the Race 
Relations Act 1976. 
The Burton case went on appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal who stated that 
the question for the tribunal was, "whether the event in question was something which 
was sufficiently under the control of the employer that he could, by the application of 
good employment practice, have prevented the harassment or reduced the extent of 
it. " 
In Go Kiclz Go Ltd v Bourdouane 66 an employer was held liable for the sexual 
harassment of a nursery teacher by the father of one of the children she was looking 
after. 
The rules relating to vicarious liability will apply to all the types of discrimination or 
harassment claims mentioned above. 
Legal Redress for Bullying 
The second area of dignity at work I want to cover in this article is bullying. 
While this a widespread activity with serious consequences for the victim including 
adversely affecting their dignity at work it has been given little attention under 
65 (1997) ICR I 
(k See Equal Opportunities Review, Number 70 1996, p 49 
employment law. The legal protection available to those unfortunate enough to 
experience bullying is limited in its coverage and ill-defined. 67 
Recent research was undertaken by the journal Personnel Today 68and the Andrea 
Adams Trust into the level of bullying amongst HR professionals and it was found 
that more than three quarters of the 1000 respondents had experienced bullying. 
Bullying has been defined as "persistent, offensive, abusive, intimidating, malicious 
or insulting behaviour, abuse of power or unfair penal sanctions which makes the 
recipient upset, threatened, humiliated or vulnerable, which undermines their self- 
confidence and may cause them to suffer stress. " 69 
Legal Redress for Bullying 0 
Where an employer breaches an implied duty in the contract of employment of an 
employee such as the duty to maintain trust and confidence this can represent a 
repudiation of his contract of employment and give rise to an action for breach of 
contract. Under the law of tort, employees whose bullying behaviour leads to other 
employees experiencing physical or mental hann are likely to be held personally 
liable for a breach of their duty of care and employers that tolerate or condone acts of 
bullying could be vicariously liable for their actions. 70 
Given that in the absence of any aspect of inequality these are the most likely heading 
off claim it is important to mention each of these remedies in turn. 
67 Supra 5 
63 Thomas, D HR the victim as bullying takes hold in UK business Personnel Today 28.09.04 
www. personneltoday. com 
69 Taken from Guidelines on Bullying produced by the Manufacturing, Science and Finance 
Union (MSF) 
70 Waters v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (2000) IRLR 720 HL 
Breach of Contract 
Where bullying or harassment is perpetrated against an employee by his supervisor or 
manager then it is likely to represent a breach of the employer's duty to maintain their 
employee's trust and confidence "There is implied into a contract of employment a 
term that the employers will not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct 
themselves in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the 
I 
relationship of trust and confidence between employer and employee.,, 71 
In Courtalds v Andrews 72 a supervisor was told by his boss 'you can't do the bloody 
job' and this was deemed to be a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. 
In The Post Office v Roberts 73 it was held the Employment Appeal Tribunal that it is 
not necessary to show that the breach of this implied term involved deliberation, 
intent or bad faith. 
The conduct of the parties has to be looked at as a whole and its cumulative impact 
assessed. 
in BG plc v O"Brien 74 it was decided that where an employer is behaving in an 
arbitrary, capricious or totally unreasonable manner to an employee in exercise of its 
contractual discretion this is a breach of their contract 75 
71 J Browne-Wilkinson in Woods vWM Car Services (Peterborough) Limited [1981] ICR 666 
EAT 
[ 19791 IRLR 84, EAT 
73 1980] ICR 347 EAT 
74 (200 1] IRLR 406 
75 See Clark v BET [ 1997) IRLR 348 
What is significant for victims of bullying or harassment is that following the case of 
Malik v BCCI 76 it is not necessary for the behaviour complained of to be targeted at 
the victim and an employee need not know of the employer's trust destroying conduct 
while he is still employed. This could mean that not just victims but witnesses to 
bullying incidents can claim there contract has been breached and even where victims 
are not fully aware of the extent of bullying or harassment towards them during their 
employment they can still bring a claim if they become aware of it after they have left 
their employment. 77 
The Malik case also extended the duty of trust and confidence to include a duty of 
cooperation taking the form of a positive obligation on the employer to take all steps 
which are necessary to achieve the purposes of the employment relationship. 
In a case involving bullying and harassment Reed and Bull information Systems Ltd v 
Stedman 78 a secretary was bullied and subjected to sexual comments and innuendoes 
by her boss, the marketing manager. She brought a claim for sex discrimination 
arguing that the discriminatory behaviour led to her constructive dismissal by the 
employer. It was recognised that such behaviour represents a breach of the implied 
term of trust and confidence but the matter was dealt with under the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975. "The tribunal had not erred in finding that a course of 
unwanted and bullying behaviour by the applicant's manager, which amounted to 
sexual harassment was a breach of the duty of trust and confidence. When the 
employee was forced to leave her job as a result this amounted to constructive 
dismissal and accordingly was an act of discrimination within the meaning of s 6(2) of 
the Sex Discrimination Act. " 
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Under equality law there is now a right to bring an action for discriminatory acts perpetrated 
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after the contract of employment is finished. 
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In Waltons & Morse v Dorrington 79 it was decided that there is a duty to provide and 
maintain a working environment which is reasonably suitable for the performance by 
their employees of their contractual duties. The following quote surnmarises the 
impact this decision could have on this area of law. "The implied duty to provide a 
reasonably suitable working environment also can be regarded as encompassing a 
duty to protect the employee from violence or from harassment, whether sexual or 
racial, or in the form of general bullying. " 80 
While there is clearly scope for bringing a claim for breach of contract based on 
bullying behaviour or harassment representing a breach of an implied term 81 the 
employee is more likely to bring an action under the law of tort 
Tort Actions 
A perpetrator of bullying and harassment may be personally liable for his actions to 
the victim for breach of their duty of care or in serious cases of physical bullying for 
the civil action for assault. It is more likely however, that the victim will sue his 
employer in tort on the basis of his breach of their duty of care or his vicarious 
liability. 
Duty of care for the safety of all employees 
An employer is under a duty to provide all his employees on an individual basis with 
a safe system of work including a safe working environment, adequate safety 
79 1997] IRLR 488 
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91 As well as those mentioned there is a implied duty on the part of the employer to take care for 
the safety of his employees 
instruction and supervision and safe and competent fellow employees. Where bullying 
occurs it can lead to an oppressive working environment that has an adverse affect on 
the health of targeted employees. If inadequate supervision is provided this could lead 
to an employer's liability, as would a failure to alert staff to the activities of known 
bullies. 
There is a duty on the part of the employer to discipline staff that is a danger to the 
health and safety of his other employees and this could extend to their dismissal. 
In Walker v. Northumberland County Council 82 it was decided by the High Court 
that the employer's duty of care could be extended beyond protecting employees from 
physical harm to risks to their mental health caused by the working environment. 
In an unreported case Ms Noonan a council worker brought an action against 
Liverpool City Council in 1999 and claimed that as a result of being subjected to 
bullying, intimidation and harassment for several years her employer had breached 
their duty of care. This case was settled before the court hearing her employer paying 
an out of court settlement of E84,000. This and other cases against public authorities 
(usually unreported) concerning bullying and harassment established that a duty of 
care exists on the part of an employer to ensure that this behaviour is not perpetrated 
against his employees. 
In Waters v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 83 Ms Waters brought a 
claim for negligence against her employer and an action for breach of contract 
because of the bullying and harassment she had experienced. 
Lord Slynn, in the House of Lords summarised the case as "one of negligence - the 
employer failed to exercise due care to look after his employee. Generically many of 
the acts alleged can be seen as a form of bullying - the employer or those to whom he 
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delegated responsibility for running his organisation, should have taken steps to stop 
it, to protect the employee from it. " 
This decision represents judicial recognition at the highest level that bullying or 
harassment is a ground for an action in tort and for breach of contract. 
Equality Claims 
In the event that the bullying is of a racist or sexist nature or directed at someone 
because of their sexual orientation, religion or belief or disability then the employer 
and the employee responsible for the behaviour could be treated as acting unlawfully 
under the equality legislation. 84 
Here, as bullying is likely to be regarded as a form of harassment for the purposes of 
the legislation the same evidential requirements as relates to harassment will apply. 
Namely the employee would need to show that the bullying behaviour would not have 
been directed at them, but for the particular ground. They would also have to show in 
cases dealing with harassment on the grounds of sex, religion or sexual orientation 
that another employee of a different category (e. g. male, Christian or heterosexual) 
would not be treated in the same way. 
As an indicator of how these cases are dealt with under equality law the following 
examples are given from cases involving sex and race discrimination. 
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In D Watt (Scotland) Ltd v Reid 85 a young male worker in a shellfish factory in 
Shetland was subject to bullying by the predominantly female workforce over a two 
month period. He was eventually forced to give up his job and successfully claimed 
sex discrimination. 
Two cases were recently pursued against the Ford Motor Co. for racist bullying. In the 
first case, brought by an employee Sukhjit Parmar, he won his case for race 
discrimination and an undisclosed out-of-court settlement in November 2000.86 In the 
second case an employee Shinder Nagra established that he had been subjected to 
racist bullying and abuse by colleagues over a six year period. His employer was 
accused of being institutionally racist and was held liable for race discrimination with 
an award of E149,000 being made against him. 
In another case Tania Clayton, a female fire fighter, suffered sever6 depression when 
she was bullied and harassed by her male colleagues over a period of 15 months 
She received an out of court settlement of E200,000 from her employer following a 
claim for sex discrimination. 87 
Where there is no discriminatory element to bullying then the victim will have to 
resort to civil actions under the common law or a combination of actions under statute 
and the common law that are unintended to provide a remedy and because of that in 
many instances ineffective. 
Other Forms of Legal Protection for Bullying and Harassment 
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What follows is a brief outline of the alternatives to the forms of legal redress for 
victims of bullYing and harassment outlined above. 
Under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 there is civil action for harassment. 
The term harassment is defined in section I and is broad enough to cover both types 
of behaviour. The significance of the Act is that it provides for an injunction to be 
granted for breach of the civil provisions which could be utilised by the victim to 
bring about cessation of the behaviour. 88 
Other criminal and civil actions that could apply include an action for breach of 
contract on termination of employment under statute, 89 an action for unfair dismissal 
90 or constructive dismissal 91 and a criminal action for assault, threat or breach of the 
peace. 
An action for could arise against public bodies for breach of the Human Rights Act 
1998, particularly under Articles 4,8 and 10 of the European Convention. 
Bullying was considered in the context of human rights cases where a claim by 
homosexuals in the armed forces that bullying by their superiors was a breach of their 
human rights was upheld as a breach of Article 8 (the right to respect for a person's 
private and family life). "' 
It is not appropriate to give these areas of legal protection detailed consideration here 
because they are dealt with elsewhere " and in the interests of brevity this article has 
There arc two criminal offences provided under the Act, Harassment and Putting in Fear of 
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Violence %% hich could apply to serious acts of bullying and harassment. 
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applying to Scotland) 
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restricted its attention to the most common avenues of redress for victims of 
harassment and bullying. 
Conclusion 
If it is accepted that the employees have a right to dignity at work that must be 
protected 94 and that the behaviour on the part of the employer that is most likely to 
compromise this right is harassment or bullying, then it is of clear importance that 
legal mechanisms are in place to protect employees against this behaviour. 
The question is, does the law as it stands offer sufficient protection? Given recent 
changes in employment law it probably does, although there are undoubtedly aspects 
of the legal rules that could still be improved. 
Now, if harassment or bullying is based on one of the grounds in the equality 
legislation 95 then the victims could have a basis for claiming legal redress. 
They may in the process face certain evidential hurdles, including showing a causal 
link between the type of discrimination and the behaviour complained of and 
establishing that the effect of the behaviour on them is sufficiently detrimental to 
merit legal protection. 
The fact that all the equality statutes now have broad and inclusive definitions of 
harassment including fon-nal recognition of the need to consider the impact of the 
behaviour on the victim, can only make things easier for applicants in these cases. 
The use of equality law in its present form is not without it critics. 
"We must doubt the effectiveness of those elaborate laws against discrimination in 
employment. The legislation relies upon individual civil claims for compensation for 
94 In Malik and Mahmud v BCCI SA 1997 IRLR 462 HL it was held that the employee was 
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losses caused by breach of an individual's rights as the principal enforcement 
mechanism, a strategy which... is generally weak. " 96 
Despite these reservations there is, in this %%Titer's view, in this context at least, some 
justification for arguing that instead of having a number of very similar definitions of 
harassment in a variety of statutes there would, in the interests of expediency and 
simplicity, be strong justification for having one statute covering all the existing areas 
of harassment. To get around some of the inadequacies identified in the present legal 
system the statute could also specifically include, protection from more general forms 
of harassment 9and bullying within its remit. 
The obvious title for such a statute based on earlier discussion would be the Dignity at 
Work Act. 
In the absence of such a move the legal protection for both types of victim (and in 
particular victims of bullying) %,. ill continue to be imprecise and in certain respects 
inaccessible. 
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